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Psi is the phenomenon of apparently responding to or receiving information by 
means other than the recognised senses. Psi information may influence human 
behaviour, without the individual intending this or even being aware of it. This thesis 
seeks to investigate nonintentional behavioural responses to psi. We present five 
empirical studies that investigated nonintentional behavioural responses to psi 
information. In each study, the psi information was hidden from participants, in that 
the participants neither had sensory access to it, nor did they know that it existed.  
Two different combinations of psi information and a behavioural response were 
examined. The first was the influence of hidden psi information on psychological 
task performance. The second was the influence of covert, remote observation by 
hidden observers on the social facilitation effect. In all the studies, the effects of 
individual differences in participants’ personalities were also considered. 
In Experiment 1 we investigated whether hidden targets influenced participants’ 
judgements of the lengths of lines. There was no overall psi effect, but we found a 
replication of a response bias effect and a significant correlation between psi and 
participants’ extraversion. In Experiment 2 we investigated whether hidden targets 
influenced participants’ speed on a maths task. There was no overall psi effect and no 
correlations between personality and psi scores. 
We reviewed previous research literature on social facilitation from the novel angle 
of investigating whether being watched can, in and of itself, lead to the social 
facilitation effect. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 developed the paradigm of testing for a 
social facilitation effect from remote observation, investigating whether remote 
observation leads to the same behavioural changes as knowingly being observed by a 
physically present person. We compared participants’ performance on psychological 
tasks under different observation conditions: alone, remotely observed by a hidden 
observer, and observed by a physically present observer. The expected social 
facilitation effect was not found in these experiments, leading to a series of 
improvements to the sampling, methodology, and tasks over the course of these 
experiments. As the social facilitation effect from a physically present observer was 
not reliably replicated, these experiments were not conclusive tests of whether there 
is a social facilitation effect from remote observation. However, there was an 
indication in Experiment 3 that remote observation does not exert a significant 
behavioural effect. 
Considered together, our studies explored novel approaches to examining 
nonintentional behavioural responses to psi. The significant correlation between 
participants’ extraversion and psi is, to our knowledge, the first time this effect has 
been found in a nonintentional psi experiment. This, and the replication of the 
response bias effect, represent important advances in parapsychology. Our 
experiments are also the first to test the assumption, inherent in many research 
designs, that covert observation does not affect participants’ behaviour. Overall, our 
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This thesis seeks to investigate whether information that cannot be accessed by the 
recognised senses can affect human behaviour, even without one trying to respond to 
this extrasensory information. There is much more information in existence than 
could possibly be presented to our senses, and it might be the case that we have 
psychic ability that enables us to respond to information or influences beyond our 
sensory reach. This thesis takes the working hypothesis that people respond to 
extrasensory information all the time, without any attempt to make this happen, and 
usually without awareness that this is happening. Given that, this thesis seeks to 
investigate aspects of nonintentional behavioural responses to purportedly psychic 
information.  
In the studies presented in this thesis, two kinds of extrasensory information or 
influence are tested. Both kinds of extrasensory information and influence are hidden 
from the participants, i.e., participants have no sensory access to them and do not 
even know that they exist. In these studies, we investigate the extent to which hidden 
information and hidden influences might affect participants’ behaviour. The first 
combination of hidden information and a behavioural response explores whether 
hidden information affects participants’ performance on psychological experiment 
tasks. In Experiments 1 and 2, the hidden information is a set of specifications for 
how participants might perform their tasks, relating to the answers they might give 
and the time they might take. In addition, in Experiments 1 and 2, we also investigate 
how psychic influences on behaviour might be influenced by participants’ 
personality. Personality and psychic ability has been well researched in the context 






not been examined as fully in experiments in nonintentional psychic ability. It is 
hoped that the effects of personality might reveal aspects of how psychic ability 
functions.  
The second combination of a hidden influence and a behavioural response introduces 
a social element. The hidden influence relates to participants being watched 
unawares, under circumstances that preclude any sensory way of knowing that 
someone is watching, such as not seeing the observer or being told about him or her. 
People’s ability psychically to detect being watched: remote observation, has 
previously been researched (see Chapter 6). This remote observation influence is 
paired with a well researched effect of observation on task performance: the social 
facilitation effect (also reviewed in Chapter 6), bringing together a psychic influence 
and a behavioural response in a novel combination. The social facilitation effect 
indicates that in psychological tasks, participants’ behaviour is affected by 
knowingly being watched by a physically present observer. In Experiments 3, 4, and 
5, we ask whether observation that one can only be aware of or influenced by 
psychically leads to the same behavioural changes as being observed by someone 
known to be physically present. If so, this might have important implications for 
experimental psychology research that relies on covert observation, and might shed 
light on other forms of unintentional communication and influence in experimental 
situations.  
This chapter introduces the basis for the experiments presented in this thesis. Firstly, 
we outline what parapsychology is, explain why it is worthy of further study, and 
define the terms used in parapsychology. We then explain the methods of 
experimental parapsychology research, along with a brief synopsis of the evidence 
that has been found so far, and the theories that support the experiments presented in 







1.2. What is Parapsychology, and Why Should it be Studied? 
Human experience includes phenomena that do not seem to be explained by sensory 
knowledge, delusions, or logical induction. These include, but are not limited to, 
apparently knowing that something will happen before it does, thinking or feeling 
another person’s thoughts or feelings, or being able to influence events in the outside 
world through the power of the mind. These events appear to involve a direct 
interaction between the mind and the external environment that is not mediated by 
normal sensory or motor means. These events and experiences have been called 
paranormal, literally meaning ‘beyond normal’, or psychic, literally meaning ‘of the 
mind’ (G. A. Miller, 2006). Both these terms refer to phenomena that are 
theoretically impossible, and beyond the currently accepted range of human or 
animal capabilities (Thalbourne, 2003). This is a negative definition: It sets the 
boundaries of what paranormal and psychic are not, rather than what they are. 
Ostensibly paranormal events are commonly experienced: Surveys have found that 
up to three-quarters of the general population believe that they have had such 
experiences (Broughton, 1991). These events therefore warrant investigation as they 
are part of human experience and are not yet fully understood. It is also important to 
conduct research to discern whether such experiences are genuinely paranormal or 
psychic, or whether a normal explanation is possible. Research is also important 
because ostensibly psychic experiences are controversial, and evoke extreme 
emotional reactions of both belief and scepticism (Broughton, 1991; Freedman, 
2005). Impartial and open minded research is therefore vital. This research is 
parapsychology: the scientific study of “apparent anomalies of behaviour and 
experience that exist apart from currently known explanatory mechanisms that 
account for organism-environment and organism-organism information and influence 
flow” (Parapsychological Association 1989, pp. 394 – 395). Although this is also a 
negative definition, it is more delimiting than that given for ‘paranormal’ above, as it 
specifies that parapsychology does not aim to investigate every phenomenon that is 






relating to anomalous information transfer and influence. These areas are collectively 
called psi phenomena.  
1.3. Psi Phenomena and Terminology 
The term psi is used to denote the unknown factor in anomalous experiences. It has 
been defined as “a correspondence between the cognitive or physiological activity of 
an organism in its external environment that is anomalous to generally accepted 
basic limiting principles of nature” (Palmer, 1986, p. 139). This is again a negative 
definition, setting the boundaries of what psi is not. This definition can be criticised 
because it does not include any reference to behavioural effects of psi, and 
behavioural effects are relevant (as discussed below). Psi is also negatively 
operationalized: It is only when all normal methods of information transfer or 
influence are excluded that we can attribute anomalous events to psi. Psi was 
originally proposed as an atheoretical neutral term that did not presuppose a 
mechanism for psychic events (Thouless, 1942). It is important that the term psi does 
not imply how psychic events might happen, because there is no agreed-upon theory 
(Irwin, 1999). Although it is common to speak of psi as though it is a mechanism or a 
process, it is merely a construct for that which is not, or not yet, understood in 
anomalous events (Broughton, 1991). Furthermore, the existence of psi has not been 
conclusively established; the existence of psi is taken as a working hypothesis, 
referred to as the psi hypothesis. We use the term psi in this thesis with the caveat 
that the existence of psi is, as yet, uncertain.   
Psi phenomena can be categorised by whether they refer to ostensibly anomalous 
information transfer: extrasensory perception (ESP), or ostensibly anomalous 
influence: psychokinesis (PK). ESP is the main focus of this thesis.  
ESP is defined as: the apparent ability of a human being to acquire 
information without using the ordinary senses of the body and without 






sensory channels (at least as we understand them today); perception can refer 
to anything from vividly “seeing” or dreaming an event to having a vague 
hunch or even obtaining information that never reaches one’s consciousness 
but in some way affects his or her behaviour. (Broughton, 1991, p. 33). 
This is a comprehensive definition that covers the different levels of awareness of psi 
information that the recipient may have; this is a key concept for this thesis which we 
will return to below. This definition can be criticised, however, for omitting that ESP 
can have an effect on the physiology of the recipient organism (e.g., Radin, 2004). 
ESP can be further subdivided by the perceived source of the psi information. If this 
is apparently from another organism, such as ostensibly knowing another person’s 
thoughts, this is telepathy. If the source of the psi information is apparently an object 
or event, such as seemingly locating a lost object through psi, this is clairvoyance. In 
experimental situations it is extremely difficult to differentiate between telepathy and 
clairvoyance, and the term general extrasensory perception (GESP) is used to 
indicate that both telepathy and clairvoyance might be involved. ESP can also appear 
to occur backwards in time. This is precognition, defined as awareness of a future 
event that cannot be deduced from present knowledge (Thalbourne, 2003). PK, while 
not the main focus of the thesis, is an important concept in understanding research 
presented later herein. Psychokinesis literally means ‘mind movement’, and is 
defined as “the apparent ability of a human being to affect objects, events, or even 
people around him or her without using the usual intervention by the muscular 
system. …often described today as the direct influence of consciousness on physical 
systems.” (Broughton, 1991, p. 35). The difference between ESP and PK is in the 
perceived direction of information flow or influence. In ESP, information apparently 
comes into someone’s mind; in PK an influence is apparently sent out. In practice it 
is difficult to distinguish between ESP and PK, just as it is difficult to differentiate 
between telepathy and clairvoyance. Consider, for example, the case of a man who 
becomes aware that he is being looked at by an unseen person, without having 
received any normal sensory information relating to being watched: remote 






looking at him is thinking? Or is it clairvoyance, anomalous awareness of the event 
of being looked at? Alternatively, it could be PK, if the observer anomalously 
influenced him to become aware of being seen. These distinctions therefore break 
down under certain situations, but are still the main classifications of psi phenomena 
(Irwin, 1999). 
1.4. Methods of Investigating Psi 
This section describes the main types of research used to investigate psi. In the early 
days of parapsychology, researchers collected case studies and anecdotal accounts of 
spontaneous ostensible psi occurrences (Broughton, 1991). Spontaneous cases are 
important in illustrating the role of psi and its processes in real life, unrestricted by 
experimental conditions (L. E. Rhine, 1978), but are at risk of artefacts that prevent 
them counting as proof for psi. These include selective memory (i.e., forgetting or 
exaggerating aspects of the memory); self-deceptions (whether intentional or a 
product of interpretation); and other unknown confounding factors that cannot be 
controlled for (Morris, 1978). Researchers who used case studies relied on the 
honesty of the contributors, and selected only cases that had no apparent normal 
explanation (L. E. Rhine, 1978). This cannot eliminate instances of intentionally 
fraudulent reporting. Spontaneous case collections are also at risk of reporting biases. 
For example, people must first interpret an experience as being a psi event in order to 
report it. Secondly, as people are likely to report only instances when, for example, 
they experienced a precognitive impression that turned out to be true, spontaneous 
case collections will lack the many instances when such impressions were 
subsequently found to be false. Thus, we cannot rule out chance as an explanation for 
these spontaneous events. Lastly, many people would not have any opportunity to 
report their experiences to a parapsychologist, and so the sample of respondents 
might not be representative of the population as a whole (Morris, 1978). As 
spontaneous events occur in uncontrolled conditions it is impossible to rule out 






for psi, but they are useful for observing patterns across large numbers of reported 
psi experiences, which can then inform experimental hypotheses.  
Most present day parapsychological research is experimental (Broughton, 1991; 
Wolman, 1977). Experimental studies are able to tackle two main problems in testing 
for psi: firstly whether normal explanations for the phenomenon have been ruled out, 
and, secondly, whether or not an apparent psi effect is a chance occurrence. It is 
important to rule out all possible normal sensory explanations, because, as noted 
above, psi is negatively operationalised. It is only when all sensory means of 
information transfer or influence are prevented that an effect can be attributed to psi. 
If there is any chance that an experimental outcome is caused by something other 
than psi, then the psi hypothesis can neither be supported nor rejected. One problem 
inherent in eliminating sensory leakage, the accidental transfer of target information 
to the participant by non-psi means, is that people’s behaviour can be affected by 
sensory stimuli that they are not consciously aware of, such as extremely quiet 
sounds (Nash, 1986; Roney-Dougal, 1986; Wilson, 2002a, 2002b). Such subliminal 
influences can affect people’s behaviour in a similar way to psi (Roney-Dougal, 
1987). Therefore, leakage of any sensory information, including stimuli too weak to 
be consciously perceived, must be rigorously prevented to be able to claim that there 
was a psi effect. Sensory leakage can be obviated by physical and sensory separation 
of the recipient and the source of psi, (for a more in-depth consideration of these 
issues see Dalton, Morris, Delanoy, Radin, & Wiseman, 1996). Unintentional cueing 
of the participant can be prevented by keeping the experimenter blind to the psi 
manipulation during his or her contact time with the participant.  
Regarding ruling out chance as an explanation of experimental outcomes, it is 
possible to construct experimental situations in which the probability of an event 
occurring can be estimated. This is usually achieved in GESP tests by having both a 
psi target (the stimulus the participant tries to identify) and a pool of other potential 






(circle, cross, wavy lines, square, and star) (J. B. Rhine, 1934; J. B. Rhine & Pratt, 
1962). Participants try to select the target. A hit is achieved when participants select 
the actual target, and a miss occurs when they select one of the other items in the 
target pool. The overall hit rate is statistically compared to mean chance expectation 
(MCE): the expected hit rate if there were no psi effect and if chance were the only 
influence. One important consideration in establishing MCE is that targets are 
adequately randomised (see Chapter 2).  
Within experimental parapsychology there are two main approaches to gathering 
evidence for psi. Much of the early research was proof-oriented, and aimed to find 
evidence for the existence of psi (Thalbourne, 2003). Process-oriented research, 
which has predominantly superseded proof-oriented research (Broughton, 1991), 
aims to determine how psi is related to other psychological variables (Thalbourne, 
2003). Through process-oriented research the field of parapsychology hopes to gain 
more understanding about psi, and validate the psi hypothesis by linking psi to other 
known psychological phenomena (Rao, Kanthamani, & Palmer, 1990; Schmeidler, 
1988), by grounding the unknown (psi) in the known (such as personality variables). 
Process-oriented research asks whether, if psi exists, certain testable consequences 
can be found. The experiments in this thesis, in common with other process-oriented 
research, are carried out despite the caveat that the existence of psi is indeterminate, 
but aim to test the psi hypothesis further.  
1.5. Evidence for Psi  
Although the existence of psi is not certain, in this section we review experimental 
evidence for psi, using as an example the Ganzfeld studies: a high-profile and 
controversial paradigm with considerable research evidence. Participants in a 
Ganzfeld study are exposed to homogenous, un-patterned sensory stimulation while 
in a state of relaxation that aims to create a psi-conducive altered state of 






in which participants know the potential target identities (the geometric shapes) and 
choose between them: forced-choice design, in a Ganzfeld experiment participants 
do not know the potential target identities. Instead, participants free associate out 
loud: free-response design. The correspondences between what the participant says 
and each of the potential targets in the pool are rated by someone blind to the identity 
of the target. If the participant’s description most closely matches the target, a hit is 
scored. The Ganzfeld studies appear to demonstrate a strong psi effect, for example a 
hit rate of 47% was found in a creative sample, where 25% would be expected by 
chance (Dalton, 1997). Bem and Honorton (1994) contended that the Ganzfeld 
database provided substantial enough evidence for parapsychology to be recognised 
in general psychology.  
To assess whether an effect is genuine, meta-analyses are used to combine the results 
of multiple studies and estimate the overall effect size. However, there is a certain 
element of subjectivity in meta-analytic procedures, such as study selection and 
weighting. Bem and Honorton’s (1994) meta-analysis Ganzfeld studies found a mean 
hit rate of 35%, significantly above MCE of 25%, and a medium effect size. These 
Ganzfeld studies were strongly criticised by a sceptic (Hyman, 1985). Following a 
critical defence of the Ganzfeld findings, which found support for the psi hypothesis 
in the better controlled Ganzfeld studies (Honorton, 1985), guidelines for 
improvements to the Ganzfeld methodology were agreed between one of the lead 
Ganzfeld researchers and the sceptic (Hyman & Honorton, 1986). Data from 
Ganzfeld studies conducted in accordance with those guidelines found a hit rate 
significantly above MCE (Bem & Honorton, 1994; Honorton, Berger et al., 1990). 
Bem and Honorton concluded that this was strong support for the psi hypothesis and 
the efficacy of the Ganzfeld methodology. This was challenged by a subsequent 
meta-analysis of 30 more recent studies; this found a null effect size (Milton & 
Wiseman, 1999). Milton and Wiseman discussed whether the previous meta-analysis 
findings were spurious, or whether some of the previous studies had been conducted 






was not strong evidence for psi. Milton and Wiseman’s (1999b) meta-analysis was 
strongly criticised for unwarranted exclusion of significant studies (Storm & Ertel, 
2001). Storm and Ertel conducted another meta-analysis based on 79 Ganzfeld 
studies; this supported the psi hypothesis. Storm and Ertel’s meta-analysis was itself 
criticised for including studies with poor methodological quality (Milton & 
Wiseman, 2001). A subsequent meta-analysis that incorporated the 30 studies in 
Milton and Wiseman (1999b) and added 10 more recent well-controlled studies to 
the analysis found a small, but significant, effect size and an overall hit rate of 30.1% 
(Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001). Thus, despite controversy and fierce debate, 
there is considerable support for the psi hypothesis. 
1.6. Theories of Psi 
Given that there is support for the psi hypothesis, we now consider theories of how 
psi might function. These theories concern the processes of receiving, responding to, 
and becoming aware of psi information, and what the role of psi might be. We 
consider theories that propose that people respond to psi information all the time, 
nonintentionally, and frequently without awareness. Lastly, we advocate the 
importance of behavioural responses to psi, in theories and experimentation.  
Inherent in the following theories is the idea that psi is an unconscious process 
(Broughton, 1988, 1991, 2006a, 2006b; Eisenbud, 1966-67; Stanford, 1974; Tyrell, 
1947). Although the term unconscious has been used to refer to different aspects of 
psi function, and will be further disambiguated below, it can be clarified by first 
defining conscious. Conscious is defined as a subjective state of awareness, including 
awareness of dreams, usually operationalised by people being able to report their 
mental contents (Vandenbos, 2007). In contrast, unconscious is defined as mental 
processes and structures outside of subjective awareness that can nonetheless 
influence conscious experience, thought, and behaviour (Kihlstrom, 1987). This is 






recalled at will (Agnes, 2008), or the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious as 
containing repressed ideas (Freud, 1977). 
Tyrrell (1949) proposed a two-stage model for ESP. The first stage is the process of 
psi information acquisition, which Tyrell argued occurs in the “subliminal self” at an 
unconscious level. This unconscious level is conjectured to be beyond time and 
causality, in which minds are interconnected so that information can be accessed 
from one mind by another (Price, 1949; Radin & Rebman, 1996; Tyrell, 1947). This 
leads to the problem that there is an infinite amount of information accessible 
through psi, requiring a filtering mechanism to restrict what is acquired (Broad, 
1953). The second stage in Tyrell’s model is psi information coming to 
consciousness via “mediating vehicles”. Mediating vehicles include hallucinations, 
dreams, and impulses and occur if there is a “motive”, such as a need for the 
recipient to receive the psi information. The mediating vehicles are not themselves 
paranormal, and also mediate other forms of unconscious knowledge. Tyrrell 
emphasised that people can only be aware of the mediating vehicle, not the process 
of psi information transfer. This, therefore, is one way in which psi is an unconscious 
process. The same, however, can be said of memory and sensory perceptions. For 
instance, we are not aware of the process by which our visual cortex processes light 
(Crick & Koch, 1995), but we are aware of seeing. It is not known how the first stage 
of Tyrrell’s model might occur, but several suggestions have been made for the 
second stage. For instance, the first stage of psi might trigger memories the recipient 
already has, and the information in the memories then forms the conscious psi 
impressions (Irwin, 1999; Roll, 1966). Irwin advocated the memory model as it does 
not require perceptual information arriving without a sensory signal, which he 
thought was counter-intuitive, especially in precognition. Alternatively, Rao (1961) 
suggested that the second stage involved imagination. L.E. Rhine (1978) also 
considered Tyrells’ two-stage model of psi valid, and used it in interpreting 
spontaneous case reports. For example, she interpreted instances of apparent 






befallen someone, but not knowing what exactly had happened, as a failure for all of 
the psi information to enter consciousness. Implicit in L.E. Rhine’s reasoning, and in 
Tyrrell’s model, is the idea that the end product of psi is conscious awareness. If, 
however, not all psi information reaches consciousness, there might be much more 
psi information available at unconscious levels, and the conscious portion might be 
the “tip of the iceberg”. 
There is support for the unconscious first stage of Tyrrell’s two-stage theory of psi 
from similarities between psi and other unconscious processes. For example, 
perception without awareness, which occurs when subliminally presented sensory 
information enters the cognitive system and influences the recipient without 
conscious awareness (Dixon, 1981; Nash, 1986; Roney-Dougal, 1986; Schmeidler, 
1986; Stanford, 1990). There is support for the second stage of Tyrrell’s theory 
involving a transfer of information from the unconscious to the conscious mind from 
research comparing defensiveness to subliminal information and psi ability. For 
instance, people with higher thresholds against consciously perceiving threatening 
stimuli also demonstrate less psi ability (Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992, 1995; 
Watt, 1993; Watt & Morris, 1995).  
Eisenbud (1966-67) considered the role of psi, specifically asking why people do not 
use psychic ability to gain great wealth and power. Eisenbud concluded that psi 
function is unconscious, in that it is not under voluntary control. Tyrrell (1949) also 
alluded to this when he stated that conscious intention is not required for telepathy to 
occur. Eisenbud also asserted that psi serves people’s unconscious needs and goals, 
which may be self-defeating. In addition, he proposed that psi also fulfils 
evolutionary goals, which might be contrary to individuals’ consciously held goals. 
For example, if psi served population control needs it might necessitate that an 
individual die; this would be contrary to the individual’s desire to survive. He 
postulated that psi is a widely distributed function in all organisms, and might 






Considering the ideas of Tyrrell and Eisenbud combined, psi can be considered to be 
unconscious in several ways. For instance, people are unaware of the process by 
which psi occurs, they are sometimes unaware of psi information, and psi occurs 
without conscious effort. However, it should be noted that psi can also be 
consciously intended (Rao, 1961). To disambiguate the use of the word unconscious, 
we will use the term nonintentional, coined by Lewis and Schmeidler (1971), to 
denote psi occurring without conscious intent.     
One of the implications of psi occurring nonintentionally is that the methods of 
testing for psi described above, such as the forced-choice guessing of Zener cards 
and the free-response guessing of Ganzfeld psi targets, might be very different from 
how psi functions in real life. Firstly, participants are intending to use psi. Secondly, 
participants are attempting to gain conscious awareness of psi information. While psi 
information can apparently enter conscious awareness, it arguably does not always 
do so, and therefore conscious guess measures might miss some psi effects.  
The psi-mediated instrumental response (PMIR) model was developed in reaction to 
the previous ESP testing paradigm that relied on conscious guess measures, and to 
the underlying idea that the end state of psi information was to be consciously known 
(Stanford, 1990). It was intended to bridge the gap between laboratory ESP testing 
and real life psi experiences, and to develop ways of researching psi that would make 
the findings more generalisable to real-life situations. Stanford noted that, by 
definition, spontaneous psi events occur without conscious intent; therefore, he 
focussed on nonintentional psi paradigms. The PMIR model was revised several 
times (Stanford, 1974, 1977, 1982, 1990). This review will refer by default to the 
most recent formulation from 1990. The PMIR model involves many stages and 
propositions; this review will focus on those which are important to the experiments 
in this thesis. Stanford postulated that psi is goal oriented, and responds to the needs 







Through psi the organism (i.e., the living behaving individual) is able to 
respond to circumstances in its environment with which it has no sensory 
contact if those circumstances are of a kind to which it would respond if it 
had sensory knowledge of them. (Stanford, 1990, p. 62) 
Although Stanford did not categorically state that the psi-mediated response would 
be the same response that people would make given sensory knowledge of identical 
circumstances, it is a reasonable assumption that in many instances the responses 
would be the same. We can illustrate this with an example cited by Stanford (1974). 
A gentleman wanted to visit friends across town, and made his journey by train. If he 
had known that his friends were not at home, but in fact near an interim train station, 
he would have alighted there. In actual fact he did not know that his friends were not 
at home, but alighted at the interim station absentmindedly, and met them, perhaps 
not as planned, but as intended. Stanford interpreted this as an example of a psi-
mediated instrumental response; it is presented here as an example of the psi-
mediated response paralleling the response that one would knowingly make. In some 
circumstances, unconscious knowledge leads to a different response to conscious 
awareness of the same information (see, e.g., Debner & Jacoby, 1994), but such 
situations are rare and difficult to contrive (Merikle & Daneman, 1998). Thus, the 
PMIR model proposed that psi enables people to respond to events and 
circumstances that are beyond sensory reach and not consciously known, as if they 
had conscious awareness of them. In addition to the psi-mediated behavioural 
responses, Stanford also proposed that PMIR leads to changes in people’s arousal, 
attentional focus, and emotions; for example, feeling inexplicably nervous prior to an 
unexpected visit from one’s manager. Psi information leads to these responses by 
triggering behaviours, feelings, images, associations, desires, or memories that are 
already part of the recipient’s repertoire. The fact that these responses are already 
habitual to the recipient is probably one of the reasons why this process can go 
unnoticed, and also a means by which psi acts in the most economical way. It is not, 
for example, necessary to have a detailed, conscious, psi-mediated impression of an 






mediated responses can also occur through unconscious changes in timing, memory, 
mistakes, associations between thoughts, and conscious cognitions. Stanford asserted 
that PMIR can, but does not necessarily, happen without any conscious effort to use 
psi, conscious effort to fulfil one’s needs, awareness of the situation that one is 
responding to, or awareness that anything extraordinary is happening. Although 
PMIR is a model for nonintentional psi, it also underpins conscious awareness of psi. 
There are similarities between the models of Tyrell (1949), Eisenbud (1966-67), and 
Stanford (1974, 1977, 1982, 1990). The concepts of needs and motives are similar 
and obviate the need for a pre-conscious filtering mechanism to prevent psi 
information from all minds, places, and times from entering conscious awareness, 
because only the relevant information is drawn in. These models propose that the psi 
process is unconscious, and that psi information is primarily unconscious. The 
difference between these models is the end product of the psi process. Tyrrell (1949) 
focussed on psi information coming to consciousness. Stanford (1990) emphasised 
the importance of behavioural responses, and suggested that conscious awareness of 
psi information might occur only in the event of adaptive behavioural responses 
failing to happen. Both Eisenbud and Stanford argued that psi events are likely to be 
much more common than is apparent, but that they occur without awareness, and so 
go unnoticed.  
One criticism of these models described above is the concept of psi responding to 
needs. The idea that psi responds to needs was proposed by Stanford (1974), based 
on his appraisal of a large collection of spontaneous case reports. However, 
spontaneous case reports might be biased towards need-relevant psi events, because 
people might not notice psi events that bore no relation to their own needs. L.E. 
Rhine (1964) noted in her collection of spontaneous case reports that, while many 
reports concerned important circumstances, many conversely concerned trivial 
events that the recipients apparently did not need to know about. As noted above, 






evolutionary needs, which might be contrary to their consciously experienced needs 
and desires. Stanford (1974, 1977, 1982, 1990) also incorporated this concept, by 
suggesting that certain factors lead to people nonintentionally using psi against their 
best interests. These factors included neuroticism, negative self-concept, low self-
esteem, guilt, and other conflicts. Therefore, if needs can be fulfilled by psi 
appearing both to serve and not to serve people’s needs, need-relevance becomes an 
irrefutable proposition, and consequently not a useful hypothesis. As a further 
illustration of how two different outcomes can both be interpreted as supporting the 
need-serving nature of psi, Eisenbud gave the example of the conflict between a 
mouse’s need to survive, and a cat’s need to eat the mouse. Stanford did, however, 
propose some testable hypotheses relating to whether psi is need-serving. For 
example, that people with stronger needs are more likely to use psi nonintentionally 
to fulfil them. The issue of whether psi serves needs, and whose needs it serves, 
raises the question of what psi is for.  
Broughton (1988) argued that psi, as a human ability, developed as a result of natural 
selection, and therefore must convey an evolutionary survival advantage. In a 
synthesis and extension of the models proposed above, Broughton suggested that the 
function of psi might be to bias thoughts, actions, and feelings unconsciously to lead 
to adaptive behaviour, such as avoiding danger. In this, psi might manifest as 
intuition or luck. He argued that psi might function better in this regard if it were 
unconscious and nonintentional, as overt, intentional use of psi might be counter-
productive. For example, it is not long since witchcraft was punishable by death 
(Broughton, 1991). Perhaps to avoid individual responsibility for psi, many cultures 
attribute ostensible psi events to external agencies such as spirits (Broughton, 1988).  
Broughton (2006) concurred with Tyrell’s (1947) two-stage theory of psi, but 
proposed a new mechanism for the second stage: the emotional system. The 
emotional system functions unconsciously, and is geared towards survival. It quickly 






memories. Emotional memories are feelings and physical states (e.g., sweaty palms 
and elevated heart rate for fear) and these emotional memories play a major role in 
decision making (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Damasio, 1995). The emotional system may 
unconsciously reduce the range of options for any decision by biasing the choice of 
memories and images that come to consciousness; this process would feel like 
intuition. Broughton (2006) argued that Stanford’s assertion that psi: fulfils 
organisms’ needs; occurs unconsciously; and functions through triggering 
behaviours, memories, feelings, images, and other mechanisms already in the 
organism’s repertoire is fulfilled by the emotional system. The emotional system also 
operates independently of conscious intention, thereby fulfilling the nonintentional 
aspect of the PMIR model. There is support for the emotional system responding to 
psi influences in presentiment research, which investigates whether emotional 
response (measured by palmar sweating) increases prior to people being exposed to 
shocking stimuli (Bierman, 1997; Bierman & Radin, 1997; Radin, 2004a). Overall, 
Broughton concluded that the chief function of psi is to provide information, whether 
conscious or unconscious, to guide behaviour.  
In summary of the theories of psi presented above, psi is widely thought to occur at 
an unconscious level, and to a much greater extent than is usually recognised. As 
Eisenbud (1966-67) suggested, this indicates that psi ability is widespread in the 
population and so unselected participants from the general public, rather than just 
selected psychics, can justifiably be used in experiments (Radin, 1997; Targ & 
Puthoff, 1974). While people can become consciously aware of psi information, it is 
likely that this is the tip of the iceberg, and more psi information might be available 
at an unconscious level.  
The implications of this for parapsychology experiments are that measures of 
unconscious responses to psi might be more successful in capturing a psi effect, if 






recent rise in psychophysiological measurements of psi, enabled by recent 
technological advances. A thorough review of psychophysiological correlates of psi-
mediated remote observation detection is discussed in Chapter 6. Additionally, 
electroencepholograms have recently been used to investigate brain activity during 
psi experiments (Baker & Stevens, 2008; Kittenis, Caryl, & Stevens, 2004). As well 
as being unconsciously processed, psi is thought frequently to occur 
nonintentionally. Therefore, rather than using the traditional intentional psi-testing 
paradigms (e.g., participants trying to guess psi targets), psi might be better tested by 
creating situations in which participants’ behaviour can respond to psi without the 
participants trying to make this happen. These nonintentional psi experiments will be 
further described in Chapter 2, but in brief, they consist of experimental situations in 
which participants are not informed that they are in a psi test. However, the outcome 
of the experiment depends upon participants’ nonintentional behavioural responses to 
target information or influences. As participants do not know that they are in a psi 
experiment, they do not know that there are psi targets; thus are called hidden 
targets, as their existence is hidden from the participants. Furthermore, if the purpose 
of psi is to guide behaviour, it follows that it is important to research whether or not 
psi affects behaviour. 
Before considering the ways that nonintentional behavioural responses to psi have 
been researched, we will outline three ways psi can affect behaviour, depending on 
the level of awareness people have of the psi information. Spontaneous case reports 
will be presented as illustrations, but do not posit proof that these events were psi-
mediated. The first way is that the recipient could become aware of psi information, 
and may even be aware that it arrived via anomalous means. This leads to declarative 
knowledge, which is knowing that something is the case, and is knowledge that can 
be verbalised. The recipient can then choose whether or not to act on the psi 
information. An example of this was related by Stanford (1982). In brief, while 
driving home at night Stanford felt a strong urge not to proceed along the main road, 






this impulse seemed irrational, and Stanford concluded that it might be a psi-
mediated warning that there was danger on the road that he would otherwise have 
taken. To test this theory, he proceeded slowly and cautiously along the main road, 
and discovered that there had been an accident, and the road was partially blocked. 
Had he been travelling at normal speed, this would have been a dangerous situation 
for himself, his passenger, and possibly for others.  
The second way is that psi information, without the recipient gaining declarative 
knowledge of it, could produce an intuitive feeling or a hunch that could influence 
behaviour. The recipient would be aware of the action they took, but would not know 
why they were taking it. In this case psi leads to procedural knowledge, which is 
knowing how to do something, and is non-verbalisable. Kihlstrom (1987) stated that 
procedural knowledge is unconscious, in the strictest sense of the word, although this 
arguably a grey area. Kihlstrom included skills that have become automatic and the 
rules of grammar as unconscious too, but it is possible to introspect on these, and it is 
the capacity to introspect on mental activity that Kihlstrom used to classify conscious 
mental states. One example of this pathway was reported by a student nurse, who had 
felt a sudden urge to enter an obstetric ward, which was out of bounds to her. She did 
not know why she felt this urge, but on arriving there found a baby bleeding 
profusely, whose life she saved by this action (L. E. Rhine, 1962).  
Lastly, psi information, without the recipient being aware of it, could bias behaviour 
that the recipient is not aware of doing. One example of this is mistakes. An example 
from Stanford’s (1974) records was a girl who mis-dialled her friend’s phone 
number, and instead reached an elderly lady having a heart attack. The girl was able 
to have the number traced and send help. Therefore, whichever level of awareness 
recipients have of psi information, the response can be a change in their behaviour. 
Thus, behavioural responses can be used to indicate a psi effect, irrespective of the 
level of awareness people have of psi information. In all the examples described 






In the experiments presented in this thesis, in line with the examples and the models 
of psi presented above, we examined nonintentional behavioural responses to hidden 
psi influences or information. In these experiments, it was not essential that 
participants never gained conscious awareness of the psi information (and therefore 
responded with unconscious behaviour). It was, however, important that participants 
were not informed that we were testing for psi. 
1.7. Outline of Thesis and Contributions 
The structure for the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
literature review of nonintentional psi experiments. In this, we describe the previous 
research methods, issues, and findings in nonintentional psi and PMIR experiments. 
In addition, we consider personality characteristics that have been found to influence 
psi performance.  
Chapters 3 and 4 present two empirical studies that aimed to discover whether hidden 
targets can influence participants’ behaviour in psychological tests. These studies 
also investigated the relationship between personality characteristics and 
nonintentional psi. Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) investigated participants’ performance 
on a nonintentional psi task disguised as a line-length judgement task. This aimed to 
create a psi influence analogous to the social pressure to conform, which reliably 
influenced people’s line-length judgements (Asch, 1952). In our study, we 
investigated whether psi information in hidden targets could exert a similar effect on 
line-length judgement. Experiment 1 found a null overall effect, but there was an 
indirect indication of a psi effect in two ways: in a response bias effect and in a 
correlation between participants’ extraversion and hit rates (see Chapter 2). 
However, Experiment 1 did not incorporate any incentive for participants to respond 
in accordance with their hidden targets, and an incentive might be important in 
eliciting psi (see, e.g., Stanford, 1974). Therefore, in Experiment 2 (Chapter 4), we 






contingent upon performance in a nonintentional psi task. The task itself was a 
conceptual replication of previous research by Stanford (1976,a,b) into the possibility 
that unconscious changes in timing would nonintentionally respond to psi. 
Experiment 2 found an overall null effect, and also null correlations between 
personality variables and psi score. These studies contribute a thorough investigation 
of a range of personality characteristics in nonintentional psi. They also extend the 
previous body of research by considering two new nonintentional psi tasks. 
Chapter 5 presents a general discussion of Experiments 1 and 2, relating their 
findings to the previous literature and showing how they extend it. We consider 
reasons for the predominantly null effects, and suggest improvements for future 
research, considering the optimal conditions for investigating psi. We suggest that 
research into nonintentional behavioural responses to psi might benefit from direct 
comparison with behavioural responses to analogous non-psi stimuli, which we had 
not included in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, we juxtaposed a proven social influence 
(social facilitation) and a conceptually related psi influence (remote observation) in 
the experiments in the second half of this thesis. This novel combination seeks to 
answer the original question of whether psi-mediated observation influences 
behaviour similarly to observation from a physically present observer. It is important 
to discover whether covert observation routinely used to assess performance in 
psychology experiments, and in general surveillance technology, has any effect on 
behaviour in and of itself.  
Chapter 6 presents a review of the literature and a detailed description of both social 
facilitation and remote observation. In this review, we consider the backgrounds, 
issues, and findings of both fields, and present a case for our novel investigation of 
these phenomena in combination. Chapter 7 presents two empirical studies 
(Experiments 3 and 4). Experiment 3 explored the paradigm of testing for a social 
facilitation effect from remote observation. In Experiment 3 we compared 






physically present observer), or remotely observed (by a hidden observer). This 
experiment found an overall null effect, and Experiment 4 aimed to improve upon 
the methodology involved, more closely replicating the most suitable previous 
research designs from the literature.  Experiment 4 compared participants’ task 
performance while alone or observed (by a physically present observer), and again 
found overall null results. The expected social facilitation effect (of simple task 
facilitation and complex task inhibition) was not found in either Experiment 3 or 4, 
but the results were suggestive of an overall facilitatory effect from a physically 
present observer. For this reason, different tasks were used in Experiment 5, intended 
to capitalise upon this effect. In this experiment (Chapter 8) we compared 
participants’ task performance while they were alone, observed (by a physically 
present observer), or remotely observed (by a hidden observer). Experiment 5 found 
null results.  
Chapter 9 presents a general discussion of Experiments 3, 4, and 5; suggestions for 
how this novel paradigm could be extended in the future; and the implications of the 
predominantly null findings for both fields. Chapter 10 presents the final discussion 
and conclusions, relating the findings of all the experiments as a whole back to the 
original aim of investigating nonintentional behavioural responses to psi, and 







2.  Literature Review of Nonintentional Psi and Personality 
2.1. Overview 
This chapter presents a review of previous experimental literature investigating 
nonintentional psi in general extrasensory perception (GESP) paradigms. Firstly, we 
explain several fundamental aspects of nonintentional psi-testing paradigms and how 
they differ from intentional psi testing. Secondly, we consider the importance of 
randomisation in psi experiments, which is relevant to the studies subsequently 
discussed. Then we consider nonintentional psi in the following tasks: standard 
psychological tests, timing in word association tasks, affective judgement tasks, and 
classroom exams. In accordance with the methodology of Experiments 1 and 2, this 
review focuses on experiments with either hidden targets or forced-choice testing 
methods. Within this chapter, we also review personality theory, because linking 
personality characteristics and psi is an important part of parapsychological process-
oriented research (i.e., investigating relationships between known psychological 
variables and psi). Following an overview of relevant personality characteristics, we 
review findings relating to personality and psi, both in the previous parapsychology 
literature in general, and in the nonintentional psi literature specifically. We conclude 
this chapter with a brief motivation of the studies in the following chapters 
(Experiments 1 and 2).  
2.2. Intentional and Nonintentional Psi-Testing Paradigms 
In intentional psi experiments, participants know that there is a target (i.e., 
information to be acquired through psi), or a sender (i.e., a person who attempts to 
transmit that information), but not what the target information is. Nonintentional psi 
experiments, in contrast, create a situation in which participants are not aware that 
they are being tested for psi, and consequently do not intentionally use psi; 






nonintentional psi experiments the fact that there is a target is hidden from the 
participants; thus, these are called hidden targets. Likewise, if there is a sender in a 
nonintentional psi study, this is also concealed from the participants, and these can be 
called hidden senders. In nonintentional psi experiments, participants perform a task 
which is, unbeknown to them, a vehicle for nonintentional psi, i.e., a task in which 
psi is expected to manifest. 
2.3. Randomisation 
The concept of randomness is important in designing psychology experiments. 
Random means without pattern. Randomness obviates biases, such the potential bias 
from an experimenter choosing which participants to allocate to experimental or 
control groups. Randomisation of target lists reduces the risk of a spurious effect 
caused by participants having a similar response pattern to a pattern in a non-random 
list. It is also preferable to create randomised target lists individually for each 
participant. This avoids the stacking effect: a spuriously low or high hit rate resulting 
from shared response biases between participants coinciding with, or deviating from, 
a shared target sequence (Thalbourne, 2003). Randomisation is particularly important 
in parapsychology because of the controversial claims that are made. If there is any 
reason other than psi that could explain an experimental effect, such as a pattern in 
non-random target sequences, then the psi hypothesis has to be rejected.  
Random number tables are the best source of random sequences because they have 
been checked for randomness. Random entry into the table of random digits by using 
a non-determinable source, such as the weather forecast or a calculator’s random 
digit function to indicate starting page, line, and column is the method usually used 
by parapsychologists (e.g., Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). 
Stanford (1990) argued for the careful use of random entry into random number 
tables, to avoid potential problems caused by experimenter psi. Experimenter psi 






use psi to influence the outcome of the experiment. For example, if a participant 
guessed above chance on a sequence of randomly created targets, it could be argued 
that the participant did not use psi, but that the experimenter precognitively created 
the target list that the participant would respond with. This theory is counter-
intuitive, and explains one psi event with another. Experimenter psi has, however, 
been raised as a counter-possibility for many psi events, and should be considered 
until it has been disproved. Dice and card shuffling are non-optimal because they 
could be affected by nonintentional biases from the person rolling the die or shuffling 
the cards. One random entry into a random number table is the preferred method. 
Computer generated random number sequences can also be used (e.g., Luke, 
Delanoy, & Sherwood, 2008; Luke, Roe, & Davison, 2008). The experiments 
reviewed below used one of these optimal methods of randomisation, unless 
otherwise stated. 
2.4. Nonintentional Psi in Psychological Tests 
It is important to consider whether psi can nonintentionally affect standard 
psychological tests, for several reasons. If psi allows for nonintentional information 
transfer or influence, such as clairvoyance from the answers to a test, this means that 
psi could “contaminate” test results (White, 1976). If psi affects mental functions, 
such as memory, in standard tests, this would show that psi interacts with known 
psychological processes. Lastly, experimenter effects have been found in 
parapsychology: Some experimenters typically find evidence for psi and others do 
not (Palmer, 1997; Smith & Savva, 2004). If information from the experimenter can 
nonintentionally affect participants’ performance, this could partially explain the 
experimenter effect (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972).  
Stanford (1970) investigated whether memory of a story could be influenced by psi. 
Participants listened to a story, and later answered a series of unexpected multiple 






details in the story, to details which could have been inferred from the story, or to 
details which were never specified (such as asking the colour of a coat only 
described as ‘bright’). For each participant, one answer to each question was selected 
as the target after the questions were answered. Answers that matched the selected 
targets were scored as hits. For details that had not been specified, the hit rate of 
31.2% was significantly higher than MCE of 25%. A greater proportion of hits were 
achieved in answers that contradicted the information in the story (36.2%), especially 
when those details had been specifically mentioned in the story (46.9%). It was rare 
that participants gave responses that contradicted specific details in the story, but 
when they did so, these answers had the highest hit rate. This pattern of rarely made 
responses being more likely to be hits when they are made is called the response bias 
effect, and as it occurs in many of the experiments subsequently presented we 
describe it below. 
The response bias effect is a proportionally higher hit rate on responses that are not 
favoured by any other (non-psi) biases (Stanford, 1967). Stanford (1967, 1973) 
suggested that people are more likely to notice, or act upon, information that might 
be psi-mediated if it is somehow out of the ordinary or incongruous. For example, if 
someone has the thought “something terrible has happened to John”, many factors 
determine whether they will think that this is due to psi, and many factors determine 
whether they will act upon it. One of these is how frequently they think that 
something terrible might have happened to John; if this is an infrequent thought, it is 
more likely to be noticed and acted upon (Stanford, 1967). The response bias effect 
requires a response bias to exist in the first place. A response bias is a tendency to 
give one response more frequently than others; for example, responding ‘A’ more 
than ‘B’, ‘C’, or ‘D’ on a multiple choice exam. The response bias effect might occur 
because the non-psi bias adds noise to the responses favoured by the bias, diluting 
the proportion of hits. Following the multiple choice analogy, this would mean that 
when a student did not know the answer, he would answer ‘A’. ‘A’ would therefore 






Stanford (1970) proposed that the response not favoured by the bias is unlikely to be 
chosen when it is not the target, thus reducing the false alarm rate. This response bias 
was first investigated by Stanford (1967) in an intentional, clairvoyance-style psi 
task. He found that the targets with fewer responses had a higher proportion of hits. 
The response bias effect is a relative effect; it is not the case that there would be a 
greater number of hits in the responses that are rarely made, but a greater proportion. 
This response bias effect was found in the following series of experiments 
investigating nonintentional psi in psychological tests. 
Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) aimed to discover whether psi influences could facilitate 
the recognition of subliminally presented letters. Participants were ostensibly 
recruited for a perception study, and were randomly assigned to act as sender or 
receiver. Sender and receiver did not meet, and the receiver did not know of the 
existence of the sender. The receiver vocally identified capital letters projected 
tachistoscopically for 10 milliseconds onto a wall. Luminosity was individually 
adjusted so that receiver guessed ¼ of the letters correctly. The experimenter was 
blind to the order of the letters, and did not watch the projections. The sender was 
located in a non-adjoining, sound-proofed room, and concentrated on sending psi 
targets to the receiver. Each letter was presented to the receiver twice, once with the 
sender concurrently concentrating on the same letter, and once with the sender 
concentrating on a control picture that was not associated with any letters. The 
experimenters and participants did not leave their separate rooms during the 
experiment, ensuring that there was no risk of sensory leakage or cueing. 
Significantly more letters were correctly identified when the same letter was being 
sent than during control trials. This effect was restricted to letters that were 
recognised less than 33% of the time in the control condition. The recognition of 
letters that were more easily detected was not improved. This experiment therefore 
supported the existence of nonintentional psi. It also replicated the response bias 
effect (Stanford, 1970) in that only responses with a low probability of success 






effect were independently replicated using a very similar procedure (Lubke & Rohr, 
1975).  
Kreitler and Kreitler’s (1972) second study into the effect of psi in standard 
psychological tests investigated the effect of a sender on the perception of 
autokinetic motion. Autokinetic motion is the apparent movement of a stationary 
point of light in an otherwise dark and featureless space. Participants, ostensibly 
recruited for a perception study, were randomly assigned to act as sender or receiver. 
Sender and receiver did not meet, and the receiver did not know of the existence of 
the sender. The receiver sat in a dark room, continuously describing the apparent 
movement of a spot of light as being static, or as moving in one of eight directions 
(up, down, left, right and the four diagonals). The experimental time was divided into 
four blocks. In the third block, a sender, in a non-adjoining, sound-proofed room, 
concentrated on one of the directions, pre-selected at random. There was no overall 
psi effect, but participants with a below-median calling rate of a direction in the 
control blocks showed significantly increased calling of that direction when it was 
the psi target: a response bias effect. The last experiment in this series is not 
considered in this review as it neither investigated the effect of hidden targets, nor 
was it a forced-choice task.  
The strongest evidence for psi in the three experiments reviewed above had been 
found in the letter recognition task, which combined a subliminal stimulus and a psi 
stimulus. To further investigate how subliminal and psi influences interact they were 
directly compared in a follow-up experiment (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1973). 
Specifically, they tested whether a hidden sender would influence a receiver’s 
perception of the relative size of geometric shapes. They also sought further to 
investigate the response bias effect, that psi had manifested in their previous 
experiments only in the responses which otherwise had a low occurrence (Kreitler & 
Kreitler, 1972). Participants, ostensibly recruited for a perceptual judgement task, 






adjoining, sound-proofed rooms by different experimenters. The receivers knew 
neither that there were senders, nor that there were psi targets. The stimuli presented 
to the receiver were a combination of supraliminal and subliminal images. The 
supraliminal images were either two lines of identical length, or two circles of 
identical size, presented at full luminosity through a tachistoscope for eight seconds. 
In some trials there were additional subliminal images, which made visual illusions, 
such as the classic Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1), by adding subliminally 
presented arrowheads to the supraliminally presented lines.   
 
Figure 1: The classic Müller-Lyer illusion 
The other subliminal illusions were a variant of the Müller-Lyer illusion with longer 
or shorter parallel lines beside the supraliminally presented lines and the Delboeuf 
illusion for the circles, both of which make one shape appear larger than the other. 
For simplicity, the description below will refer predominantly to the classic Müller-
Lyer illusion on the lines. Firstly, just the supraliminal stimuli were shown to the 
receivers, who were told that the difference between the lines was very small, but to 
answer left or right for the line they thought was longest. These trials established 
participants’ response bias baseline: their tendency to call left or right most 
frequently. Secondly, the subliminal stimuli were added, without a psi influence, to 
establish that the subliminal stimuli were truly below the level of conscious 
awareness and did not affect participants’ responses. Lastly there were the psi trials. 
The sender concentrated on images of pairs of lines (or circles) clearly different in 
size, the order of which was individually randomised for each participant. The sender 






left line is longer” (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1973, p. 176). In the first block of trials the 
sender had been instructed to concentrate intensely on the images, but had not been 
told that there was a receiver. In the remaining trials the sender was told about the 
receiver and attempted to send the images to the receiver. Within each block, the 
three conditions: psi influence alone; concurring psi influence and subliminal illusion 
(e.g., both the sender and the illusion indicate that the left line is longest); and 
contrasting psi influence and subliminal illusion (e.g., the illusion would make it 
appear that the left line is longest, but the sender is looking at a longer right line) 
were randomly varied. There was a significant interaction between sender mode and 
influence type, and a positive deviation from MCE, when the sender was “sending” 
and the psi and subliminal influence contrasted. This occurred for the classic Müller-
Lyer and Delboeuf illusions, but not for the other variant of the Müller-Lyer illusion, 
possibly because it was the weakest of the illusions. Kreitler and Kreitler (1973) 
interpreted this as meaning that psi signals would normally be subsumed by stronger 
sensory signals, “arrive” in a usually unattended channel, and are only acted upon 
when they contrast with other available information. It could also be interpreted as 
the response bias effect. The psi information only appeared to exert an influence 
when it contrasted with the subliminal information, the condition in which the psi 
target answer would be the least likely response.  
The strengths of the Kreitlers’ experiments were the controls against sensory leakage 
and experimenter bias. There was no risk of sensory transfer of information between 
the participants or experimenters throughout the experiment. The participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions, the targets were optimally randomised, and the 
experimenters were blind to the targets. The authors did not act as the experimenters, 
but recruited others who were kept blind to the full details of the experiment and its 
aims until all testing was complete. Thus the authors did not meet the participants 
and could not bias their performance by any form of social interaction. While all the 
experiments found interesting psi effects in the comparisons between conditions, 






from chance. While this could be used to argue against the psi hypothesis, it is 
important to consider reasons for these findings. There were aspects of these 
experiments that might not have been psi-conducive. Sceptics were deliberately 
chosen as experimenters, and were advised that a psi effect was not a desirable 
outcome. Experimenter belief and attitude has been found to affect psi experiments, 
(e.g., Wiseman and Schlitz, 1997). It might also have been psychologically difficult 
for the sender to send to an unknown receiver. 
The final pair of experiments we will consider that used a psychological test as a 
vehicle for nonintentional psi aimed to investigate whether psi could influence the 
interpretation of homophones (Wilson, 2004). In both experiments, participants were 
ostensibly recruited for a word association test. Participants individually listened to a 
tape-recording of homophones and gave the first word association that came to mind. 
The homophones all had two main alternative interpretations, such as steal/steel, one 
of which had been predetermined to be the psi target. Just before the participants 
heard each homophone, a sender in a non-adjacent room focussed on a visual image 
of the psi target interpretation (e.g., a picture of a burglar for ‘steal’). In these 
experiments the experimenter took the role of the sender. To establish rapport 
between the participant and the sender, they met before the trials took place; 
although the participants were not informed that there would be anyone acting as a 
sender. The overall hit rates for both experiments were non-significantly different 
from MCE. In the first experiment the response bias effect was found. There was a 
greater proportion of hits in the less frequently given homophone interpretations. In 
the second experiment the response bias effect was not found. This failure to 
replicate could have been because participants’ response preferences were 
determined from the combined responses of all the participants. Wilson 
recommended that future research use response biases calculated at the individual 
participant level, which was not possible in his experiments as each homophone was 






The experiments reviewed above, taken together, provide some evidence that psi 
information in hidden targets or from hidden senders can influence performance on 
psychological tests. The effect exerted by psi information is not great, and appears to 
manifest most in the least frequently given responses. One criticism of this style of 
study is that there was no “need” in these experiments for the participants to perform 
in accordance with their psi information, which might explain the low overall effects. 
A main premise of Stanford’s psi-mediated instrumental response (PMIR) model is 
that psi is need serving and goal oriented (Stanford, 1990). Therefore, people respond 
nonintentionally to psi information in a way that fulfils their needs. Needs can be 
utilised by creating a situation, unbeknown to the participants, in which behaviour on 
a nonintentional psi task will lead to them receiving a reward or a punishment. This 
reward and punishment contingent upon performance in a nonintentional psi task is 
the basic set-up for PMIR experiments. The future reward and punishment conditions 
are thought to act as an incentive to motivate the participants to use psi, although the 
participants are unaware of the contingency. All PMIR experiments are therefore 
nonintentional psi experiments, and the following section reviews those that 
investigated the effect of psi on timing. 
2.5. Nonintentional Psi and Timing of Word Association 
Responses 
One of the ways in which behaviour might respond nonintentionally to psi, and bring 
about a need-relevant outcome, is by a change in timing (Stanford, 1990; Stanford & 
Thompson, 1974). Stanford (1974) proposed that PMIR would manifest in the most 
economical way possible, and that the appropriate response would automatically be 
selected through psi. If, for example, the disaster of driving over a bridge as it 
collapsed could be averted by simply driving over the bridge a little faster and 
reaching the other side before it collapsed, then this change in timing might occur 
through PMIR. This is economical in that the driver would not need to have a 






of action, and would not even need to know that psi had influenced him, all of which 
are aspects of how PMIR is thought to function (Stanford, 1990). We review below 
PMIR experiments that used a change in timing on word association tasks as the 
vehicle for nonintentional psi. 
Stanford and Thompson (1974) recruited college-age male participants for a 
precognition task, a test of intentional psi. After completing the precognition task, the 
participants were then asked to do a word association task, ostensibly to investigate 
the thought processes associated with precognition. Each participant individually 
listened to 13 words played on a tape-recorder, the first three of which were a 
practice. After each presentation of a stimulus word, participants immediately voiced 
the first word that came to mind. Prior to the experiment, an assistant had randomly 
selected one trial to be the “key” trial, and also randomly selected whether the target 
direction for the key trial was fast or slow. The experimenter was blind to the identity 
and direction of the key trial. If the key trial was fast and the participant’s reaction 
time for the key trial was the fastest, or joint fastest, of their 10 responses, the 
participant went on to do a reward task; if the key trial was not the fastest he 
performed a punishment task. The reverse applied for the slow targets. The reward 
task was to rate pictures of attractive women, in various states of undress, on a 
variety of adjectives. The punishment task was circling certain letters on sheets of 
random letters. Performance on the nonintentional psi task was non-significantly 
different from chance. Participants’ scores on the precognition task, however, 
correlated positively with their performance on the nonintentional psi task, lending 
partial support for timing responding nonintentionally to psi.  
Using timing in word associations as the vehicle for nonintentional psi, Stanford and 
Stio (1976) also aimed to investigate two sub-propositions of the PMIR model. 
Firstly, they tested whether participants with a greater need for the reward more 
frequently entered the reward condition. The strength of the all-male participants’ 






randomly selected half of the participants a banned erotic song prior to the 
experiment. The other participants listened to it afterwards. Secondly, they tested the 
proposal that PMIR occurs by the facilitation of readily available responses. On the 
basis that voicing the first word that comes to mind is a readily available response, 
Stanford and Stio (1976) hypothesised that it would be more likely to be facilitated 
(sped up) by psi than inhibited (slowed down). Therefore, they predicted when the 
target direction was fast participants would be more likely to achieve a hit than when 
it was slow. The word association task was conducted as in Stanford and Thompson 
(1974). The reward condition was a mildly sexually arousing relaxation and free-
response ESP task, conducted by a female experimenter. The punishment was a 25-
minute forced-choice ESP task. There was no significant effect from the need-
strength manipulation, which Stanford and Stio (1976) attributed to the song not 
producing as much arousal as expected. They recommended that manipulations are 
checked to avoid this problem in the future. An alternative explanation, if 
precognition is viable, is that it made no difference presenting the song before or 
after the experiment, as both could have an effect (Schechter, 1977). Response times 
for the key trials when the target direction was fast were faster significantly more 
often than chance. When the target direction was slow the key trial timings were non-
significantly different from chance, supporting the facilitation of ready responses 
hypothesis. The overall comparison to chance was not reported. It is possible that a 
stronger effect was produced in this experiment than in Stanford and Thompson 
(1973), in which the experimenter was male, because the female experimenter 
increased the participants’ need to enter the arousing reward condition. 
Stanford and Associates (1976) directly compared the effect of attractive female 
experimenters and male experimenters. The hypothesis was that the female 
experimenters would increase the all-male participants’ need to enter the erotically-
toned reward condition. The word association task was as described above. The 
reward condition was rating pictures of attractive women, as used in Stanford and 






participants tracked the movement of a light. Participants tested by females scored 
significantly higher than MCE, confirming the need-strength hypothesis. The overall 
outcome for both the male and female experimenters combined was not reported. 
Stanford and Associates (1976) reported evidence of a nonintentional psi effect that 
supports the need-strength hypothesis of the PMIR theory, but did not report 
evidence for an overall psi effect.  
The experiments discussed so far have concentrated on a reward and punishment 
condition for the participant him- or herself. This was extended to examine whether 
participants will nonintentionally and unknowingly put someone else into the reward 
condition (Stanford & Rust, 1977). Thirty participants did the word association task 
previously described, with all the psi targets in the faster direction. Each participant 
was matched to a male helpee, who was given a reward task of rating pictures of 
partially dressed women, or a punishment: the pursuit rotor task. The participants and 
helpees did not know each other, did not meet in the experiment, and were neither 
told about each other, nor the relationship between their tasks. Seven helpees went 
into the reward condition, significantly more than the MCE of three, but there was no 
overall psi effect found when comparing the key trial and mean response times. This 
was a failure to replicate Stanford and Stio’s (1976) finding that there is a greater psi 
effect when the target direction is fast. This experiment found evidence that people 
nonintentionally help others through psi, but only when the direct hit measure was 
considered.  
In summary, this series of experiments that used incidental timing of word 
associations as a vehicle for nonintentional psi found evidence in line with PMIR 
hypotheses, but their evidence for nonintentional psi per se is limited, as the overall 
hit rates were not compared to MCE. Additionally, one further study did not support 
any PMIR hypotheses, or the existence of nonintentional psi, using a very similar 
paradigm (Stanford & Castello, 1977). One limitation of this group of experiments 






experimenter effect is an issue in parapsychology, independent replication by other 
researchers is important. These experiments all also used a very similar word 
association task, and conceptual replication of the timing paradigm with a different 
task would help to validate or abrogate it. These experiments aimed to create a 
laboratory analogue of the spontaneous psi experience of coinciding with need-
fulfilling circumstances by being faster or slower, relative to other events. In these 
experiments just reviewed, the task was to make one key trial faster or slower than 
the control trials. Individual differences in reaction time in the word association trials 
could have interfered with any psi effect. A measure that relies on overall timing 
without other confounds might be preferable. In addition to timing, other vehicles for 
PMIR have been researched; this review now considers more recent research using 
affective judgement tasks. 
2.6. Nonintentional Psi in Affective Judgement Tasks 
The three most recent studies into nonintentional psi aimed to test aspects of the 
PMIR theory with a precognition task, and shared the same basic procedure (Luke, 
Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008). Participants chose their favourite of 
four fractals, pre-matched to be neutrally pleasant, believing this to be preparation 
for a later psi task. As soon as participants registered their choice by clicking the 
fractal image onscreen, one fractal was randomly selected by the computer program 
to be the psi target. If this was the same fractal the participant had chose, it was a hit. 
If, after the 10 trials were complete, the participants had scored above MCE (2.5 
hits), they went on to perform a reward task, for a longer duration the more hits they 
had achieved. If they scored under MCE they went on to perform a punishment task, 
for a longer duration the fewer hits they had achieved. The punishment was a 
vigilance task (indicating when three consecutive odd or even numbers appeared 
onscreen) that was made more unpleasant by not informing the participants how long 
it would last. The reward task varied between the experiments, being either rating 






2008). In all three experiments the participants achieved more hits than MCE. The 
mean effect size across all the experiments (r  = .35) was a medium to large effect 
size (J. Cohen, 1988). One of the strengths of these experiments was that there was 
no risk of sensory leakage of the target identity to the participant, as the psi targets 
were precognitive, and had not been generated at the time the participants rated each 
set of fractals. The experimenter was also blind to the identity of the future targets, 
eliminating the risk of inadvertent cueing. 
These experiments also aimed to test the PMIR sub-proposition that psi responds to 
participants’ needs, by investigating whether reward and punishment contingencies 
are necessary. In one experiment, in addition to the reward and punishment 
conditions, some participants were randomly assigned to a no-contingent condition, 
in which they left at the end of the affective judgment task, and did not do the reward 
or punishment task, irrespective of their psi performance (Luke, Roe et al., 2008). 
Contrary to expectation, the participants in the no-contingent condition performed 
best. This could be interpreted as contradicting the PMIR theory, because the 
participants without a reward or punishment contingency performed best. However, 
the participants in the no-contingent condition were able to leave earlier, which 
might have been a greater incentive than rating cartoons. Therefore, an alternative 
interpretation is possible: The most psychically gifted participants used psi to enter 
into the condition in which they were able to leave soonest, and had no risk of getting 
the punishment. This, once again, demonstrates the need for manipulation checks to 
verify the validity of the reward and punishment conditions that are used to provide 
an incentive for participants to use psi. In their follow-up experiment, Luke et al. 
(2008) checked participants’ ratings of the reward and punishment conditions, and 
found that cartoons were rated as significantly preferable to the vigilance task. 
However, that experiment did not include a no-contingent condition, so participants’ 






Other PMIR experiments with affective judgement tasks did not find support for 
nonintentional psi (Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). In both 
these studies participants rated 13 images of Japanese Kanji script characters, pre-
selected to be neutrally pleasurable, for how pleasant they found them. The first three 
characters were a practice. Of the remaining 10 characters, one had been randomly 
pre-selected to be the psi target. Each psi target (the number of the character) was 
placed in an opaque envelope, with a number on the outside corresponding to each 
participant’s number. During each participant’s trials, the experimenter kept the 
relevant target on her person throughout the whole procedure, while remaining blind 
to the target identity until after experimentation was concluded. Participants scored a 
hit if they rated an odd numbered character highest if their target was an odd number, 
and vice versa for even numbers. 
In Watt and Nagtegaal’s (2000) experiment participants with a hit could choose their 
reward between either leaving early without performing another task, listening to 
relaxing music, or playing an asteroids game on the computer. Participants without a 
hit performed a computer-based vigilance task as punishment. In Watt and 
Ravenscroft’s (2000) study, a hit (or miss) by the participant performing the 
nonintentional psi task resulted in a second participant, a helpee in a separate room, 
entering the reward (or punishment) condition. Neither participant was informed 
about the other, nor that their tasks were linked in this way. This was a conceptual 
replication of the PMIR and rewarding others experiment by Stanford and Rust 
(1977). There was no significant overall psi effect found in either of Watt’s 
experiments. A strength of both experiments was that the participants’ ratings of the 
reward and punishment tasks were compared; the rewards were rated as significantly 
more preferable than the punishment. The Watt studies used leaving early as a 
reward condition, whereas Luke et al. (2008) used leaving early as a condition 
without reward or punishment. Eight of the 40 participants in the reward condition 
chose to go early, and rated it as 4/6 when asked how much they valued the chance to 






reward options, which both scored 4.6/6 on pleasantness. This difference, however, 
might have been in part due to the different wording of the questions (how much they 
valued leaving early, versus how pleasant the tasks were), a limitation of these 
studies. None of the five participants with a hit in Watt and Nagtegaal’s (2000) 
experiment chose to leave early. This indicates that leaving early is a moderately 
favourable choice for participants, and thus it follows that the no-contingent 
condition might have acted as an incentive in Luke et al.’s (2008) experiment, as 
suggested above.  
There were some major similarities between Luke’s and Watt’s experiments; both 
used a forced-choice nonintentional psi task, and both used affective judgements. 
Forced-choice affective judgements respond to unconscious information whereas, for 
example, forced-choice recognition tasks do not (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; 
Merikle & Daneman, 1998). They might, therefore, be well suited for psi 
experiments, if psi information is non-consciously received. Taking the affective 
judgement nonintentional psi experiments overall, three found a significant psi effect 
(Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008) and two did not (Watt & 
Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). Possible reasons for the difference in 
findings are the experimenter effect, different populations, and random variation. The 
most viable non-psi explanation is that there was an artefact in Luke et al.’s 
experiments that could explain the findings. In summary, these studies provide some 
proof for nonintentional psi.   
2.7. Nonintentional Psi in Exams 
The final area of nonintentional psi research reviewed here concerns whether there is 
any psi effect from hidden targets on university students’ exam performance. This is 
conceptually related to the first section of this review, which considered whether psi 
could play any role in standard psychological tests, as exams are a standard testing 






studies are also conceptually related to the PMIR studies reviewed above, in which 
the role of motivation was considered, because the students in these exams were 
thought to have a high level of motivation to succeed. The exam studies also aimed 
to investigate spontaneous nonintentional psi in a real-life context (Johnson, 1973).  
The pioneering research was conducted in a series of three experiments on students 
writing short, essay-style answers to eight psychology exam questions (Johnson, 
1973). In the first two experiments, the correct answers to four questions were 
randomly pre-selected as the psi targets for each student. Target packs were created, 
with the psi target answers photocopied into the relevant spaces on the exam papers, 
and blank spaces following the control questions. To ensure students could not see 
the targets, they were covered in aluminium foil and sealed in envelopes. The target 
packs were stapled to the actual exam papers, with the psi target answers aligned 
with the spaces into which the students would write their answers. The students were 
told that the answer packs were to facilitate marking the exams, and not to open them 
(no envelopes were opened). The exams were scored by raters, who were blind to the 
target identities, before being matched to the targets to determine the hit rates. In 
both experiments, students’ answers to questions with hidden psi targets scored more 
points than the control questions. One limitation of both of these experiments was in 
the marking of the exam questions. In the first experiment the two raters’ scores were 
significantly different for the subset of the exams they both rated, and Johnson did 
not specify whose ratings were used for the analysis. In the second experiment there 
was only one rater. These two experiments found evidence of nonintentional psi, and 
support the PMIR model as the students nonintentionally responded to the psi targets 
in a way that fulfilled their needs of increasing their exam scores. 
Johnson’s (1973) third experiment used a very similar set-up and target packs, but 
incorporated negative psi targets. The negative psi targets had two parts: false, but 
relevant, information for the exam question and a discouraging statement, such as 






exam questions were accompanied by encouraging statements only, and no 
information relating to the answers. Inter-rater reliability was improved in this 
experiment. Scores for answers with negative psi targets were lower than those with 
encouraging statements. It is, however, debatable whether this experiment supports 
the PMIR hypothesis. It would depend upon whether the difference in scoring 
between the negative and positive psi target answers were due to a reduction on the 
scores for the negative target answers, or whether there had been an increase in the 
scores for the positively toned controls. The mean scores were lower in the third 
experiment, indicating that the negative targets might have reduced the scoring. The 
strengths of these experiments were the individually randomised targets, within-
subject controls, and the measures taken to restrict sensory leakage. The weakness in 
the third experiment was the lack of a valid control condition. All three of the 
experiments by Johnson provide evidence for a nonintentional psi influence on 
behaviour. 
These exam performance experiments were conceptually replicated by several 
independent investigators. The first replication failed to find any effect on exam 
scoring from the hidden psi targets (Willis, Duncan, & Udofia, 1974). (Two 
experiments were carried out, but in the second experiment the students were told 
that the psi target packs contained hints about the exam, so it was not a true 
nonintentional test, and is excluded from this review.) Psychology students were 
given 35-item multiple choice exams, and the answers to the first six questions were 
used as psi targets, between-subjects. The targets were presented similarly to those in 
Johnson’s (1973) experiments in that the target answers were aligned with the space 
into which the students would write their answers, but no information was reported 
about safeguards against cheating. The students were told that the purpose of the 
answer packs was to facilitate scoring, as Johnson (1973) had. There was no psi 
effect in this experiment: Students’ error rates did not differ significantly between the 
participants with the answers and those without. This could have been because there 






the error rates were very low. The psi targets could only confer 17% of the total 
score, (compared to 50% in Johnson’s experiment) which, combined with the overall 
low error rate, meant there might have been inadequate incentive to motivate the 
students to access the hidden target information. Students’ performance might also 
easily have been affected by order effects, because only the first six questions had psi 
targets (Schechter, 1977). This experiment had many flaws, and failed to test the 
impact of nonintentional psi from hidden targets in exams adequately.  
A second replication of Johnson’s (1973) experiments found support for 
nonintentional psi. W. G. Braud (1975) investigated the effect of hidden psi targets 
on a parapsychology exam with essay-style answers. The students received answer 
packs, made in a similar way to Johnson’s, with good control against sensory leakage 
and cheating, with either one half (A), or the other half (B) of the correct answers as 
psi targets. ‘A’ or ‘B’ was clearly marked on the exam packs that students received, 
but they were not told what it meant. This might have introduced a systematic bias 
into which students received which pack, especially as the students were instructed to 
choose the pack that felt right to them. This might have changed the nature of the 
task, introducing an element of intentionality in what was purportedly a test of 
nonintentional psi. This is a less serious problem than it was in Willis et al. (1974), 
because W. G. Braud’s (1975) experiment also included an intentional psi task, and 
the students were led to believe that the answer pack contained only the items for the 
intentional task. Error rates for the answers with psi targets were lower than for the 
control answers. Therefore, the psi targets appeared to help participants answer the 
questions. The limitations of this experiment were the non-random allocation of the 
target packs to the students and the lack of individually randomised targets for each 
participant. Participant’s increase in performance on the answers with psi targets was 
inversely correlated with their performance on the control items. W. G. Braud 
interpreted this as a confirmation of the need-strength sub-proposition of the PMIR 
model, assuming participants with the poorest performance had the greatest need for 






performing students might have been the ones with the greatest need to pass. This 
disagreement highlights the need for checks of how much the participants desired the 
outcomes assumed to act as their incentives. This effect could also be interpreted as 
the response bias effect: The participants who performed worse were less likely to 
choose the right answers, and were those for whom the psi targets had a greater 
effect.  
The most recent investigation into hidden psi targets and exam performance was 
conducted by Schechter (1977). Only the first two of his experiments are reviewed 
here as the third was less well controlled. The target packs were prepared and 
presented in a similar way to Johnson’s (1973) with good controls against sensory 
leakage and cheating. The psi targets were the answers to either the odd or the even 
numbered questions. The answer packs were stacked so that they alternated odd and 
even psi targets, and were handed out to the students in sequence. Schechter (1977) 
found a difference in performance between the participants with odd numbered and 
even numbered psi targets, so there might have been a systematic bias in the way that 
the students received the packs. It is a limitation of this experiment that neither true 
random allocation of targets to participants, nor individually randomised target lists 
were used. In both experiments participants scored higher on the questions with psi 
targets than the control questions. The nonintentional psi hypothesis was supported 
by these findings.  
In summary, the tests of nonintentional psi in exams predominantly support the psi 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, three of the experiments had potential randomisation 
problems, and only Johnson’s (1973) experiments involved truly random allocation 
of targets to participants. Johnson was also the only researcher to create individual 
psi targets for each participant. Johnson’s three experiments used the best 






One question raised by the exam studies is why the answers in the psi targets exerted 
an influence over each student’s performance whilst other possible sources of psi did 
not. The other potential psi influences in these experiments included other students’ 
answers, other students’ knowledge, the teacher’s knowledge, each student’s notes 
and textbooks, and each student’s future knowledge from the time when they could 
check the answers after the exam. Schechter (1977) considered a few possible 
reasons why the psi targets might have exerted an influence while the other sources 
did not. Firstly, the psi targets might have exerted a greater influence due to their 
physical proximity. W. G. Braud (2010) reviewed the findings relating to distance 
and psi. While he found some evidence for a decline in psi effects over distance, he 
attested that it was inconclusive, because participants’ and experimenters’ 
expectancies about distance were not controlled and extreme distances have not been 
tested. Proximity remains a possible reason for the effectiveness of the psi targets. 
Secondly, Schechter (1977) thought that the target packs might have caused the 
students to focus their attention on the material inside, somehow increasing psi 
information transfer. This applies to W. G. Braud’s (1975) experiment as the 
participants were asked to focus their attention on the answer packets (for the 
intentional psi part of the exam). The targets might have been psi conducive because 
they had the same layout as the exam question and answer sheets (Schechter, 1977). 
The proximity and layout might both have led to cheating or sensory leakage, but 
there were good measures against the participants seeing the psi target answers in all 
the experiments with positive effects (W. G. Braud, 1975; Johnson, 1973; Schechter, 
1977). It is not known why the information in the answer packs would have 
influenced the students’ performance when other sources of psi did not, but psi target 
packs appear to be effective clairvoyance targets. 
In summary, there is evidence of psi nonintentionally affecting participants’ 
behaviour in standard psychological tests, in PMIR experiments in timing and 
affective judgement, and in students’ exam performance. As this current thesis will 






characteristics play a role in parapsychological phenomena, this review will briefly 
relate the individual differences to be considered. Then it will consider the role of 
individual differences in parapsychology in general, before reviewing the evidence 
for individual differences effects in nonintentional psi tasks.  
2.8. Individual Differences in Psi Research  
Individual differences is the hypernym for variables, such as personality and IQ, that 
differ between people. As most of the individual differences that we will consider 
herein are personality variables we discuss those first. Contemporary psychology 
describes personality using the concept of traits: habitual patterns of thought and 
emotion that influence behaviour, that vary between individuals, and are relatively 
stable over time (Matthews & Deary, 1998). One of the most prevalent models of 
personality traits is the Big Five: extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992a). These traits 
emerged from factor analysis of personality-related adjectives, and represent a 
comprehensive empirical system for quantifying individual differences in 
personality. Each of these trait domains can be further subdivided into facets. For 
example, extraversion is made up of gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, 
excitement-seeking, and positive emotions. The Big Five traits that will be used in 
the experiments in this thesis are extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to 
experience. In addition to these personality traits, we will also investigate the role 
that two further individual differences: state anxiety and belief in psi, might play in 
psi task performance. All of these variables will be measured by questionnaire (the 
methodological details are described in the experimental chapters).  
Eysenck (1967) emphasised the importance of considering the reliability of psi 
scores when comparing them to other factors, such as personality. On the evidence of 
the limited number of studies that reported reliability scores, Palmer (1977) noted 






reliability for psi scores would be positive, but low. Consequently, correlations 
between psi and individual differences are likely to be small and unstable, hence it is 
unwise to base conclusions on the outcome of individual studies (Palmer, 1977). 
Therefore, the review below will focus upon meta-analyses and reviews of multiple 
studies where possible. In the following sections, each of these individual differences 
characteristics are defined, and research evidence for their role in parapsychology 
research in general is outlined. 
Extraversion is the personality trait associated with being outgoing and sociable. 
People with high extraversion are referred to as extraverts, and those low in 
extraversion as introverts. Extraverts prefer being in groups, are talkative, and like 
excitement (Costa & McCrae, 1992a). Four narrative reviews of the research into psi 
and extraversion independently concluded that psi performance and extraversion 
correlate positively (Eysenck, 1967b; Palmer, 1977; Rao, 1974; Sargent, 1981). 
Eysenck (1967) noted similarities between aspects of psi performance in general and 
extraverts’ performance in general, such as decline over time and improved 
performance with novel tasks or stimuli. Rao (1974) and Palmer (1977) both noted 
instances of the relationship between psi and extraversion being reduced to non-
significance if participants’ neuroticism was also considered. The narrative reviews 
all used the vote-counting technique, counting statistically significant studies that 
provide evidence for, and against, an hypothesis. These reviews can be criticised for 
their over-reliance on statistical significance. The vote-counting technique also does 
not take into account the effect sizes of the studies, and cannot estimate an overall 
effect size.  
In order to estimate the overall effect size of the relationship between psi and 
extraversion, a large meta-analysis was conducted, investigating 60 independent 
studies involving 2,963 participants (Honorton, Ferrari, & Bem, 1990, 1998). The 
relationship between psi and extraversion was analysed separately depending on 






guessing Zener cards. While the relationship between psi and extraversion was 
evident in free-response studies (r = +.20), the authors challenged the validity of the 
relationship between psi and extraversion in forced-choice studies. The studies that 
showed evidence for a positive correlation between psi and extraversion were those 
in which in which the extraversion measure was taken after the ESP test. Honorton et 
al. (1998) concluded that the relationship between psi and extraversion was 
artefactual, caused by the participants’ knowledge of their psi scores having 
influenced their self-ratings of extraversion. For example, participants who were 
happy to have high psi scores might rate themselves higher on extraversion. 
Honorton et al. also suggested that the relationship between psi and extraversion 
might be an experimenter expectancy effect, caused by the experimenter’s 
knowledge of the participants’ ESP scores leading them to bias the participants on 
the extraversion measures.  
Palmer and Carpenter (1998) challenged these suggested artefacts on the following 
grounds. Firstly, the test-retest reliability of extraversion measures is high; they are 
designed not to respond to state changes with any degree of magnitude. Secondly, 
Honorton et al. (1998) had not provided any evidence that these artefacts did in fact 
occur. Honorton et al.’s claims were investigated in an experiment specifically 
conducted to test whether informing participants that they have scored well in a psi 
task inflates their extraversion ratings (Krishna & Rao, 1991). Student participants 
first did a forced-choice ESP task, after which half the students were told that they 
had scored well on the psi task (irrespective of their actual scores); the other half 
were told they had scored poorly. The students then completed a High School 
Personality Questionnaire to assess extraversion. There was no difference in the 
mean extraversion scores between participants misinformed that they had high, or 
low, psi scores. Thus, the artefact of participants’ knowledge of psi scores 
influencing their extraversion ratings was countered, although the effect of 
participants knowing their true psi scores was not tested. In a re-analysis of the same 






testing) was found to be confounded with the order of the ESP test and the 
extraversion measure (Palmer & Carpenter, 1998). Testing situation appeared to be 
the explanatory factor, with a positive relationship between psi and extraversion in 
forced-choice tests being found only when participants were tested individually, with 
a comparable effect size to the free-response studies (r = +.21). However, Palmer 
and Carpenter could not rule out poor study quality as a confound in the relationship 
between psi and extraversion. There is a need for the relationship between psi and 
extraversion to be investigated further in good quality studies without risk of the 
artefacts mentioned above.  
Palmer (1978) suggested three reasons for the relationship between psi and 
extraversion. Firstly, extraverts have higher spontaneity, which is apparently psi-
conducive. Secondly, extraverts might create a more psi-conducive atmosphere by 
getting on better with the experimenter. The third reason relates to cortical arousal 
levels. Eysenck (1967) proposed that psi is an ancient form of perception, and might 
have developed prior to the cortex. Eysenck proposed that a central brain area, the 
ascending reticular activity system, governs psi, and that psi is inhibited by increased 
cortical arousal. There is evidence for low cortical arousal being psi conducive in 
prior literature. Honorton (1977) argued that sensory deprivation, which lowers 
cortical arousal, creates a need for participants to increase their arousal by seeking 
out psi-target information. W. G. Braud (1975) found that psi retrieval is associated 
with low levels of arousal. Lower arousal might be psi conducive because the mind 
becomes quiet, and one’s attention is free to notice stimuli that might otherwise be 
overridden by stronger sensory information (W. G. Braud, 1981). As extraverts have 
lower cortical arousal levels (Matthews & Deary, 1998), they might have better psi 
ability. 
The evidence for extraversion being psi conducive comes from intentional psi 
studies. As relaxation and sensory deprivation are also conducive to retrieval of 






(Nash, 1986), this indicates that lower cortical arousal might facilitate the retrieval of 
unconscious information. It does not necessarily follow that extraversion is 
associated with psi “reception”. This can only be tested in situations in which there is 
no conscious guess component, such as nonintentional psi tasks.  
In summary, there is likely to be better performance from extraverts in forced-choice 
psi experiments, although it is uncertain whether this will extend to nonintentional 
psi tasks. Extraversion should be considered along with neuroticism, in case these 
two characteristics interact (Palmer, 1977; Rao, 1974). The association between psi 
and neuroticism is considered below.  
Neuroticism is the personality trait of being prone to negative states, such as “fear, 
sadness, embarrassment, anger, guilt, and disgust” (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, p. 14) 
The neuroticism domain comprises six facets: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, 
self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, p. 
14). People with high neuroticism cope poorly with stress and have irrational ideas.  
Previous research indicated that there is a tendency for low neuroticism to correlate 
with higher psi scoring. For example, in a series of studies investigating neuroticism 
and psi scoring on a card-guessing ESP task, high neuroticism was associated with 
below-chance scoring (Kanthamani & Rao, 1973). A review of 24 studies found that 
the seven significant findings all showed a negative correlation between psi and 
neuroticism, across many different personality scales, although some studies using 
the Manifest Anxiety Scale showed the reverse effect (Palmer, 1977), and this was 
corroborated by another review with overlapping studies (W. G. Braud, 1981). These 
reviews used the vote-counting method and are therefore not as strong evidence as an 
assessment of effect size through meta-analytic techniques.   
Palmer (1977) also suggested that people’s reaction to anxiety affects how anxiety 
and psi relate. For example, people who cope with anxiety defensively, and therefore 






increased sensitivity to anxiety, who are vigilant to anxiety-provoking stimuli, 
perform better at psi tasks. This was further explored in research with the Defence 
Mechanism Test, which investigates people’s thresholds of perception of threatening 
subliminally presented stimuli (Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992; Haraldsson, 
Houtkooper, & Hoeltje, 1987; Johnson & Haraldsson, 1984). Defensive participants, 
those with higher thresholds for conscious awareness of threatening stimuli, were 
found to be poorer at intentional psi tasks. Harraldsson suggested these participants 
were also defensive against psi. Therefore, defensive participants had raised 
thresholds against psi information, making them less able to become aware of 
putative psi information. This paradigm was extended to include participants with 
vigilance, lower thresholds for threatening stimuli, who were found to have better psi 
scoring than defensives (Watt & Morris, 1995). Overall it appears that there is a 
negative relationship between psi performance and neuroticism.  
The relationship between psi performance and neuroticism could be underpinned by 
differences in arousal. Neuroticism is highly correlated with trait anxiety, which is in 
turn highly correlated with sympathetic nervous system arousal (Spielberger, 1983). 
While neuroticism has not been found to correlate consistently with cortical and 
sympathetic nervous system arousal, even under stress (Matthews & Deary, 1998), 
there is some evidence of neuroticism-related cortical arousal (W. G. Braud, 1981). 
As reviewed above, higher cortical arousal in introverts is thought to be psi-
inhibitive. In a similar way, high arousal in neurotic people might also be psi-
inhibitive. 
State anxiety is a temporary emotional state in which people feel tension and 
apprehension; it is also characterised by increased autonomic nervous system activity 
(Spielberger, 1983). In contrast to neuroticism, which is a stable trait concerning the 
tendency to become state anxious, state anxiety is transitory. If anxiety has any part 
to play in the relationships discovered between neuroticism and psi scoring described 






performance. If, as W. G. Braud (1981) suggested, low autonomic nervous system 
arousal levels facilitate ESP performance, state anxiety might differentiate between 
low and high scorers.  
There has been very little parapsychological research conducted with state anxiety in 
comparison to extraversion and neuroticism. Broughton and Perlstrom (1986; 1992) 
investigated participants’ state anxiety, measured on the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983), and psychokinesis (PK) in three experiments. 
Participants with higher state anxiety performed worse on a PK task, presented as a 
computer game, in which they rolled dice to win points. A negative relationship 
between state anxiety measured on the STAI and ESP was found in a dog-race 
computer game in which participants selected the dog they hoped would win (Roe, 
Davey, & Stevens, 2003). Participants with higher state anxiety were less successful 
in selecting the winning dog. This effect reached significance only when the dog-race 
was disguised as a PK task, i.e., when participants were attempting to will their dog 
to win, but the winner was actually predetermined. Considering this evidence and the 
conceptual similarity between state anxiety and neuroticism, we would predict a 
negative relationship between state anxiety and psi scoring.  
People with high openness to experience are imaginative, creative, open to new and 
unorthodox ideas, and sensitive to their inner feelings (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). The 
facets of openness to experience on the NEO PI-R are openness to: fantasy, 
aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). Although 
openness to unorthodox ideas and sensitivity to inner feelings have intuitive appeal 
as psi-conducive characteristics, there has been surprisingly little research 
investigating psi and openness to experience. 
A positive relationship between psi performance and openness to experience has 
been shown in a handful of previous investigations. A significant positive correlation 






International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999) and performance on a 
presentiment task (S. P. Wright, 2003). Openness to experience and its facets, 
measured with the NEO PI-R, were hypothesised to correlate with performance in a 
free-response Ganzfeld ESP experiment (Morris, Cunningham, McAlpine, & Taylor, 
1993). A significant positive correlation between psi score and openness to actions 
was found, but there were no significant findings with any of the other facets, nor 
with the openness domain. Osis and Bockert (1971) found a significant positive 
correlation between performance on two psi tasks and a scale they devised of self-
transcendence and openness. The psi tasks were a motor task in which participants 
were influenced to select a square on a grid, and a telepathy task with art pictures as 
targets. Their scale of openness was not the same as openness to experience on the 
NEO PI-R, it was more oriented to describing meditative states of mind, but it had 
some conceptual similarity. More recently, on a pilot test of a new psi-testing 
paradigm, precognitive déjà vu, participants high on openness to experience scored 
particularly high (Bem, 2004). In precognitive déjà vu, participants rate the 
familiarity of faces prior to being subliminally shown the randomly selected target. 
Openness to experience might be associated with experiencing and interpreting psi 
events. Significant positive correlations between openness to experience and an 
index of psi experiences were found in creative participants (Zingrone, Alvarado, & 
Dalton, 1999), indicating that people with high openness might experience more psi 
events. Creative people have tended to achieve high hit rates in free-response ESP 
tasks (Bem & Honorton, 1994; Dalton, 1997); as creativity is related to openness, 
this indicates that individuals high on openness might also score high in psi tasks. 
The characteristic of perceptual defensiveness, the tendency unconsciously to screen 
out threatening stimuli, correlated negatively with psi task performance (Haraldsson 
& Houtkooper, 1995). A negative correlation between perceptual defensiveness and 
openness to experience was found (Watt, 1993), which suggests that individuals with 
high openness to experience would score well in psi tasks. Overall, considering the 






experience and other psi-conducive characteristics, we would expect people high on 
openness to experience to be more likely to demonstrate psi ability. 
The final individual difference that we will consider the effect of is belief in psi. 
People who believe in psi have been found to score higher in psi experiments than 
people who do not believe in psi (Lawrence, 1993). Schmeidler named the believers 
“sheep” and the disbelievers “goats” (Schmeidler & McConnell, 1958, p. 30). The 
phenomenon of psi believers scoring higher in psi experiments is often called the 
sheep-goat effect. The sheep-goat effect is one of the more robust findings in 
parapsychology, and once thought promising as a reliable enough effect to refute 
sceptical counter arguments (Rao, 1974).  
The effect of belief in psi was first investigated in forced-choice clairvoyance psi 
tasks, using the standard Zener cards (Schmeidler, 1945). Participants guessed the 
symbols on cards that they could not see. Prior to the psi test, all participants were 
asked how they thought they would score. Based on their answers, participants were 
classified as sheep, those who expected to succeed, or as goats, those who expected 
to score at chance. Across five independent experiments, the sheep scored 
significantly above chance, and the goats scored non-significantly below chance. 
Schmeidler (1945) noted that the overall effect of these experiments, had the sheep 
and goats scores been analysed together, would have been at chance. Schmeidler 
suggested that null results in other psi studies could have been due to conglomerating 
sheep’s and goats’ scores together. It is therefore important to take the sheep-goat 
effect into account in psi research.  
Since this early research, many further studies have corroborated the sheep-goat 
effect. An early review of 17 experiments into belief in psi found that 13 of them 
found the sheep-goat effect, six of which were independently significant (Palmer, 
1971). Palmer’s review used the vote-counting technique, which overly relies on 






highly significant positive association between belief in psi and performance, across 
a wide variety of psi tasks (Lawrence, 1993). The effect size estimated is small 
(mean trial based r = .03). In meta-analyses that include only published studies there 
is a risk of finding a spuriously high effect size estimate, resulting from biases 
towards publishing studies with significant findings: the file-drawer effect. 
Lawrence’s estimate had a low risk of the file-drawer effect, with 24 unreported non-
significant studies required, for each of the 73 reported, to nullify the sheep-goat 
effect. As Palmer (1971) concluded, the sheep-goat effect appears to be a genuine 
phenomenon.  
There are other characteristics which differ between sheep and goats. People who 
believe in psi report more psi experiences (Haight, 1979). People who reported more 
psi experiences were also found to score better in a forced-choice psi task (Haight, 
1979) and in free-response psi tasks (Honorton, 1997). This suggests that sheep 
might have more psi experiences. Sheep were found to be more extraverted than 
goats (Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). Extraversion, as noted above, has been 
associated with positive psi scoring in experiments. It is not known whether there is a 
causal link between extraversion and belief in psi both being psi-conducive. It might 
be instructive, therefore, to investigate extraversion and belief in psi in conjunction. 
Goats were found to be shyer than sheep (Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). 
Thalbourne and Haraldsson point out that people who are shy might wish to retain 
privacy, psychically as well as socially. These differences were, however, minor, and 
there are no recognised personality traits with which we can predict whether 
someone is a sheep or a goat.  
Schmeidler originally classified participants by whether they believed in the 
possibility of a successful psi result in their particular experiment (sheep), or whether 
they rejected this possibility (goats) (Schmeidler & McConnell, 1958). These terms 
have been used more loosely since then, encompassing belief in psi and disbelief 






& Feather, 1969; Van de Castle & White, 1955). Palmer (1971) noted that using 
participants’ expectation of success in their particular experiment was more 
successful at finding the sheep-goat effect than more abstract measures of belief in 
psi. Conversely, Lawrence (1993) found no significant differences in the sheep-goat 
effect depending on which scale of belief in psi was used. This indicated that all the 
scales measure a common element. Given that both psi experiences and expectation 
of success in experiments predict positive psi scoring, a questionnaire that includes 
both should be used. Such a questionnaire was produced by the Koestler 
Parapsychology Unit at the University of Edinburgh (see Appendix 1), and was used 
throughout the experiments presented in this thesis.  
The sheep-goat effect could occur for several reasons. Firstly, sheep have more 
positive expectations of their performance in experiments, and this might be why 
they are indeed more successful. On the other hand there is evidence that participants 
who strongly believe that they can score high actually score lower then sheep who 
just believe that psi is possible (Palmer, 1972). So the sheep-goat effect does not 
seem to be caused by positive expectations alone. Secondly, sheep might have better 
psi ability. This would lead to them performing better in psi tasks and having more 
psi experiences, which might in turn lead to them believing in psi. A counter-
argument to the idea that sheep have better psi ability than goats is the fact that goats 
sometimes score significantly below chance (Roney-Dougal, 1991). This 
phenomenon, called psi-missing, does not imply that goats have less psi ability, but it 
does imply that they use their ability to repudiate a psi effect. If this is the case, it 
follows that goats would score well at psi tasks, if they did not know that they were 
psi tasks.  
One example of this in the previous literature aimed to investigate whether sheep and 
goats would score in line with their beliefs (Lovitts, 1981). Participants were 
classified as sheep or goats using the Bhadra (1966) questionnaire. Half the 






experiment in which high scores would disprove ESP. The other half were told that 
they were in a psi experiment in which a high score would prove the existence of 
ESP. Participants attempted to guess which of five typed symbols, similar to the 
Zener card symbols (+ = O L X), were projected at sub-threshold speed and 
luminosity. The actual visual stimuli presented were conglomerates of the five 
symbols superimposed on one another. Unbeknown to the participants, individual 
packs of hidden psi targets had been created for each of them, with a target symbol 
for each trial. Participants scored hits if their guesses corresponded with their target 
symbols. There was a significant interaction between participants’ belief and their 
perceived purpose of the experiment. The goats scored higher when they thought that 
this would disprove ESP, and the sheep scored higher when they thought this would 
prove ESP. This experiment showed that goats have psi ability, and that people score 
in line with their beliefs. This supports Palmer’s (1971; 1972) suggestion that people 
use psi to vindicate their previously formed beliefs. It follows, therefore, that instead 
of intrinsic differences in psi ability leading people to believe or disbelieve in psi, 
that an initial difference in belief drives how people use, and consequently 
experience, psi. In other words, psi might not be a case of ‘you have to see it to 
believe it’, but rather that ‘you have to believe it to see it’. There has been one 
attempt to replicate Lovitts’ findings, which failed to find the same effect (Lawrence, 
1990-1991). Both the original and the replication study used a similar, but small, 
sample size so neither finding is more robust based on power. Both studies found a 
positive association between female gender and psi belief, and Lawrence proposed 
that a gender imbalance between the groups in his study might partially explain the 
failure to replicate, but admitted it would not explain it entirely. The question of 
whether the reversal of the sheep-goat effect is genuine requires further research with 
gender-balanced samples. 
If the sheep-goat effect is the product of intrinsic psi ability, this has consequences 
for nonintentional psi. In nonintentional psi tests, participants do not know that they 






then goats would score well in nonintentional psi tasks. If participants do not know 
that they are in a psi test, then the argument that sheep score better because of their 
positive expectations cannot apply. Nonintentional psi experiments are therefore a 
forum to test out whether there is a difference in sheep’s and goats’ intrinsic psi 
ability. Further research into the effect of differences of belief in psi on psi scoring 
when people are not aware that they are in a psi task is required to understand the 
aetiology and mechanisms of the sheep-goat phenomenon. 
2.9. Prior Research considering Personality and other Individual 
Differences in Nonintentional Psi 
Investigations into how personality characteristics and psi performance are related 
have focussed predominantly on intentional psi experiments, as reviewed above 
(Stanford, 1990). There has been very little investigation of the role of personality in 
nonintentional psi. This is unfortunate, because nonintentional psi experiments are 
more similar to spontaneous psi experiences, and are therefore more generalisable to 
real-life situations. There are also confounding factors in intentional psi experiments 
that nonintentional psi paradigms avoid. For example, participants in intentional psi 
experiments usually aim for declarative knowledge of the psi information. It is 
therefore ambiguous whether personality traits associated with good psi performance 
are indicative of greater psi receptivity, or of greater ability to bring psi information 
to consciousness. Research into personality and nonintentional psi would address this 
issue. In intentional psi tasks participants know that they are in a psi experiment, so 
their performance might be affected by their beliefs about, and attitude toward, psi. 
Belief and attitude should not interfere with nonintentional psi, and so we would not 
expect the sheep-goat effect to emerge in nonintentional psi. Unless, that is, the 
sheep-goat effect is underpinned by a difference in the psi ability of the sheep and the 
goats. Investigating belief in psi and nonintentional psi would disentangle the role of 
belief and psi ability, and shed light on the origin of the sheep-goat effect. More 






therefore extend the understanding of the role of personality in parapsychology. The 
previous research investigating neuroticism, openness to experience, and belief in psi 
in nonintentional psi experiments is reviewed below. 
Watt and Ravenscroft (2000) investigated nonintentional psi and neuroticism in a 
PMIR experiment. Neuroticism was measured on the 60-item NEO FFI, a shorter 
version of the NEO PI-R. Participants completed an affective judgement task, in 
which they rated how pleasant they found Japanese kanji script characters. Hits were 
scored if participants’ ratings concurred with hidden psi targets. This led to another 
person, paired with the participant, receiving a reward or punishment task. A 
negative correlation between psi hitting and neuroticism was predicted. A weak 
negative correlation was found that was just short of significance. The experiment 
did not find an overall effect from nonintentional psi, but Watt and Ravenscroft 
noted that it had low power. This investigation of nonintentional psi and neuroticism 
was inconclusive.  
Openness to experience has been investigated in two PMIR-style nonintentional psi 
experiments (Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000; Luke, Roe et al., 2008). Watt and 
Ravenscroft (2000) measured openness on the NEO FFI. The task was the affective 
judgement task described above. Openness was hypothesised to correlate positively 
with hit rate. No relationship between hit rate and openness to experience was found. 
Luke, Roe et al. (2008) used the openness to experience scale from the International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999). The nonintentional psi task was to 
make affective judgements: Participants rated how much they liked a series of fractal 
images. If their ratings concurred with their precognitive psi targets hits were scored. 
Hit rates higher than MCE entered participants into a reward condition; lower hit 
rates entered them into a punishment condition. The hypothesis was again that 
openness would correlate with psi performance. Openness correlated positively with 
hit rate, with a large effect size (r = .46). So far there have been two very different 






difference in findings be due to the use of different personality scales? The IPIP and 
the NEO items are equivalents, and the correlations for the sub-facets of openness to 
experience are between .70 and .80 (Goldberg, 1999), so the difference in findings 
should not be due to the researchers using different scales. There was also a 
difference in the populations used: Watt and Ravenscroft (2000) used students, and 
Luke, Roe et al. (2008) used visitors to a museum. One other difference between 
these studies is in the nature of the reward and punishment task used to give 
incentive to the PMIR. In Watt and Ravenscroft’s (2000) study another person, not 
the participant, received the reward or punishment. In Luke, Roe et al. (2008) the 
participant who did the nonintentional psi task was the one who received the reward 
or punishment accordingly. In both experiments the participant who did the 
nonintentional psi task’s openness was measured. Perhaps Watt and Ravenscroft 
(2000) should have considered the openness of the other participant as well. The 
other main difference between the studies is that Luke, Roe et al. (2008) found an 
overall positive hit rate but Watt and Ravenscroft (2000) did not. An overall null 
effect does not rule out the possibility of relationships with personality variables, but 
if there was an unknown aspect of Watt and Ravenscroft’s (2000) experience that 
had suppressed any potential psi effect, then it might have suppressed a relationship 
between psi and personality. In summary, the relationship between openness to 
experience and nonintentional psi is not yet clear.  
The relationship between belief in psi and nonintentional psi scoring was first 
investigated in forced-choice tasks (Kennedy & Haight, 1978). Belief in psi was 
measured by asking participants whether they though that ESP was possible in this 
experiment. Participants answered yes (sheep), no (goats), or undecided (excluded 
from analysis). The hypothesis was that sheep would have a higher psi score than 
goats. The nonintentional psi task was the Mood Adjective Check List. Participants 
ticked the mood adjectives that applied to their current mood. The psi targets were 
individually randomised hidden clairvoyance targets. Hit rates were determined by 






psi targets. The overall hit rate was non-significantly different from MCE. This 
might have been because there was no attempt to influence the participants’ mood, 
and their mood would have strongly influenced their answers. The authors also did 
not report whether conflicting moods, such as happy and sad, might have been 
selected for the same participant, which could have reduced the likelihood of a hit. 
Nonetheless, the sheep scored significantly higher than the goats, supporting the 
hypothesis. A more recent investigation into forced-choice nonintentional psi tasks 
and belief used both a belief in psi scale and a belief in the paranormal scale (Luke, 
Delanoy et al., 2008). The belief in psi scale was a five-item sheep-goat scale, based 
on Palmer (1971). The belief in paranormal scale was a 12-item subset of an 
anomalous experience inventory that asked whether participants believed, for 
example, that mind can control matter. The nonintentional psi task was the affective 
judgement task described above. The hypothesis stated that both belief scales would 
correlate positively with psi performance. This hypothesis was supported by 
significant positive correlations between psi scoring and both belief scales. In 
summary, in the limited research that has been carried out into the role of belief in 
psi and nonintentional psi performance, a positive association between belief and psi 
performance has been found. This is very important in understanding the sheep-goat 
effect. Differences in scoring between believers and disbelievers in nonintentional 
psi tasks cannot be due to cognitive effects of belief. A sheep-goat effect in 
nonintentional psi experiments, indicated by the findings so far, therefore points to 
the difference in scoring between sheep and goats being due to intrinsic differences 
in their psi ability. 
In conclusion, very little research has been conducted into the role of personality 
characteristics in nonintentional psi. As there is considerable evidence, as reviewed 
above, for extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, and belief in psi 
playing a role in intentional psi experiments, but little understanding of how these 
interactions might function, research into personality and nonintentional psi is vital. 






individual differences (Palmer, 1977). As personality variables can interact with each 
other, and with the testing situation, multivariate approaches are recommended. To 
date, investigations into nonintentional psi and personality appear not to have 
considered the role of extraversion. Extraversion scores were almost certain to have 
been collected by Watt and Ravenscroft (2000), because the NEO FFI should only be 
administered in its entirety. It is unfortunate that they did not investigate the 
relationship between extraversion scores and psi hit rate in their experiment. As 
extraversion is associated with higher psi performance in intentional psi experiments 
(as reviewed above), it is worth investigating whether extraversion plays a role in 
nonintentional psi. In the next two chapters, we present two experiments that 
investigate the role that personality factors, including extraversion, might play in 
nonintentional psi. These two studies use different vehicles for investigating 
nonintentional psi, and we therefore motivate their precise methodologies in more 











3. Experiment 1: The Effect of Hidden Targets on a Line-
Length Judgement Task 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter presents an empirical study, Experiment 1, which investigated 
nonintentional psi with a novel task, and what role personality might play in this 
phenomenon. Participants made judgements about the relative length of visually 
presented lines, when there were actually no differences in the length of the lines. 
Unbeknown to the participants there were hidden targets with the “answers” to the 
line-length judging task. The associations between participants’ hit rates on the 
nonintentional task and their extraversion, belief in psi, openness to experience, 
neuroticism, and state anxiety were investigated. 
3.2. Introduction 
Nonintentional psi experiments ask whether participants, without conscious effort, 
respond to information that can only be gained through psi. As reviewed in Chapter 
2, hidden targets (i.e., those that participants do not know exist) can influence 
memory of a story (Stanford, 1970) as well as performance in exams with both 
multiple choice (Schechter, 1977) and essay-style questions (W. G. Braud, 1975; 
Johnson, 1973). In Experiment 1, below, hidden targets were used in a similar way to 
those in the exam studies, as written lists of targets in a format that parallels the 
answers participants will give. Hidden targets and hidden senders (i.e., senders who 
participants do not know exist) can also influence participants’ performance on 
standard psychological tests, to varying extents (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972, 1973). 
Experiment 1 used a standard psychological test, namely perceptual judgements, as 
the vehicle to assess nonintentional psi. One advantage of using a standard 






experiment, because they were required not to know that it was a parapsychological 
study. 
In Experiment 1 participants were presented with pairs of lines for a very short 
duration, aiming for perception on the threshold of conscious awareness. Participants 
were led to believe that there were differences in the length of the lines, although 
there actually were not. Their task was to select whether the line on the left or the 
right was the longest. Following the nonintentional psi hypothesis (that information 
that can only be accessed through psi can, without intention or awareness, guide 
behaviour in the same way it would if it were conscious knowledge) it was predicted 
that participants would choose answers to the line-length judgement task in 
accordance with a set of hidden targets more often than chance. 
The choice of task was motivated by prior empirical literature. Versions of the line-
length judgement task have been used in both psychology and parapsychology. In the 
former, it has been shown that one person’s judgement about line-lengths can be 
influenced by the consensus of a majority (Asch, 1951, 1955; R. Bond & Smith, 
1996). This is a strong influence, which can influence people to say that a clearly 
shorter line is the longest. In parapsychology, line-length judgements can also be 
influenced by telepathy, under certain circumstances (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1973). In 
Kreitler and Kreitler’s (1973) experiment, participants saw clearly visible lines that 
were the same length, and still selected one as the “longest”. Therefore line-length 
judgements are susceptible to psychological and parapsychological influences. The 
current experiment used the line-length task to investigate whether these judgements 
can be influenced by hidden targets.  
In addition to hypothesizing that the overall psi effect would be positive, we also 
hypothesized a response bias effect. The response bias effect is that there is a 
proportionally higher psi hit rate on the responses that are not favoured by any other 






experiment presented here, participants were expected to have a response bias, and 
answer either left or right more frequently when choosing which line is longest. 
Participants’ most frequent answer, their preferred side, is the one favoured by their 
response bias. So proportionally more psi hits are predicted on the non-preferred 
side. For example, a participant with a bias to respond left would have a higher 
proportion of psi hits in the trials when he responds right. This response bias effect 
has been found in previous experiments assessing nonintentional psi with recall of a 
story (Stanford, 1970), word association (Wilson, 2002a, 2004), recognition of 
subliminally presented letters, and autokinetic motion (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972), as 
reviewed in Chapter 2. In these previous experiments, with the exception of 
autokinetic motion test (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972), the response biases were taken 
from the combined responses of the participants at group level, and were not 
individual to each participant, and so may not have applied to all the participants 
equally. In Experiment 1 the response bias was calculated individually for each 
participant, extending the previous findings by considering the response bias with a 
new task, and at individual participant level. The participants’ less frequently given 
responses are expected to show a higher psi hit rate.  
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there has been minimal research into the role of 
personality characteristics in nonintentional psi experiments. In previous research in 
intentional psi experiments, extraversion appeared to correlate positively with psi 
performance (Eysenck, 1967b; Palmer, 1977; Sargent, 1981; Honorton et al., 1998). 
Additionally, in previous research with intentional and nonintentional psi tasks 
openness to experience correlated positively with psi scoring (Luke, Roe et al., 2008; 
Osis & Bokert, 1971; Wright, 2003 #95), but not in Watt and Ravenscroft (2000). 
Belief in psi has also been found to correlate positively with psi scoring in intentional 
and nonintentional psi experiments (Kennedy & Haight, 1978; Luke, Delanoy et al., 
2008). Neuroticism has usually correlated negatively with psi scoring in intentional 
tasks (W. G. Braud, 1981; Honorton, 1965; Kanthamani & Rao, 1973; Palmer, 






but was predicted to be associated with lower hit rates due to previous negative 
associations between state anxiety and psi performance in PK and ESP tasks 
(Broughton & Perlstrom, 1986, 1992; Roe et al., 2003). The current experiment 
extends this work by considering a broader range of traits within a single 
nonintentional psi study. Following from the previous findings in both intentional 
and nonintentional psi research, extraversion, belief in psi, and openness to 
experience are likely to be positively associated with performance on the 
nonintentional psi task. Neuroticism and state anxiety are likely to be negatively 
associated with performance on the nonintentional psi task. 
In Experiment 1, participants judged which of each pair of lines was the longest, 
although they were actually the same length. Unbeknown to the participants, there 
were hidden targets with the answers. We first assessed whether participants’ line 
length judgements concurred with the hidden targets more often than chance would 
dictate. Second, we assessed whether there was a response bias effect by assessing 
whether participants showed a proportionally higher hit rate on their non-preferred 
side. Finally, we assessed associations between participants’ extraversion, belief in 
psi, openness to experience, neuroticism, and state anxiety on their hit rate on the 
nonintentional task. 
3.2.1. Hypotheses. 
1 When required to choose which line in each pair of identical lines is the 
longest (the one on the left or the right), participants will choose in accordance with 
their hidden psi targets (score a hit) more often than MCE.  
2 Participants will score a higher proportion of hits on the line-length 
judgement task when they respond with their less frequently chosen answer (non-






3 Participants’ hit rates in the line-length judgement task will be positively 
correlated with their extraversion, belief in psi, and openness to experience scores, 
and negatively correlated with their neuroticism and state anxiety scores. 
3.3. Method  
3.3.1. Design. 
This experiment used a one group design. Participants’ responses were compared to 
MCE of 50%.  
3.3.2. Participants. 
Fifty participants volunteered, ranging from 17 to 45 years of age (M = 23.33, SD 
5.11 years), 28 of whom were female and 22 male. They were ostensibly recruited 
for an experiment in perceptual judgement.  
3.3.3. Ethical Considerations. 
We identified one potential ethical issue in this experiment. This was the intentional 
deception of participants regarding the overall aim of the experiment and the exact 
function of the experimental task. It was integral to the experimental design that 
participants would be deceived without their consent. We anticipated that this 
deception would not induce psychological harm or stress. We inferred that giving 
participants the right to terminate the experiment at any time and a full debrief 
following the experiment would adequately address this issue. The Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Edinburgh granted ethical approval 






3.3.4. Materials and Apparatus. 
Personality questionnaires. 
The 240-item NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) was used to score extraversion, 
neuroticism, and openness to experience. The NEO PI-R measures neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and the six 
facets (sub-sections) of each of these domains. It includes negatively phrased items; 
these are important to counteract the common tendency to answer yes more than no, 
which could lead to spurious findings if all the items were positively phrased. 
Participants circle their answer on five-point Likert scales anchored at 0 (strongly 
agree) and 4 (strongly disagree) in response to each item. An example item for 
extraversion is “I’m known as a warm and friendly person”. An example of a 
negatively phrased item for neuroticism is “I rarely feel fearful or anxious”. The 
items are scored from 0 to 4, leading to a possible maximum score for any domain of 
192. High scores indicate high levels of that trait, e.g., high extraversion.  
To measure state anxiety, participants completed the state anxiety section of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983). This is a well-validated 
and reliable measure of both state anxiety and trait anxiety; the internal consistency 
of the scales is .9, which is very high (Kline, 1998). The test-retest reliability for the 
state anxiety scale is low, but as state anxiety varies with the presence and absence of 
stressful influences it should vary from one test to another. Kline (1998) concluded 
that it is a very good quick test of anxiety. The state anxiety scale is a 20-item list of 
short statements that includes negatively phrased items, such as “I feel pleasant”. 
Participants fill in a circle on four-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (not at all) and 4 
(very much so) in response to each item. The items are scored from 1 to 4, with a 







Belief in psi was measured using the Koestler Parapsychology Unit belief in psi 12-
item questionnaire (Appendix 1). This comprises questions about participants’ belief 
in and experience of telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis; for 
example “Have you ever had an experience which is best explained by telepathy?” It 
includes two questions which ask whether participants think they have psi ability, in 
general “What best describes your own psi ability?”, and in experiments “Do you 
believe that you might be able to demonstrate any psi ability in a controlled 
laboratory experiment?” The seven-point response scales vary in wording due to the 
phrasing of the questions, but most are anchored at 1 (yes) and 7 (no). This 
questionnaire has a minimum score of 12 and a maximum of 84; high scores indicate 
a high belief in psi. This is neither a validated questionnaire, nor does it contain any 
negatively phrased items. It has been used in previous research (e.g., Wilson, 2002a).  
Line-length judgement materials. 
The stimuli comprised 50 pairs of identical lines. The lines were always the same 
length: 250 pixels high; the screen was set to a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. The 
lines were white on a black screen, and the experiment program was run in 
Shockwave on a Sony VAIO Laptop. There were stickers on the two keys that the 
participants would press to respond in the line-length judgement task: red for the left 
on the A key, blue for the right on the L key. 
Hidden targets. 
The hidden targets were the “answers” to the line-length discrimination task, and 
these answers were displayed in several different modalities. There is conflicting 
evidence regarding what information is received in psi experiments; it could be a 
visual image without the meaning, as was found in remote viewing experiments 
(Sinclair, 1962). Alternatively, there are accounts of the meaning being transmitted, 
without accurate imagery, such as hunches or symbolic dreams (Broughton, 1991). 






participants to achieve hits, information was represented in the following modalities: 
the meaning, a visual image, and the key that participants would press to score a hit. 
Each target therefore included: the word left or right; a picture of the lines, with the 
“longer” one represented by a line and the “shorter” one by a dot (e.g., | . or . |); the 
colour of the sticker on the key that they should press (red or blue); and the letter of 
that key (A or L). Thus, the left target was: left  | .  red A, and the right was: right  . | 
blue L. Although the lines differed in length in the hidden psi targets, they did not 
differ in length in the visual stimuli presented to the participants. 
Since each participant would do 50 trials (see Procedure below), 50 hidden target 
answers were created for each participant. These answers were printed on sheets of 
A4 paper, with each trial’s number (1 – 50) listed next to each trial’s target answer, 
e.g., 1. left  | .  red A. There was one vertical column of trial numbers, and one 
vertical column of target answers, aligned so that the answer to the first trial was at 
the top, and the last trial at the bottom. Nothing else was written on the sheet. Each 
participant had an individually randomised list of target answers to overcome the risk 
of the stacking effect (an unwanted artefact, see Chapter 2). 
3.3.5. Procedure. 
Hidden target selection and security. 
Prior to the start of the experiment, a member of staff at the University of Edinburgh, 
otherwise unconnected with the experiment, created the randomised lists of hidden 
target answers using a random function in Visual Basic. He created 50 unique lists, 
each with 50 target answers, balanced so that 25 targets were right and 25 were left 
in every list. The lists were printed and placed into opaque envelopes by a colleague, 
who was also otherwise unconnected with the experiment. She sealed the envelopes 
and wrote a participant number (from 1 – 50) on the outside. The first participant’s 
hidden targets were in envelope 1, and so on. The target envelopes were sealed with 






opened or tampered with. The participants did not know about the target envelopes, 
see them, or handle them, and so extra measures against fraud were not deemed 
necessary. The experimenter did not see any targets until after all the 
experimentation was concluded. At this point the envelopes were checked and none 
of them showed any evidence of having being tampered with. The target lists were 
kept in a locked drawer in the experimenter’s office until needed. Prior to each 
participant’s arrival, the experimenter took the envelope corresponding to the 
participant’s number, and concealed it under a PC on the testing desk, next to the 
laptop that participants used in the experiment. The envelope was out of sight.  
Session procedure. 
Participants were tested individually. They were greeted at the door to the 
psychology building, and shown to a waiting room in which they completed the NEO 
PI-R, which took between 20 and 35 minutes. Participants also signed a standard 
consent form agreeing to participate, and on the understanding that they could 
terminate the experiment at any time (no participants chose to). The experimenter 
then showed participants into the experimental room. One office in the Department 
of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh was used for testing. To maintain a 
constant level of luminosity a blackout blind was drawn over the window and the 
room was lit by artificial lights. Participants sat around 60 cm from the screen of the 
testing computer, a Sony VIAO Laptop computer, which was on a desk. This laptop 
had a screen size of 23 cm high by 30.5 cm wide; the screen resolution was set to 
1024 x 768 pixels. There was also a PC on the desk, under which the hidden targets 








Figure 2: The Experimental Room for Experiment 1 (not to scale) 
 
The experimenter gave verbal instructions for the line-length judgement task, and 
participants completed one practice trial, in which the lines were clearly a different 
length. Participants then had the opportunity to ask questions before moving onto the 
line-length judgement task. (Before beginning this task, participants briefly 
completed another task, not reported here. See Chapter 7). The experimenter left the 
room before the lines task began; participants did the line-length judgement task 
alone and unobserved. Each trial started with a one-second presentation of a fixation 
spot in the centre of the screen, in white on a black background. This was followed 






duration of 40 milliseconds was chosen after pilot testing. It was the duration at 
which most participants reported that they only indistinctly saw the lines.) The two 
vertical lines were immediately followed by a visual mask of two identical vertical 
columns of ‘x’ s where the lines had been. The mask aimed to prevent after-images 
and preserve the short duration of the presentation of the lines. Participants entered 
their choice for the longest line as the one on either the left or the right, by pressing 
the ‘A’ key on the laptop for left or the ‘L’ key for right. The computer program 
would not accept any answer other than ‘A’ or ‘L’. Once the participant had 
responded, the next trial began automatically, immediately presenting the fixation 
spot. When the trials were over, participants fetched the experimenter from the 
waiting room. The experimenter then asked a manipulation check question to 
establish how participants had experienced the task “Did you see the lines clearly?” 
(She also asked other questions related to the task reported in Chapter 7). Participants 
then completed the STAI. The experimenter then showed them out of the building. It 
was only after the results were analysed that the participants were debriefed by 
email. 
3.3.6. Analyses. 
Analyses were conducted in SPSS version 14 (SPSS Inc, 2005) and Microsoft Excel 
(Microsoft Corporation, 2003).  
3.4. Results 
Manipulation check. 
All participants were able to perform this task, regardless of whether they reported 
conscious awareness of seeing the lines. Therefore, these stimuli were fit for the 
purposes of this task. Seventeen participants reported not seeing the lines, and a 
further eight were unsure whether they had seen the lines. However, none of the 






Hypotheses 1 and 2: When required to choose which of each 
pair of identical lines is the longest (the one on the left or the 
right), participants will choose in accordance with their hidden 
psi targets (score a hit) more often than MCE. Participants will 
score a higher proportion of hits on the line-length judgement 
task when they answer with their less frequently chosen answer 
(non-preferred side) compared to their more frequently chosen 
answer (preferred side). 
Data was coded such that participants scored a hit when they pressed the button for 
the left or right line being longest corresponding to their hidden target for that trial. 
Three participants’ data were lost due to a programming error. The data that were 
included in the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Means, standard deviations and range of hits on the line-length 
judgement task, overall and split by side (preferred/non-preferred). 
 mean SD min max 
Total hits as % 49.96 5.86 38 60 
Preferred side hits as % 49.76 5.13 39 59 
Non-preferred side hits as % 51.37 8.14 36 69 
Note. N = 47. 
Each participant’s hit rate was calculated as the number of hits/total number of trials 
as a percentage. The mean percentage of hits on the lines task was 49.96. This was 
found to be non-significantly different from MCE of 50 by one-sample t test, t(46) = 
-.05, p = .96, effect size f = -0.01. This effect size is the equivalent of d (J. Cohen, 
1977); this is an extremely small effect size. Hypothesis 1 was not supported. There 
was no overall evidence of psi in this experiment. 
Each participant’s hit rate for his or her preferred side was calculated as the number 
of hits on the preferred side/the number of trials in which the preferred side was the 






hits on the preferred and non-preferred sides were significantly different from each 
other by paired-samples t test, t(46) = -2.11, p =.04, Cohen’s d = 0.24, a small effect 
size. Hypothesis 2 was supported; participants got more hits on their less frequently 
chosen side.  
Hypothesis 3: Participants’ hit rates in the line-length judgement 
task will be positively correlated with their extraversion, belief in 
psi, and openness to experience scores, and negatively 
correlated with their neuroticism and state anxiety scores. 
Table 2 shows the outcomes of Pearson’s correlations between overall hit rate on the 
psi task and neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, belief in psi, and state 
anxiety. The alpha level was set to p =.01 to correct for there being five analyses. As 
the directions of effects were stated in the hypothesis all ps are one-tailed. A sub-set 
of personality questionnaires (N = 29 for the NEO PI-R, N = 23 for belief in psi, N = 
22 state anxiety) were lost prior to coding due to a break-in, and after it was no 
longer practical to ask participants to repeat them. The remaining data are shown 
below.  
Table 2:  Personality and individual differences correlation coefficients 
with overall hit rate 
Variables Correlated N Pearson’s r p 
Neuroticism  21 .22 .19 
Extraversion 21 .48** .01 
Openness to Experience 21 .34 .06 
Belief in Psi 27 .13 .25 
State Anxiety 28 .04 .43 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
There was a significant correlation between the total number of hits on the lines task 
and extraversion. There was no significant correlation found with neuroticism, state 






To assess the personality variables in conjunction with each other, the data were re-
analysed with a regression. Extraversion, openness to experience, state anxiety, 
neuroticism, and belief in psi were entered into a backwards stepwise linear 
regression model with entry point determined as p = .05 and exit point determined as 
p = .10. Extraversion, openness to experience, and state anxiety were retained in the 
model. These variables were put into a regression model using the enter command. 
The model constant and outputs are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary of stepwise regression analysis for personality 
variables and psi task hit rate 
Variable B SE B ß p 
Constant 4.21 13.27   
Extraversion 0.16 0.55 .54** .01 
Openness to Experience 0.14 0.72 .35 .07 
State Anxiety 0.22 0.12 .35 .08 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
The standardised beta value ß is the number of standard deviations that the outcome 
(overall number of hits) will change as a result of a 1 standard deviation change in 
the personality variable, so it is an indication of the size of the relationship between 
the personality variable and hit rate. There was a significant relationship between hit 
rate and extraversion. Openness and state anxiety did not have a significant 
relationship, but contributed to the model which explains 44% of the variance in the 
hit rates between participants (R
2
 = .44). This provides further support that the 
relationship between extraversion and hit rate in Table 2 is genuine. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 was supported for extraversion, but not for any of the other personality 
variables.  
3.5. Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate whether participants’ behaviour could be altered by 






influenced by personality. Participants judged which of two lines was longest in a 
task where the lines were in fact the same length, and their responses were compared 
to a set of pre-determined hidden target answers. There were three hypotheses, and 
these are considered in turn below. 
The first hypothesis was that there would be an overall positive psi hit rate, i.e., that 
participants’ responses would match the hidden target answers more often than 
would be expected by chance. This hypothesis was not supported. This may be 
because there was in fact no psi influence in this experiment; however, it is important 
to consider possible reasons why this experiment might have failed to find a psi 
effect, if one existed. Although versions of the line-judgement task have been used 
previously, they have shown effects in somewhat different circumstances to those 
used here. Asch (1952) found that participants would give false line-length 
judgements to conform with a unanimous group. Asch also displayed the lines for a 
long duration, so they were clearly seen. In the current study, in contrast, the lines 
were displayed for a very short period of time (around the threshold of awareness) 
and the influence came from a psi source, which we expected to exert a weaker 
influence than the social influence of pressure to conform. So, although the line-
length judgement task was inspired by research into conformity, the adaptations to 
make it suitable for a nonintentional psi task rendered it quite different in nature from 
these social conformity experiments.  
Nonetheless, a line-length judgement task has previously been used in a 
nonintentional psi task (Kreitler and Kreitler, 1973). However, there were two key 
differences between Experiment 1 and Kreitler and Kreitler’s study. Firstly, there 
was no sender in the current study. Kreitler and Kreitler found that only when a 
sender was actively trying to transmit information was the receiver’s choice affected. 
Possibly there was no evidence of psi in Experiment 1 because there was no sender. 
However, this conclusion would be at odds with other experimental findings that 






free-response GESP experiments (Morris, Dalton, Delanoy, & Watt, 1995; Palmer, 
1978). Therefore, the absence of a sender alone cannot explain the findings. 
 A second difference between this lines task and the one used by Kreitler and Kreitler 
(1973) was that in their experiment the stimuli were clearly presented lines of the 
same length, or circles the same size, with distorting illusions subliminally 
superimposed in two-thirds of the trials. A significant deviation from chance was 
found only in the trials in which the psi information contradicted the subliminal 
information. For example, the subliminal illusion made the right line look longer, but 
the psi-target information was that the left line was longer. No psi effect was found 
when the psi and subliminal information were in agreement, or when there was no 
subliminal illusion presented. In Experiment 1 the lines were presented at what was 
aimed to be the threshold of conscious awareness. One limitation was that it was not 
possible to adjust the presentation duration individually for each participant, and so 
some did not see the lines, and some reported seeing them clearly. For the 17 of the 
50 participants who reported that they did not see the lines, the presentation was 
below the subjective level of conscious awareness. For the others it was still arguably 
a weak stimulus. The line stimuli presented were always the same length as each 
other, and so conflicted with the psi information to an extent, but not as strongly as 
the stimuli in Kreitler and Kreitler’s (1973) experiment, in which the subliminal 
information and psi information gave opposite answers. There was no overall 
deviation from chance, however, and so this does not corroborate Kreitler and 
Kreitler’s (1973) finding that a psi effect is more likely to occur when its information 
contradicts another weak stimulus. Admittedly the stimuli in Experiment 1 were 
quite different, and a more exact replication of the Kreitler and Kreitler’s (1973) 
experiment might duplicate their findings.  
An additional suggestion as to why an overall psi effect was not found relates to the 
participants’ motivation in the lines task. Stanford (1974, 1990) and Broughton (2006 






situations where psi would be acting nonintentionally and without awareness. The 
experiments on nonintentional psi in exams used the students’ intrinsic motivation as 
the incentive, and these found evidence that supported a nonintentional psi effect (W. 
G. Braud, 1975; Johnson, 1973; Schechter, 1977). Another way to create an incentive 
is to provide a reward if the participants score in line with their hidden targets, or a 
punishment if they do not (Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008; 
Stanford & Associates, 1976; Stanford & Stio, 1976; Stanford & Thompson, 1974; 
Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000). These studies have also predominantly found significant 
effects. The participants in Experiment 1 were unlikely to be as strongly motivated to 
perform well on the lines task as students sitting an exam, although a need for the 
psi-target information was created by asking them to pick the longest line for each 
trial. Participants who did not see the lines might also have experienced reduced 
motivation because they found the experiment frustrating and thought that they could 
not do it. They also were not provided with any reward for psi performance, and 
therefore, if an incentive is important in psi tests, this might have been a reason for 
the overall null effect.  
The lack of feedback might also have had an effect on participants’ performance in 
the line-length judgement task. Trial-by-trial feedback has been found to be psi-
conducive (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989). This could be because it acts as a reward for 
the participant, as they receive a sense of achievement, although this might depend 
upon how well they do at the task. The importance of feedback is also implicated by 
the observational theories of psi, which state that the source of psi has to observe the 
outcome in order for a psi effect to occur (Broughton, 1988). If the participant is the 
source of psi and the observational theories are correct, it might be vital for 
participants to receive feedback. The participants in Experiment 1 did not receive 
trial-by-trial feedback, and their individual performance on the lines task was not 






In summary, regarding Hypothesis 1, there were issues in this experiment concerning 
aspects of the task, feedback, and participant motivation that might have reduced the 
possibility of finding a psi effect. In future experiments manipulations to increase 
motivation, checks that this has worked, and giving feedback to the participants 
could be used to increase the chances of a psi effect.  
The second hypothesis in this study was that there would be a higher proportion of 
hits on the participants’ less preferred responses, in accordance with the response 
bias effect. This hypothesis was supported. This replicates previous response bias 
effect findings, all of which found a greater psi effect in the response for which there 
was no non-psi bias (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; Stanford, 1967, 1970, 1973; Wilson, 
2002a, 2002b). The analysis in Experiment 1 used each participant’s individual 
preference to answer left or right. This differs from most previous research, in which 
the response biases were calculated for the whole experimental sample (Wilson, 
2002a; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; Stanford, 1967) or from published norms (Stanford, 
1973). In these experiments for which the response bias was calculated at a group 
level there is a risk that some of the participants would have had different response 
biases, affecting the accuracy of the calculations to an unknown level. Experiment 1 
therefore adds support to the response bias effect, and has extended the previous 
findings by investigating this effect with a new task.  
The response bias effect has now been demonstrated in word association tasks 
(Stanford, 1973; Wilson, 2002a), memory tasks (Stanford, 1970), intentional 
clairvoyance tasks (Stanford, 1967), letter recognition, autokinetic motion and 
responses to TAT cards (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972). In addition, a similar effect has 
been found with a selected psychic participant (Morris, 1971) indicating that it is a 
robust effect. The only previous experiment to have considered participants’ 
response biases at an individual level was the autokinetic motion study (Kreitler & 
Kreitler, 1972). A similar pattern was found in both Experiment 1 and in the 






response bias effect. This indicates that it is worth looking for internal effects for psi 
even in studies with null overall effects. The response bias effect, if it is a true psi 
effect, indicates that psi acts upon the behaviours that are otherwise less likely to be 
carried out. This could be a function of the behaviour being rarer, as there is a greater 
capacity for a rare event’s frequency to be increased (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972). It 
could also be because an unusual psi-mediated impulse is less likely to be ignored 
(Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; Stanford, 1967). Morris (1971) argued that psi 
information cuts through the usual behaviour pattern. Whatever the reason, there is 
an implication that psi might influence behaviour in the absence of other information. 
As other sensory information is clearer, and more verifiable, it might only be when 
sensory information is lacking that one would need to use psi. It might also be the 
case that any other stronger sensory signals override psi information. Further 
investigations of the response bias effect might lead to a greater understanding of 
how psi functions. 
The third hypothesis was that there would be an association between participants’ hit 
rates and their personality and individual differences scores. These relationships were 
investigated to increase the understanding of how personality might relate to 
performance in nonintentional psi tasks. A secondary aim of considering these 
factors was to ensure that any patterns in participants’ performance that were related 
to personality were not masked by an overall null effect. For instance, an overall null 
effect could result from high performance from extroverts and low performance from 
introverts. Extraversion, openness to experience, and belief in psi were hypothesised 
to be positively correlated with psi scoring. Neuroticism and state anxiety were 
hypothesised to be negatively correlated with psi scoring. The outcomes with each 
personality variable will be considered in turn.  
Extraversion scores correlated significantly with psi scoring on the nonintentional psi 
task, with a large effect size (r = .48). This was in the expected direction: Higher 






role of extraversion in nonintentional psi. Extraversion has previously been found to 
be associated with higher psi scoring in intentional psi tasks (Eysenck, 1967b; 
Honorton et al., 1998; Palmer, 1977; Sargent, 1981). The effect size estimated for 
individually tested participants in forced-choice intentional psi experiments was r = 
.15 (Honorton et al., 1998). The effect size in Experiment 1 was larger, although this 
should be interpreted with caution given the small number of participants. Honorton 
et al. concluded that the relationship between extraversion and psi scoring in forced-
choice psi tasks was artefactual, the result of participants rating their extraversion 
higher if they received high psi scores. In Experiment 1 the participants completed 
the extraversion measure before the psi task was explained to them, and did not know 
that there was a psi task, so there was no risk of that artefact. The positive correlation 
between extraversion and psi in Experiment 1 therefore supported the extraversion 
and psi association in general, and extended the findings to a nonintentional task. 
Although no strong conclusions can be drawn from just one experimental finding, the 
correlation between extraversion and psi in this nonintentional psi task suggests that 
the relationship between extraversion and psi is not due to any confounding factors 
present in intentional psi tasks, such as the attempt to become consciously aware of 
psi information, but that extraversion is related to psi ability per se.  
Openness to experience correlated non-significantly with hit rates. This is a failure to 
replicate the positive correlation between psi and openness in a nonintentional task 
(Luke, Roe et al., 2008). It concurs with the null finding of Watt and Ravenscroft 
(2000). Although non-significant, the correlation between hit rate and openness in 
Experiment 1 had a medium to large effect size (r = .34), and so with a larger sample 
size might have reached significance. The effect size in Luke et al.’s (2008) 
experiment (r =.46) was of a similar magnitude. Further replication is required to 
draw any conclusions about the role of openness to experience in psi, in both 






There was no significant relationship between psi score and belief in psi in 
Experiment 1, a failure to replicate the positive correlations between hit rate and 
belief in psi in two previous nonintentional psi experiments (Kennedy & Haight, 
1978; Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008). This difference in findings might be due to 
random variation, or methodological or sampling differences between the 
experiments. The importance of belief in psi in nonintentional tasks is the insight it 
could give into the origins of the sheep-goat effect. Whereas the two previous 
findings indicated that there is an effect of belief in nonintentional psi tasks, and 
therefore that psi ability might lead to the difference in belief, Experiment 1 does not.  
There was no significant correlation found between hit rate and state anxiety or 
neuroticism in Experiment 1. The null correlation with state anxiety failed to 
replicate previous findings in which high state anxiety was associated with poorer psi 
scoring (Broughton & Perlstrom, 1986, 1992; Roe et al., 2003), but these previous 
findings derive from intentional psi tasks. The null correlation between psi and 
neuroticism in Experiment 1 concurred with Watt and Ravenscroft (2000), who did 
not find a significant relationship between psi and neuroticism in a nonintentional psi 
task. In intentional psi tasks, negative correlations between psi and neuroticism have 
been found (W. G. Braud, 1981; Palmer, 1977). This has not been upheld in the 
nonintentional psi task investigations so far.  
One limitation of the investigation into the effect of personality in this experiment 
was the low number of participants who provided personality data. This reduced the 
power of the analyses. The NEO PI-R took up to half an hour to complete, which 
was a drawback because it restricted recruitment; not all potential participants could 
spare such a long time for the experiment. As the NEO PI-R is completed on a 
copyrighted booklet it is not viable for participants to complete only individual 
subscales; the whole questionnaire has to be completed. This wasted time, as 






drawback of the NEO PI-R was that it was scored manually, risking human error. A 
quicker, computer-based questionnaire would be preferable.  
3.6. Conclusions 
There was no overall psi effect. There was a replication of the response bias effect. 
There was a significant positive correlation between hit rate and extraversion, 
supporting the hypothesis that psi ability and extraversion are related, and extending 






4. Experiment 2: The Effect of Hidden Targets on Incidental 
Timing of a Maths Task 
4.1. Overview 
This chapter presents Experiment 2, which investigated the effect of hidden targets 
and personality in a novel nonintentional psi task. Experiment 2 aimed to improve 
upon Experiment 1 by using a larger sample and an incentive for the participants to 
score in accordance with the hidden targets. Participants timed themselves 
completing a maths task. One aspect of the timing of the maths task dictated whether 
the participants received a pleasant reward or an unpleasant punishment. The 
associations between hit rate on the nonintentional task and participants’ 
extraversion, belief in psi, openness to experience, neuroticism, and state anxiety 
were investigated. 
4.2. Introduction 
According to the PMIR model, behavioural responses to psi information happen via 
the triggering of people’s usual behaviours, and one such mechanism suggested is 
timing (Stanford, 1974, 1990). As reviewed in Chapter 2, effects on timing have been 
found in nonintentional psi experiments, under certain conditions (Stanford & 
Associates, 1976; Stanford & Stio, 1976). In these previous experiments, the relative 
timing of one key trial in a word association task dictated whether participants 
entered a reward condition or a punishment condition. Timing has not previously 
been used as a vehicle for nonintentional psi in any task other than word association. 
In Experiment 2, participants timed themselves completing a maths task. Unbeknown 
to the participants, hidden targets (targets that the participant does not know exist) 
had been created, relating to the timing of the task. Specifically, the hidden target 
stated whether the last digit of the stopwatch, which recorded 100
th
s of seconds 






determined whether the participant received a reward or a punishment. The 
centisecond digit was chosen in preference to the minute digit, for example, because 
altering the number of minutes would be confounded with other factors such as the 
participant’s maths ability. This task in Experiment 2 also differed from the word-
association timing tasks in that a change in the total time of the maths task was the 
dependent variable, not the speed of one trial relative to the others. We hoped that 
this would reduce noise and confounds. Participants were hypothesised to adjust their 
timing nonintentionally to get an odd or an even final digit on the stopwatch in line 
with a randomly selected hidden target, more than mean chance expectation (MCE). 
A reward might be important in providing people with an incentive, albeit 
nonintentionally, to “use” psi (Broughton, 2006a; Stanford, 1974, 1990). In 
Experiment 1 there was no incentive for the participants to generate psi hits, such as 
a reward or feedback. This lack of incentive may have reduced the chances of finding 
a psi effect. In Experiment 2 participants’ responses on the nonintentional task will, 
unbeknown to them, lead to either a favourable reward if they achieve a hit or to a 
punishment condition if they do not. The following rewards, contingent upon hit rate, 
have been used in nonintentional psi experiments that found an overall significant psi 
effect: cartoons (Luke, Roe et al., 2008), erotic pictures (Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008; 
Stanford, 1973; Stanford & Associates, 1976; Stanford & Thompson, 1974), and 
erotic-toned relaxation (Stanford & Stio, 1976). The following punishment 
conditions have been used in nonintentional psi experiments that found an overall 
significant psi effect: a forced-choice ESP task (Stanford & Stio, 1976), a pursuit 
rotor task (Stanford & Associates, 1976), and vigilance or inspection tasks (Luke, 
Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008; Stanford, 1973; Stanford & Thompson, 
1974).  
The reward condition in Experiment 2 was winning chocolate, and the punishment 
condition was to tell participants that they had not won this prize. The previous 






main categories: joy (e.g., cartoons) and sexual arousal (e.g., erotic pictures and 
relaxation), both of which could be subsumed by pleasure. Chocolate was chosen as 
the reward for Experiment 2 because it should also be a pleasurable incentive. It is 
important to check that participants find the reward desirable, otherwise it might not 
provide an incentive at all (Luke, 2008). Participants’ ratings of the desirability of the 
reward tasks and punishment tasks were checked by Luke, Roe and Davison (2008), 
in their second experiment only, but in all the other experiments referenced above 
these were not checked. In Experiment 2 this was checked by asking participants to 
rate their experiences of the reward or punishment.  
Experiment 2 also continued the investigation of the relationship between 
nonintentional psi performance and the following personality measures: extraversion, 
openness to experience, neuroticism, state anxiety, and belief in psi. In Experiment 1, 
a significant correlation between hit rate and extraversion was found, and so 
extraversion was of particular interest in Experiment 2. In line with the findings in 
previous literature (see Chapter 2), we hypothesised that higher extraversion, 
openness to experience, and belief in psi will be associated with psi hitting, as will 
lower state anxiety and neuroticism.  
In summary, in Experiment 2, participants timed themselves with a stopwatch 
completing a maths task. Unbeknown to the participants, there were hidden targets 
relating to timing, of either odd or even numbers. If participants stopped the 
stopwatch with the final digit (centiseconds) showing an odd or an even number that 
concurred with their hidden target (i.e., scored a hit), they won a reward of chocolate. 
If they did not score a hit they were told that they had not won chocolate. Firstly, we 
assessed whether participants stopped the stopwatch on a digit that concurred with 
their hidden targets more often than MCE. Secondly, we assessed the associations 
between participants’ extraversion, belief in psi, openness to experience, neuroticism, 






4.3. Hypotheses  
1  More participants will stop their stopwatch on a digit in accordance with their 
hidden target (score a hit) than MCE.  
2  Personality variables will be associated with the likelihood of a hit on the 
nonintentional psi task. Extraversion, openness to experience, and belief in psi are 
hypothesised to have a positive association with the likelihood of a hit on the 
nonintentional psi task. State anxiety and neuroticism are hypothesised to have a 
negative association with the likelihood of a hit on the nonintentional psi task.  
4.4. Method 
4.4.1. Design. 
This experiment used a one group design. Participants’ responses were compared to 
MCE of 50%.  
4.4.2. Participants. 
One hundred participants with a mean age of 22.87 years, 38 of whom were male and 
62 female, participated for course credits. The participants were naïve to the purpose 
of the experiment, and did not know of the experimenter’s interest in 
parapsychology.  
4.4.3. Ethical Considerations. 
We identified one potential ethical issue, deliberate deception of the participants, 
similarly to Experiment 1 (see Chapter 3). We addressed this by giving participants 
the right to terminate the experiment at any time and a full debrief following the 
experiment. The Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of 






4.4.4. Materials and Apparatus. 
A 50-item maths task composed of 50 simple multiplication questions was presented 
on paper (see Appendix 2). An ATECH SW210 stopwatch, accurate to centiseconds, 
was provided along with a clipboard and pen.   
Personality Questionnaires. 
Extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience were measured on scales from 
the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999). Each scale has 10 items, such as “I feel comfortable 
around people” for extraversion and “I have a vivid imagination” for openness to 
experience. Some of the items, such as “I am not easily bothered by things” for 
neuroticism, are negatively phrased items. Participants respond on five-point Likert 
scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). Each trait scale is 
scored from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 50 points. High scores indicate, for 
example, high extraversion. The IPIP measures the same five-factor personality 
constructs as the NEO PI-R (Goldberg, 1999), but it is in the public domain, and 
therefore free and editable. A bespoke version was constructed (see Appendix 3), 
omitting the scales for agreeableness and conscientiousness, saving experiment time 
and money.   
State anxiety was measured on a six-item state anxiety questionnaire (Marteau & 
Bekker, 1992). Participants rate items, for example “I am tense” on four-point Likert 
scales anchored at 1 (not at all) and 4 (very much). State anxiety is scored from a 
minimum of six to a maximum of 24 points; high scores indicate high state anxiety.  
The final questionnaire was the Koestler Parapsychology Unit belief in psi 12-item 
questionnaire (Appendix 4). Participants respond on seven-point Likert scales 
anchored at 1 (no) and 7 (yes). Minor changes in the wording of two of the questions 






throughout, which facilitated online presentation. Belief in psi is scored from a 
minimum of 12 to a maximum of 84; high scores indicate a high belief in psi.  
4.4.5. Procedure. 
Target selection and security. 
Prior to Experiment 2 starting, the experimenter generated the hidden targets using 
Microsoft Excel’s random function. This produced a list of 100 numbers to 
correspond to the 100 participants. Each number ranged between 0 and 9. If the first 
number was odd the target for the first participant was odd, and so on. The list 
remained in electronic form. It was stored in a password-protected data area on the 
Department of Psychology’s secure server at the University of Edinburgh. The 
experimenter was not blind to the targets.  
Session procedure. 
The experiment was carried out in one room within the experimental laboratory suite 
in the basement of the Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh. 
Participants were tested individually. The experimenter greeted participants in the 
waiting area of the suite, or, occasionally, by the door to the building. They were 
shown into the experimental room. Participants sat at the testing desk with an 
experimental PC (Vision Master Pro 413) on it. The experimenter verbally explained 
the procedure. After an opportunity to ask questions, all the participants signed a 
standard consent form agreeing to participate. This explained that they could 
terminate the experiment at any time (no participants chose to). Participants practiced 
using the stopwatch.  
The participants completed the personality questions and the STAI on the PC in 
Lime Survey, an online survey host (Lime Survey, 2005), and then went on to 






completed the maths task on paper. Once each participant finished the maths task, the 
experimenter checked the final digit of the participant’s recorded time for the maths 
task against his or her target. Participants scored a hit if their final digit was odd and 
their target was odd, or if both were even. The experimenter then told the participant 
that there had been a hidden task within the maths task for which they could win a 
prize of chocolate, and whether or not they had been successful. They chose their 
prize immediately from a large assortment if they won. They were not told what the 
hidden task had been. Participants were requested not to discuss the experiment with 
their classmates because they might also be participating. After the maths task the 
participants did the post-experiment questionnaire online. This included a 
manipulation check of how much the participants were motivated to win the reward 
and avoid the punishment and the belief in psi scale. All participants were asked 
“Did you win chocolate for the maths task?”, and answered yes or no by clicking a 
tick-box onscreen. Participants who answered yes were then asked: “How happy 
were you to win chocolate?” and they answered on a seven-point Likert scale 
anchored at 1 (very little) and 7 (very much). Participants who had answered no were 
asked: “How disappointed were you NOT to win chocolate?”, and answered on a 
similar Likert scale. The questions were routed by a function called skip-logic which 
enables different questions to be presented depending on the participants’ previous 
answers. The belief in psi scale was presented last to avoid indicating to participants 
that the experiment had anything to do with parapsychology during the experiment. 
After the questionnaire was completed, participants had an opportunity to ask 
questions and were then shown out of the laboratory. Only after the results had been 
analysed were participants de-briefed by email, but they were never told what the 
hidden psi task had been. 
4.4.6. Analyses. 







Manipulation check: Were participants motivated to win 
chocolate? 
Participants’ motivation for the reward was assessed by averaging participants’ 
rating of their answers to the manipulation check questions (How happy/disappointed 
were you to win/NOT to win chocolate?). A low score on either question indicated 
low motivation for the reward. Participants overall expressed a medium motivation 
level for the reward (M = 4.10). Four is the midpoint on a seven-point scale. Thus 
this reward was moderately desired by the participants. 
Hypothesis 1: More participants will stop their stopwatch on a 
digit in accordance with their hidden target (score a hit) than 
would be expected by chance.  
Of the 100 participants, 47 scored a hit and 53 did not. This was non-significantly 
different from the MCE of 50%, exact binomial p (two-tailed) = .62. Therefore, this 
hypothesis was not supported as the participants did not get hits any more often, or 
less often, than chance. The two-tailed analysis was chosen to allow for the effect of 







Hypothesis 2: Personality variables will be associated with the 
likelihood of a hit on the nonintentional psi task. Extraversion, 
openness to experience, and belief in psi are hypothesised to 
have a positive association with the likelihood of a hit on the 
nonintentional psi task. State anxiety and neuroticism are 
hypothesised to have a negative association with the likelihood 
of a hit on the nonintentional psi task.  
This was assessed by backwards stepwise logistic regression with inclusion and 
exclusion criteria of .05 and .10. None of the personality and individual differences 
variables (predictors) were retained in the model. To produce the figures in Table 4, 
the predictors were forced to enter a logistic regression model.  
Table 4: Logistic Regression for Personality and Individual Differences 
Predictors and Psi Task Performance 
 95% CI for exp b 
  B (SE) exp b Lower Upper 
Constant -1.74 2.64 1.42     
Not included in model           
Extraversion -0.04 0.04 0.96 0.89 1.04 
Neuroticism -0.02 0.04 0.98 0.91 1.06 
Openness to experience 0.06 0.04 1.07 0.98 1.16 
State Anxiety 0.06 0.09 1.06 0.90 1.26 
Belief in psi 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.98 1.04 
Note. N = 98 
The value of exp b indicates the direction of the effect, values greater than 1 mean 
that the odds of a hit increase with an increase in the predictor. Values of less than 1 
mean a negative association between the predictor and the odd of a hit. The 
personality variables are significant predictors if the 95% confidence intervals do not 
contain 1. Therefore, none of these variables significantly predict a hit on the 







Experiment 2 aimed to investigate whether participants’ behaviour would 
nonintentionally respond to information in hidden targets, when these dictated 
whether or not participants would “win” a reward. Participants timed themselves 
with a stopwatch completing a maths task. If participants stopped the stopwatch with 
the final digit (centiseconds) concurring with their hidden target, in terms of being 
showing an odd or an even number, they won a reward of chocolate. The first 
hypothesis, that there would be an overall positive deviation from chance for the hit 
rate, was not supported. Therefore, the results of this experiment do not support the 
psi hypothesis. This null finding was unexpected given that there have been two 
previous experiments that found a significant timing effect from nonintentional psi 
(Stanford & Associates, 1976; Stanford & Stio, 1976); however, in both those studies 
the significant effect was only found in certain conditions. Stanford and Stio (1976) 
found a significant timing effect between trials in which the target direction was fast, 
but not when it was slow, while Stanford and Associates (1976) only found a 
significant difference between trials with female and male experimenters. The 
findings from Experiment 2 concurred with Stanford and Thompson (1974), who did 
not find a significant effect in their word association and timing experiment. One 
explanation for the null findings is that the psi hypothesis is false. If this is not the 
case, there might be indications in previous experiments as to why there was a null 
effect in Experiment 2, and these are considered below.   
One possible reason that the current study did not find a psi effect is that the timing 
task itself was quite different to that in the three Stanford experiments. In Experiment 
2 participants scored a hit if the final digit on their stopwatch matched their hidden 
target by being odd or even, when timing themselves completing a maths task. In 
Stanford’s experiments, participants scored a hit by being faster or slower on a 
randomly determined key trial in producing word associations relative to the speed of 






Stio, 1976; Stanford & Thompson, 1974). These other trials might add noise, and so 
Experiment 2 used overall timing, not relative timing, as a simpler dependent 
variable. The exploratory idea that overall timing might better capture a psi effect 
was not supported. Stanford and Stio (1976) argued that their word association task 
involved participants giving their dominant responses (the responses that are most 
readily made) as participants voiced the first word that came to mind. Stanford and 
Stio (1976) reasoned that dominant responses are more likely to be facilitated than 
inhibited by psi. This led them to hypothesise that trials in which the key word 
association had to be produced faster (rather than slower) than the other responses 
would show a greater psi effect, and this was found. The same argument cannot be 
applied to whether participants stopped a stopwatch on an odd or an even digit, as 
neither response is more dominant, and this might account for the null effect found in 
Experiment 2.  
A second difference between Experiment 2 and the timing and word association 
studies relates to Stanford’s finding that better psi performance occurred with female 
experimenters (Stanford & Associates, 1976; Stanford & Stio, 1976). This might 
have been because the presence of an attractive female experimenter increased the 
all-male participants’ need to take part in the erotic reward tasks, but it also might 
have been because female/male experimenter/participant pairs work better overall, as 
has been indicted in some intentional psi experiments (Dalton, 1994; Dalton & Utts, 
1995). It is possible that Experiment 2 failed to detect a psi effect on timing because 
the participants were of mixed gender. To test this, a post-hoc chi-squared analysis 
was run, but it showed no difference in the scoring rates for male and female 
participants in Experiment 2: χ² (1, N = 100) =.59, non-significant. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, neither gender scored better than the other, and so the null results are 
not attributable to the mixed-gender sample. In summary, the fact that the timing task 
was quite different in nature from that used in the word association and timing 






There are other possible explanations for the null results in Experiment 2. Although 
Experiment 2 had a large sample size, each participant contributed only one trial, 
with a binary outcome. This might not have been sensitive enough to detect a psi 
effect, if there was one. Other studies with only one trial per participant did find 
results that support the psi hypothesis, however (Stanford, 1990), suggesting that 
sensitivity may not be the key issue here.  
A further difference between the procedure in Experiment 2 and those of previous, 
successful experiments is the proximity of the targets to the participants. In previous 
experiments with hidden answers to exams the answers were attached to the 
students’ answer documents (W. G. Braud, 1975; Johnson, 1973; Schechter, 1977; 
Willis et al., 1974). In Experiment 2 the targets were not in close proximity to the 
participants, and only existed in electronic form as numbers on a spreadsheet. 
Schechter (1977) suggested that the proximity of the target answers in the exam 
studies is one reason why the target answers affected the students’ responses, but 
there have been other successful, nonintentional psi experiments in which the targets 
were not in close proximity to the participants. For instance, Stanford (1970) 
generated the psi targets after all the experimental trials had been run, and so at the 
time of the experiment the targets did not even exist. The table of random numbers 
that Stanford (1970) used to determine the targets did exist at the time of the 
experiment, but the entry point was only determined afterwards. Similar precognitive 
targets, generated by a random algorithm after each trial, were used in experiments 
that found an overall nonintentional psi effect (Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, in Experiment 1 the targets were presented in close 
proximity to the participants and an overall psi effect was not found. Therefore, 
target proximity is unlikely to be the reason for the chance effects in Experiment 2.  
Finally, Schechter (1977) also suggested that the format of the targets might have 
been important in the exam studies. In the exam studies, the targets were presented in 






Nonetheless, it is unlikely that target format explains the null results, because other 
studies with targets in a different format from the participants’ answers or responses 
have shown a psi effect. For example, precognitive targets that were not yet created 
and, therefore, had no format, have demonstrated an influence (Luke, Delanoy et al., 
2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008; Stanford, 1970).  
Stanford (1974, 1990) proposed that people nonintentionally use psi to fulfil their 
needs or reflect their inclinations. This is tested experimentally by arranging rewards 
and punishments contingent upon performance in nonintentional psi tasks, (e.g., 
Stanford 1973). Experiment 2 incorporated an incentive for participants to stop the 
stopwatch in accordance with their hidden target. Unbeknown to the participants they 
would win a reward of chocolate if they scored a hit. In order for this reward to 
function as an incentive it has to be desirable to the participants. As noted in the 
introduction, this has rarely been checked in previous experiments. In Experiment 2 
participants’ motivation ratings were near the midpoint of the scale, and so the 
reward might not have been a good enough incentive to motivate them, 
nonintentionally, to win. If the chocolate was not a good enough incentive, then, 
according to the PMIR theory, we would not expect a psi result in this experiment. 
Therefore, while the results of Experiment 2 did not show evidence of psi, they could 
be interpreted as supporting the PMIR theory. However, participants’ motivation for 
the reward was estimated from amalgamated ratings from both those who won the 
reward and those who did not. The motivation scale used in Experiment 2 was 
confounded by the different wording for the two manipulation check questions used: 
Those who won rated how happy they were to have won, and those who did not win 
rated how disappointed they were. In previous research all the participants rated how 
pleasant their contingency task was, whether it was a reward or a punishment task 
(Luke, Roe et al., 2008; Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). In 
hindsight, it would have been better to use comparable questions when asking 
participants to rate the reward and punishment conditions, so that direct comparisons 






The rating of how happy the participants were to get the reward in Experiment 2 is 
comparable to the ratings of how pleasant the rewards tasks were in the previous 
experiments (Luke, Roe et al., 2008; Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 
2000). The rating of how disappointed the participants who did not win in 
Experiment 2 were is not comparable, as the question was negatively phrased. As a 
post-hoc comparison, we can compare the ratings from the participants who won in 
Experiment 2 to the ratings of the rewards in the previous experiments. They were: 
Experiment 2: 5.66 on a 7 point scale (81% of the scale maximum), Luke, Roe and 
Davidson (2008): 7/10 (70% of the scale maximum), and Watt’s experiments: 4/6 
(67% of the scale maximum) (Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). 
Therefore the chocolate reward was rated as being desirable by the participants in 
Experiment 2, and more desirable than the rewards in previous experiments. 
However, the key to making an effective incentive might not simply be that the 
reward is desirable, but that it is significantly more desirable than the punishment. In 
Experiment 2 the low ratings for how disappointed participants were in the 
punishment condition (2.69, 62% of the scale minimum) indicates that the 
participants were not particularly disappointed by the punishment, although this 
rating is confounded by the question being negatively phrased. In conclusion, if the 
reward and punishment provided an incentive, then Experiment 2’s findings 
contradict the PMIR theory that participants will nonintentionally use psi to fulfil 
their needs. If, however, the reward and punishment failed to provide an incentive, 
the PMIR theory is not contradicted. Due to the limitations in the manipulation check 
questions neither conclusion can be reached. Either way, Experiment 2 did not 
support the existence of nonintentional psi.  
It was an important aim of Experiment 2 to consider the role of personality in 
nonintentional forced-choice psi tasks.  In Hypothesis 2, extraversion, openness to 
experience, and belief in psi were hypothesised to be positively associated with psi 






associated with psi scoring. No relationship was found between psi scoring and any 
of these individual difference variables.  
There was no significant relationship found between psi scoring and extraversion in 
Experiment 2. In intentional psi tasks, extraversion has previously been found to be 
associated with higher psi scoring (Eysenck, 1967b; Honorton et al., 1998; Palmer, 
1978; Sargent, 1981). Experiment 2 did not lend support to the idea that this 
relationship exists between between psi scoring and extraversion in nonintentional 
psi tasks. 
No significant association was found between psi scoring and openness to 
experience. This finding is in contrast with a positive correlation previously found 
between performance on a nonintentional affective judgement psi task and openness 
measured on the IPIP (Luke, Roe et al., 2008). One potential reason for the 
difference in findings is that Luke, Roe and Davison’s (2008) experiment was 
significant overall, whereas Experiment 2 was not. This would appear to be 
supported by the fact that the other investigation into the role of openness in a 
nonintentional psi experiment found both a null overall result, and a non-significant 
correlation with openness to experience (Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000). It would, 
however, theoretically be possible for participants high on a certain trait to score high 
on the psi task and those low on that trait to score low, producing an overall chance 
outcome. Therefore, an overall chance outcome does not necessarily mean that no 
association between psi and individual differences will be found. In Experiment 2, 
however, the evidence points to there having been no psi effect, which is one 
possible reason for there being no relationships found with the personality traits. The 
evidence for a relationship between psi and openness to experience in intentional psi 
tasks is currently minimal (see Chapter 2), and the relationship requires further 






Experiment 2 found a non-significant relationship between hit rate and belief in psi. 
Previous investigations of the role of belief in psi in nonintentional psi tasks found 
positive relationships between hit rate and belief in psi (Kennedy & Haight, 1978; 
Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008). In intentional psi tasks the positive relationship between 
hit rate and belief in psi has been well documented (Lawrence, 1993; Palmer, 1971; 
Schmeidler, 1945). Contrary to the previous research, the experiments in this thesis 
do not lend support to there being a sheep-goat effect in nonintentional psi tasks. If 
there were a sheep-goat effect in nonintentional psi tasks, it would indicate that an 
initial difference in psi ability between sheep and goats led to the difference in belief. 
Although further research would be required to draw any firm conclusions, these 
findings cast doubt on that theory. 
In Experiment 2, the relationships between psi hit rate and both neuroticism and state 
anxiety were non-significant. In a previous nonintentional psi task there was a non-
significant relationship between psi score and neuroticism (Watt & Ravenscroft, 
2000). This is at odds with the negative correlations found between psi hit rate and 
both neuroticism and state anxiety in intentional psi tasks (W. G. Braud, 1981; 
Broughton & Perlstrom, 1986, 1992; Palmer, 1977; Roe et al., 2003). Stanford 
(1990) theorised that neuroticism might be associated with psi-missing, because 
neuroticism is associated with self-defeating behaviour. Whilst this relationship 
appears to be upheld in intentional psi tasks, the limited investigations with 
nonintentional psi tasks do not support this theory so far.  
On a practical note, the online survey method of administering the personality 
questionnaires greatly facilitated the coding and analysis. Creating a bespoke 
questionnaire was possible because the IPIP is in the public domain. This saved time 
in the experiment as the participants only completed the scales that were being 
investigated. It would also be possible in online surveys to randomise the order that 






effects. In all, the online surveys were a great improvement on the paper booklet 
personality questionnaires.  
4.7. Conclusions 
The nonintentional psi task did not find evidence of a psi effect: The results were at 
chance. There were no significant relationships between personality variables and psi 











5. General Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2: Hidden 
Targets and Nonintentional Psi 
This section reviews the findings from Experiments 1 and 2. We start by briefly 
comparing similarities and differences across the findings of these studies. Given the 
number of overall null results, we also discuss what the optimal conditions for 
finding for a psi effect might be, and whether the designs of Experiments 1 and 2 
approximated those conditions. We also describe what type of design might be better 
used for any hypothetical replications, and then make suggestions for future research. 
Throughout this general discussion, we will also address what implications our 
findings have for the wider literature. 
Experiments 1 and 2 aimed to discover whether hidden targets could influence 
participants’ behaviour in psychological tests. Experiment 1 investigated whether 
participants’ judgements about line length would concur with hidden targets that 
contained the desired answers (although, in fact, both lines were the same length). 
Experiment 2 also used hidden targets, but these targets related to the timing of the 
task. Specifically, the targets determined whether participants should stop their 
stopwatch at the end of the task on an odd or an even number to achieve a hit. 
Experiment 2 also included a reward for participants who achieved a hit, as a psi 
incentive. In both studies, we also assessed whether psi ability correlated with 
extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, state anxiety, and belief in psi. 
Neither experiment found a significant psi effect, although there is suggestion of a 
psi effect in the significant response bias effect finding in Experiment 1. We also 
found a significant correlation in Experiment 1 between psi score and extraversion. 
We discuss these findings in turn below. 
The null overall psi result in both studies raises two questions: whether psi exists and 
whether the experiments presented in this thesis would capture a psi effect, if there is 






optimal conditions for psi testing and how these compared to the methods used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Regarding whether psi exists at all, the review in Chapter 1 
showed there is experimental evidence both for and against the psi hypothesis. The 
evidence from Experiments 1 and 2 did not support the psi hypothesis. Participants 
were no better at making line-length judgements in accordance with their hidden 
targets, and there was no indication of an effect from hidden targets on participants’ 
reaction times on the maths task. 
One indication that there might have been a psi effect in Experiment 1, despite the 
overall null results, was the replication of the response bias effect. The response bias 
effect is an apparent psi effect that manifests within participants’ existing response 
biases. In Experiment 1 participants responded left or right to indicate which of each 
pair of lines they thought was the longest, over a series of presentations. Participants 
have naturally occurring response biases, this is, individual preferences to say left 
more frequently than right, or vice versa. The response bias effect is the tendency for 
there to be a proportionally higher psi hit rate on responses that are not favoured by 
any other (non-psi) bias. A response bias effect was indeed found; participants scored 
a higher proportion of hits on their less preferred responses. For example, if a 
participant tended to respond left more often than right overall, the hit rate was 
higher within their right responses. The response bias effect was predicted on the 
basis of previous research, which found a higher hit rate in the less frequently chosen 
answers. The response bias effect has been found in both intentional psi tasks 
(Stanford, 1967, 1973) and nonintentional psi tasks (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; 
Stanford, 1970; Wilson, 2002a, 2004). In most of the previous research, however, 
response biases were taken from the combined responses of the participants at group 
level, or group norms, and were not individual to each participant. They may, 
therefore, not have applied to all of the participants. In Experiment 1, we extended 
this finding by considering preferences at the individual level, thereby strengthening 






The response bias effect appears to be prevalent, manifesting in a wide variety of psi 
tasks, and we should consider what it tells us about psi function. Stanford (1967, 
1973) and Kreitler and Kreitler (1973) originally explained the response bias effect 
as follows: People are more like to notice or act upon a psi impression if it is 
somehow out of the ordinary or incongruous. In other words, a commonly-occurring 
thought would be more readily dismissed as not being a psi impression, because 
there is already a non-psi explanation for it (Stanford, 1973). This explanation, 
however, relies upon conscious awareness of the psi information, which may not be 
relevant in nonintentional psi experiments. In the line-length judgement task used in 
Experiment 1, we postulated neither that participants would have conscious 
awareness of the information in their hidden targets, nor that they would select the 
longest line based on deliberating whether they were receiving psi information. As 
the response bias has occurred in nonintentional psi experiments, in which 
participants are not necessarily aware of the psi information, we require an 
explanation that does not rely on conscious awareness of psi.  
Stanford (1975) related the response bias effect to signal detection theory, which is 
concerned with how people discern uncertain signals, such as distinguishing a quiet 
sound from background noise. If psi information is seen as being a relatively weak 
“signal”, we can apply signal detection theory to the response bias effect in our study 
as follows. We assume that people will usually choose their preferred response in the 
line-length judgement task unless there is a strong enough psi signal to overcome this 
response bias. For example, people with a bias to respond left will give the answer 
left on all of the trials with too weak a psi signal to overcome this bias. However, a 
stronger psi signal may arise, and this would direct responses according to the hidden 
target (to either the left or the right). Importantly, when this strong signal triggers a 
left response, the overall hit rate on the left side will be proportionally lower (since 
this one correct hit is diluted by the many misses (false alarms) also on the left). 
Conversely, where this strong psi signal triggers a right response, the overall hit rate 






detection theory works well within the current study, but it does rely on the 
assumption that some psi signals are stronger than others. Why this would be is not 
known, and so further research is required to understand the response bias effect.  
As noted above, the null overall psi result in both studies raises the question of 
whether psi exists, to which these findings, despite the replication of the response 
bias effect, do not provide a conclusive answer, and also whether or not the 
experiments presented in this thesis would capture a psi effect, if there is one. To 
address the second question, the optimal conditions for psi testing will now be 
compared to the methods used in Experiments 1 and 2, with suggestions for 
improvements, future analyses, and future research. Three optimal conditions for psi 
testing were previously identified in a meta-analysis of forced-choice precognition 
experiments (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989). This meta-analysis focussed on intentional 
psi tasks, but these findings might be transferable to nonintentional tasks, and we 
review these considerations here.  
Firstly, Honorton and Ferrari (1989) found that selected participants, those who were 
pre-tested and found to be above-average psi task performers, scored better than 
unselected participants. The participants recruited for Experiments 1 and 2 were 
unselected on the basis of previous psi task ability; we might have been more likely 
to find significant results if we had used pre-selected participants. Participant 
selection could be problematic for nonintentional psi tasks, as it is important that 
participants are not informed that they are in a psi experiment, and the selection 
process might reveal this. It might be feasible, however, to combine a nonintentional 
psi task with an intentional psi task for which participants are selected, without 
revealing the nonintentional task. This has the further advantage of enabling 
comparison between intentional and nonintentional psi task performance (e.g., 
Stanford & Thompson, 1974), and so this approach is recommended for future 
research. A second aspect from Honorton and Ferrari (1989) that might elicit a psi 






testing, was psi-conducive. Both Experiments 1 and 2 used individual testing, and so 
cannot be improved on that account, and future studies should continue to test 
individually.  
Other aspects of the participant sample might also be important in increasing the 
chance of finding any psi effect. Indications as to the optimal participants for psi 
testing were discovered in investigations of participants who performed well in free-
response ESP tasks in the Ganzfeld (Honorton, 1997). To remind the reader, the 
Ganzfeld is a sensory deprivation and relaxation technique for participants, which 
has provided much support for the psi hypothesis (Bem & Honorton, 1994). Four 
characteristics of high performing participants were identified. Although these 
participant characteristics all relate to a specific testing paradigm, the Ganzfeld, they 
might apply to all ways of testing for psi. The first of these was prior parapsychology 
testing experience. It is worth reflecting on why prior experience might help; it might 
indicate that these participants were very keen to contribute to parapsychology 
research, and the issue of motivation will be considered further below. Another 
possibility is that participation increases peoples’ psi ability. Data on prior 
parapsychology testing experience was not collected in Experiments 1 and 2. One 
suggestion for future research is to use participants who have participated in 
parapsychology experiments before, or if that is not practical, to train naïve 
participants. Once again, this might be difficult in a nonintentional psi paradigm as 
participants should be blind to the fact that they are in a psi experiment.  
The second characteristic of successful Ganzfeld participants was involvement with 
mental disciplines, such as meditation (Honorton, 1977). Mental disciplines might 
assist psi task performance because they reduce internal noise and cognitive 
interference, and allow people’s attention to come to their internal mental state 
(Honorton, 1977). For this reason, future studies might test only participants who are 
involved with mental disciplines. Again, however, this might not be relevant to 






becoming aware of psi information might be a two-stage process, the second of 
which is gaining conscious awareness of unconsciously held information (Tyrell, 
1947). If this is the case, a quiet mind and internal mental states might assist the 
second stage. However, if people’s behaviour is nonintentionally influenced by psi, 
without them becoming aware of it, there might be no advantage in quiet internal 
mental states. Therefore, it is uncertain whether using participants involved in mental 
disciplines would lead to a greater effect in nonintentional psi tasks. This is one 
additional avenue for future research. One final characteristic of successful Ganzfeld 
participants was self-reported personal psi experiences, which will be considered 
below along with belief in psi. We next consider how psi might be enhanced in 
future studies by manipulating motivation.  
Motivation is considered to be important in eliciting psi effects (Broughton, 1988, 
2006a). Participants could be motivated by their innate enthusiasm about 
participating in the experiment, either because they are interested in psychology 
experiments in general, or because they are particularly interested in parapsychology. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the purpose of the tasks, and the very fact that they were 
parapsychology experiments, was deliberately concealed from the participants. 
Therefore, this latter type of motivation is not possible in nonintentional psi 
experiments. Regarding motivation for any type of psychology experiment, those in 
Experiment 1 did volunteer, whereas those in Experiment 2 were students who had a 
requirement to take part for course credits, some of whom may not have participated 
otherwise. Therefore, Experiments 1 and 2 may not have used adequately motivated 
participants. Participants could also be motivated by the possibility of a future 
reward, and avoidance of a future punishment, contingent upon their performance in 
the nonintentional psi task. This is the basic premise of PMIR experiments, which 
aim to test whether participants will, without knowing about future rewards or 
punishments, behave so that they enter the reward condition more than chance would 
dictate (Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008; Luke, Roe et al., 2008; Stanford & Associates, 






1974; Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000). Experiment 1 did not include a reward and 
punishment contingency, but Experiment 2 did: Participants entered the reward 
condition by responding with a reaction time in accordance with their hidden targets. 
Therefore, Experiments 1 and 2 did not clarify whether motivation is psi conducive.  
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there is experimental support for the PMIR theory in that 
people appear to behave in accordance with hidden targets more often than chance in 
studies where this would enter them into a reward condition. However, the question 
of whether rewards and punishments are necessary for this effect has not been 
conclusively answered, because the one study that attempted a direct manipulation of 
the reward contingency, Luke, Roe et al., (2008), was confounded. In their no-
contingency condition the participants were allowed to leave early, which might have 
constituted a motivating reward in and of itself (see Chapter 2). Given this, a reward 
was included in Experiment 2 as a conservative measure. Interestingly, the fact that a 
reward was included in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1 might appear to offer a 
test of the reward contingency manipulation itself. No psi effect was found in either 
study, but these experiments were also sufficiently different that any hypothesised 
differences in results could not categorically be attributed to the reward motivation 
alone. One suggestion for future research is to continue to err on the side of caution 
by including incentives for participants, until the issue of whether reward and 
punishment contingencies do facilitate finding a psi effect becomes clearer. Another 
suggestion for future research is directly to compare participants’ performance on 
identical tasks with and without reward and punishment contingencies, but to use a 
non-confounded design.  
One additional problem with comparing tasks with and without reward and 
punishment contingencies comes from the theory that psi is need-serving (Stanford, 
1990). In Experiment 1 there was no reward, which raises the question of whose 
needs would be served by any possible significant result, when there is no reward for 






frequently the most invested in the experiment and motivated for it to succeed 
(Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976; Palmer, 1997). Therefore, a nonintentional psi 
experiment with no reward contingency could be construed as a test of the 
experimenter’s psi. (A similar argument could apply to the no contingency condition 
in Luke, Roe et al.’s (2008) experiment.) For example, in Experiment 1, in which 
participants judged line-lengths without knowing that the lines were the same, or 
even that there were hidden targets, the only true beneficiary of a high hit rate would 
have been the experimenter. Furthermore, in Experiment 1, there was no reason for 
the participants to access their own target list through psi, as opposed to someone 
else’s target list, or, indeed, any other list of answers that might exist, other than that 
the experimenter intended it. To recapitulate, the participants each did the line-length 
judging task with a list of hidden targets located close by. Other than proximity, there 
was no link between each particular participant and his or her hidden targets, unless 
that link was made by the experimenter’s intention.  
It is not possible to rule out the influence of experimenter psi unless the very notion 
of psi itself is ruled out (White, 1976). This leads to the possibility that individual 
differences among experimenters’ own psi ability might lead to greater experimental 
success for some experimenters than for others. Indeed, it has been observed that 
some experimenters do consistently find evidence supporting the psi hypothesis, 
while others do not (Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976; Palmer, 1997). Further 
experiments might have a greater chance of finding a psi effect if experimenters with 
a good track record are used.  
Another psi-conducive factor is trial-by-trial feedback, and short intervals between 
testing and feedback (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989; Palmer, 1978). This is perhaps 
because feedback might act as a reward, with a greater effect the sooner the feedback 
is given. In Experiment 1, participants were not given feedback. If further work were 
carried out on this line-length judgement paradigm, one option for trial-by-trial 






This would facilitate trial-by-trial feedback, which was not possible with the paper 
target set-up that was used. Conversely, in Experiment 2 there was only one trial, and 
participants were given feedback almost immediately, and so this task cannot be 
improved in this way.  
We turn now to our findings relating to psi ability and personality. A positive 
correlation between hit rate and extraversion was found in Experiment 1, but not in 
Experiment 2. We also tested for the influences of neuroticism, openness to 
experience, state anxiety, and belief in psi, but these were all non-significantly 
associated with psi hitting. Below we discuss these findings in turn. In this, we again 
relate our findings to the wider literature, and discuss ways in which future studies 
might better approximate optimal conditions.   
In Experiment 1, psi hit rates were positively correlated with participants’ 
extraversion. This accords with previous findings from intentional psi experiments 
(Eysenck, 1967b; Palmer, 1977; Sargent, 1981; Rao, 1974). Honorton, Ferrari and 
Bem (1998), however, concluded that the relationship between psi scoring and 
extraversion in forced-choice intentional psi tasks was artefactual, the result of 
participants’ knowledge of positive psi scoring inflating their self-ratings of 
extraversion. This artefact could not apply in Experiment 1, as the extraversion 
measure was administered before the psi task. Experiment 1 therefore extended the 
extraversion and psi findings into a nonintentional task, while avoiding the risk of the 
aforementioned artefact. A second advantage of Experiment 1 is that we considered a 
range of personality factors along with extraversion. In some previous research 
extraversion and neuroticism were correlated, and the effect of neuroticism explained 
the apparent effect of extraversion on psi performance (see, e.g., Palmer, 1977). 
Hence any correlation between psi and extraversion that did not consider neuroticism 
might have been confounded. In Experiment 1, therefore, we avoided this confound 
by independently showing that extraversion, but not neuroticism, was the influential 






Importantly, this correlation between psi and extraversion was not replicated in 
Experiment 2. Experiments 1 and 2 had considerably different sample sizes (21 vs. 
100, respectively). Had we failed to find an effect with extraversion in the study with 
the smaller sample, we might have attributed this failure to a lack of power. 
However, the reverse was found: Experiment 1 had only 21 participants, but still 
revealed this effect. Additionally, a positive relationship between psi and 
extraversion has previously been found with a similar sample size of 23 (Bellis & 
Morris, 1980). For this reason, we cannot easily attribute the differences in the 
findings to a difference in power between these studies.  
There might have been some differences in task sensitivity which led to a 
relationship between hit rate and extraversion in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2. 
The task in Experiment 2 was arguably less sensitive than the task in Experiment 1, 
as the task in Experiment 2 had only one trial per participant. This could have 
reduced the likelihood of this task detecting an association with extraversion, 
assuming that there is an association to be found. Future replications should perhaps 
therefore include a greater number of trials per participant, in order to generate a 
better estimate of means across items.  
In addition to sample size and sensitivity, a third difference between these two 
studies is that we used different questionnaires to measure extraversion. We used the 
NEO PI-R in Experiment 1, and the IPIP in Experiment 2. Although these scales 
have been found to correlate highly, and are thus thought to measure the same 
constructs (Goldberg, 1999), they are not exactly the same. A recent study compared 
extraversion scores on the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) and a short form of 
the NEO PI-R, the NEO-FFI, to performance on intentional forced-choice psi tasks 
(Roe, Henderson, & Matthews, 2008). Roe et al. (2008) found a significant positive 
correlation between psi scoring and extraversion measured on the EPI, but not 
between psi scores and extraversion measured on the NEO-FFI. Although Roe et 






this thesis, this example demonstrates the possibility of two different extraversion 
questionnaires leading to two different outcomes.  
In summary, we found an apparent relationship between psi and extraversion that 
does not appear to be attributable to issues relating to power or task-ordering, or to 
confounds with other personality traits. If there is a genuine relationship between 
nonintentional psi and extraversion, we should consider what that indicates about 
how psi functions, although findings from just one experiment are only tentative 
evidence until replicated. Firstly, any relationship between a personality 
characteristic and psi performance might indicate that psi is not merely an anomalous 
deviation from chance, but an effect that co-varies with other factors known to 
influence human behaviour. This in turn strengthens the psi hypothesis. A 
relationship between psi performance in laboratory tests and extraversion, 
specifically, could be due to several reasons: extraverts’ increased spontaneity, 
greater ease and comfort in social situations, and low cortical arousal (Sargent, 
1981). Palmer (1978) concluded from a wide review of previous research that 
spontaneity is psi-conducive. Palmer suggested that more spontaneous people are 
more likely to produce responses that go against their usual response biases, thereby 
favouring their chances of psi hitting through the response bias effect (see above). 
One suggestion for future analyses of the data from Experiment 1 would be to 
investigate this, by testing whether participants’ extraversion is related to their 
tendency to show increased psi hitting on their less-preferred responses.  
A second reason why extraversion might relate to psi was noted by Rao (1974). Rao 
suggested that extraverted participants interact more easily with the experimenter 
than introverted participants do, and this might create a psi-conducive environment. 
Experiment 1 was not very social; the participants were alone most of the time, and 
so being more at ease with the experimenter is unlikely to have contributed to the 
extravert’s improved performance. Eysenck (1967a,b) argued that extraverts’ lower 






experiments that found that increased relaxation levels (W. G. Braud & Braud, 1974) 
and sensory deprivation (Honorton, 1977), which both lower cortical arousal, were 
psi-conducive. As argued in Chapter 2, the advantage of low cortical arousal could 
be that it aids the conscious retrieval of psi information. In nonintentional psi tasks, 
however, a psi effect is indicated by a behavioural change, rather than conscious 
awareness per se. Hence, an effect from extraversion in a nonintentional task would 
imply that extraversion or low cortical arousal is advantageous not only to becoming 
aware of psi information, but also to receiving it. The possibility that extraverts are 
more receptive to psi might be because extraverts desire stimululation (Matthews & 
Deary, 1998), thus they might attract more information through psi than do 
introverts. Future research might investigate psi performance and extraversion in 
comparable intentional and nonintentional tasks. One final implication of our 
positive association between psi performance and extraversion is that future studies 
would be well advised to screen participants for extraversion to maximise the 
chances of finding a psi effect.  
We turn now to the fact that there were null results in both Experiments 1 and 2 for 
the relationships between psi and neuroticism, state-anxiety, openness to experience, 
and belief in psi. In this section, we describe why these effects may not have been 
found in the current studies, and what light this sheds on the existing literature on psi 
and individual differences.  
Firstly, we will consider the null findings between psi and measures of neuroticism 
and state anxiety in both our experiments. Previous findings have indicated that there 
may be reduced psi, or psi-missing, with higher neuroticism (Palmer, 1977). This 
negative association between neuroticism and psi was also predicted by Stanford 
(1990), on the basis that the self-defeating behaviour of neurotic people might lead 
them to use psi against themselves, (i.e., to achieve the opposite effect than serving 
their needs). The limited previous research with state anxiety showed that it, also, 






1992; Roe et al., 2003). These characteristics were included in our study primarily to 
further explore the effects of neuroticism and state anxiety in nonintentional psi 
performance. Secondly, the interaction found between extraversion and neuroticism 
(see above), meant that any effect found with the former would necessitate 
investigating an effect in the latter, to avoid a misleading result. In Experiments 1 
and 2, we found no significant relationship between psi scoring and neuroticism or 
state anxiety. These null results accord with the non-significant relationship found 
between psi scoring and neuroticism in a nonintentional affective judgement psi task 
(Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000), but not with the previous findings from intentional psi 
studies. There have been two reviews of the relationship between psi and 
neuroticism, and these concluded that a relationship between psi hitting and low 
neuroticism does exist (W. G. Braud, 1981; Palmer, 1977).  
The last of the Big Five personality traits considered in Experiments 1 and 2 was 
openness to experience. Neither experiment found a significant relationship between 
hit rate and openness to experience. This is a failure to replicate the positive 
association found between psi hitting and openness in a nonintentional affective 
judgement task (Luke, Roe et al., 2008). There is less previous research investigating 
openness to experience than extraversion or neuroticism. Some previous studies have 
found a relationship between psi and openness to experience (Osis & Bokert, 1971; 
S. P. Wright, 2003) whilst others have not (e.g., Roe, Holt, & Simmonds, 2003). 
Given this, the experiments reported in this thesis might be added as evidence against 
the hypothesis for a robust relationship between psi and openness to experience, on 
the assumption that our methodology provided an adequate test. One issue for 
consideration is that, although Experiment 1 found a non-significant correlation 
between hit rates and openness, there was a large effect size, which suggests that 
with a larger sample a significant effect might have been found. In other words, there 
may yet have been a suggestion that openness plays a role, and future studies might 






The sheep-goat effect, that believers in psi tend to score better in psi tasks than 
disbelievers, was not found in either Experiment 1 or 2. This is at odds with the 
previous findings in nonintentional psi experiments, (Kennedy & Haight, 1978; 
Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008), and with previous findings in intentional psi 
experiments (Palmer, 1971, 1972). As the estimated effect size of the sheep-goat 
effect is small, it is possible that Experiment 1, which had a small sample size, 
lacked adequate power to detect this effect. On the other hand, Experiment 2 had 100 
participants, the same sample size as Luke, Delanoy et al.’s (2008) experiment, 
which did find a significant positive correlation between hit rate and belief in psi. 
One possible reason for the failure to replicate the sheep-goat effect may be related 
to the different scales used to measure belief in psi. Luke, Delanoy et al. used a five-
item scale modified from Palmer (1971), which asked about the participants’ belief 
in psi and their perceived psi ability only. Experiments 1 and 2 used the 12-item 
Koestler Parapsychology Unit questionnaire, which asked about belief in a variety of 
psi events, first- and second-hand experience of the same psi events, and perceived 
psi ability. It is possible, therefore, that these different scales tested slightly different 
constructs. Moreover, although Lawrence (1993) concluded that all scales for belief 
in psi detected the sheep-goat effect equally well, his assessment included neither the 
Palmer (1971) questionnaire nor the KPU questionnaire.  
A second possible reason for the failure to replicate the sheep-goat effect concerns 
the type of questions within each scale. The original sheep-goat question used by 
Schmeidler (1945) asked whether participants believed in, or rejected, the 
“possibility of paranormal success under the conditions of the experiment” 
(Schmeidler & McConnell, 1958, p. 30). Since this question generated a significant 
effect, we might have benefited from asking exactly the same question here. 
Nonetheless, a very similar question did appear on the scale used in both 
Experiments 1 and 2 “Do you believe that you might be able to demonstrate any psi 
in a controlled laboratory experiment?”, the difference being just that our question 






were about to do. We decided to use this question because it was not possible in 
Experiments 1 and 2 to ask a question that linked the task at hand and belief in psi, as 
participants were required not to know that they were in a psi experiment. As such, 
the version we presented was designed to be the best possible approximation under 
the circumstances. With the benefit of hindsight, however, a preferable alternative 
might have been to ask “Schmeidler’s question” exactly, but prior to an intentional 
task and nonintentional task combined. This approach is recommended for future 
research.    
A second difference between Luke, Delanoy et al.’s (2008) experiment and 
Experiments 1 and 2 that might explain the failure to find the sheep-goat effect, is the 
difference in their overall findings. Luke, Delanoy et al. had an overall positive psi 
effect, and Experiments 1 and 2 did not. If there were no psi effect at all in 
Experiments 1 and 2, there would have been no psi effect to correlate belief in psi 
with. However, since a correlation was found with extraversion in Experiment 1, it 
was worth investigating whether the overall null findings masked differential scoring 
between sheep and goats, or indeed from any of the other individual differences 
variables investigated here. 
The sheep-goat effect has predominantly been investigated in the context of 
intentional psi experiments, from which it was uncertain whether sheep scored better 
because of their positive expectations, enthusiasm for psi, beliefs, or ability (Rao, 
1966). Research on the effect of belief in psi in nonintentional psi experiments would 
differentiate between these effects, as, of the four reasons above, only psi ability 
could conceivably influence performance when participants were not aware that they 
were using psi. Previous research has found a sheep-goat effect in nonintentional psi 
experiments (e.g., Kennedy & Haight, 1978; Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008), indicating 
that intrinsic differences in sheep’s and goats’ psi ability underpins the sheep-goat 






that the sheep-goat effect might not be due to intrinsic differences in psi ability, but 
due to differences in belief, expectation, or enthusiasm. 
5.1. Summary and Rationale for Experiments 3, 4, and 5  
The psi tasks presented in Experiments 1 and 2 did not show overall support for the 
psi hypothesis, although a psi effect was indicated by a response bias effect and a 
correlation between hit rate and extraversion in Experiment 1. We have discussed 
improvements to our designs that might be implemented in future studies and how 
our findings relate to the previous literature. In the following section, we now turn to 
the second half of this thesis, which investigates nonintentional psi effects in the 
context of social influences. 
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated whether psi would manifest in nonintentional 
behavioural responses to hidden targets. This effect was not found. One observation 
made earlier was that Experiment 1 had no social influence, and a social influence 
had previously been a factor that influenced line-length judgements similar to the 
task used in Experiment 1. In these earlier, non-psi studies, participants gave 
incorrect estimates about the length of a line, if those same judgments had previously 
been given by others in a social context (Asch, 1951, 1955). In a similar way, 
Experiment 1 also aimed to elicit incorrect judgements from participants about which 
line was longest (since the lines were, in fact, the same length), but did so through a 
psi manipulation. In other words, Experiment 1 attempted to create a psi analogue of 
a social effect (pressure to conform in line-length judgements), but without including 
a psi equivalent of the social pressure to conform, such as a sender. Indeed, neither 
Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 had any social component in the psi influence. 
Interestingly, some studies have shown that a better psi effect is achieved with a 
sender (e.g., Kreitler and Kreitler, 1973) although the value of a sender has been 
debated and is by no means established (see, e.g., Roe, Holt, & Simmonds (2003) for 






effects in both non-psi line-length judgements, and also in prior psi studies, a better 
approach might have been to combine a social and a psi influence together, an idea 
that we address in the second half of this thesis.  
A second consideration for the latter half of this thesis comes from a proposal of 
Stanford’s (1990), already discussed above, that, through psi, people nonintentionally 
respond to circumstances beyond their sensory reach, if those circumstances would 
elicit a response given sensory knowledge of them. This account of psi might be 
interpreted to suggest that psi-mediated behavioural responses would parallel 
“normal” responses to those same events. In other words, people’s responses to 
psychic information about ‘x’ might be the same responses that they would make to 
explicit knowledge about ‘x’. This comparison is implicit in the nonintentional psi 
experiments reviewed above, but was not explicitly compared. For example, previous 
nonintentional psi studies made no comparison between the behaviour that 
participants were expected to make in response to their hidden targets, and the 
behaviour that actual knowledge of those hidden targets would have generated. This 
omission might be due to this comparison appearing too obvious. For example, it 
might seem self-evident that explicitly telling participants that responding a certain 
way on a task will lead to a reward will make them respond in that way. However, if 
done carefully, we might successfully compare hidden psi and explicit non-psi 
influences on behaviour. 
Combining the ideas above, the second half of this thesis presents three studies that 
juxtapose a social influence and a psi influence, while comparing their effect on 
behavioural responses. In this, we take as our dependent variable a well-established 
behavioural response to a social situation: changes in participants’ task performance 
from being watched. Then, we compare both explicit non-psi and hidden psi 
influences that might lead to this behaviour. Specifically, we compare being watched 
by a physically present observer to being watched remotely by a hidden observer. 






social facilitation effects, and any evidence for psi-mediated effects from 






6. Literature Review of Social Facilitation and Remote 
Observation 
6.1. Overview 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate ways in which people’s behaviour is 
nonintentionally affected by information or influences that can only be received 
through psi, whether or not the people are consciously aware of the psi information 
or influence. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated the effects of hidden targets on 
participants’ performance on psychological tasks. We argued in Chapter 5 that the 
effect of a hidden psi influence on behaviour might be better investigated by using a 
social influence that gives rise to a well-researched behavioural response. In 
Experiments 3-5, we will therefore combine a psi influence with a well-researched 
behavioural response: the social facilitation effect. The social facilitation effect is 
that people perform tasks differently when they are being watched, compared to 
when they are alone. We will investigate the social facilitation effect in conjunction 
with a psi influence known as remote observation. Remote observation is observation 
that cannot be detected by normal sensory means. We shall define both these terms 
(social facilitation, remote observation) in greater detail below, and link them to the 
studies that follow in the subsequent chapters. In brief, these studies will investigate 
whether remote observation (a psi influence) leads to the same behavioural responses 
as observation (by non-psi means) found in the existing social facilitation literature. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we present reviews of the literature on social facilitation 
and remote observation detection. In this, we make a case for why there might be a 
social facilitation effect from remote observation. We also consider how this current 






6.2. Social Facilitation 
This section reviews the effect of normal (non-psi-mediated) observation on people’s 
behaviour. We examine the effect of observation on behaviour by considering the 
field of social facilitation, a term first coined by Allport (1920). Starting with 
investigating the effects of competitors (Triplett, 1898), the field of social facilitation 
has examined the way that many different social influences affect one participant’s 
task performance. These social influences have predominantly included co-actors 
(Allport, 1924), people who are doing the same task as the participant, and audiences 
(Travis, 1925), people who watch, but do not take part in the tasks with the 
participant. This review distills, from the wide field of social facilitation, the research 
that is relevant to the question of whether remote observation could elicit a social 
facilitation effect. It will, therefore, focus mainly on the effect of audiences, rather 
than co-actors, because the behaviour of the co-actors is an additional and possibly 
confounding variable. In Experiments 3-5 we used audiences, not co-actors.  
In most social facilitation research, audiences were both physically present and 
observing the participant (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1993); however, at 
present we require these influences of observation and presence to be disentangled 
and these terms to be defined. Some research considered the effect of presence 
without observation (e.g., Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968) and others 
observation without presence (e.g., Geen, 1973). For the purposes of this review, 
presence is defined as the physical existence of another person (or people) in the 
same room as the participant, and does not necessarily imply observation. 
Observation is defined as being watched, and does not necessarily imply that the 
observer is present. Observation from an audience that is both present and observing 
will be termed proximate observation. Later, we shall define other types of audience 






Firstly, however, we will explore the social facilitation effect. We will consider the 
importance of task complexity in social facilitation, how this has been researched 
previously, and issues relating to it. We then discuss the leading theories of social 
facilitation and how they tie in with previous research evidence. Following that, we 
consider previous studies that investigated participant characteristics and the 
observer-participant relationship in social facilitation experiments, and how these 
link with the most pertinent of the theories. We then consider whether observation, in 
and of itself, can influence behaviour. Throughout this review, we distill the 
methodological implications for testing social facilitation in our subsequent 
experiments.   
6.2.1. Task Complexity. 
We have defined social facilitation thus far as an effect that alters behaviour 
according to whether one is being watched. Specifically, the social facilitation effect 
is that people perform simple tasks better (facilitation), and complex tasks worse 
(inhibition), when they know that someone is watching them, or when they are in the 
presence of another person. Social facilitation therefore involves both facilitatory and 
inhibitory effects from presence or observation on performance. For this reason, it is 
sometimes called social facilitation/inhibition (e.g., Zanbaka, Ulinski, Goolkasian, & 
Hodges, 2007) or SFI (e.g., Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999) but it is 
usually just called social facilitation. Following convention, this thesis will use the 
term social facilitation, but it is important to note that this encompasses both 
facilitatory and inhibitory effects.   
The distinction between what are now usually called simple and complex tasks was 
first made by Zajonc (1965). In a review of the seemingly contradictory previous 
research, some of which found performance was facilitated by audiences, and some 
that it was inhibited; Zajonc noted that the tasks that audiences facilitated were well-






were still learning, or that were novel. He proposed that this effect was due to the 
audience inducing participants to produce the response they are most likely to make, 
(i.e., their dominant response). On well-learned tasks, people’s dominant responses 
are likely to be correct; hence the audience facilitates performance, whereas the 
opposite applies to novel tasks. Later the distinction between simple and complex 
tasks replaced the previous terminology (e.g., Zajonc, 1980) to accommodate easy 
tasks which are facilitated without the need for practice, and difficult tasks that 
remain inhibited even when well-practiced. This led to the current delineation 
between simple tasks, which are easy or well-practiced, and complex tasks, which are 
difficult or novel (e.g., Uziel, 2007).  
A variety of simple and complex tasks have been investigated previously, using both 
quantitative measures such as speed, and qualitative measures such as accuracy (C. 
F. Bond & Titus, 1983). An example of a simple task is that Grant and Dajee (2002) 
found that proximate observation increased the speed of participants’ completion of 
simple multiplication, compared to participants who completed the task alone, (see 
also Dashiell, 1930). Another simple task was used by Bergum and Lehr (1963), who 
trained participants in detecting when a light failed to come in a sequence of flashing 
lights. Participants under proximate observation performed, on average, 34% more 
accurately than those who were alone. Some experiments used both speed and 
accuracy measures. For instance, students completed a simple maze task both faster 
and with fewer errors under proximate observation compared to those who did the 
maze alone (Rajecki, Ickes, Corcoran, & Lenez, 1977). Finally, Ferris and Rowland 
(1980) found participants’ performance was facilitated by proximate observation 
when playing a simple video game.  
Strauss (2002) considered the complexity of motor tasks. He categorised them as 
those that require predominantly co-ordination skills, such balancing; those that 
require strength, such as weight-lifting; and those that require both, such as 






a review of the literature, found that they were usually facilitated by an audience. Of 
tasks that require co-ordination, those that were easy, or in which the participants 
were well trained, were facilitated by audiences. For example, participants well-
trained in a pursuit-rotor task of following a moving target with a stylus performed 
better with an audience compared to their performance when alone (F. G. Miller, 
Hurkman, Feinberg, & Robinson, 1979; Travis, 1925). The direction of the effect of 
an audience on tasks which require both co-ordination and strength depends upon the 
participants’ initial skill level, and thus whether the tasks are simple and complex to 
individual participants (Strauss, 2002).   
Some examples of complex tasks that were inhibited by observation include a 
decision making task used by Wapner and Alper (1952). Participants chose one of 
two words that matched the meaning of a preceding phrase, for example, a musical 
composition followed by the choice of: symphony or concerto. This was deemed a 
complex task because there were competing dominant responses; both words could 
be right so it was difficult to choose between them. Participants’ decision-making 
time was lengthened by observation. In another study with a complex task, Bradner 
and Mark (2001) found that performance on a cognitively demanding maths task was 
slowed by observation through videoconferencing media. Observation has also been 
found to inhibit complex task accuracy. For example, proximate observation 
impaired participants’ accuracy on difficult, novel, computer-based anagram-solving 
tasks (Aiello & Svec, 1993), on learning complex word pairs (Berkey & Hoppe, 
1972) and on learning complex nonsense words (Pessin, 1933). Finally, Rosenbloom, 
Shahar, Perlman, Estreich and Kirzner (2007) compared the success rates of people 
who took driving tests either with the examiner only, or with the addition of another 
testee in the back of the car, a type of audience condition. A higher pass rate was 
achieved by the people with the examiner only. These examples show that the social 






To estimate the magnitude of the overall social facilitation effect, C.F. Bond and 
Titus (1983) conducted a meta-analysis of 241 studies. They estimated the mean 
effect sizes for the social facilitation effect, separately considering simple and 
complex tasks, and speed and accuracy measures (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Effect Size and Fail-Safe N Estimates for the Social Facilitation 
Effect (data from C.F. Bond & Titus, 1983) 
Task complexity Measure Effect size d N studies Fail-safe N 
Simple Speed 0.32 154 6183 
 Accuracy 0.11 112 194 
Complex Speed -0.20 54 160 
 Accuracy -0.36 147 5697 
Note. The positive effect size values indicate facilitation from observation, and the negative 
effect sizes indicate inhibition from observation. 
As can be seen in Table 5, the greatest effect sizes were found in experiments 
measuring the speed of simple tasks or the accuracy of complex tasks, which were 
both small to medium effect sizes (J. Cohen, 1988). These are also the two effects 
least at risk of the file-drawer effect, a potential spurious finding based upon the 
selected publishing of significant studies only. The fail-safe N is the estimated 
number of unpublished null studies which would reduce the effect to non-
significance (Rosenthal, 1984). For the effect sizes of speed of simple tasks and the 
accuracy of complex tasks, around 40 unpublished null studies would have to exist 
for every study considered in the meta-analysis. For the smaller effect sizes of the 
accuracy of simple tasks and the speed of complex tasks, only around two 
unpublished null studies would have to exist for every study considered in the meta-
analysis to reduce the effect to non-significance. These effect size estimates indicate 
that in order to best capture an effect, experiments should include both speed and 
accuracy measures of both simple and complex tasks.  
This meta-analysis has limitations that might reduce the accuracy of the effect size 






241 studies included used observers, the others used co-actors. Secondly, C.F. Bond 
and Titus (1983) classified participants as being “alone” if the researchers had called 
them alone, even though in 96 of these studies an experimenter was in the room with 
the participant, and in 52 of those studies the participant could see the experimenter. 
The true effect size for social facilitation might therefore be larger than C.F. Bond 
and Titus estimated, as greater facilitation and inhibition effects were found in 
studies with a physically alone condition compared to the overall mean (this analysis 
only considered a subset of studies, see Uziel, 2007). (The implications of poor 
control in the alone condition in social facilitation research will be discussed in more 
detail below, see Section 6.4.2.) Thirdly, C.F. Bond and Titus accepted the 
researchers’ decision of whether a task had been simple or complex, and this 
distinction is somewhat problematic.  
The use of the simple/complex task distinction was criticised for lacking any 
objective criteria by which to classify tasks (Uziel, 2007), and for being arbitrarily 
decided (Strauss, 2002). If stricter classifications for simple and complex tasks were 
used, larger effect sizes might have been found in the meta-analysis cited above. As 
noted above, if the distinction between simple and complex tasks were that the 
dominant responses were correct or incorrect, then there would be an objective 
criterion; however, this is seldom used. One rare example is from a study by Rajecki 
et al. (1977), who used a criterion of over 50% correct answers for their simple task. 
One other problem with the simple/complex task distinction is that it could depend 
upon individual differences in skill level. It might be possible for a task to be simple 
for some of the participants and complex for the others (e.g., Aiello & Kolb, 1995; 
Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978; Berkey & Hoppe, 1972). Despite these caveats, 
simple task facilitation and complex task inhibition are the recognised social 
facilitation effects, and the theories that seek to explain social facilitation focus on 






6.2.2. Social Facilitation Theories. 
The following section briefly outlines the theories of social facilitation. These 
theories can be grouped into three main types: activation theories, social conformity 
theories, and cognitive process theories.  
The activation theories argue that presence or observation leads to an increase in 
activation in the participant; that is, an increased attentiveness or readiness for 
action. Zajonc (1965, 1980) proposed that this increase in activation is due to an 
increase in alertness in preparation to respond to the potential threat imposed by 
social presence, underpinned by an increase in generalised arousal. According to the 
Hull-Spence drive theory (see Spence, 1958) this increased activation leads to an 
increase in dominant responses, and hence to the social facilitation effect. Activation 
has been used synonymously with arousal and drive (Zajonc, 1965), but following 
Strauss (2002) this thesis will use the term activation when referring to these 
theories. In addition to presence, other aspects of being observed have been proposed 
to increase activation and thus lead to the social facilitation effect. For example, self-
presentation concerns, such as the apprehension of evaluation by others (Cottrell et 
al., 1968; Henchy & Glass, 1968; Feinberg & Aiello, 2006), comparing oneself 
negatively to others, or concern about the impression one makes (Baumeister, 1982; 
C. F. Bond, 1982). Activation can also result from the distracting effect of the 
participant watching the audience (Dashiell, 1935), or thinking about the audience 
(Allport, 1924). The conflict between the distraction and the cognitive demands of 
the task is called distraction-conflict, and is also hypothesised to cause social 
facilitation by increasing activation (Baron, 1986; Baron, Moore, & Sanders, 1978).  
The social conformity theories all concern standards of behaviour in the presence of 
others. The objective self-awareness theory argues that the people view themselves 
the way that the observer does, or is imagined to, and this measuring of actual 






(Wicklund & Duval, 1971). The controls system model also argues that people seek 
to reduce the discrepancy between their actual performance and their standard 
(Carver & Scheier, 1978). Neither of these theories propose a mechanism for the way 
that the aversive state of performing below one’s expected standards leads to the 
social facilitation effect, unless it acts like activation (Guerin, 1993).  
The cognitive processing theories include attentional theories. One attentional theory 
argues that the observer is a disruption that facilitates simple task performance and 
inhibits complex task performance by bringing more attention to the tasks (Manstead 
& Semin, 1980). Other theories claim that the observer draws the participant’s 
attention away from the task (Huguet et al., 1999), or that the presence of co-actors 
leads to increased attention focussing, and that this in turn leads to the social 
facilitation effect (Muller & Butera, 2007).  
There have also been attempts to unite the theories to make one that is universally 
applicable, but they have all failed (Guerin, 1993). All of the theories focus on the 
simple task facilitation, complex task inhibition pattern, and most of the theories 
explain this pattern almost equally well. The theories are therefore underdetermined. 
Uziel (2007) argued that the theories are not mutually exclusive, that they each 
represent a way of reacting to observation, and can co-occur. It is very likely that 
aspects of all of the processes described in the theories above all occur in social 
facilitation, especially as the predicted outcomes are very similar. The majority of 
empirical research has focussed on the activation theories, which have the most proof 
(especially for presence and evaluation apprehension), and provide the best 
theoretical framework (Geen & Gange, 1977). The other theories tend to be 
supported only by their originator’s own research (Strauss, 2002). One limitation of  
this research is that in many experiments presence and observation were 
manipulated, and task performance was measured, with no direct test of whether 
activation mediated the social facilitation effect (e.g., Matlin & Zajonc, 1968; 






Zajonc & Sales, 1966; J. L. Cohen & Davis, 1973). There is, however, evidence, 
although not without caveats, that activation is increased by observation and/or 
presence. As we will see below, activation provides a link to the influence of remote 
observation, which has been found to affect sympathetic nervous system activation. 
6.2.3. Proximate Observation and Activation. 
As noted above, activation theories state that an increase in arousal underpins the 
social facilitation effect. One problem with investigating arousal is that it lacks a 
universally accepted definition (Mullen, Bryant, & Driskell, 1997). It is operationally 
defined by the way that it is measured, for instance: self-reports (e.g., state anxiety 
scales) and physiological measures (e.g., palmar sweat, heart rate, and electrodermal 
response, a measure of the electro-conductivity of the palmar skin, an indirect 
measure of palmar sweating). The high correlations between such scales imply that 
they tap into the underlying construct of arousal. We will consider evidence from 
experiments and a meta-analysis for whether there is an effect of observation, 
presence, and task complexity on arousal. 
Chapman (1974) measured participants’ arousal levels under presence and alone 
conditions. Participants were given a relaxation session prior to testing to stabilise 
their baseline tension levels. Participants then attended to a short story, and their 
forehead muscle tension levels were automatically recorded every minute while 
either in the presence of the experimenter or while alone. The participants’ muscle 
tension was significantly higher in the presence condition than in the alone condition. 
The participants were not involved in a task, and also reported that they did not feel 
evaluation apprehension, and so this arousal increase was due to the presence of the 
experimenter, not to evaluation apprehension. This supports Zajonc’s (1965) 
proposal that presence increases arousal. Mullen, Bryant and Driskell (1997) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 16 experiments which used self-report measures of 






compared participants’ arousal levels between audience presence, co-action, or alone 
conditions. Both electrodermal measures and self-report measures revealed an 
overall increase in arousal from presence. This meta-analysis and Chapman’s (1974) 
study support the activation theories in that they found an increase in arousal from 
proximate observation.   
Other studies, however, did not find an overall increase in baseline arousal solely 
from proximate observation, but only when participants were involved in complex 
tasks. In one, participants learned a complex motor task either alone, or in the 
presence of an audience of 10 students (Martens, 1969). Palmar sweat was measured 
by taking prints of the hands, which were inspected for open sweat pores, at baseline 
and at intervals throughout the trials. There was no significant difference at baseline 
between the two groups. During the task, however, the proximately observed 
participants showed a significant increase in palmar sweat and made significantly 
more errors compared to the alone participants. This supports Zajonc’s (1965) claim 
that increased arousal interferes with learning a complex task, and demonstrates an 
arousal effect from proximate observation, both of which support the activation 
theory. Similarly, two studies found that increased cardiovascular activity only 
occurred when participants were performing a complex task with proximate 
observation, but not when alone or when performing a simple task (Gendolla & 
Richter, 2006; R. A. Wright, Killebrew, & Pimpalapure, 2002). Cardiovascular 
measures, however, do not respond to easy tasks as low effort is required (Gendolla 
& Richter, 2006). C.F. Bond and Titus’s (1983) meta-analysis also found that 
audience or co-actor presence increased arousal in complex tasks, but did not 
significantly affect arousal during simple tasks. Thus, these studies and meta-analysis 
provide only partial support for the activation theories. 
Lastly, there is recent evidence to suggest that audiences increase reactivity to 
stressors, such as complex tasks, rather than baseline arousal levels. For instance, 






participants thought that the experimenter was just calibrating the equipment, and 
were not involved in any task performance. They compared an alone condition, in 
which the participant was physically alone in the room, with being knowingly 
observed by the experimenter via a one-way mirror. The observed participants 
exhibited increased electrodermal responses to the aural presentation of tones. 
Participants’ baseline arousal was not affected by observation, but observation 
increased physiological reactivity to the tone stimuli. Likewise, the presence of a 
friend, in addition to the presence of an experimenter, increased physiological 
reactivity to stressful complex tasks compared to the presence of the experimenter 
only (Allen, Blascovich, Tomaka, & Kelsey, 1990). Thus, there is evidence that 
presence and observation increase activation, but that this relationship is not 
straightforward. However, this might be, in part, due to individual differences in how 
people react to arousal (e.g., Bates & Rock) and the different ways that the various 
measures of arousal respond to proximate observation (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001). For 
example, electrodermal activity and palmar sweating show greater activation when 
there is an audience present during task performance, but there is no consistent 
pattern for heart rate and muscle tension (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983; Geen & Gange, 
1977; Guerin, 1986). 
The optimal arousal curve, or inverted U hypothesis, can be used to show how 







Figure 3: The Optimal Arousal Curve, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yerkes-Dodson_law 
 
The optimal arousal curve can also be considered to have activation along the x axis. 
Prior to any social facilitation research occurring, it had been assumed that increased 
activation or arousal would improve performance in a linear relationship (Guerin, 
1993). The relationship was found instead to be curvilinear, with performance 
highest at medium arousal and lowest at either extreme: the Yerkes-Dodson law 
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Other aspects of the observer, the participant, and the task 
can be conceptualised as forces that increase activation thus pushing the performance 
to the right along the x axis. Task complexity is one such aspect, observation is 
another. These can be combined; for example, a simple task without observation 
would be at the far left, with low activation and low performance. A complex task 
with observation would be at the far right with high activation and low performance. 
Either a simple task with observation, or a complex task without observation, either 






with optimal performance for that task. Influences on behaviour can be 
conceptualised as either increasing or decreasing activation, and, depending on the 
baseline level, this will either facilitate or inhibit performance. Up to a point they can 
be considered additive. Thus the optimal arousal curve provides a model of how 
different influences might combine to produce activation, and enable performance 
facilitation or inhibition to be predicted.  
One implication of the inverted U hypothesis is that simple task performance would 
not be infinitely facilitated by observation or other activating influences, but, if 
activation were to increase beyond the optimal level, performance would be 
inhibited. There is support for this in the phenomenon of “choking under pressure”, 
performance decrements under situations of high stress (Baumeister, 1984). Another 
implication is that all the influences that could affect participants’ behavioural 
responses should be considered when predicting whether a task should be facilitated 
or inhibited. These influences might include personality variables, and aspects of the 
relationship between the observer and the participant.  
6.2.4. Social Facilitation and Personality. 
There has been remarkably little social facilitation research that also investigated 
personality (Uziel, 2006). Uziel attributed the paucity of personality and social 
facilitation research to the focus on task complexity, which directed research 
attention to aspects of the task, not the participant. However, when an observer is 
introduced to an experimental situation, a social element is created. Therefore, we 
should consider participants’ personality traits, because they affect social preferences 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992b). In Chapter 2, we described the Big Five personality traits 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992b); we now consider how two of these: extraversion and 
neuroticism, might impact upon the social facilitation effect. We will also consider 
the effect of participants’ state anxiety. We shall determine whether these individual 






Regarding the relationship between observation and extraversion, one study 
compared extraverts’ and introverts’ performance on a letter deletion task 
(Colquhoun & Corcoran, 1964). Their task was to delete the letter ‘e’ in lines of 
prose, and their speed was measured. Extraverts and introverts were defined by a 
median split from the Heron personality inventory. Participants were assigned to 
work alone (although they were observed by the experimenter through an open door) 
or in co-acting groups with unfamiliar co-participants. There was a significant 
interaction between personality and group condition: The extraverts performed better 
than the introverts when in groups, and the introverts performed much better than the 
extraverts in isolation. Although Colquhoun and Corcoran investigated co-action, not 
observation, co-action usually has a similar effect to observation on performance. 
Thus, the indication is that extraverts would perform better when observed and 
introverts when alone. 
A similar outcome was found in a study investigating extraversion and audience 
effects on a sporting task (Graydon & Murphy, 1995). This experiment aimed to 
replicate the environment of a sport competition, with either a large, noisy audience 
or a single, silent scorer. In neither condition were the participants alone and 
unobserved. Extraverts and introverts were defined as the 10 highest and 10 lowest 
scoring of 50 participants screened with the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI). 
Their task was to serve table tennis balls into a marked grid, scored for accuracy, and 
they were all familiar with, but not expert at, table tennis. The interaction between 
extraversion and audience condition was highly significant. The extraverts performed 
much better with the large audience, and the introverts performed better with the 
silent scorer; this shows once more that extraversion is a factor in social facilitation.   
In one final study considering extraversion and social facilitation, extraverts’ and 
introverts’ performance was compared on a simple maths task (Grant & Dajee, 
2003). Participants were categorised as extravert or introvert based on a median split 






observation or alone conditions; they then measured the time taken to complete the 
maths task themselves. Both personality groups were facilitated by the proximate 
observation condition, but in contrast to the two studies above, the introverts were 
facilitated to a much greater degree. Once again, there was a significant interaction 
between personality and observation condition, but this time in the opposite 
direction. 
The relationship between extraversion and observation was considered in a meta-
analysis, which concluded that extraverts’ task performance tends to be facilitated by 
proximate observation (Uziel, 2007). Uziel also concluded that introverts’ task 
performance is inhibited by proximate observation, irrespective of task complexity. 
However, extraversion might also interact with task complexity. Extraverts 
performed faster and more accurately on a variety of complex, cognitive tasks and 
introverts performed slowly, but more accurately (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). In 
sum, the prior literature reviewed above suggests that extraversion interacts with 
observation and task complexity, but that this relationship is not straightforward.  
In the following section, we consider how arousal might play a role in the 
relationship between extraversion and task performance. If extraversion is 
characterised by lower cortical arousal than introversion (Eysenck, 1967a), then, 
according to the optimal arousal curve, we would expect extroverts to perform better 
under conditions of higher arousal. This expectation was corroborated by an 
experiment that compared extraverts’ and introverts’ performance on an IQ task 
under one of five different arousal levels (Bates & Rock, 2004). Arousal was 
manipulated by sound: from silence, through different volumes of white noise, to 
screams. There was a significant interaction between arousal level and extraversion. 
The extraverts performed increasingly better the higher the arousal level, and the 
reverse was found for the introverts. Other research, however, suggested that 
extraverts and introverts might have qualitatively different responses to the same 






and Amelang suggested there may be a positive association between arousal and 
performance in extroverts, but a negative association between arousal and 
performance in introverts.  
If the social facilitation effect is mediated by arousal, then, according to the optimal 
arousal curve, we would expect extroverts to perform better at complex tasks or 
while observed. The effect of combinations of all these factors might be very 
difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the evidence reviewed above indicates that 
extraversion should be considered in social facilitation research, especially as the 
performance effects of extraversion and introversion are often in the opposite 
direction to each other. Therefore, omitting considering extraversion risks missing an 
informative finding in an overall null effect (Eysenck, 1967a). 
The other personality characteristics that will be considered in relation to the social 
facilitation effect are neuroticism and anxiety. Neuroticism is the personality trait of 
being prone to negative states (Costa & McCrae, 1992a, p. 14). Anxiety can be 
subdivided into state anxiety and trait anxiety. State anxiety is present-moment 
subjective feelings of anxiety, and trait anxiety is the propensity to become state 
anxious (Matthews & Deary, 1998; Spielberger, 1966). Trait anxiety and neuroticism 
are very highly correlated (Spielberger, 1983), and state anxiety has been found to be 
more detrimental to performance than trait anxiety (Matthews & Deary, 1998). All 
three of these personality characteristics are associated with increased autonomic 
nervous system arousal (Spielberger, 1983). Below, we review studies that 
considered the relationship between anxiety and task complexity, and anxiety and 
observation.  
Anxiety has been found to improve performance on simple tasks, but to impair 
performance on complex tasks (Matthews & Deary, 1998; Spence, Farber, & 
McFann, 1956; Spence, Taylor, & Ketchel, 1956). For example, the effect of anxiety 






experiments (Spence, Farber et al., 1956; Spence, Taylor et al., 1956). Participants 
were drawn from the lowest and highest scorers on the Manifest Anxiety Scale. Their 
task was to learn pairs of words, so that when presented with the first word they 
could respond with the second word of the pair. Some paired associate words had a 
strong semantic relation to each other (e.g., adept-skilful), these word pairs were the 
simple task. Other paired associate words had strong semantic links to other words 
on the list; these were the complex task because participants’ dominant responses 
would have been the incorrect answers. Participants with high anxiety levels 
outperformed participants with low anxiety on the simple task. Participants with low 
anxiety outperformed participants with high anxiety on the complex task. These 
experiments demonstrated therefore that high anxiety has a similar effect on 
performance as observation: They both facilitate the performance of simple tasks and 
inhibit the performance of complex tasks. This is the pattern predicted by the optimal 
arousal curve. Similarly, Carron (1965, as cited in Bargh & J. L. Cohen 1978) found 
an interaction between trait anxiety and task difficulty: Participants with high trait 
anxiety performed better than those with low trait anxiety on a simple motor task, 
and this pattern was reversed on a difficult motor task. These findings indicate that 
social facilitation research should consider participants’ anxiety levels. 
The following experiments investigated the effects of anxiety and observation on 
task performance. In the first of these experiments, participants learned a series of 
nonsense words under either alone or observed conditions (Ganzer, 1968). As 
participants learned the words, they tried to anticipate the next word in the series, and 
the number of accurate guesses was recorded. In the observed condition they were 
told that there would be an observer behind a one-way mirror, but there actually was 
no observer. (In pilot tests this “deception of observation” condition had proven to be 
a similar influence to actual observation through a one-way mirror.) In both 
conditions the experimenter was hidden from sight, but in the same room as the 
participant, and spoke to the participant to conduct the experiment. There was neither 






Participants were classified as having low, medium, or high anxiety on the Test 
Anxiety Scale, and were randomly assigned to the observed or alone conditions. The 
alone participants made a significantly greater number of accurate guesses than the 
observed participants. There was also a significant effect of anxiety. The high-
anxiety participants made fewer accurate guesses than the medium- and low-anxiety 
participants. There was also a significant interaction between observation and 
anxiety: The high-anxiety participants who were observed made the fewest accurate 
guesses. Observation and anxiety were both detrimental for this complex task, thus 
demonstrating that anxiety can interact with the social facilitation effect.  
Also investigating anxiety and observation conditions on performance, Cox (1968) 
conducted a series of experiments comparing children’s speed on a simple motor 
task. High and low anxiety children were selected from the highest 25% and lowest 
25% of large populations screened with the Test Anxiety Scale. Their task was to 
drop marbles into a box, and the rate of marbles per minute was timed. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the following observation conditions. In the control 
condition only the experimenter was present. In the observation conditions, the 
children began this task in the presence of the experimenter only, and after a minute 
another observer (their teacher, their father, or a stranger) entered the room and 
watched them. There was a significant interaction between observation condition and 
anxiety. The additional observers inhibited the high-anxious children’s performance, 
and facilitated the low-anxious children’s performance compared to those in the 
control condition. Thus, once more, high anxiety and observation were detrimental to 
task performance. 
A more recent study compared the effects of anxiety and observation on participants’ 
performance of a complex anagram task (Geen, 1985). Participants were selected 
from the highest 15% and lowest 15% of 350 students screened on the Sarason Test 
Anxiety Scale. Participants were told that the anagram task was a test of IQ, and 






under pressure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three observation 
conditions. These were either: alone; passive observation, in which the experimenter 
observed the participant, but not their progress on the anagram tasks; or evaluative 
observation, in which the experimenter observed the participant and their progress on 
the anagram tasks. Participants also completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI) twice: immediately prior to starting the anagram tasks and as soon as the 
anagram tasks were over. There was a main effect of anxiety: High test-anxiety 
participants attempted fewer anagrams. There was also a significant interaction 
between anxiety and observation condition. Within the high test-anxious participants, 
fewer anagrams were attempted by the evaluated participants than by the passively 
observed participants or the alone participants. There was no effect of observation 
condition on low test-anxious participants’ performance. Participants’ change in state 
anxiety from before the experiment, to immediately after, showed a similar pattern to 
the performance scores. The highest increase in state anxiety was in the high test-
anxious participants with evaluative observation. Geen attributed the performance 
inhibition and the increase in state anxiety to the effect of evaluation apprehension. 
As state anxiety scores are a self-report measure for arousal, this study also supports 
the activation theories of social facilitation.  
A further study investigated the effects of anxiety and co-action on both learning 
(complex) and performance (simple) tasks (Pederson, 1970). Participants were 
classified as having low, medium, or high anxiety on the Test Anxiety Scale. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either being alone or being in groups with 
four other co-actors. The learning task was a paired-associates task, in which 
participants learned to respond with the second of a pair of unrelated words (e.g., 
stimulus: calendar – response: shoe). There were no main effects of anxiety or group 
condition, but there was a significant interaction: High-anxiety participants in co-
acting groups made more omissions on the paired-associates task. The performance 
tasks were letter deletion and multiplication. Again, there was a significant 






performed better in groups, and the high-anxiety participants better alone. Once 
again, these are the findings predicted by the optimal arousal curve, and they support 
the activation theories of social facilitation.  
In the four experiments reviewed above, observation inhibited task performance in 
high-anxiety participants. This pattern was also found in a meta-analysis of the 10 
social facilitation studies that considered neuroticism (Uziel, 2007). It was also 
suggested as far back as 1898, by Triplett, who suggested that levels of nervous 
excitement differentiated participants who performed simple motor tasks better or 
worse with a competitor. Thus, anxiety can interact with presence and observation, 
and with task complexity, and is therefore an important consideration in social 
facilitation research.  
6.2.5. Observer-Participant Relationship. 
There are two aspects of the relationship between the observer and participant that 
we will consider in Experiments 3 – 5. The first is how familiar they are with each 
other. If unfamiliar observers pose a risk of threat or danger (Guerin, 1983; 1993; 
Guerin & Innes, 1982), or create an uncertain social situation which people are 
predisposed to monitor for threat (Zajonc, 1980), unfamiliar observers would be 
likely to exert a greater activating effect. Support for this hypothesis was found in a 
meta-analysis of 23 studies: Unfamiliar observers increased arousal levels in 
participants performing complex tasks (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983). There was no 
difference in arousal for familiar or unfamiliar observers during simple tasks. In 
support of affiliation theory, that people have positive and supportive interpersonal 
bonds (Schachter, 1959), familiar others had a slight calming influence on 
participants performing complex tasks (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983). Familiar 
observers exerted less of a performance effect on simple and complex task 
performance, irrespective of whether speed or accuracy measures were taken (C. F. 






animal behaviour in which animals responded very differently to familiar and 
unfamiliar members of the same species. Therefore, unfamiliar observers are more 
likely to elicit the social facilitation effect. 
The second aspect of the relationship between the participant and the observer that 
we will consider is whether the observer has peer or expert status to the participant. 
This concept is closely linked to the evaluative potential of the observer, and the 
following experiment illustrates the social facilitation effect from both evaluation 
apprehension and an expert audience. Henchy and Glass (1968) trained student 
participants to recognise and pronounce nonsense words. They trained with some 
words many times; these words became familiar to the participants, and were deemed 
to have acquired correct dominant responses; these comprised the simple task. They 
trained with other words less frequently; these comprised the complex task. In the 
testing phase the nonsense words, and blank stimuli comprised of the words with 
lines obscuring the letters: pseudo-recognition trials, were presented very rapidly 
with a tachistoscope, just at the threshold of awareness. Participants were aware that 
a word had been presented, but not which word it was, and guessed vocally which 
word they had seen. Proximate observation had previously been found to increase the 
proportion of the frequently trained dominant response words on the pseudo-
recognition trials (Cottrell et al., 1968; Henchy & Glass, 1968; Zajonc & Sales, 
1966). Henchy and Glass (1968) compared participants’ performance between four 
observation conditions: alone, peer audience, expert audience, and future evaluation. 
Participants in the alone condition were physically alone in the room (although they 
knew that the experimenter could hear them). The peer audience comprised two 
confederates, introduced as being students who were interested in watching an 
experiment. The expert audience comprised two confederates, introduced as being 
professors who were specialists in this kind of experiment. In the future evaluation 
condition the participants were led to believe that they were being filmed, and that 
the film would be analysed by expert professors. The future evaluation and expert 






responses on the pseudo-recognition task, presumably by inducing more evaluation 
apprehension. Similarly, Wright, Killebrew and Pimpalapure (2002) found that only 
an evaluative expert audience increased cardiovascular activity during task 
performance. Likewise, participant’s performance on a pursuit-rotor task was most 
facilitated by being observed by a person with expert status (F. G. Miller et al., 
1979). Thus, audiences that the participants believe to be experts lead to a greater 
social facilitation effect. Therefore, to best elicit a social facilitation effect observers 
who are both unfamiliar and expert should be used.  
6.2.6. Evidence that “Mere Observation” might elicit the Social 
Facilitation Effect. 
Zajonc’s (1965, 1980) proposal that presence was necessary and sufficient for the 
social facilitation effect led to research that focussed primarily on the effect of 
audience presence. Audience presence frequently included observation (proximate 
observation). As reviewed above, proximate observation does lead to the social 
facilitation effect. The influence of observation has rarely been considered separately 
from presence and evaluation apprehension. It is important for this review to 
consider whether there might be a social facilitation effect from observation without 
presence or evaluation apprehension, because that would strengthen the claim that 
there might be a social facilitation effect from psi-mediated remote observation. We 
will call observation without presence mere observation. This section reviews 
previous research that casts light on whether there might be a social facilitation effect 
from mere observation, although none of these previous experiments considered the 
influence of remote observation that one can only detect, or be affected by, through 
psi. The first body of evidence for a social facilitation effect from mere observation 
is from experiments in which participants are physically alone, but knowingly 
observed via videoconferencing media (e.g., Bradner & Mark, 2001). The second 
group of experiments reviewed below compared proximate observation to a presence 






observation will, for the purposes of this review, be termed mere presence. The term 
mere presence is, however, more loosely defined in the wider social facilitation 
literature; it broadly means that the present person is not engaged in any activity 
(Zajonc, 1965); this has included conditions in which the merely present person is 
watching the participant (e.g., Huguet et al., 1999). Lastly, studies that directly 
compared presence and observation orthogonally (Geen, 1973), and observation and 
evaluation apprehension orthogonally (Geen, 1974) are considered, to disentangle the 
effects of presence, observation, and evaluation apprehension.  
Bradner and Mark (2001) randomly assigned participants to perform a complex 
maths task with either: computer monitoring, in which the observer can see the 
participant’s real-time progress on a remote screen; or a two-way video link, in 
which the participant and observer see real-time images of each other. In both 
conditions the participants were physically alone. All participants also did the task 
alone without observation. Performance was significantly slowed by both forms of 
mere observation, and there was no significant difference between the two-way video 
and computer monitoring conditions. Bradner and Mark ran a follow-up study in 
which participants did the same maths task with either computer monitoring or a one-
way video link, in which the observer watches the participant’s real-time image on a 
screen, but the participant cannot see an image of the observer. Once again, 
performance was significantly slowed by both forms of observation, and there was 
no significant difference between them. These two experiments provide evidence that 
mere observation can cause the social facilitation effect.  
Other studies also investigated whether there are social facilitation effects from mere 
observation from computer monitoring (Aiello, 1993; Aiello & Douthitt, 2001). 
Aiello and Shao (1993) reported the outcome of four experiments in which 
participants performed simple tasks while either unobserved or with computer 
monitoring. One of these simple tasks was a letter deletion task, in which participants 






participants did simple data entry tasks. In all these experiments, computer 
monitoring improved simple task performance. Aiello and Shao also ran two 
experiments with complex anagram tasks. In both experiments, participants’ task 
performance was impaired by computer monitoring. Aiello and Kolb (1995) found 
that computer monitoring increased the speed at which participants performed a 
simple data entry task. Douthitt and Aiello (2000) randomly allocated participants to 
being computer monitored, or not monitored, to perform a complex time-card 
problem-solving task designed to simulate a genuine office assignment. Correcting 
for participants’ baseline skill levels, the participants were significantly slower with 
computer monitoring. In all, these experiments found that computer monitoring, a 
form of mere observation, leads to both simple task facilitation and complex task 
inhibition.  
In none of the experiments discussed above was any comparison made between the 
effects of proximate observation and mere observation. Aiello and Svec (1993), 
however, compared proximate observation to computer monitored conditions. All of 
the participants were shown the computer monitoring network before being 
randomly allocated to one of the following groups. The not-monitored participants 
were told that they would not be monitored. The no-instructions participants were 
monitored, but were only given instructions relating to the performance task and 
were not informed about their monitoring status. The told-monitored participants 
were monitored, and told that they would be monitored. There was also a proximate 
observation condition in which a female observer, not the experimenter, watched the 
participant while standing just behind them, facing in the direction of the computer 
screen. All participants completed a complex anagram solving task. The not-
monitored participants made the least errors, followed by the no-instructions 
participants. The told-monitored and proximately observed participants made the 
most errors, and there was no significant difference in the error rates between these 
groups. This indicates that mere observation can have as large a social facilitation 






being monitored. A similar effect was found in another experiment with computer 
monitoring, in which being told about monitoring facilitated participants’ 
performance of a simple data entry task compared to being monitored without being 
told (Nebeker & Tatum, 1993). In all the above experiments, there is support for 
mere observation eliciting the social facilitation effect. However, there is also the 
possibility that evaluation apprehension led to the social facilitation effect, as all the 
participants were aware that they were being observed. The effects of mere 
observation and evaluation apprehension are impossible to tease apart in these 
designs.  
The second group of studies that indicate that mere observation might cause a social 
facilitation effect compared both proximate observation and mere presence (presence 
without observation) to an alone condition (Cottrell et al., 1968; Markus, 1978; 
Schmitt, Gilovich, Goore, & Joseph, 1986). Any difference found between the effect 
of proximate observation and mere presence could be due to the influence of 
observation in and of itself.  
Cottrell et al. (1968) compared participants’ performance on a pseudo-recognition 
task in one of three conditions: alone, mere presence, and proximate observation. 
Although participants in the alone condition were alone in the test room, they knew 
that their answers could be heard by the experimenter. In the mere presence 
condition, two blindfolded confederates, who remained silent throughout the 
experiment but who were able to hear the participant’s responses, were in the testing 
room. The confederates did not express any interest in the participant; they were 
there under the pretext of being involved in a later study. In the proximate 
observation condition, two confederates, also ostensibly waiting for a later 
experiment, were in the room with the participant and were openly interested in 
watching the participant. To recap the pseudo-recognition task, participants first 
received differential training in pronouncing nonsense words, until some of these 






words were tachistoscopically presented when, in reality, blank stimuli were 
presented. As the responses were spoken, and the participant was listened to in all the 
conditions, including the alone condition, there was a possibility for evaluation 
apprehension in all the observation conditions. The risk of evaluation apprehension 
was, however, similar across all the conditions, and so should not have confounded 
the differences between the observation conditions. Participants with proximate 
observation produced more of the frequently trained responses on the pseudo-
recognition trials than did those in the alone or mere presence conditions. This 
experiment therefore demonstrated a social facilitation effect from proximate 
observation, but not from mere presence. If the risk of evaluation apprehension was 
the same across all the observation conditions, this effect could have been due to the 
influence of mere observation. 
Two further experiments compared mere presence to proximate observation 
(Markus, 1978; Schmitt et al., 1986). Here we briefly outline the aspects of this 
experiment that relate to the possibility of a social facilitation effect from mere 
observation. The methodology of these two experiments is considered in greater 
detail below (see Section 6.4.2). Markus (1978) aimed to reduce the risk of 
evaluation apprehension in her experiment by using a non-evaluative task that the 
participants thought was part of the preparation for a subsequent experiment. 
Participants put on and removed familiar clothing (the simple task) and unfamiliar 
clothing (the complex task) in either alone, mere presence, or proximate observation 
conditions. Participants were timed by a confederate watching though a gap in 
curtains that covered a one-way mirror. There was an interaction between task 
complexity and observation condition. Participants who were proximately observed 
were faster at changing familiar clothing than the participants who were in the mere 
presence condition, who were in turn faster than the alone participants. This pattern 
was reversed for the unfamiliar clothing (see Table 6). There was therefore a greater 
social facilitation effect in the proximate observation condition than there was from 






to alone. These results support the hypothesis that mere observation can lead to the 
social facilitation effect, because of the steps taken to reduce evaluation 
apprehension. The task of donning unfamiliar and ill-fitting clothes was, however, 
criticised by Schmitt et al., (1986) because it might have caused participants anxiety 
over their appearance, which might exert a similar activating effect as evaluation 
apprehension. 
This limitation of Markus’s (1978) experiment was addressed by an experiment that 
used a covert task that would neither cause embarrassment nor elicit evaluation 
apprehension (Schmitt et al., 1986). Participants performed simple and complex 
typing tasks that were presented as gathering background information prior to the 
experiment, and were automatically timed by the computer they were typing on. 
Participants were randomly assigned to alone, mere presence, or proximate 
observation conditions. In the alone condition the participant was physically alone 
and neither listened to nor covertly observed. In the mere presence condition there 
was a confederate, wearing headphones and a blindfold, in the room with the 
participant. The participants were told that the confederate preparing for a 
subsequent sensory deprivation task in the experiment. In the proximate observation 
condition the experimenter stood behind the participant watching over his or her 
shoulder. There was a significant overall interaction between task complexity and 
observation condition. Participants typed the simple typing task faster in the 
proximate observation condition than in the mere presence condition, and faster in 
the mere presence condition than alone. The complex typing task was, however, most 
inhibited by mere presence, then proximate observation, compared to being alone 
(see Table 6). The authors theorised that the mere presence condition might have led 
to participants worrying about their later sensory deprivation, which might have 
produced an activation effect. In the simple task at least, this experiment supports the 
idea that there is a greater social facilitation effect from proximate observation than 
from mere presence, and, given the safeguards against evaluation apprehension, this 






Table 6: Mean Time in seconds for Task Completion in Markus (1978) 
and Schmitt et al. (1986) by Observation Condition 








(A-M) (M-P) (A-P) 
Markus 
(1978) 
Simple 16.46 13.49 11.70 2.97 1.79 4.76 
Complex 28.85 32.73 33.94 -3.88 -1.21 -5.09 
Schmitt et 
al. (1986) 
Simple 14.77 9.83 7.07 4.94 2.76 7.70 
Complex 52.41 72.57 62.52 -20.16 10.05 -10.11 
 
In Table 6 negative time intervals mean that the task was performed relatively 
slowly, i.e., it was inhibited. The social facilitation effect from mere presence is 
demonstrated by the column headed A-M. The effect from proximate observation is 
demonstrated by the column headed A-P. Both of these effects are all in the expected 
directions. The effect from mere observation is demonstrated by the column headed 
M-P: the difference between proximate observation and mere presence. These two 
studies that compared proximate observation and mere presence provide evidence 
that mere observation is an influence that can lead to the social facilitation effect, 
although it might be a weaker effect than mere presence.  
The following experiment tested the assertion that mere presence can elicit a social 
facilitation effect by orthogonally comparing presence and observation (Geen, 1973). 
This experiment differs from those previously presented in that it did not compare 
simple and complex task performance, but instead used a memory task that is 
affected by arousal. Pairs of nonsense syllables and single digits: paired associates, 
learned in a state of high arousal are recalled better after a long interval such as 45 
minutes than a short interval such as two minutes, and vice versa for paired-
associates learned with low arousal (Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1964). This experiment 
aimed to replicate this memory effect with observation and presence. Participants 






presence, proximate observation, and mere observation. In the alone condition the 
experimenter was listening from the outside the room, a possible source of evaluation 
apprehension; the participant was, however, alone in the room. In the mere presence 
condition the experimenter sat in the same room as the participant, reading papers 
with her back to the participant. In the proximate observation condition the 
experimenter watched the participant, standing just behind her, looking over her 
shoulder. In the observation without presence condition the participant was observed 
via a camera. This camera was present in all the conditions, but clearly turned off in 
the other conditions. There was an interaction between observation condition and 
time to recall. The observed participants, both proximately observed and merely 
observed, were better at recall after a longer duration than a shorter duration. The 
non-observed participants showed the opposite pattern. There was no effect of the 
experimenter’s mere presence, but this might have been due to there being evaluative 
influences in the alone condition. Nonetheless, these findings indicate that mere 
observation is a more powerful influence than mere presence, and support the 
activation theories, because observation and high arousal both led to a similar recall 
pattern.. However, the paired-associates task had clear success and failure criteria, 
and so might have provoked evaluation apprehension, especially when the 
participants were informed that they were being observed via the camera. Therefore, 
in this experiment, similarly to those above (Aiello, 1993; Aiello & Douthitt, 2001), 
it is not possible to distinguish whether mere observation or evaluation apprehension 
influenced the participants’ performance. 
Consequently, a further experiment was run to investigate observation and evaluation 
apprehension separately (Geen, 1974). The same paired-associates task was used as 
in Geen (1973). Geen (1974) manipulated evaluation apprehension by either telling 
participants that good recall was correlated with intelligence (high evaluation 
apprehension), or that they were testing the list of words for their suitability (low 
evaluation apprehension). Observation was varied between either a proximate 






clearly watching, or a mere presence condition with the experimenter sitting just to 
the participant’s left but facing away and reading papers. The interactions between 
evaluation and time to recall, and observation and time to recall, were both 
significant. This experiment revealed an arousal-mediated performance effect from 
observation that was separate from either presence or evaluation apprehension. Thus, 
this experiment provides additional, conclusive evidence that mere observation has a 
social facilitation effect.  
6.2.7. Summary of the Social Facilitation Effect Research. 
As reviewed above, there is evidence that mere observation, in the form of computer 
monitoring and videoconferencing, can lead to the social facilitation effect. There is 
also some evidence, from studies that showed a greater effect from proximate 
observation than mere presence conditions, that mere observation has a social 
facilitation effect. To an extent, the effect of mere observation has been separated 
from evaluation apprehension, but it is possible that any condition in which a 
participant is knowingly watched could evoke some evaluation apprehension. 
Therefore, the way to clarify whether observation, without presence or evaluation 
apprehension, can elicit a social facilitation effect is to include a hidden observer 
condition, in which participants are not informed that they are being watched. 
However, if people can be consciously aware of remote observation from a hidden 
observer through psi, then evaluation apprehension might not be ruled out 
completely. This would extend the development of the field of social facilitation, 
which, over the course of time, has investigated competition, co-action, presence, 
observation, evaluation apprehension, and mere observation, and could now progress 
by investigating remote observation.  
It is important to discover whether there is a social facilitation effect from remote 
observation by hidden observers, because of the high level of covert surveillance in 






covertly observed, and if this affects behaviour there might be important 
implications. As noted above, performance on a driving test was inhibited by the 
presence of an additional testee (Rosenbloom et al., 2007). If the cameras that 
monitor speed and safety on roads potentially worsen driving performance that could 
entail serious consequences. Other implications of a social facilitation effect from 
remote observation relate to improving experimental control conditions. It is 
frequently assumed that covert observation that participants are not informed about 
has no influence on their behaviour (e.g., Markus, 1978); this is common practice in 
social psychology research (e.g., Lepper & Greene, 1973). The field of social 
facilitation has done much to challenge previous assumptions that social 
environments are inconsequential to psychological tests (e.g., Huguet et al.), or that 
observation via one-way mirrors does not affect behaviour (e.g., Wapner & Alpner), 
but the time is now ripe for an investigation of whether psi-mediated remote 
observation can also affect behaviour. This review now turns to the 
parapsychological field of remote observation detection to review the evidence that 
people can detect or respond to observation though psi. 
6.3. Remote Observation Detection 
This section reviews evidence that people can detect whether they are being watched, 
through psi. Remote observation detection is psi-mediated awareness of, or influence 
from, being looked at by a human. For this to be a psi influence there have to be no 
ordinary sensory channels by which awareness or influence could be transmitted. For 
instance, the person who is being observed, the observee, must not be able to see or 
hear that the observer is looking. The term remote is used following W. G. Braud to 
mean “inaccessible through ordinary means” (2003, p. xxvii); the observer need not 
necessarily be physically distant, but is remote in that there are no conventional 
sensory pathways to inform the observee that he or she is being watched. Remote 
observation is also called remote staring (e.g., Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997) and unseen 






for a more complete discussion of this terminology. The rates of belief in remote 
observation detection are high, reported to vary from 68% to 94% of various 
populations surveyed (Coover, 1913; Sheldrake, 2003; W. G. Braud et al., 1993a; 
Thalbourne & Evans, 1992). Sheldrake (2003) reported many examples of 
spontaneous remote observation detection experiences, which typically involve the 
observee feeling as though he or she were being stared at, in the absence of sensory 
information, and this transpiring to be the case. While spontaneous reports and the 
high prevalence of belief in remote observation detection are not proof that these 
experiences are genuinely psychic, remote observation detection warrants 
experimental investigation to determine whether it is a genuine psi phenomenon. 
This can be achieved by experiments that test whether remote observation can be 
detected under conditions that eliminate normal sensory awareness of being 
observed, and logical inference. We review these studies below, starting with a brief 
outline of the earliest studies, and other studies with the observer and observee in the 
same room. Secondly, we review studies in which the observer and observee were 
physically and sensorially separated (e.g., in separate rooms with observation 
enabled by video links). In this, we first consider those studies with conscious guess 
measures. Then we consider those studies with unconscious psychophysiological 
measures of remote observation detection, which have also been the subject of two 
meta-analyses (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997; Schmidt, Schneider, Utts, & Walach, 
2004). We review evidence from these experiments and meta-analyses to assess 
whether remote observation can be consciously and unconsciously detected. Lastly, 
we critique the exiguous remote observation experiments that used behavioural 






6.3.1. Remote Observation Detection Studies with Conscious 
Guess Measures and the Observer and Observee in the Same 
Room. 
This section reviews studies that used the following basic procedure. An observer 
and an observee sat in the same room, with the observee unable to see the observer 
(e.g., facing the other way). According to a randomisation method, the observer 
either looked at the back of the observee’s head (observation trial) or did not look 
(non-observation trial). The observee consciously guessed whether he or she had 
been remotely observed. Experimentation in this paradigm began at the end of the 
19
th
 century (Titchener, 1898). Based on a series of experiments he conducted, 
Titchener reported that remote observation detection did not occur. Unfortunately, he 
provided no further details or results, so it not possible to assess his claim. 
Coover (1913) reported results of a total of 1,000 such trials using 10 observees who 
believed that they could detect remote observation. Observation condition was 
determined by a real-time die roll. The observer signalled the start and end of each 
20-second trial by tapping on a desk with a pencil. Overall, 50.2% of the guesses 
were correct. These data were originally interpreted as being at chance, but a 
subsequent re-analysis found that the hit rate in the observation trials considered 
alone (53.3%) was significantly above chance (Sheldrake, 1998).  
Poortman (1959) aimed to improve upon Coover’s (1913) procedure by using an 
observer purportedly gifted in influencing others by observing them, and by 
increasing the duration of the trials. Poortman, who believed he could detect remote 
observation, was the observee. They took part in 89 trials of about three minutes each 
in the observer’s house. The observation condition for each trial was determined by 
the colour of a pre-shuffled deck of cards; the observer drew one card before each 






was sitting at. The observee spoke out loud to end each trial. Overall 59.55% of the 
guesses were correct, significantly greater than MCE (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a). 
These early studies reviewed above show the origins of the remote observation 
detection paradigm. These experiments had some major limitations. In each of these 
studies there was no barrier to sensory leakage or sound cues. For example, changes 
in the sound of the observer’s breathing, the volume of the pencil tapping, or 
knocking could have indicated differences between observation and non-observation 
to the observee. Some participants reported purposefully listening out for such cues 
(Coover, 1913). The methods of selecting observation conditions (die rolls and card 
shuffling) might not have been adequately random, and therefore might have 
concurred with patterns in observee’s guessing. There was also a risk of fraud and 
error in the observer deciding the observation condition in real time. These 
experiments therefore do not provide conclusive proof for, or against, remote 
observation detection. In addition to these early investigations, some modern 
research has also used experimental set ups with the observer and observee in the 
same room (e.g., Sheldrake, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001; Schwartz & Russek, 1999).  
Sheldrake has amassed an enormous amount of data on conscious guess detection of 
remote observation from workshops, volunteer third-party researchers, and 
experiments in schools (Sheldrake, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005b). 
Observation trials were usually 10 to 20 seconds long, and the sequences were either 
randomised in advance, or based on a real time die roll or coin toss. Some of them 
were cued to start by the observer or an experimenter speaking, or by a mechanical 
clicker. Many of the experiments involved the observer and observee receiving trial-
by-trial feedback. Feedback, information regarding whether the observee’s guess was 
correct, can be given to the observer, the observee, or to both. One risk in giving 
feedback to the observee is that they will, intentionally or unintentionally, learn 
patterns in non-random observation sequences, creating artefacts. The other risk in 






sensory leakage with a particular observation condition. Any sensory leakage might 
convey information about the observation condition, but combined with trial-by-trial 
feedback this is a greater problem. 
Sheldrake investigated remote observation detection in considerable detail, breaking 
empirical data down by whether hits occurred in the observation trials or the non-
observation trials. The overall pattern, which is upheld in all but two of the 
experiments, is that observees detected remote observation around 5% above MCE, a 
hit rate of around 55%, but did not detect non-observation significantly differently 
from MCE. Sheldrake (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005b) noted that response biases, 
such as responding observed more often than non-observed, that would lead to hits in 
the observation condition would also lead to misses in the non-observation condition. 
This bias to answer yes, or observed, more often than no does exist (Sheldrake, 
2005b), but it cannot be the only explanatory factor because the corresponding 
misses in the non-observation condition were not found. Cheating and cueing would 
likewise lead to increased hits in the observation and non-observation trials alike, so 
are unlikely to be the sole explanation, although a combination of response bias and 
cheating might be. Sheldrake suggested that the tendency to detect observation better 
than detecting non-observation might be because observation is a stimulus, and it is 
easier to detect a stimulus than an absence of stimuli. The consistency of this pattern, 
of significant remote observation detection solely in the observation trials, across 
many different experiments strengthens the case that this effect is not artefactual. 
The large size of this dataset enabled Sheldrake to test whether potential artefacts had 
inflated remote observation detection by comparing the results of experiments with 
different levels of control against sensory leakage. Sheldrake (1999) compared the 
hit rates of experiments that used a sound created by the observer, such as a tap on 
the table, to those which used a mechanical clicker to start the observation trials. If 
there were information about the observation condition being conveyed in the 






mechanical clickers. The hit rates were almost identical, and the differences between 
them were non-significant. This argues against the risk that in any comparable 
experiment, such as Poortman (1959), there was an artefactual effect of observation 
detection caused by tapping volume. Sheldrake (2001) also investigated the 
possibility that the observees could see the observers, by varying blindfold wearing 
within-subjects, and found no significant difference in the hit rates. The randomised 
sequences that Sheldrake used were criticised by Colwell, Shroder and Sladen 
(2000), who argued that they were non-random, and therefore contained a pattern 
that the observees could learn implicitly from the feedback they received. Sheldrake 
(2001) tested the effect of feedback by varying this within-subjects, and found that it 
made no significant difference to the hit rates. The implicit learning of the 
observation sequence hypothesis is also countered by the positive findings, with the 
same hit rate pattern, in previous experiments without feedback (Sheldrake, 2000, 
2001), indicating a genuine ability to detect remote observation.  
The pattern of significant hit rates in the observation condition and chance hit rates in 
the non-observation condition was simulated by a computer program (Lobach & 
Bierman, 2004). By combining a guessing strategy based on feedback depending on 
the number of times the observee has been observed, and the response bias to answer 
‘yes’ (or ‘observed’) 55% of the time, the same pattern was generated. However, this 
does not explain the success in the experiments without feedback. In summary, the 
majority of the Sheldrake experiments did not adequately rule out artefacts, but there 
are indications that the positive findings were not due to inadequate randomisation, 
implicit learning, or cueing. Additional support for Sheldrake’s (1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2003, 2005) findings come from a pilot study which aimed to replicate 
Sheldrake’s experimental design, while ensuring the randomisation of the 







The final three studies to be reviewed in this section incorporated comparisons 
between observation, imagined observation, and the body part being observed 
(Schwartz & Russek, 1999). The first experiment compared observees’ ability to 
detect observation of either the head or the back. Each observer/observee pair was 
unique. According to a counterbalanced sequence, the observer either looked at the 
observee’s head or back. Trials started with the observer saying ready and ended 
with the observee guessing head or back. Trials took a few seconds, and there was a 
10-second break between trials. The proportion of correct answers was significantly 
greater than the proportion incorrect. Schwartz and Russek were interested in 
whether an emission of “biophysical energy” or the observer’s intention had led to 
detection. 
Schwartz and Russek (1999) ran another two experiments comparing the detection of 
observation of the head or lower back, and the imagined observation of the head or 
lower back. In the imagined observation condition the observer kept his or her eyes 
closed and imagined observing the head or back of their observee. Otherwise the 
procedure was the same as for the first experiment. Schwartz and Russek argued that 
imagined observation would test only the effect of the observer’s intention to 
observe, and not any effect from biophysical energy emitted during actual 
observation. The imagined observation condition did not, however, rule out 
involuntary changes in the observer’s breathing or tone of voice that might act as 
cues to the observee. This second experiment found a marginally significant greater 
proportion of correct guesses overall. This same procedure was replicated in a third 
experiment, which aimed to improve upon the second experiment by increasing the 
sample size and number of trials to increase the power. This experiment found a 
highly significant detection rate. There was no difference between the hit rates for 
actual and imagined observation; these were detected equally well. In these 
experiments there was a risk of sensory leakage and cueing. The counterbalancing of 
the observation condition sequences risked the observees also counterbalancing their 






If, however, the observation detection effects above were not due to cues, nor to the 
order of the observation conditions, this experiment shows that imagined observation 
is as detectable as actual observation. This implies that the observees might be 
detecting the observer’s intention to observe, or attention on the observee, rather than 
the act of being seen. Schwartz and Russek (1999) noted that this could explain why 
some sceptical observers do not get significant observation detection effects: The 
intention that accompanies observation might be crucial. It might be the case that the 
effect of observation is entirely due to attention, but that looking at the observee or 
the observee’s image on a screen focuses the observer’s attention on the observee. 
The wider implications of an effect from attention or intention affect all remote 
observation experiments and, indeed, all psychology experiments. If an observer 
focuses their intention or attention on the observee when they are not observing, a 
similar effect to observation might occur. This could severely compromise the non-
observation condition. If intention or attention has an effect then any experimenter 
could be affecting the participants in any psychology experiment. 
In summary, the early research into remote observation detection, and other 
experiments with the observer and observee in the same room, predominantly found 
that observees could detect remote observation more often than one would expect by 
chance alone. In these studies the observation influence that is tested is direct gaze. 
This is similar to the spontaneous experience model, in which there is a direct line of 
sight, and it therefore has ecological validity. In these experiments there was a large 
risk of sensory leakage and unintentional cueing. The positive results found might 
therefore be artefacts of poor experimental control rather than genuine psi effects, 
and it is not possible to conclude that there is a psi-mediated remote observation 
detection effect from these studies. Risks of cues, sensory leakage, and artefacts of 
poor randomisation have to be eliminated to claim that an apparent remote 
observation detection effect is due to psi. Before reviewing studies with better 
controls against sensory leakage, we will consider participants’ self-reports of the 






6.3.2. The Feeling of Being Remotely Observed. 
A minority of the papers reviewed so far report the observees’ feeling of being 
remotely observed. This is described as being a fairly unpleasant phenomenon 
“uncanny …unpleasant tension” (Titchener, 1898, p. 895). Titchener also postulated 
that an audience that is behind one causes nervousness. Coover (1913) collected 
reports from his observees, and categorised them as visual images or kinaesthetic 
sensations. Visual imagery included unbidden images of the observer looking 
directly at them. The kinaesthetic sensations associated with observation included 
feelings of: restlessness; discomfort; connection with, or nearness to, the observer; 
being criticised; and the desire to turn round. There was only one reported feeling of 
non-observation, and that was the feeling of being alone. The most frequently 
reported feeling in a large collection of anecdotal accounts of spontaneous remote 
observation detection is uneasiness, then restlessness (Sheldrake, 2003). Responses 
to a questionnaire on remote observation detection experiences showed that 78% 
students in a parapsychology class in Australia experienced a strong emotional 
reaction to being stared at, such as anxiety, sexual arousal, fear, or anger and 56% 
experienced a strong physical reaction, such as a pounding heart or blushing 
(Thalbourne & Evans, 1992). It seems strange that no positive feelings associated 
with remote observation detection have been reported from spontaneous cases. It is 
possible that, just as being observed by most people might be unsettling, there are 
some with whom there is a positive enough bond to create a positive feeling, like 
affiliation (Schachter, 1959). This could also be the case remotely; we could, 
perhaps, call it remote affiliation. The reported experiences are, however, mostly 
uneasiness and nervousness, which might originate from remote observation 
detection being an evolutionary product of being able to detect predators’ gaze. 
Lee et al. (2002) found differences in how people conceptualised being stared at 
depending on personality types. They devised their own questionnaire to measure 






watched in public places, which might just be because there are more chances of 
being seen. Those who scored high on social awareness felt watched when they felt 
“alone, isolated or vulnerable” (Lee et al., 2002, p. 408). This indicates that people 
feel watched in environments that cause them unease; this corroborates the 
spontaneous reports of remote observation being unsettling. It also warns researchers 
not to allow observees to confuse any uneasy feeling with the feeling of being 
observed.  
6.3.3. Recent Remote Observation Detection Studies with 
Conscious Guess Measures and Physical Separation of Observer 
and Observee. 
More recent studies into remote observation detection with conscious guess measures 
are reviewed below. These experiments improved on the methodology of the earlier 
remote observation detection studies by reducing the risk of sensory leakage and 
inadvertent cueing. This was achieved by physical separation of the observer and 
observee, and better techniques of randomising the trial observation conditions.    
The earliest remote observation research with better controlled conditions was 
conducted by Peterson (1978, as cited in W. G. Braud et al., 1993b). Nine 
observer/observee pairs each took part in four 6-minute experimental sessions. The 
observer and observee were in separate, adjacent rooms with a one-way mirror 
between them, which allowed the observer to see the observee, but not vice versa. 
The risk of noise cues was reduced by the observee listening to white noise through 
headphones. Prior to the trials there was a training period, in which the observee was 
given feedback, to help them to learn how it feels to be observed. There was no 
feedback in the test trials. The observer watched, or did not watch, the observee 
through the mirror according to a randomised schedule. The observee pushed a 
button whenever he or she felt observed. The time and number of button presses 






non-observation trials. There were significantly more button presses in the 
observation trials. This experiment therefore supported the detection of remote 
observation under conditions in which there were very few risks of sensory leakage 
or cueing. 
Williams (1983) investigated remote observation detection along with the effect of 
belief in psi. The observees were 14 believers in psi and 14 disbelievers, selected 
from a large group of students screened with a 10-item belief in psi scale. There was 
very good control against sensory leakage; the observer and observee were in 
separate rooms 60 feet apart. The observer watched an image of the observee on a 
monitor relayed from a closed-circuit television link (CCTV). The monitor displayed 
12 seconds of the image of the observee, randomly interspersed with 12 seconds of 
blank screen, to denote the observation and non-observation trials. A tone signalled 
the start of each trial. The observee pressed a ‘yes’ button to score trials that he or 
she thought were observation trials, and made no response for those that he or she 
thought were non-observation. There was an overall significant positive deviation 
from chance in remote observation detection, with a large effect size (r = .31); this 
was greater for the believer observees (r = .49). The disbelievers considered alone 
guessed at chance. This study, therefore, demonstrated significant detection of 
remote observation with randomised observation condition sequences and good 
controls against sensory leakage and cueing. This supports the hypothesis that remote 
observation detection is psi-mediated, and adds the finding that believers in psi might 
be better able to detect remote observation. 
Sheldrake (2000) reported the results of some well-controlled experiments that 
supported remote observation detection. Three experiments were conducted at 
schools in London that adequately separated the observers and observees. Whole 
classes of primary school children participated at once, in observer and observee 
pairs. The observees were outside with their teacher, and they wore blindfolds. The 






the classroom windows, which were closed. They were separated by a distance of 
between three and 100 metres. Only after the observees were in place did the 
observers receive their randomised lists of observation sequences, which were unique 
to each pair, obviating any incentive to copy from others. There were 20 trials of 10 
seconds each. Sheldrake told the observers when to start, and made a tone sound 
outside for the observees. A teacher outside with the observees told them when the 
trial was over; subsequently, the observees noted their guess on paper. There was no 
feedback given to either the observers or the observees. The hit rates were 
significantly above chance overall.  
Colwell et al. (2000) investigated the sequences of observation conditions that 
Sheldrake (1998) had provided to encourage the general public to replicate his 
studies. Participants, who believed in the ability to detect remote observation, 
undertook 60 remote observation detection trials without feedback, followed by 180 
trials with trial-by-trial feedback. The observer was one of the authors (S. Shroder). 
Observer and observee were in adjacent rooms with a one-way mirror between them, 
which allowed the observer to view the observee during the observation trials. The 
observee’s room was not sound-proofed, but the observer took care not to provide 
noise cues relating to observation. The start and end of each 20-second trial was cued 
by the words trial then yes or no displayed on computer monitors, one in each of the 
two experimental rooms. When feedback was provided, this also appeared on the 
monitors immediately after the observee registered his or her guess. Overall, 
participants performed significantly above chance in the observation trials, but not in 
the non-observation trials. They performed significantly better than chance in the 
trials with feedback, but not in those without feedback, and there was improvement 
over the trials. This could have been because the participants were learning to 
identify the feeling of being remotely observed over the course of the feedback trials. 
The observation condition sequences were, however, found to be non-random, with 






be because the participants were implicitly learning a pattern to the observation 
condition sequences.  
To test whether inadequate randomisation had led to artefactual findings a second 
experiment was run using genuinely random sequences from random number tables 
(Colwell, Schroder, & Sladen, 2000). This followed the same procedure as their first 
experiment, with the exception that there was a different observer (D. Sladen), and 
participants did 200 trials each, the first 20 of which had no feedback. There was no 
overall remote observation detection effect found, neither did participants improve 
over time. Colwell et al. (2000) attributed the positive effect in the first experiment to 
participants implicitly learning the sequences. There are, however, other differences 
between these two experiments which might have caused the discrepancies in the 
outcomes. These two experiments had different observers. The longer non-feedback 
condition that preceded the feedback condition in the first experiment could have 
acted as practice time, improving performance in the feedback condition. Therefore, 
the order of the observation conditions is not the only possible reason for the 
different results between these two experiments. However, this study highlights the 
importance of truly randomised observation sequences.  
In all of the experiments considered so far, there has been only one observer and one 
observee at any one time. A different set-up was devised in which there were 
concurrently around 13 observers and two observees (Wiseman & Smith, 1994). 
Participants rotated roles and acted as both observers and observees. The observers 
and observees were in adjacent rooms, with a one-way mirror allowing the observers 
to see the observees. The two observees were divided by a screen, and one of the 
experimenters was also in the same room as them. Each observee pair undertook six 
trials, each of 20 seconds duration, and rated each trial on a seven-point scale for 
how observed they felt. There were no significant differences between the 
participants’ ratings in observation and non-observation conditions. This set-up has 






might be other people present, and more than one observer. There was also fairly 
good control against sensory leakage, and truly randomised observation condition 
sequences. One possible reason for the null findings might be because the observees 
were not alone, and so may not have felt unobserved, even in the non-observation 
condition. 
A further series of experiments found no evidence for remote observation detection 
(Lobach & Bierman, 2004). Their first experiment compared the effect of the 
observer’s belief in psi. Each observee was observed for half their trials by a 
believing observer, and for the other half by a sceptical observer. The observer and 
observee were in adjacent rooms with a one-way mirror in between them. The 
observer looked at the left side of the observee’s face, or looked away and focussed 
her thoughts on something else, according to a unique, randomised schedule that had 
been prepared in advance. The trials were 15 seconds long, and were started by a 
tape recorded voice played in both rooms. Their second experiment used a 
combination of psychophysiological measures of remote observation detection and 
conscious guess measures, and will be reviewed fully in the section below on 
psychophysiological responses. In a brief outline of the conscious guess aspects of 
this second experiment, the observer watched the observee through a CCTV link 
from an adjacent room, or did not watch, for twenty 30-second trials according to a 
randomised schedule. The observee pressed a button to record his or her guess in a 
pause between each trial. In their third experiment observer and observee pairs who 
knew each other were compared to unacquainted pairs. Participants were recruited in 
pairs of friends, and each took the role of observer and observee with their friend, 
and with a member of another pair whom they did not know. The observer and 
observee were in adjacent rooms with a one-way mirror between them. The 
observees rated their guesses by button presses after each 10-second trial. The hit 






The experiments just reviewed with conscious guess as the measure of remote 
observation detection covered a wide range of different experimental set-ups. They 
tested selected and unselected participants with different numbers and durations of 
trials. These studies therefore acted as conceptual replications for each other: They 
addressed the same question, but with variations in the methodology. The advantages 
of conceptual replications over exact replications, in which an experiment is 
duplicated, include reduced risk of fraud from involving many different 
experimenters and participants, and reduced risk that a positive effect might be due 
to a hidden artefact in one experiment’s methodology or an inaccuracy in one 
experiment’s procedure (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997). These studies’ hit rates, the 
outcome of single means t tests comparing hit rate to MCE, and the effect sizes are 
summarised in Table 7.  
Four of the seven studies presented are independently significant. There are two 
additional non-significant studies (Lobach & Bierman, 2004), for which the data 
were not available; thus the majority were non-significant. However, there is a 
greater proportion of significant studies than the five percent that would be expected 
by chance. Of the significant studies, three had large (>.3) effect sizes: Peterson 
(1978), Williams (1983), and Colwell et al. (2000) and one had a medium (>.15) 
effect size: Sheldrake (2000). These experiments had good controls against sensory 
leakage and cueing, and so, with the exception of the possible randomisation artefact 
in Colwell et al.’s (2000) first experiment, there were no known artefacts that would 
indicate that this effect was not due to psi. The two experiments with the best 
controls against sensory leakage: Peterson (1978) and Williams (1983), had the 
highest effect sizes, indicating that remote observation detection is not an artefact of 
sensory leakage. Two of the experiments with null findings were conducted by 
sceptics: Colwell et al. (2000) and Wiseman and Smith (1994), indicating that there 
might be an experimenter effect in this dataset. Overall, there is some evidence that 






Table 7: Outcomes of Well-Controlled Remote Observation Detection 
Studies with Conscious Guess Measures 
Study N 
observees 
t Significant at 
p<.05 * 
r Hit rate 
Peterson (1978) 9 2.65 * .41 54.86% 
Williams (1983) 28 1.71 * .31 53.32% 
Sheldrake (2000) 155 2.14 * .17 52.6% 







 * .46 N/A 
a
 






 NS .11 N/A 
a
 
Wiseman and Smith (1994) 65 .93 NS .12 N/A 
b
 




45 .1.24 NS .18 52.1% 
 
a
Colwell et al. (2000) reported their results in four blocks of trials per experiment. The effect 
sizes reported are the mean effect size for each experiment based on the results of the 
blocks. There were no t tests or hit rates reported for each experiment as a whole.  
b
Wiseman and Smith (1994) did not report a hit rate because their observees rated how 
much they felt observed on a Likert scale. Their results only deviated slightly from what 
would be expected by chance.  
 
W. G. Braud, Shafer and Andrews (1990, 1993a) reviewed the findings of remote 
observation detection studies with conscious guess measures prior to 1985. They 
argued that the results supported remote observation detection, but with small effect 
sizes. Given that spontaneous reports of observation detection frequently include 
“unconscious behavioural and bodily changes…rich in physiological content…and 
automatic movements” (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a, pp. 376-377) and rarely involve 
higher cognitive functions, W. G. Braud et al. proposed that using a more 
unconscious measure of nervous system activity might be more sensitive to remote 
observation, and therefore better at detecting it. Measures of unconscious 
physiological responses would also be free of cognitive interferences such as 
guessing strategies and response biases. For example, Coover’s (1913) participants 






maintain an even balance overall. Sheldrake (1999) also argued that the effect sizes 
were small because remote observation detection is usually unconscious “under the 
artificial conditions of experiments, people are being asked to do consciously when 
they may usually do unconsciously. Self-consciousness may interfere with their 
sensitivity.” (p. 67). In this above quotation, Sheldrake might have meant that the 
process of remote observation detection is normally nonintentional. Therefore, 
nonintentional psi measures might increase the chances of finding an effect. 
However, in the majority of the studies reviewed below, observees knew that they 
would be remotely observed, just not when. Therefore, these are not truly 
nonintentional psi studies. If, as argued in Chapter 1, it is the case that psi 
information is first received unconsciously, and that only part of this information 
reaches consciousness, then unconscious measures would have greater potential to 
capture this effect. 
6.3.4. Remote Observation Detection Studies with Unconscious 
Psychophysiological Measures. 
In this section, we review remote observation detection studies with 
psychophysiological dependent variables. The psychophysiological measure that has 
been used for remote observation detection is electrodermal activity, also called skin 
conductance (Lobach & Bierman, 2004) or galvanic skin response (Wiseman & 
Smith, 1994). Electrodermal activity is measured by placing electrodes on the 
observee’s non-dominant hand. A small electric current is passed through these and 
conductivity is measured at regular intervals. Sweating increases the conductivity of 
the hand. Electrodermal activity is an indication of the activity in the sympathetic 
branch of the autonomic nervous system (sympathetic nervous system arousal). 
Increased sympathetic nervous system activity is associated with the body’s response 
to stress, and the fight-flight syndrome. It involves increased palmar sweating, pupil 
dilation, heart rate, blood pressure, bronchiole dilation, and release of adrenaline (D. 






with feelings of fear, nervousness, and agitation. Decreased sympathetic nervous 
system response is associated with calming, and with increased activity in the 
antagonistic branch of the autonomic nervous system, the parasympathetic nervous 
system (D. U. Silverthorn et al., 2009).  
In remote observation studies with electrodermal measures, the observees’ skin 
conductance is measured throughout the observation and non-observation trials. 
There are different ways used to calculate the effect of observation. The difference in 
the electrodermal activity scores between the observation and non-observation 
sessions can be calculated as a ratio and compared to MCE by single means t tests 
(e.g., W. G. Braud et al., 1990); the conductivity scores can be deducted from each 
other and compared to zero by single means t tests (e.g., Wiseman, Smith, Freedman, 
Wasserman, & Hurst, 1995); or the conductivity scores in the observation and non-
observation trials can be compared to each other by paired t tests (e.g., Wiseman & 
Smith, 1994).  
What would the effect of remote observation on sympathetic nervous system activity 
be? The spontaneous reports and the descriptions of participants’ feelings in the 
experiments reviewed above depicted a sensation of uneasiness and nervousness 
from remote observation. Therefore, the effect is likely to be sympathetic nervous 
system activation, as this is associated with nervousness and agitation. Some of the 
remote observation studies that measured electrodermal activity found that remote 
observation lead to activation, and others found it lead to calming. We review the 
studies that found activation first, then those that found calming, and then we will 
examine the studies for possible explanations for this difference.  
The first study that found activation from remote observation was also the first study 
to use a psychophysiological dependent variable (W. G. Braud et al., 1990; 1993a). 
Sixteen unselected volunteer participants were the observees. The observer was D. 






several other rooms. There was no risk of sensory leakage. Remote observation was 
carried out via CCTV. There was a continuously active camera in the observee’s 
room, and a video monitor in the observer’s room. The observer first set up the 
observee with palmar electrodes and informed him or her that he or she would be 
watched only at random times and just to sit quietly. Then she went to the 
observation room, and only then opened a randomised, sealed list of observation 
conditions. Opening these after the contact with the observee is over obviates the risk 
of inadvertent cueing during the set-up. Each observee had his or her own unique 
sequence, which ruled out the risk of the sequences accidentally coinciding with 
popular guessing patterns. There was a significant increase in the activation of the 
observees’ sympathetic nervous systems during remote observation trials. This 
difference was due to the remote observation, not to the camera, as the camera was 
running continuously in both the observation and non-observation trials. There was a 
larger effect size found than the conscious guess studies (r = .57), and W. G. Braud 
et al. (1990, 1993a) concluded that electrodermal activity was a more powerful 
method of detecting remote observation.   
In another study in which remote observation was associated with increased 
electrodermal activity, the influence of observation was combined with the observers 
trying to activate the observees (Schlitz & LaBerge, 1994, 1997). This study follows 
not only from the work of W. G. Braud et al. (1990; 1993a,b) but also from healing 
analogue studies. In these healing analogue studies, remote influencers aimed to calm 
or activate the electrodermal responses of a distant participant, not through 
observation, but through intention and imagery (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997). There 
was considerable experimental support for the ability to influence a participant’s 
physiology remotely (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997). Thus, in Schlitz and LaBerge 
(1997), the effect may have been a combined effect of observation and intention. The 
observer and observee discussed ways that each particular observee might be 
activated. The observer and observee were taken to separate rooms, 15 metres apart, 






non-observation, non-observation, observation, or vice versa (ABBA) were created 
to balance the observation conditions and control for the possibility of electrodermal 
activity decreasing over time. The randomised, counterbalanced sequence of 
observation/non-observation trials was controlled by the computer program. The 
observer watched the image of the observee or a black screen, and either tried to 
activate the observee or attended to other things, accordingly. There were thirty-two 
30-second trials, interspersed with short breaks of randomised duration. The 
experimenter was blind to the observation sequences until after concluding all 
interactions with the observer and observee. There was very good control against 
artefacts in this experiment. Observees’ skin conductance was significantly higher in 
the observation trials than in the non-observation trials. These findings add some 
support to the idea that remote observation can lead to electrodermal activation, with 
the caveat that this effect might have been caused by the intention to activate the 
observees.  
Wiseman and Smith (1994) also found an increase in participants’ electrodermal 
activation from remote observation by a group of observers. In a similar way to their 
experiment with conscious guess as the dependent variable (Wiseman and Smith 
1994), there were two observees at a time, separated by screen. There was a video 
camera monitoring each observee. This differs from the other studies with 
psychophysiological measures reviewed here, in that the observees were not alone. 
Thirteen observers were located on a different floor of the laboratory that had two 
monitors, each of which displayed an image of one of the observees. Half of the 
observers were allocated to watch each observee. The observers watched the images, 
or looked away, according to instructions from the experimenter who followed a pre-
prepared, randomised, counterbalanced sequence of observation trials. These had 
been created by rolling a die to determine random entry into a random number table, 
then assigning an observation trial followed by a non-observation trial to even 
numbers, and the reverse for odd numbers. There were six trials per pair of 






observers and observees. There was a significant difference between the 
electrodermal activity in the observation and non-observation conditions. The 
authors further investigated the randomised and paired sequences and found that 
pairing of observation trials before non-observation trials predominated. This could 
have caused an artefact if the observees’ electrodermal activity reduced over the 
trials, and further investigation corroborated that this might have occurred. This 
artefact could also have masked a genuine psi effect if there was one. Using 
randomised ABBA counterbalanced blocks, as Schlitz and LaBerge (1997) did, 
overcomes this problem, and these were used by all the following experiments in this 
review, unless otherwise stated.  
Due to the possible randomisation artefact in the previous study, another two studies 
were run that investigated electrodermal response to remote observation (Wiseman et 
al., 1995). In both these experiments observees took part individually. There were 
good controls against sensory leakage; the rooms that the observee and observer 
were in were in some cases about nine metres apart, and in others the observers were 
on a different floor and at the opposite side of the building. The randomisation of the 
observation trials was different in each of the experiments. In the first experiment 
entry into a random number table was determined by die roll, then the next 10 digits 
were used to create the sequences. An even number translated to an observation trial 
followed by a non-observation trial; an odd number, vice versa. For each sequence 
created from the random number tables a counterbalanced sheet was created, in 
which the exact reverse observation conditions were listed. In the second experiment 
the randomised ABBA sequences were used. There were 10 observation and 10 non-
observation 30-second trials, with 30-second rest periods in between, for each 
observee. In both experiments there was no significant activation effect from remote 
observation. The non-significant findings in these experiments and in Wiseman and 






A striking experimenter effect was found in a study that also found electrodermal 
activation from remote observation (Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997). This study set out to 
compare the effects of a sceptical observer (R. Wiseman), who found null results in 
previous remote observation studies (Wiseman & Smith, 1994; Wiseman et al., 
1995), with a psi proponent (M. Schlitz), who found significant results in a previous 
study (Schlitz & LaBerge, 1997), to see if any light could be shed on the difference 
in results. All of the trials were run at the same location, in the University of 
Hertfordshire, where R. Wiseman worked, with the same apparatus, and all 32 
observees were from the same pool. The observees were assigned opportunistically 
to one of the observers. The observer and observee were in different rooms, 
separated by a distance of 20 metres. The observer greeted the observee and set up 
the electrodermal monitoring equipment. The randomised and counterbalanced 
observation sequences had been prepared in advance. It was only after the observer 
had left the observee and returned to the observer’s room that he or she saw the 
observation sequence. The observer watched the observee through a CCTV link with 
a camera in the observee’s room and a monitor in the observer’s room. There was 
very good control against sensory leakage, error, cueing, and fraud. After an initial 2-
minute delay to allow the observee’s electrodermal activity to settle to baseline 
levels, the observer either watched the image of the observee on the monitor, or 
looked away and diverted his or her attention. Each trial lasted 30 seconds, and there 
were 32 trials for each observee. There was significantly higher electrodermal 
activity during remote observation in the observees for whom M. Schlitz was the 
observer, but no difference between observation and non-observation in the 
observees for whom R. Wiseman was the observer. It is not possible to determine 
whether this difference between the observers is due to their social interactions with 
the observees, their psychic ability as observers, or other characteristics. There is also 
a risk that the non-random allocation of observees to observers resulted in a 
difference between the two groups that could account for the different effect of the 






within-subjects. This study demonstrated that remote observation can lead to 
electrodermal activation, and that experimenter effects might play a role in this. 
In summary, these experiments reviewed above all found an increase in the 
observees’ electrodermal activity from remote observation. This equates to an 
increase in the sympathetic nervous system arousal of the observees, and is 
associated with feelings of nervousness, unease, and agitation. This fits well with the 
descriptions of the spontaneous experiences of remote observation. Other studies, 
conversely, found a calming effect from remote observation on the observees’ 
sympathetic nervous systems, and we review them next. 
A series of experiments in which the observer and observees had participated 
together in connectedness exercises found that remote observation reduced the 
sympathetic nervous system activity (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a,b). The first of these 
experiments (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a) was carried out similarly in terms of the 
observation sequence randomisation, procedure, and physical separation of the 
observer and observee to the experiment described above that found electrodermal 
activation from remote staring (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a). The connectedness 
exercises involved the group sharing a present-time, unitary focus of attention while 
voicing what they were experiencing; this generated a strong feeling of 
interconnectedness (Andrews, 2004). The observees and the observer/experimenter 
(D. Shafer) participated in the connectedness exercises together, prior to the remote 
observation trials. The observees’ electrodermal activity was significantly lower in 
the observation trials compared to the non-observation trials. The most likely reason 
for remote observation being calming was the connectedness training. This training 
was interpreted as having changed the “typical … threatening” (W. G. Braud et al., 
1993a, p. 387) stimulus of remote observation, to the observer and observee being 
more relaxed and comfortable with the idea of connection. The connectedness 
training did not increase or decrease the magnitude of the effect of remote 






Two further experiments by the same research team also found a calming response 
from remote observation (W. G. Braud et al., 1993b). The first experiment used three 
new observers, who were trained by D. Shafer. These new observers did not receive 
connectedness training, although it was explained to them in general terms. In the 
second experiment D. Shafer was the observer. The procedure was the same as in the 
first of this series of experiments (W. G. Braud et al., 1990; 1993a). The observees’ 
electrodermal activity was significantly lower in the observation trials compared to 
the non-observation trials. This last experiment incorporated a check that these 
results were not due to the observees being coincidentally in synchrony with the 
randomised schedule. A “sham control” was set up in which sessions were called 
observation/non-observation, but in all of which there was no observation. In these 
trials there was no significant difference between participants’ electrodermal activity 
in the “observation” and “non-observation” sessions. This check is a strong counter 
claim to any criticism that significant remote observation detection findings might be 
artefacts of natural rhythms coinciding with the order of observation conditions.  
The different effects from observation before and after connectedness training were 
not predicted by the authors. W. G. Braud et al. (1993b) suggested that the change in 
direction from remote observation, from activating to calming, was due to a change 
in the observer’s attitude. In the first experiment D. Shafer had been uneasy and 
nervous, but from the second experiment onwards she was relaxed and comfortable. 
This increased comfort was very likely a product of the connectedness training, but 
might have also been due to increased familiarity and confidence from having done 
the experiment before. Her comfort with remote observation was transferred to the 
additional observers she trained, who also exerted a calming influence. This indicates 
that the emotions of the observer could be transmitted through observation; it might, 
therefore, be difficult to have a pure observation influence. This series of 
experiments provides strong evidence for psychophysiological remote observation 
detection, and how connectedness training could change the remote observation 






Another study that found a calming effect from remote observation (Wiseman & 
Schlitz, 1998) was a replication of Wiseman and Schlitz’s (1997) experimenter effect 
and remote observation study described above. In a similar procedure to their 
previous experiment, observees were opportunistically assigned to the two observers, 
who followed the same methods throughout. The experiment was conducted at the 
Institute for Noetic Sciences where M. Schlitz worked. The observer first took the 
observee to the experimental room, which contained a camera, the electrodermal 
monitoring equipment, and headphones for the observee that played white noise, 
reducing the risk of noise cues. The observer then went to the observation room, 
which was separated from the observee’s room by a few meters, and started the 
computer program that randomised the sequence of observation conditions for the 
trials.  The observer watched the observee’s image on a computer monitor during the 
observation trials, and did not watch the image and paid attention to other matters 
during the non-observation trials. Each trial lasted 30 seconds. There was a 
significant calming of observees’ electrodermal activity only in M. Schlitz’s 
sessions. In their previous experiment M. Schlitz’s sessions showed a significant 
activation effect from observation (Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997).  
Unfortunately, Wiseman and Schlitz (1998) did not discuss why there was a calming 
effect in this experiment, but we can make some suggestions. If, as suggested by W. 
G. Braud et al. (1993b), the relaxation or nervousness of the observer can be 
transmitted through the observation process, then this calming effect might have 
occurred because M. Schlitz was more relaxed in the second experiment. There are 
plausible reasons why she might have been more relaxed. This experiment it was a 
replication, and so the procedures were more familiar to her. It also replicated an 
experiment in which she had already found a successful psi effect, and so she might 
have felt more confident in her abilities to produce an effect. Additionally, this 
experiment was conducted in M. Schlitz’s workplace, presumably more familiar and 
comfortable to her than R. Wiseman’s workplace where the first experiment was 






this effect was their belief in psi. M. Schlitz was a psi proponent and R. Wiseman a 
sceptic.  
Lastly, we consider a study that compared the effect of observation with and without 
informing the observees that they would be watched (Lobach & Bierman, 2004). 
This is the first study in this review to investigate the influence of a hidden observer, 
i.e., an observer that the observee does not know exists. Although in the previous 
remote observation detection studies with psychophysiological measures the measure 
itself was unconscious, the observees were aware that they would be remotely 
observed, just not when. Lobach & Bierman’s experiment is the first to measure 
remote observation detection when the observees were not aware that they would be 
remotely observed, so it can be considered the first nonintentional remote 
observation detection study. This study also included simultaneous electrodermal 
and conscious guess measures.  
Observees were ostensibly recruited for ‘judging musical fragments’. Observees 
rated whether 20 musical pieces, each 30 seconds long, were relaxing, by pressing a 
button on a response box while electrodermal measures were recorded. Unbeknown 
to the observee, a hidden video camera relayed his or her image to a computer in the 
observer’s room. The observer’s room was adjacent to the observee’s; this did not 
rule out all possible noise leakage, but occluded all visual cues. The observer did not 
meet the observee, and did not leave the observation room during the experiment. 
The randomised sequence of observation and non-observation trials was determined 
by selecting slips of paper with stare/non-stare written on them; a unique list was 
created for each observee. However, the order of observation conditions was not 
counterbalanced, which is important in electrodermal studies due to the tendency for 
electrodermal activity to reduce over time.  
After the first 20 trials were completed, the experimenter (not the observer) entered 






observee would be remotely observed at random intervals. There were a further 
twenty 30-second trials, during which the observee rated, with the response box, 
whether or not they were being observed. Electrodermal measures were taken 
simultaneously. There was no significant difference between the observees’ 
electrodermal activity between observation and non-observation trials in either half 
of the experiment, although there was an activating effect that fell just short of 
significance (p = .054 one-tailed) in the second half when participants were informed 
about the remote observation. Lobach and Bierman interpreted their findings as 
showing that observees’ electrodermal activity only responded to remote observation 
when they were aware that it might occur, but there are some problems with this 
interpretation. Firstly, detection was non-significant in both conditions, so the 
difference could be random variation. Secondly, there is a confounding factor. In the 
first half of the experiment the observees were listening to relaxing music, which 
might have calmed their electrodermal responses and over-ridden any effect of 
remote observation. The musical pieces were all rated as relaxing, and no analyses 
were conducted to discover whether or how they had affected the observees’ 
electrodermal responses (Lobach, 2010). 
As noted above, this was the first remote observation study to compare conscious 
guess and psychophysiological measures simultaneously. Observees’ electrodermal 
activity was, on average, 1% higher when they rated themselves as being observed 
than when they rated themselves as not observed: a significant difference. This is in 
line with the social facilitation findings presented above, which imparted that when 
people are proximately observed, they have been found to have higher arousal levels. 
This is therefore an indication that remote and proximate observation might exert a 
similar influence. This comes with the caveat that neither the conscious guess nor the 
electrodermal measures significantly differentiated between observation and non-
observation conditions in this experiment. It does, however, indicate that the 






observed. A summary of the findings from studies with electrodermal activity as a 
measure of remote observation detection is presented in Table 8. 




t Sig at 
p<.05 * 
r Direction 
Braud et al. (1993a) (untrained) 16 -2.66 * .57 Activate 
Braud et al. (1993a) (trained) 16 2.15 * .48 Calm 
Braud et al. (1993b) (3 observers) 30 1.98 * .34 Calm 
Braud et al. (1993b) (Shafer) 16 1.08 * .47 Calm 
Schlitz and LaBerge (1997) 48 2.65 * .36 Activate 
Wiseman and Smith (1994) 30 1.45 NS .26 Activate
c
 
Wiseman et al. (1995) (exp 1) 22 .66 NS .14 N/A 
Wiseman et al. (1995) (exp 2) 20 .91 NS .20 N/A 
Wiseman and Schlitz (1997) 
(Wiseman’s) 
16 0.48 NS .14 N/A 
Wiseman and Schlitz (1997) 
(Schlitz’s) 
16 2.25 * .50 Activate 




 NS .07 N/A 




 * .33 Calm 




 NS 0.002 N/A 









These values are not from a t test, but are z from a Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
b
These 
values are from a paired t test. 
c
These two studies were almost significant, so the direction of 
the effect is given. 
 
Half of the remote observation studies that used electrodermal measures are 
independently significant, whereas five percent would be expected by chance. The 
studies with optimal ABBA counterbalanced and randomised observation conditions 






Wiseman and Schlitz (1997), and Wiseman and Schlitz (1998). With the exception of 
the trials conducted by R. Wiseman, these studies all found large significant effects. 
The only studies with possible randomisation problems: Lobach and Bierman (2004) 
and Wiseman and Smith (1994), found borderline effects. Therefore, the possible 
artefact of poor randomisation cannot be raised against the other studies’ significant 
findings. All the studies had good control against sensory leakage and cueing. In all 
the experiments, except Lobach and Bierman’s (2004), the observer and observee 
were in non-adjacent, physically separated rooms. Sensory leakage is therefore 
unlikely to be an artefactual confound. 
The electrodermal calming effects from remote observation were predominantly 
from two observers: D. Shafer and M. Schlitz (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a,b; Wiseman 
& Schlitz, 1999). (The other calming effectss were from the three observers trained 
by D. Shafer (W. G. Braud et al., 1993b).) These two observers also have produced 
activating responses to remote observation (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a; Wiseman & 
Schlitz, 1997). The magnitudes of the effect sizes are similar, whether the outcome 
was activating or calming, and they were all large effect sizes. Thus it seems that 
these two observers achieve a substantial remote observation effect, regardless of the 
direction of the effect. The unknown factor that leads to the difference in the 
direction of the effect does not appear to affect its magnitude. This is contrasted with 
an observer such as R. Wiseman who does not seem to exert an influence when 
remotely observing. It appears, therefore, that an observer either has an effect, 
whether that be activating or calming, or does not have an effect, rather than that 
some observers always influence their observees in either a calming or an activating 
direction. As these observations are based on experiments involving only three 
observers these comments are tentative, but this pattern, if it is genuine, validates the 
tendency for researchers to count both increases and decreases in electrodermal 
activity as remote observation effects. The calming effects occurred in the follow-up 
experiments when there were plausible reasons for the observers themselves to feel 






confidence in the proceedings. W. G. Braud et al. (1993b) also noted that the 
observees who received the connectedness training found that remote observation 
became a pleasant and positive experience, which they were disappointed to 
discontinue. This could indicate a remote affiliation effect, but there is insufficient 
experimental information to draw any strong conclusions. Based on the prevailing 
description of remote observation as feeling “uneasy” (Sheldrake, 2003; Titchener, 
1898), and the fact that both of the observers with remote calming effects had remote 
activating effects in their first experiments, it is likely that the effect of remote 
observation will usually be electrodermal activation, unless there is a reason for 
calming. 
Two meta-analyses have been conducted to estimate the combined effect size of the 
remote observation and psychophysiology studies (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997; 
Schmidt et al., 2004). There was a large overlap in the studies reviewed by both these 
meta-analyses, but different outcomes were found. The first meta-analysis reviewed 
11 remote observation studies with 230 individual sessions with psychophysiological 
dependent variables (Schlitz & W. G. Braud, 1997). In all of these studies, the 
observer and observee were physically separated and video links enabled 
observation. Sixty-four percent of the experiments were independently significant, a 
greater rate than would be expected by chance (5%). A mean effect size for all these 
studies was calculated by taking a straightforward average. This resulted in a 
medium (J. Cohen, 1988), and highly significant, effect size (r = .25). Schlitz and W. 
G. Braud concluded that this was a considerable effect, and not due to artefacts such 
as sensory leakage, human error, or the stacking effect. Schlitz and W. G. Braud 
were also confident they had included all the relevant studies ever conducted, 
avoiding the risk of a spurious effect from selective data reporting. They also found 
the same mean effect size for studies in which a remote influencer aimed to raise or 
lower a remote person’s electrodermal activity, through intention/visualisation, rather 






The later meta-analysis analysed 15 remote observation studies (Schmidt et al., 
2004). All the same papers as the Schlitz and W. G. Braud (1997) meta-analysis were 
included, and, in addition, two student projects conducted at the University of 
Edinburgh. In their estimation of the mean effect size the studies were weighted by 
sample size. This resulted in a very small (J. Cohen, 1988), but significant, effect size 
estimate (d = .28, the equivalent of r = .14). Some of the remote observation studies 
had two-tailed analyses, and so counted either activation or calming as being 
evidence of remote observation detection. A correction was applied to the estimated 
mean effect size to take this into account. This resulted in a smaller effect size 
overall (d = .13, the equivalent of r = .05). This is a smaller estimate than that made 
by Schlitz and W. G. Braud (1997). Both meta-analyses found homogeneity of effect 
sizes across the remote observation studies that they considered, and a significant 
overall effect.  
One limitation of the remote observation detection studies is that no experiments 
have used any psychophysiological measure other than electrodermal activity. The 
electrodermal measurements in remote observation studies were strongly criticised 
for not being up to current standards (Schmidt & Walach, 2000). These experiments 
reviewed might have therefore contained artefacts, or missed effects that could have 
been detected.  
In the experiments reviewed so far there is considerable evidence that remote 
observation can be detected by both conscious guess and unconscious 
psychophysiological measures. As argued in Chapter 1, behavioural responses are 
influenced by both conscious and unconscious influences, hence behaviour should 
respond to remote observation. Spontaneous reports and descriptions of observees’ 
experimental experiences of remote observation also implicate behavioural 
responses, such as turning to look at the observer (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a; Coover, 






Behaviour has been researched far less than either conscious guess or 
psychophysiology as an indicator of remote observation detection.  
6.3.5. Remote Observation Studies with Behavioural Measures. 
In this section we review the previous research into hidden and remote observers’ 
effect on behaviour. One experiment investigated whether people turn to look at 
hidden observers (Sheldrake, 2003). There were six observers, concealed from the 
observees behind a one-way mirror. The observers were in an office overlooking the 
entrance to a BBC studio, where a large audience was waiting to be allowed in. The 
audience members had signed release forms allowing video images of themselves to 
be recorded, and had already been ostentatiously filmed. Sheldrake (2003) therefore 
assumed that at the time they were actually observed and covertly filmed for the 
experiment they were not expecting to be covertly and remotely observed or filmed. 
The audience were facing away from the one-way mirror. The observers all observed 
the audience together, or all looked away, according to a pre-prepared randomised 
schedule. In the office with the observers was a video camera that ran continuously, 
recording images of the audience waiting outside. The number of times that members 
of the audience turned to face the camera was rated from the video recording by a 
judge who was blind to when the observation and non-observation periods were. 
There were 27 turns in the observation periods and 12 in the non-observation 
periods, which Sheldrake reported as a significant difference, although no further 
details were given. If this difference represents a genuine psi effect, there was an 
effect from the hidden observers that was greater than any possible effect of 
“observation” by the camera or future observation by the judge. The audience 
members were later interviewed, and none of them expressed that they were aware of 
having turned around, nor that they felt as though they were being observed. This 
indicates that the observees who turned may have done so automatically rather than 
deliberately. This is the only previously reported experiment that tests the influence 






be observed, i.e., it used hidden observers, and it supports the hypothesis that remote 
observation can affect behaviour. 
One other study considered a behavioural measure of remote observation (Lee et al., 
2002). The observees, who were informed that they would be observed at random 
intervals, performed a motor coordination task of passing a loop along a “wobbly 
wire”. If an observee made an error and touched the wire with the loop, this closed 
an electric circuit, made a warning tone, and recorded an error. The observees were 
observed through a CCTV link via a monitor in an adjoining room. The position of 
the camera was varied: It was either in front of or behind the observee. The number 
of observers was also varied: There were either three observers or one. There were 
no differences found in the error rate on the wobbly wire task from observation, 
camera position, or number of observers. Lee et al. (2002) did not consider the effect 
that normal (non-remote) observation would have on task performance (i.e., the 
social facilitation effect). Therefore, they could neither predict whether remote 
observation would be likely to have an effect on this task, nor what the direction of 
that effect would be.  
Behaviour is under-researched as a measure of remote observation detection, 
compared to conscious guess and psychophysiology. Sheldrake’s (2003) findings are 
promising, and use a measure of turning to look at the observer, which is one of the 
most frequently reported behavioural responses to remote observation. Studies of 
performance tasks, such as Lee et al.’s (2002), would benefit from considering the 
effect that normal observation has on performance: the social facilitation effect. 
Research that combines the influence of remote observation and the social 
facilitation effect as a behavioural response would further the field of remote 






6.3.6. Summary of Remote Observation Detection Research. 
In summary, parapsychological investigations into remote observation detection were 
inspired by a plethora of reported spontaneous experiences, and aimed to discover 
whether this is a genuine psi phenomenon. The field has developed from poorly-
controlled early investigations that exclusively used conscious guess measures, to 
sophisticated well-controlled experiments with conscious guess and 
psychophysiological measures. These experiments have shown that there is an effect 
from remote observation detection, and that this effect is better captured by 
unconscious psychophysiological measures than conscious guess measures. As 
behaviour can respond to conscious and unconscious influences, behavioural 
responses are likely to be an effective way to detect remote observation, and, despite 
many reported behavioural reactions to remote observation, behavioural responses 
are under-researched. One criticism of the remote observation research carried out to 
date is that the normal (non-remote) effect of observation has not been considered, or 
compared to, the remote effect. As reviewed above, the social facilitation effect 
describes the effect of normal observation on task performance. We now consider 
why remote observation might elicit social facilitation, and methodological issues 
inherent in combining remote observation and social facilitation.   
6.4. Remote Observation and Social Facilitation 
6.4.1. Why might Remote Observation elicit a Social Facilitation 
Effect? 
This section briefly encapsulates the reasons we might expect remote observation to 
manifest a social facilitation effect. Firstly, to return to the main working hypothesis 
of this thesis, we predict that, through psi, people will respond to extrasensory 
circumstances if they would respond to the same circumstances given sensory 
knowledge of them (Stanford, 1990). Therefore, if sensory knowledge of observation 






observation should also. Secondly, both remote observation detection and the social 
facilitation effect relate to arousal levels. As reviewed above, remote observation can 
affect an observee’s sympathetic nervous system arousal (e.g., W. G. Braud et al., 
1993a,b). As argued above, the most likely arousal effect is activation, unless there is 
some reason for a calming effect. The social facilitation effect might also be 
mediated by changes in arousal, and, although this is not universally accepted, it is 
still the leading explanation of the social facilitation effect (Mullen et al., 1997). 
Therefore, if remote observation leads to arousal increases, and these lead to the 
social facilitation effect, then remote observation would lead to the social facilitation 
effect. Incidentally, Stanford (1990) hypothesised that, through psi, changes in 
arousal would occur in response to relevant circumstances. One example of this 
might be an increase in arousal from remote observation, if such an increase would 
occur from proximate observation. The last reason why remote observation might 
elicit a social facilitation effect relates to the possibility of the observee becoming 
aware of being remotely observed. If, for example as Sheldrake (2003) argued, 
people can become aware of remote observation, it might influence their behaviour 
in the same way as a proximate observer.  
6.4.2. Investigating a Social Facilitation Effect from Remote 
Observation. 
This section outlines some of the important methodological considerations required 
in testing for a social facilitation effect from remote observation. Firstly, we briefly 
reiterate considerations important in psi experimentation discussed above and in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Secondly, we consider the optimal interaction between observer 
and participant. Lastly, we explain the importance of a true alone condition, and how 
this might be created. 
In psi experiments it is important that there is no sensory leakage or inadvertent 






for the psi hypothesis. For the same reason, the order of the observation conditions 
should be truly random, as should the allocation of participants to observation 
conditions.  
There are two aspects concerning how the observer and participant might optimally 
interact to create a social facilitation effect. The first of these is based upon the 
limited findings relating to observer/participant familiarity: More familiar observers 
affect participants’ behaviour differently (Guerin, 1993), and might exert less of a 
social facilitation effect (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983). Although the arousal 
explanation for social facilitation is not unequivocal, the familiarity findings can be 
interpreted in line with the remote observation detection findings explained above. 
Namely, that remote observation usually increases sympathetic nervous system 
activation, but that interpersonal connectedness and comfort can reduce sympathetic 
nervous system activation (e.g., W. G. Braud et al., 1993a,b). This link is tentative, 
but implies that the observer should not create an affiliative bond with the 
participant, or, if one already exists, this should be controlled for.  
The second aspect pertaining to the way the observer and participant interact 
concerns the behaviour and location of the observer during proximate observation. 
As we will be considering the effect of an observer, not a co-actor, the observer will 
not engage in any particular activity, but will just watch the participant. Research that 
compared continuous watching to intermittent watching found that continuous 
watching had a greater social facilitation effect (Huguet et al., 1999). The location of 
the observer has also been considered. Observers who stand diagonally behind the 
participant, looking over his or her shoulder, have been found to exert a greater 
social facilitation effect than an observer sitting in front of the participant (Huguet et 
al., 1999; Klauer, Herfordt, & Voss, 2008). Therefore, in Experiments 3 – 5 the 







The final methodological condition we will expound here relates to the importance of 
a true alone condition. In a true alone condition there is no presence, observation, 
evaluation apprehension, expectation of evaluation, or deception of observation. In 
other words, a true alone condition aims to eliminate, as far as possible, all the 
influences that could manifest the social facilitation effect. As noted above, the alone 
condition has been poorly controlled in the majority of social facilitation research 
(see Guerin (1993) for an exhaustive list of 140 studies with presence or observation 
in the condition called alone). For example, Travis (1925) compared an audience 
condition of four to eight students, and an alone condition with the experimenter 
present. Although Travis found a social facilitation effect from this audience, it does 
not mean that experimenter presence does not exert any social facilitation effect, 
merely that the audience exerted more. Moreover, Ekdahl (1929) found complex task 
inhibition from the experimenter observing, compared to a physically alone 
condition. This means that experiments with poorly controlled alone conditions 
might appear to find a weaker social facilitation effect (see, e.g., Uziel, 2007), or fail 
to find an effect entirely, due to the inadequate baseline for comparison. Poorly 
controlled alone conditions have led to discrepancies in the literature. For example, 
Cottrell et al. (1968) claimed that mere presence exerted no greater effect than alone, 
but, as noted above, the experimenter was listening in the alone condition, which 
constitutes an evaluative influence. However, experiments with improved alone 
conditions did find a social facilitation effect from mere presence (Markus, 1978; 
Schmitt et al., 1986). Remote observation is likely to be a weak influence compared 
to proximate observation, and it is therefore vital that a true alone condition is 
created as a baseline. 
Guidelines for creating a true alone condition in social facilitation experiments were 
created by Markus (1978). These were designed for investigating mere presence, but 
are transferable to investigating remote observation because both require that a true 
alone condition be created as a baseline. We will assess their suitability for 






tasks that can be measured or assessed are used. This is to ensure that both the effects 
of simple task facilitation and complex task inhibition be captured. She specified that 
these tasks should not, in and of themselves, elicit evaluation apprehension, and that 
neither the participant nor the observer should invoke a standard to compare the 
performance to. This is to reduce the possible effect of evaluation apprehension, or 
other forms of negative judging that can act as if they are a form of observation, such 
as negative self-evaluations (Baumeister, 1982; C. F. Bond, 1982). Likewise, Markus 
(1978) and Chapman (1974) recommended using tasks that lack clear criteria for 
good or bad performance. In contrast, almost all the tasks used in previous social 
facilitation research had clear criteria for success or failure, such as anagram tasks 
(e.g., Aiello & Svec, 1993) and many of the other tasks reviewed above. One other 
way to reduce evaluation apprehension is to have participants perform a task that 
they do not believe to be part of the experiment. Lastly, the participant should truly 
be alone. These criteria, of reducing evaluation apprehension as much as possible 
and physical aloneness, also apply to remote observation and social facilitation 
research. One extra criterion would be added for social facilitation research 
considering remote observation: There should not be any covert observation of the 
participant, as this is the remote observation stimulus to be tested. 
Markus (1978) argued that no previous experiments had fulfilled her criteria. Her 
experiment was outlined above when considering the mere observation effect, but 
certain aspects of the methodology regarding the alone condition will now be 
expanded upon below. Individual participants were told that they were to participate 
in a group experiment, for which they all had to be dressed the same. Each 
participant was asked to prepare for this by taking off his own shoes, putting on 
socks provided by the experimenter over his own socks and putting on large trainers 
and a large lab coat. The experimenter subsequently explained that the other 
participants had not arrived and the experiment could not proceed, so the participant 
could change back into his own clothes. Although the participants were led to believe 






clothes was the simple task, and changing in and out of the unfamiliar clothes was 
the complex task. This procedure is likely to have reduced evaluation apprehension, 
because the task of getting dressed should not evoke evaluation apprehension, and 
because the participants were led to believe that this was an incidental part of the 
proceedings, and not part of the experiment itself. 
Each participant got changed under one of three observation conditions, to which 
they were randomly assigned. In the proximate observation condition the participant 
was watched by a confederate sitting in the testing room. In the mere presence 
condition there was a person present in the testing room with his back turned to the 
participant, busy mending machinery. In the alone condition participants were 
physically alone in the testing room, but in all conditions they were timed by a 
confederate watching through a gap in the curtains that covered a one-way mirror. As 
noted above, the social facilitation effect was found, with a clear increase in the time 
taken to change unfamiliar clothing from alone to mere presence, and mere presence 
to proximately observed conditions, and a clear decrease for the familiar clothing. 
The alone condition was clearly an adequate baseline to compare mere presence to. It 
was not, however, truly alone in the way that an alone condition in a remote 
observation experiment would require to be. The use of a covert, remote observer in 
the alone condition in Markus’s (1978) experiment indicates that Markus did not 
consider that this form of observation could exert any influence. If the possibility of 
social facilitation from remote observation is to be tested, however, an alone 
condition without remote or covert observation has to be used as the baseline. 
The importance of the covert nature of tasks in creating an alone condition was 
further emphasised by research that investigated the conditions under which 
participants feel monitored (Griffin, 2001; Griffin & Kent, 1998). Griffin and Kent 
predicted that participants to whom a task was given would assume that they were 
being monitored, and that if no obvious method of monitoring them were apparent, 






conditions: alone without a task; alone with a card sorting task; and alone with a card 
sorting task, self-timed with a stopwatch. Participants with a task felt significantly 
more judged, concerned about doing well, and monitored than did participants 
without a task. In a follow-up study, Griffin (2001) compared the same three alone 
conditions as Griffin and Kent (1998) and a proximate observation condition. The 
participants felt most monitored with the audience, and more monitored in the task 
conditions than the alone without a task condition. Thus, participants engaged in an 
experimental task will infer that they are being monitored, even without apparent 
means of monitoring, and will therefore experience evaluation apprehension, despite 
being physically alone. Therefore, physical aloneness does not guarantee 
phenomenological aloneness, and the nature of the task has to be considered when 
creating a true alone condition. Specifically, the participants should not realise that 
they are performing a task: The task should be covert. 
There is one previous social facilitation experiment that used a true alone condition 
and covert tasks. Schmitt et al. (1986) intended to improve upon Markus’s (1978) 
experiment. Schmitt et al. criticised the task of changing into large and ill-fitting 
clothing for potentially causing anxiety about one’s appearance. Instead, they used 
typing tasks, which they did not think would cause embarrassment or evaluation 
apprehension. Participants were asked to type their name (the simple task) and then 
their code for the experiment, comprised of their name spelled backwards, 
interspersing ascending digits (the complex task). These tasks were presented as 
gathering background information prior to the start of the experiment, which was 
ostensibly about sensory deprivation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three observation conditions: proximate observation, mere presence, or alone. In the 
proximate observation condition the experimenter stood in the room with the 
participant, looking over his or her shoulder. In the mere presence condition a 
confederate who was blindfolded and wearing head-phones, unable to see or hear, 
was in the room with the participant. In the alone condition the participant was 






recorded by the computer, circumventing the need for any human observation of the 
participant in order to measure performance. No participants suspected that they 
were being timed, or that these tasks were part of the experiment. There was a 
significant interaction found between task complexity and observation condition (as 
described above). This is, to my knowledge, the only prior social facilitation 
experiment with an alone condition adequate for investigating a social facilitation 
effect from remote observation.  
The tasks described above, of typing the name and a code, fulfil the criteria set out 
by Markus (1978) for tasks that could be used with a true alone condition. They are 
comparable simple and complex tasks, which did not cause participants to infer that 
they were being observed or evaluated. It was possible to present them as an 
incidental part of the experiment set-up without participants suspecting that they 
were being observed or recorded (Schmitt et al., 1986). The time taken to type can be 
recorded automatically by the computer. These characteristics make these tasks the 
most suitable of any that have been researched before for use in a social facilitation 
experiment that uses a remote observation condition. The use of deception of the 
participant, into believing that the tasks are an incidental part of the experimental 
procedure, and tasks that are amenable to this, might be crucial in reducing 
evaluation apprehension enough to create an alone condition that remote observation 
can be compared to. 
6.5. Summary 
This literature review integrated previous empirical findings relating to the effects of 
being observed from the fields of social facilitation and remote observation 
detection. Many forms of social presence, including proximate observation, have 
been found to lead to the social facilitation effect. Arguably, mere observation also 
elicits the social facilitation effect, and testing for the social facilitation effect from 






covert observation can justifiably be used as if it makes no difference to participants’ 
task performance. Remote observation detection research has found some evidence 
that people can detect psi-mediated observation, but behavioural measures of remote 
observation detection are currently under-researched and inconclusive. Considering 
whether remote observation could lead to the social facilitation effect would extend 
both these fields, by combining the psi influence with the well-researched 
behavioural effect from proximate observation. In the following two chapters, we 
present three experiments that investigated whether there is a social facilitation effect 











7. Experiments 3 and 4: Psi-Mediated Social Facilitation from 
Remote Observation in Covert Task Performance 
7.1. Overview  
This chapter presents two empirical studies. Experiment 3 investigated 
nonintentional behavioural responses to remote observation (covert observation that 
one can only detect through psi). Specifically, Experiment 3 asked whether remote 
observation can elicit the social facilitation effect (simple task facilitation and 
complex task inhibition). Participants completed simple and complex typing tasks 
under three observation conditions within-subjects: alone, remote observation, and 
proximate observation (overt observation from a physically present observer). The 
moderating effects of participants’ extraversion, neuroticism, state anxiety, belief in 
psi, and familiarity to the observer were controlled for. This is, to our knowledge, the 
first investigation of a social facilitation effect from remote observation. Experiment 
4 addressed limitations in the methodology of Experiment 3, and aimed to obtain the 
social facilitation effect comparing only proximate observation and alone conditions 
on covert task performance.  
7.2. Introduction 
The PMIR model states that, through psi, people respond nonintentionally to 
situations they do not have sensory knowledge of, if sensory knowledge of these 
situations would itself provoke a response (Stanford, 1990). As reviewed in Chapter 
6, people respond to observation that they have sensory knowledge of with the social 
facilitation effect. The social facilitation effect is the facilitation of simple task 
performance and the inhibition of complex task performance when the participant is 
in the presence of an observer (proximate observation) compared to being alone 
(Zajonc, 1965). If the PMIR statement above is correct, then observation that 






through psi (remote observation), would also have a social facilitation effect. 
Experiment 3 aims to investigate whether remote observation has a social facilitation 
effect by comparing performance on simple and complex tasks under remote 
observation, proximate observation, and a true alone condition.  
Experiment 3, below, investigated whether remote observation can lead to the social 
facilitation effect by comparing it to both being alone and to proximate observation 
(observation from a present observer). Remote observation is covert observation by a 
hidden observer, who participants can only be influenced by through psi. Remote 
observation was achieved by the hidden observer watching the participant via a 
webcam link from another room, which isolated the observer and the participant 
from sensory contact. As argued in Chapter 6, it is important that the alone condition 
is a true alone condition, without presence, observation, covert observation, or 
evaluation apprehension (Markus, 1978). In addition, participants should not suspect 
that they are being observed, or that their task performance is being monitored 
(Markus, 1978). In order to create a true alone condition several steps were taken. 
Firstly, participants were alone in the room. Secondly, participants were not 
informed that any remote observation would occur. This differs from the remote 
observation influence usually used in parapsychology experiments, in which 
participants are aware that they would be observed remotely, just not when (e.g., W. 
G. Braud et al., 1993a, 1993b). Finally, participants were not engaged in a task on 
which they would expect their performance to be monitored. Participants infer that 
they are being monitored if they are given a task, even if they there is no overt 
method of monitoring or observing them (Griffin, 2001). Therefore, participants did 
covert tasks.  
Following Markus (1978) and Schmitt et al. (1986) we used covert tasks, which 
participants were told were an incidental part of the preparation for the experiment. 
The tasks were presented as being the log-in to another experiment, which had three 






to type the participant’s name (simple task) and an alphanumeric code (complex 
task), similarly to logging-in to a computer or an email account. As name and code or 
password log-ins are common we considered this a plausible ruse. These tasks could 
be measured covertly, and had shown a social facilitation effect in a previous 
experiment (Schmitt et al., 1986). Specifically, Schmitt et al. found that proximate 
observation increased participants’ speed of typing their names and decreased the 
speed of typing their codes. Thus, these typing tasks demonstrated the social 
facilitation effect of simple task facilitation and complex task inhibition. In this 
experiment, proximate observation and remote observation were predicted to 
increase participants’ speed of typing their names, and reduce participants’ speed of 
typing their codes. 
As reviewed in Chapter 6, there are personality and individual differences 
characteristics that can affect both task performance and how observation affects 
people’s task performance. High neuroticism, for example, is associated with 
performance decrements from observation irrespective of task complexity (Uziel, 
2007), and neuroticism and anxiety improve performance on easy tasks and impair 
performance on difficult tasks (Matthews & Deary, 1998). Extraversion (Uziel, 
2007), neuroticism, and state anxiety could confound the relationship between 
observation and complexity and task performance. There are also other variables that 
can affect participants’ responses to observation, such as the relationship between the 
observer and the participant (Guerin, 1993; F. G. Miller et al., 1979; Henchy & 
Glass, 1968). Finally, there are individual differences that affect task performance in 
general and/or psi task performance. These include age (Der & Deary, 2006), gender 
(Dalton, 1994), and belief in psi (Lawrence, 1993). To ensure that the effect of 
observation and complexity was investigated without the effect of these potential 
confounds, they were controlled for. Given the complicated nature of the possible 
effects of these individual differences on the social facilitation effect, directional 






In Experiment 3, below, participants typed their first name (simple task) and a code 
made up of the letters of their name backwards interspersed with ascending digits 
(complex task) three times, which they were told was the log-in to a subsequent 
experiment. Each time they did the typing tasks, the participants went on to complete 
a short parapsychology experiment that provided a plausible experiment for the 
participants to log-in to and provided time between the log-ins for the experimenter 
to change location as the observation conditions required. Each time the participants 
typed their name and code they were either alone, remotely observed, or proximately 
observed; the order of the observation conditions was randomised and 
counterbalanced. Firstly, we asked whether the normal social facilitation effect was 
replicated, by investigating whether there was an interaction between observation 
condition and task complexity, when only the alone and proximate observation 
conditions were considered.  Secondly, we asked whether there had been a social 
facilitation effect from remote observation by investigating whether there was an 
interaction between observation condition and task complexity, considering all the 
observation conditions. Lastly, we controlled for possible confounding personality 
and individual differences variables.  
7.2.1. Hypotheses. 
1 There will be an interaction between observation condition (proximate 
observation or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex). Proximate 
observation will increase the speed at which participants type their name (the simple 
task) and decrease the speed at which they type the alphanumeric code (the complex 
task) in comparison to their typing speed when alone. In other words, proximate 
observation will elicit the social facilitation effect. 
2 There will be an interaction between observation condition (proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex). 






participants type their name (the simple task) and decrease the speed at which they 
type the alphanumeric code (the complex task) in comparison to their typing speed 
when alone. We tentatively predict that proximate observation will have a greater 
effect than remote observation.  In other words, proximate observation and remote 
observation will both elicit the social facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker 
effect from remote observation. 
7.3. Method 
7.3.1. Design. 
This experiment used a 3x2 within-subjects design. The independent variables were 
observation condition (alone, remote observation, or proximate observation) and task 
complexity (simple or complex).  
7.3.2. Participants. 
A convenience sample of 30 participants was chosen for this experiment. They 
comprised 14 men and 16 women; 15 were university students. They ranged in age 
from 17 to 61 years (M = 29.37 years, SD = 11.56 years). 
Participants were ostensibly recruited for a “Colour and Precognition” experiment. 
They were asked to try to bring someone unknown to the experimenter. They were 
told that this was to aid recruitment, because people who did not know the 
experimenter would be less likely to volunteer. It was also to ensure that participants 
unknown to the experimenter would be included in the experiment. The participants 
were a mixture of friends or acquaintances of the experimenter and strangers, and a 
mixture of people she had either a peer or expert status with.  
Experimenter and Observer. 






7.3.3. Ethical Considerations. 
We identified two potential ethical issues in this experimental design. There was 
deliberate deception of the participants regarding the overall aim of the experiment 
and the exact function of the experimental tasks, and covert observation via webcam 
images relayed to a computer terminal. As discussed in Chapter 3, the deception 
issue was discharged by giving participants the right to terminate the experiment at 
any time and a full debrief following the experiment. The images of the participants 
were not recorded, and so this method of covert observation raised no data-protection 
issues. We anticipated that the covert observation would cause participants no 
psychological harm or stress. We concluded that giving participants the right to 
terminate the experiment at any time and a full debrief following the experiment 
would resolve this issue. The Psychology Research Ethics Committee granted ethical 
approval for this experiment to proceed. 
7.3.4. Materials and Apparatus. 
Program.  
The typing tasks and the decoy (colour and precognition) task were combined in one 
program, written by the author in E Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 1996). This 
program ran on a PC.  
E prime is software designed for presenting stimuli in psychology experiments and 
recording and timing responses. To time the letter strings a function called ‘ask box’ 
was used. This presents an input box on the screen into which text can be typed. It 
timed from the opening of the input box, triggered by the participant pressing the 
space bar in response to instructions on the previous screen, to the closing of the 
onscreen box, triggered by the participant pressing return after typing the name or 
code. It did not record the time taken to make each keystroke. This program recorded 






replaced. For example, whether Sam typed Sam or s-backspace-Sam the output was 
the same: Sam. Timing in E prime is potentially millisecond accurate, but this can be 
compromised by the power of the computer that it is run on (E Prime, 2002). Tests 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) run on the experimental computers in the 
department of psychology by the computing supervisor demonstrated that the timing 
fell very slightly short of millisecond accuracy, but well above 1/100
th
 of a second 
(centisecond) accuracy. As a conservative measure, the centisecond accuracy level 
was used in this experiment.  
Webcam. 
The webcam was a Creative Web Blaster III which used Microsoft Netmeeting 
Video Conferencing software.  
Personality Questionnaires. 
Participants filled out their contact information, age, and gender on a participant 
information form that included the 12-item belief in psi scale produced by the 
Koestler Parapsychology Unit (Appendix 1).   
Participants also completed the EPI (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964). This 57-item 
questionnaire is a validated, well-tested measure of extraversion and neuroticism 
with extensive experimental and theoretical support (Eysenck, 1967a). This 
questionnaire includes negatively phrased items. An example of a negatively phrased 
item for extraversion is “Do you prefer to have few but special friends?” An example 
of a positively phrased item for neuroticism is “Would you call yourself a nervous 
person?” This questionnaire includes a lie scale to check for socially desirable 
responding. No participants had high lie scale scores, and no prediction had been 
made about these, so nothing further is reported on them.  Participants answer the 






score of 24 for extraversion and 24 for neuroticism. High scores indicate high 
extraversion, or high neuroticism. 
To measure state anxiety, participants completed the 20-item state anxiety section of 
the STAI (Spielberger, 1983). Participants respond to each item on four-point Likert 
scales anchored at 1 (not at all) and 4 (very much so). The scores have a minimum of 
20 and a maximum of 80; high scores indicate high state anxiety.   
7.3.5. Procedure. 
Randomisation of observation conditions. 
A schedule of observation conditions was prepared in advance by a member of the 
University staff who was not otherwise involved in this experiment. She prepared a 
schedule for 30 participants, with five repetitions of each of the six possible 
combinations of the three observation conditions (e.g., remote observation first, 
alone second, and proximate observation third). The order that these combinations 
were listed in on the schedule was randomised in Visual Basic (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2003). The experimenter was not blind to the order of the observation 
sequences. Participants were assigned to the next line in this list as they finished their 
pre-test questionnaires, which avoided any selection bias in the assignment of 
participants to their order of observation conditions.  
Session procedure. 
All the sessions took place on the first floor in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Edinburgh. Three rooms were used: an experimental room, a waiting 
area, and a remote observation room (see Figure 4).  
Participants were directed to the waiting area from the front door of the psychology 
department by posters. The waiting area was the corridor just outside the computer 






remote observation room, and the staircase. In the waiting area a sign requested that 
participants begin to fill out the questionnaires. There were seats and clipboards with 
pens and questionnaires provided. If the experimenter was free she waited here for 
the participants, and if she was busy with the experiment she checked the waiting 
area regularly.  
All the participants filled out the belief in psi questionnaire and the EPI in the 
waiting area. Participants also signed a standard consent form agreeing to participate, 
and on the understanding that they could terminate the experiment at any time (no 
participants chose to). The first six participants also filled out the STAI in the waiting 
area. From the seventh participant onwards, the STAI was completed sitting in front 
of the experimental computer. This change was made because the state anxiety test is 
sensitive to the situation in which it is conducted (Spielberger, 1983). Participants 
had been arriving in small groups, and chatting to each other while they filled out the 
questionnaires. It would not have given an accurate estimation of their state anxiety 
during the experiment if participants filled out the questionnaire while conversing 
with their friends. In order to make the conditions under which each participant filled 
out the state anxiety questionnaire as similar as possible to the conditions under 
which the experiment would be conducted, the experimenter made sure she was in 
the room for part of the time, and out of the room for part of the time, although she 



















The star marks the position for the observer in the proximate observation condition.        
The word ‘Observer’ denotes the remote observation room. 
Figure 4: Map of the Experimental Suite for Experiment 3 (not to scale). 
 
Participants were tested individually. They were shown one at a time into the 
experimental room after completing the questionnaires. The experimental room was 
Blinds over windows 
Webcam 
Curtains over one-way mirror 
Experimental room 










a large computer laboratory with eight computers in total. All the monitors, except 
that of the experimental computer, were switched off. There was a one-way mirror in 
the wall between this room and the waiting area; this was covered by curtains, and 
there were blinds over the windows. No aspect of the room layout should have made 
participants feel overlooked. 
Then the experimenter sat next to the participants at the experimental computer, and 
explained the procedure to them. She explained that they would do a colour and 
precognition task. The colour and precognition task maintained the covert nature of 
the name and code tasks by deceiving participants that they were only a log-in to the 
“real” experiment. As many of the participants knew that the experimenter was 
interested in parapsychology, we thought a psi task would be a convincing decoy 
task. The results from the colour and precognition task are not reported in this thesis. 
The colour and precognition task comprised three rounds, justifying participants 
logging in three times.  
The experimenter told participants that in order to start each round they would log-in 
to the experiment by entering their first name and their experiment code. Participants 
were told this was so that the data would be logged under their name. The 
experimenter wrote both the name and code down for the participants on a piece of 
paper, explaining how the code was made up of their first name spelled backwards 
interspersed with ascending digits. We assumed that this verbal explanation and 
informal presentation of the task would make the log-in seem like an incidental part 
of the proceedings. Detailed onscreen instructions might have attracted too much 
attention to the importance of the log-in. 
Whether or not participants asked if she would be staying in the room with them, the 
experimenter always said that she would be “in and out”. This was to prevent her 
arrivals and departures from being any more of a distraction than they needed to be. 






log-in and the colour and precognition tasks. Each round followed the same basic 
format. Instructions for each round of the colour and precognition task were 
presented, along with a reminder to log-in. The participants controlled the speed at 
which these screens scrolled by pressing the space bar. This allowed participants 
time to understand the instructions. It also ensured that their fingers were at the 
keyboard, ready for the typing tasks, so the time recorded for the typing tasks did not 
include the delay of participants moving their hands to the keyboard. The first round 
differed only in that the first screen of instructions remained on the monitor for 25 
seconds before participants could scroll on. This allowed the experimenter time to 
leave the room, if she was required to be outside the room for the first round. It also 
ensured that participants did not accidentally scroll past the instructions (a problem 
revealed in the pilot testing stage). Participants typed their name into a text box on 
one screen, and their code into a text box on the consecutive screen. The colour and 
precognition task started automatically once participants had completed the log-in. 
In each round the experimenter either observed participants from within the room, 
observed them remotely, or left them alone according to the observation condition 
schedule. In the proximate observation condition the experimenter was in the 
experimental room. She watched participants typing at close proximity, standing just 
behind them looking over their shoulders. She could see the participants, their hands 
on the keyboard, and their computer screen. She focussed her attention on the 
participants the whole time and blocked out other thoughts by mentally rehearsing “I 
am watching you. You are being watched.” 
In the remote observation condition participants were physically alone in the 
experimental room. The experimenter observed his or her image onscreen via a 
webcam link from the observation room. The remote observation room was a small 
room containing one computer. The two rooms shared one common wall, but neither 
could be seen from the other room. The webcam was situated two metres behind the 






waist up and the screen in front of them. The webcam was hidden by a pile of wires, 
a mouse, and a mouse mat that looked like general office hardware. The webcam was 
running throughout the whole experiment (in the alone and proximate observation 
conditions the camera was on and images of participants were sent to the remote 
observation computer, but no-one was watching the images). The images were not 
recorded. In the remote observation sessions participants’ images were watched 
continuously. The observer focussed her attention on the images the whole time and 
blocked out other thoughts by mentally rehearsing “I am watching you. You are 
being watched.” 
 In the alone condition participants were physically alone in the experimental room. 
The experimenter was outside the room, and occupied her mind with other thoughts. 
There was a sign on the door to inform people that there was an experiment in 
progress and not to go in. The door could only be opened by a swipe card, which 
only staff and senior students had, and the room was booked on the Department of 
Psychology’s website. These measures prevented other people from entering the 
experimental room during the trials. Therefore, there was no-one watching the 
participant, and no-one other than the participant in the experimental room in the 
alone condition. 
After the three rounds of the experiment were over, the experimenter re-joined the 
participant at the experimental computer. The experimenter verbally asked the 
following manipulation check questions and wrote down participants’ answers. 
1 “Honestly, did you realise the typing tasks were part of the experiment?” 
2 “How often do you type your name on an average working day?” 
3 “Have you ever typed your name backwards with numbers interspersed, 
like the code?” 
4 “Did you notice any difference between the three times you typed your 






prompted the participants to comment on their level of nervousness, and 
the speed and ease of the typing tasks, if they did not volunteer this 
information.) 
5 “Did you see the webcam?” 
All the participants were asked questions 1 – 4 above. It would have been 
inappropriate to ask all of them whether they had seen the webcam, because many of 
the participants knew each other, and might tell others who were in the experiment 
later. Only five participants known to be discreet were asked whether they had seen 
the webcam. In doing this the experimenter made two assumptions: that the camera 
was adequately hidden, and that any participants who saw the camera would ask her 
about it.  
Participants were thanked for participating, and could take a sweet from a ‘lucky dip 
box’ as a gesture of thanks before they were shown back to the waiting room. Only 
after all the participants were tested and the results were analysed were the 
participants debriefed by email.  
After all the participants had completed the experiment, but before the data were 
analysed, the experimenter coded participants by how well she knew them. 
Participants were categorised into one of five groups on an ordinal scale: 1 (total 
stranger never met before the experiment), 2 (knew by sight), 3 (colleague or casual 
acquaintance), 4 (friend), and 5 (good friend). This rating was called familiarity.  
7.3.6. Analyses. 







Manipulation check 1: Did the participants believe that the 
typing tasks were not part of the experiment? 
Twenty-three participants (77%) did not realise that the typing tasks had anything to 
do with the experiment; many were surprised even to think that they had. Seven 
participants (23%) thought that the typing task might have had something to do with 
the experiment. This was expressed as an “inkling”; no-one guessed the purpose of 
these tasks. The name and code were, therefore, on the whole, convincingly 
presented as an incidental part of the experiment.  
Manipulation check 2: Was the typing the name a familiar task?  
Twenty-five participants (83%) typed their name once or more on an average 
working day. Five participants (17%) reported typing their name less than once an 
average working day, four of whom reported typing it once a week or more, and one 
participant once a month. Typing the name was therefore confirmed as a simple task 
in that it was well practiced.  
Manipulation check 3: Was typing the code a novel task? 
No participant had ever typed their name backwards interspersing ascending digits. 
The code was therefore a complex task in that it was novel. 
Manipulation check 4: Were there any differences between the 
rounds in participants’ self-reported nervousness and the speed 
and ease of doing the tasks? 
Seventeen participants (57%) reported no difference in their level of nervousness 
between the three rounds. Ten participants (33%) reported feeling less nervous as the 






because the participants became more comfortable with the experiment as it 
progressed. Two participants (7%) reported that they were more nervous in the 
proximate observation condition because they were aware of being watched.  
Eighteen participants (60%) reported an increase in the speed of the typing tasks, 
twelve (40%) did not. Twenty-two participants (73%) reported an increase in the 
ease of the typing tasks, one that they became harder, and seven (23%) reported no 
difference. Except for the participant who reported that the tasks became harder, 
these differences are attributable to practice effects. One participant commented that 
he had memorised the code by the final round.  
Manipulation check 5: Did anyone see the webcam? 
None of the five participants who were asked had seen it. 
Exploratory data analyses for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The normality of the data was assessed by examining z-scores for the skew and 
kurtosis, and by visual inspection of histograms. The criterion for normality of the z-
score of skew and kurtosis was <= 2.58 (Field, 2005). Two of the six cells (for the 
name and code in the alone condition) were not normally distributed, they were 
positively skewed, and the rest were normally distributed. Deleting outliers from one 
cell would have led to either dropping that participants’ data from all cells, or having 
unequal numbers between cells. ANOVA are robust against some non-normality as 
long as cell sizes are equal (Field, 2005), and so the data were retained. As part of the 
exploratory analyses the data were subjected to a log10 transformation to normalise 
the data, and ANOVA were run on the transformed data. This found the same 
outcome in the results as the ANOVA on the non-transformed data. As most of the 
cells were normal, and the transformation did not reveal any further effect that the 







Exploratory analyses conducted on these data found that the complex task took 
longer to type. As the complex typing task (code) involved more keystrokes than the 
simple task (name), the code should take longer to type, irrespective of whether it 
were a more complex task.  In order to counteract the effect of the code being longer, 
the times for the complex task were halved.  For names under 10 letters long the code 
was exactly twice the number of keystrokes as the name, so halving was perfectly 
accurate for these participant's data.  There was only one name of 10 letters in length, 
which had a code of 21 keystrokes, not 20. As there was only one name that would 
be inaccurate by only one digit in this analysis, halving was a reasonable method of 
comparing the time taken to do these tasks more directly. Any further effect of 
complexity found would reflect the different nature of the tasks, rather than the 
different number of keystrokes. All presented analyses use the halved times for the 
complex task. It is not necessary to calculate the times per letter because the within-
subjects design ensures that the lengths of the names are constant across the groups. 
It was not possible to calculate the time per actual keystroke, because the E Prime 
program did not record changes or deletions. Table 9 displays the means, with the 
halved times for the complex task. These data are also displayed in Figure 5. 
Table 9: Time taken in milliseconds (rounded to centiseconds) to 
complete Simple and Complex Typing Tasks by Observation Condition 
Observation condition   
Task   Alone Remote Proximate Row 
 M SD M SD M SD Means 
Simple:  4610 2690 4520 3520 3930 1980 4360 
Complex 
a 
7140 3570 7350 4350 6090 3060 6860 
Column Means 5880  5940  5010  5610 
Note. N = 30. The values in were first created from the raw values from E Prime, and then 
rounded up to centiseconds. The row, column and grand totals may not match the means 
that would be created from if the rounded data in the cells were averaged 
a

















* These values are halved 
Figure 5: Mean Time in milliseconds (rounded to centiseconds) to 
complete Simple and Complex Typing Tasks by Observation Condition 
 
Table 9 and Figure 5 display the mean times by task complexity and observation 
condition. From visual inspection of these data, the simple task was completed faster 
under proximate observation than remote observation, and faster under remote 
observation than when alone, as predicted. The complex task was completed slowest 
under remote observation and fastest under proximate observation; this is not the 
predicted pattern. 
Hypothesis 1: There will be an interaction between observation 
(proximate observation or alone) and task complexity (simple or 
complex). Proximate observation will increase the speed at 
which participants type their name and decrease the speed at 
which they type the code in comparison to their typing speed 
when alone.  
In order to test Hypothesis 1, and discover whether there was a normal social 






speed as the dependent variable. Observation condition (proximate observation or 
alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) were the within-subjects variables. 
Remote observation was omitted from this analysis. The outputs are in Table 10. 
Table 10: Outcome of the 2x2 Analysis of Variance for Typing Times 
Variable Main Effects df Error df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 29 5.31* .16 .03 .61 
Complexity 1 29 23.97** .45 <.01 >.99 
Interaction       
Observation x Complexity 1 29 0.57 .02 .46 .11 
Note. N = 30. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
As shown in Table 10, there was a significant effect of task complexity, despite 
halving the times for the code. This shows that the complex task was completed more 
slowly than the simple task, and that this is due to a difference in the nature of the 
tasks, not to the longer length of the complex task. There was also a significant effect 
of observation. Both the simple and complex tasks were completed faster when 
participants were proximately observed. There was no significant interaction 
between observation and complexity. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
There was a significant main effect of observation: Participants typed faster when 
they were proximately observed than when they were alone. As the figures in Table 9 
indicated that this effect might be more pronounced in the code, a post-hoc Wilcoxon 
test was run to assess whether the code was typed significantly faster in the 
proximate observation condition than in the alone condition. It was: T = -2.38, p < 
.01 (one-tailed), with a small effect size: r = .04. Therefore, typing the code was 
facilitated by observation. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction between observation 
condition (proximate observation, remote observation, or alone) 






observation and remote observation will increase the speed at 
which participants type their name (the simple task) and 
decrease the speed at which they type the alphanumeric code 
(the complex task) in comparison to their typing speed when 
alone. 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, and discover whether there was a social facilitation 
effect from remote observation, a two-way ANOVA was calculated with typing 
speed as the dependent variable. Observation condition (proximate observation, 
remote observation, or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) were the 
within-subjects variables. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated for the main effect of observation: χ
2 
(2) = 9.76, p = .01, and the 
interaction between complexity and observation: χ
2 
(2) = 7.87, p = .02. The Huynh-
Feldt correction is the appropriate adjustment to use when ε > .75 (Field, 2005). The 
degrees of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 
.81 for observation and ε = .84 for the observation and complexity interaction). The 
adjusted figures are reported in Table 11. 
Table 11: Outcome of the 2x3 Analysis of Variance for Typing Times 
Variable Main Effects df Error df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1.61 44.85 2.07 .07  .15 .36 
Complexity 1 29 21.28** .42 >.01 .99 
Interaction       
Observation x Complexity 1.69 48.90 0.50 .17  .49 .11 
Note. N = 30.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
There was a significant effect of task complexity, even with the times of the complex 
task halved. The complex task was completed more slowly than the simple task, and 
this is due to a difference in the nature of the tasks, not to the longer length of the 
complex task. There was neither a significant effect of observation, nor a significant 






supported. Given that there had been a main effect of observation when proximate 
observation and alone were considered without remote observation, two further post-
hoc tests were run. The first, a Wilcoxon test, investigated whether the code was 
typed significantly faster under the remote observation condition than the alone 
condition. It was not: T = -.15, p > .05 (one-tailed). The second, a t test, investigated 
whether the code was typed faster under proximate observation than remote 
observation. It was: t (29) = 2.40, p = .02 (one-tailed), with a small effect size, r = 
.14. Therefore, the speed of typing the code was non-significantly different between 
the alone and remote observation conditions, but significantly different between 
proximate observation and alone, and proximate observation and remote observation 
(or marginally significant if alpha is reduced to .16 to account for the three post-hoc 
analyses). 
The non-significant results for Hypothesis 2 might have been due to confounding 
personality variables, such as extraversion and neuroticism, or other individual 
differences, such as state anxiety, belief in psi, familiarity, age, and gender. In order 
to increase the sensitivity of the analysis, the personality and individual differences 
variables that might have introduced variance were controlled for. Participants’ 
responses to the personality questionnaires are summarised in Table 12. 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for the Personality Variables 
Variable M SD Minimum Maximum 
Extraversion 12.10 3.81 4 21 
State Anxiety 32.63 7.24 30 56 
Neuroticism 11.70 4.41 3 18 
Belief in psi 45.13 16.79 16 72 
Note. N = 30. 
The familiarity variable was ordinal level data. The five categories of familiarity 
were forced onto a quasi-normal distribution, so the data has a normal distribution 






In order to rule out multicollinearity, the inter-correlations between all these 
variables were assessed by two-tailed Pearson correlation coefficients. A coefficient 
of over .8 indicates problematic multicollinearity (Field, 2005). If two variables 
correlate over .8 they should be amalgamated, or one of them should be dropped. All 
the correlations are presented in Table 13, none of which were over .8 
Table 13: Individual Differences variables Correlation Coefficients 
Variables Neuroticism State Anxiety Belief in psi Familiarity Gender Age 
Extraversion .04 .25 .11 .22 .15 .04 
Neuroticism  .48** .20 -.39* -.22 -.22 
State Anxiety   .46** .18 -.04 -.30 
Belief in psi    .07 .16 -.12 
Familiarity     .15 -.38* 
Gender           -.09 
Note. N = 30. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
The covariates were entered into an ANCOVA (general linear model) with typing 
speed as the dependent variable. Observation condition (proximate observation, 
remote observation, or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) were the 







Table 14: Main Effects and Interactions from the Personality Covariates 
on Typing Speed 
Main Effects from Variables df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 2 1.60 .07 .21 .32 
Complexity 1 0.36 .16 .55 .89 
Extraversion 1 0.70 .03 .41 .13 
Neuroticism 1 0.38 .02 .54 .09 
State Anxiety 1 1.97 .08 .18 .27 
Belief in psi 1 0.33 .02 .57 .09 
Familiarity  1 2.44 .10 .13 .32 
Gender 1 1.70 .07 .21 .24 
Age 1 1.03 .05 .32 .16 
Error 22 (23393650.37)    
Interactions      
Observation x Complexity 2 1.57 .07 .22 .32 
Extraversion x Observation x Complexity 2 0.38 .02 .69 .11 
Neuroticism x Observation x Complexity 2 1.20 .05 .31 .25 
State Anxiety x Observation x Complexity 2 0.13 .01 .88 .07 
Belief in psi x Observation x Complexity 2 0.86 .04 .43 .18 
Familiarity x Observation x Complexity 2 0.43 .02 .65 .12 
Gender x Observation x Complexity 2 0.42 .02 .66 .11 
Age x Observation x Complexity 2 1.01 .04 .37 .22 
Error 44 (7727256.04)    
Note. N = 30. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the 
main effect of observation, χ
2 
(2) = 6.90, p = .03. Therefore, degrees of freedom were 
corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 1.00) (in this case the 






The figures in the top half of Table 14 denote the main effects. The main effects of 
observation and complexity in Table 14 report only the variance that is uniquely 
attributable to these variables, with the effects of the covariates controlled for. The 
main effects of observation and complexity are non-significant. Controlling for the 
variance attributable to the personality and individual differences measures did not 
render these main effects significant, and so the non-significant results of the 
ANOVA in Hypothesis 2 were not due to confounding variables. 
The main effects of the personality variables (in the top half of the table) show the 
amount of the variance in the dependent variable, typing speed, that each personality 
variable explains. Partial ŋ
2 
gives the effect size for that variable, not influenced by 
the effect of other variables included in the analysis. None of the personality 
variables, age, gender, or belief in psi had a significant main effect on typing speed.  
The second half of the table displays the interactions for each of these predictors and 
observation and complexity; lower order interactions were included in the model. 
This shows the effect that each predictor had on the social facilitation effect (i.e., the 
interaction between a personality variable and observation and complexity). None of 
these interactions were significant: Neither extraversion, neuroticism, state anxiety, 
belief in psi, familiarity, gender, nor age had any significant effect on the social 
facilitation effect. The interaction between observation and complexity was non-
significant. Controlling for the variance attributable to the personality and individual 
differences measures did not render this interaction significant, and so the non-
significant interaction in the ANOVA in Hypothesis 2 was not due to confounding 
variables. 
Post-hoc analysis into task repetition, a potential confound. 
As the differences in the time taken to type the simple and complex tasks did not 
vary significantly between the observation conditions, we ran a post-hoc analysis to 






three repetitions would not be enough to make participants familiar with the complex 
task (the code). However, as one of the participants did report having memorised the 
code by the last round, it is possible that the repetitions reduced the complexity of the 
code, by making it more familiar and better practised, and therefore not such a 
complex task. The complex task should be both difficult and novel. As the main 
results were presented by observation condition, and these were randomised across 
the rounds, the effect of the rounds is masked. If the code was complex in the first 
round, but behaved as if it were a simple task by the final round, the overall effect 
could be null. In order to investigate whether this happened, the data for each round 
were separated and are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15: Time taken for the Typing Tasks by Observation Condition, 
Complexity and Round in milliseconds (rounded to centiseconds) 
Observation condition 
Round Task  Alone Remote Proximate 
  M  SD M  SD M  SD 
1 Simple 7330 2910 7000 5040 4790 1640 
1 Complex 
a
 8360 4510 8240 4580 7760 3220 
2 Simple 2620 550 3770 1500 3930 2610 
2 Complex 
a
 6040 2350 7700 2990 5520 3300 
3 Simple 3880 1110 2790 1240 3090 1260 
3 Complex 
a
 7040 3490 6120 5330 4990 2050 
Note. N = 10 in each round. 
a
These values are halved. 
A visual inspection of the data in Table 15 reveals that there are differences across 
the rounds. In the alone and remote observation conditions the name is completed 
much faster in the second and third rounds compared to the first. This could be the 
result of practice effects. The timing program, as noted above, timed from when the 
input box appeared on the screen, not from when the participants started typing into 
it. It timed until the participants pressed return, not when they stopped typing, so 






first task. The faster typing speed for the name under proximate observation in the 
first round suggests that proximate observation made participants begin typing 
sooner. In the proximate observation condition the complex task gets faster across 
the rounds to a greater extent than in the other observation conditions. In the third 
and final round the complex task is completed fastest under proximate observation: 
the pattern that is expected for a simple task.  
To assess whether the repetition across the rounds affected the results, a three-way 
ANOVA was calculated with typing speed as the dependent variable. Observation 
condition (proximate observation, remote observation, or alone), and round (first, 
second, or third) were the between-subjects variables and task complexity (simple or 
complex) was the within-subjects variable. The results are presented in Table 16.  
Table 16: Outcome of the 3x2x2 Analysis of Variance for Typing Times 
Variable Main Effects df Error df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 2 81 1.30 .03  .28 .27 
Complexity 1 81 42.00** .34 <.01 1.00 
Round 2 81 9.83** .20 <.01 .98 
Interactions       
Observation x Complexity 2 81 0.26 .01  .77 .09 
Complexity x Round 2 81 1.00 .02 .37 .22 
Observation x Round 4 81 .79 .04 .54 .24 
Observation x Complexity x Round 4 81 1.08 .05 .37 .33 
Note. N = 10 in each round. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
According to the results in Table 16, there were main effects for complexity and for 
round. The main effect for complexity is consistent with the findings so far: 
Participants typed the simple task (name) faster than the complex task (code). The 
main effect for round indicates that participants typed faster as the rounds 
progressed. This might have been due to practice effects, if participants improved at 






observation, round and complexity, and all three combined indicate that, although 
participants typed faster as the rounds progressed, there was no difference in their 
relative speed between observation conditions and task complexities.    
7.5. Discussion 
This experiment aimed to investigate whether people nonintentionally respond to psi-
mediated observation in the same way that they do to proximate observation that they 
have sensory knowledge about. In other words, Experiment 3 investigated whether 
there is a social facilitation effect from remote observation. The participants 
completed typing tasks that were presented as being the log-in to another experiment, 
and so should not have elicited evaluation apprehension. The participants typed both 
a simple task (their first name) and a complex task (an alphanumeric code) three 
times, under a different observation condition each time: alone, remotely observed, 
or proximately observed. We assessed whether there was simple task facilitation and 
complex task inhibition from proximate observation compared to being alone, in 
other words, whether there was a normal social facilitation effect. There was no 
significant interaction between observation condition and task complexity, and so the 
first hypothesis was not supported. The design of Experiment 3 was based upon a 
previous study that found a significant social facilitation effect (Schmitt et al., 1986). 
Experiment 3 differed from Schmitt et al.’s experiment in that it had a remote 
observation condition instead of mere presence, and a within-subjects design. On 
further investigation, more differences between Experiment 3 and Schmitt et al.’s 
experiment came to light. These differences might explain the null findings. 
The name and code tasks in Experiment 3 were intended to replicate the tasks used in 
Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment. The tasks in Schmitt et al.’s experiment took 
longer (the name took between seven and 15 seconds, and the code between 52 and 
73 seconds, compared to between four and five seconds for the name and around 






previous experiment were longer. Schmitt et al. had not reported whether they used 
forenames or full names in their typing tasks. Goore confirmed that they had used 
full names, and excluded names less than 10 letters long (Goore, 2002). Six of the 
names in Experiment 3 were very short, just three letters long, and only one name, 
the longest, was 10 letters long. Thus there was very likely a ceiling effect in the 
simple typing task, from participants not being able to type their names any faster, 
which would limit how much of an effect observation could have. With such short 
times for these tasks, there was probably also inadequate lability for any observation 
effects to make a difference. Participants in Experiment 3 typed the code 
considerably faster than the participants in Schmitt et al.’s experiment. While this 
was no doubt partially due to the code being shorter, it might also have been an 
inadequately complex task. There is additional evidence for the code acting as a 
simple task, rather than a complex task, from the main effect of observation in the 
two-way ANOVA comparing only proximate observation and alone in the analysis 
for Hypothesis 1. The post-hoc test revealed that the speed of typing the code was 
increased by proximate observation. If it were acting as a complex task, we would 
expect observation to decrease the speed of typing the code. 
We had assumed that the code, being a complex task, would be inhibited by 
proximate observation, as it had in Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment, but there were 
differences in the way the code was used in Experiment 3 that might have reduced its 
complexity. Importantly, as discussed above, the tasks were shorter, which would 
have made the code easier. The other pertinent difference between Experiment 3 and 
Schmitt et al.’s experiment was the repetition of the tasks. Participants had some 
practice with the code by the final round, and one criterion of a simple task is that it 
is well-practised (Zajonc, 1965). A complex task should be novel or difficult 
(Schmitt et al., 1986). Although the manipulation check revealed that none of the 
participants had typed the code prior to the experiment, they might have become 
familiar with it by the end of the experiment. For example, one participant reported 






mentioned that the both the typing tasks became easier and faster throughout the 
experiment. Accordingly, participants got significantly faster from the first to the 
third round. Although we had thought that three repetitions would not be enough to 
make participants familiar with the code task, it may have been a much simpler task 
by the third round. Future experiments should not repeat tasks that are intended to be 
complex. 
The last difference between Experiment 3 and Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment was 
that the experimenter wrote the code down for the participants. The code was, 
therefore, visible throughout the experiment. This changed the task from having to 
work out the code and type it, to just copying it. A participant in the pilot test gave 
feedback that the fact that the code was copied meant that it was not a particularly 
difficult task; unfortunately, this feedback was not given until after all the experiment 
trials had been run. We had elected to use an informal way of presenting the code, a 
verbal explanation and a hand-written reminder, to make this task appear to be an 
incidental part of the set-up of the colour and precognition task. Schmitt et al. had not 
specified how the code instructions were given to their participants. This was 
clarified by Goore (2002) “The first time they received the ‘code word’ instructions 
was during the experiment. The instructions were presented on screen, and the 
instructions also contained an example… We made sure there were no paper or 
pencils around so the task would have to be completed in one’s head.” We had 
assumed that the code was a complex task in itself, irrespective of how was 
presented. This assumption was incorrect. It might be important that participants 
have to work out the code: This would increase the cognitive load of the task (G. A. 
Miller, 1956) and the amount of working memory capacity it used. This might make 
it a more difficult task. In all, it appears that the code may not have been difficult 
enough to function as a complex task. Task difficulty may be an important aspect of 
complex tasks. For example, in a previous experiment that found the social 
facilitation effect, participants rated the complex task as significantly more difficult 






found significant inhibition effects from proximate observation when participants 
were dressing and undressing in unfamiliar clothes, which is not difficult, only 
unfamiliar. Zajonc (1965) categorised tasks by whether they were well-learned 
(familiar, i.e., simple) or still being learned (novel, i.e., complex). The critical factor 
distinguishing these categories was, he proposed, that the participants’ dominant 
responses (the responses people are most likely to make) were incorrect for complex 
tasks. This could be achieved by not repeating the code, and making it more difficult. 
Future experiments should ensure that the complex task is more difficult than the 
code in Experiment 3, and check that the participants find it difficult. Future 
experiments with these tasks should also replicate more closely the conditions in 
Schmitt et al. (1986). 
The observation influence in Experiment 3 might have differed from Schmitt et al.’s 
(1986) experiment, because in Schmitt et al.’s experiment the observation conditions 
were between-subjects. In Experiment 3 the observation conditions were within-
subjects, so all participants experienced proximate observation, remote observation, 
and alone conditions. This changing between conditions might have “contaminated” 
the alone condition. There is a potential precedent for this. Guerin (1993) criticised 
Sanna & Shotland's (1990) experiment, which did not find a performance effect from 
mere presence, and in which the experimenter entered the room frequently to 
administer the tasks, for having a contaminated alone condition. In Experiment 3 we 
minimised the amount that the experimenter had to enter the room by designing a 
fully automated program for the tasks, and therefore avoided that problem, but the 
within-subjects design might still have affected the observation conditions. It is not 
known how long the influence of observation continues after observation ceases 
(Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Guerin, 1993). If the influence of one observation 







So far, the comparisons between Experiment 3 and Schmitt et al. (1986) have been 
negative, focussed on the failure to replicate the social facilitation effect, but 
Experiment 3 merits positive appraisal for creating a true alone condition. The 
criteria for a true alone condition were that participants should be physically alone, 
the tasks they perform should not elicit feelings of being evaluated or of self-
evaluation (Markus, 1978), and there should not be covert observation in the alone 
condition. All of these criteria were fulfilled. Although some of the participants said 
they suspected that the name and code may have had more to do with the experiment 
than just being the log-in, the way that the question was phrased also told them that 
this was the case. When asking this question, the experimenter apprehended that 
some participants wanted to give the impression that they had realised that the name 
and the code were involved, rather than that they had actually thought this at the 
time. This is a limitation of this manipulation check, and future experiments should 
not use leading questions. 
The way that the name and code were timed may also have been problematic. The E 
Prime program could not time each keystroke. It timed from the participants pressing 
the space bar, in order to open the screen into which they typed their name or code, 
to when they typed return at the end of the name or code. Thus the times recorded 
include any delay before starting to type, any time for corrections, and any delay 
before pressing return, in addition to the time taken to type. These added noise to the 
data, which could not be separated out. The E Prime program also only recorded the 
final product of the name and code typing, not any of the corrections. This means 
that there might be noise from corrections that we could not separate out. When she 
was observing, the experimenter noticed that some participants paused between 
finishing typing and pressing return. This would have happened more in the first 
round, as in the later rounds the participants would have known what to do. Although 
the first round was equally spread across the observation conditions, the extra time 
added by these delays may have obscured any social facilitation effect. The delays 






overcome this limitation more accurate task recording and timing software should be 
used.  
Experiment 3 failed to replicate the normal social facilitation effect of simple task 
facilitation and complex task inhibition from proximate observation. This effect was 
intended to be a benchmark, against which the effect of remote observation would be 
compared. We thought it likely that the effect of remote observation would be similar 
in direction, but lesser in magnitude, to the effect of proximate observation. 
Alternatively, remote observation could have produced a completely different effect. 
There was, however, no social facilitation effect from remote observation; 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. As the normal social facilitation effect was not 
found, it is unlikely that Experiment 3 had any chance of detecting a remote 
observation effect. Even when the possible confounding individual differences 
measures were controlled for there was no effect. Future experiments investigating 
remote observation and social facilitation should improve upon the limitations 
identified here to improve the chances of finding the social facilitation effect.  
In summary, the lack of a social facilitation effect between the alone and proximate 
observation conditions prevented there being a baseline with which to conceptually 
calibrate the effect of remote observation. A variety of limitations in the experiment, 
notably the repetition of the rounds, length and ease of the tasks, and inaccuracies in 
the timing program were identified as possible reasons for the null results and should 
be improved. 
7.6. Summary of Experiment 3 and Rationale for Experiment 4 
In summary, Experiment 3 investigated whether there was a social facilitation effect 
from remote observation compared to alone and proximate observation conditions. 
The results were inconclusive, as the social facilitation effect of simple task 






and the proximate observation condition. The lack of the social facilitation effect 
between the alone and proximate observation conditions in Experiment 3 prevented 
there being a baseline with which to compare the effect of remote observation. A 
variety of limitations were identified, and Experiment 4 aimed to address each of 
these, in order to test whether the normal social facilitation effect (between 
proximate observation and alone) could be replicated with covert typing tasks.  
Experiment 3 did not replicate the procedure of Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment, 
specifically in terms of task length, repetition, and presentation. In Experiment 4 
participants used their full names in the name and code log-in tasks. This not only 
made the typing tasks longer, increasing the chance of finding a social facilitation 
effect, but also aimed to make them more difficult, as they might have been too easy 
in Experiment 3. In Experiment 4 the participants did not repeat the name and code 
log-in tasks, because practice effects and increased familiarity from repeating the 
tasks in Experiment 3 may have interfered with the social facilitation effect. Lastly, 
the code in Experiment 4 was not visible throughout the experiment and could not be 
copied: Participants had to work the code out in their heads. To check that these 
manipulations worked, participants were asked to rate how difficult and familiar 
these tasks were.  
Experiment 3 also differed from Schmitt et al.’s (1986) procedure in terms of the 
observation conditions. In Experiment 3 these were within-subjects, and the change 
from one condition to the other might have interfered with any observation condition 
exerting an influence. In Experiment 4, as in Schmitt et al.’s experiment, the 
observation conditions were between-subjects. With these changes to the task length, 
repetition, presentation and design, Experiment 4 should closely replicate the 
procedure that obtained a social facilitation effect in Schmitt et al.’s experiment. 
One limitation of the apparatus used in Experiment 3 was the inaccuracy in the 






timing program was used that timed individual keystrokes with millisecond accuracy 
(see Materials and Apparatus below). A second limitation in the apparatus of 
Experiment 3 was that the individual keystrokes made by participants were not 
recorded, only the final product. Therefore, a thorough assessment of accuracy could 
not be made, as corrected errors were not recorded. In Experiment 4, every keystroke 
made by the participants was recorded. This allowed the accuracy of the typing tasks 
to be assessed as well as the speed. It is advantageous to assess both speed and 
accuracy in social facilitation experiments because speed is the most reliable measure 
for simple tasks, and accuracy for complex tasks (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983). 
Measuring both speed and accuracy maximises the chances of capturing the social 
facilitation effect.  
In addition to accuracy, perceived difficulty was used as an indicator of the social 
facilitation effect in Experiment 4. It is possible that observation, as well as affecting 
the performance of tasks, might make them seem more difficult or easier to do 
(Bradner & Mark, 2001). Bradner and Mark compared participants’ performance on 
a complex maths task between two observation conditions. These were alone, and 
observation by two-way video links in which the observer and participant could see 
each other’s image on computer screens in separate rooms. The maths task was 
performed more slowly and rated as being more difficult in the two-way video 
observation condition compared to alone. Therefore, from this limited previous 
research, it appears that complex tasks are not only performed as if they are more 
difficult (more slowly) with observation, but are also perceived to be more difficult. 
This makes participants’ ratings of task difficulty an indicator of whether there is an 
effect from observation. It is not known whether or how this effect would apply to 
simple tasks, i.e., whether they would be rated as easier when observed, but this 
seemed logical. The way perceived difficulty responds to observation in both simple 






One more indicator of the effect of observation was introduced in Experiment 4. As 
reviewed in Chapter 6, the social facilitation effect is thought to be mediated by 
observation leading to an increase in the participants’ arousal (Moore & Baron, 
1983). State anxiety can be used as a self-report measure for arousal level (Mullen et 
al., 1997). In a change from Experiment 3, in which state anxiety was used as an 
individual difference that might interact with the social facilitation effect, in 
Experiment 4 state anxiety was used as an indicator of the influence of observation 
on arousal. This was achieved by asking participants retrospectively to rate their state 
anxiety during the experiment. The state anxiety section of the STAI is valid if used 
to refer to the present moment, or to a recent time in the past (Spielberger, 1983). 
Therefore, it is valid as a retrospective measure. State anxiety was expected to 
increase under proximate observation.  
In Experiment 3, personality characteristics and individual differences that can affect 
both task performance and how observation affects people’s task performance were 
measured. As a conservative measure, the potential effect of these individual 
differences was controlled for when assessing whether a social facilitation effect was 
found. Extraversion, neuroticism, gender, and age were retained for Experiment 4. 
Belief in psi was not used in Experiment 4, as there was no remote observation 
condition. The indicator of the relationship between the participants and the observer 
(familiarity) was also not used. Instead, the relationship between the participants and 
the observer was kept constant by using participants that the observer did not know 
well, or did not know at all. The relationship between the participants and the 
observer was also kept constant by ensuring that the observer had expert status to the 
participants. Both unfamiliar and expert observers should have a greater social 
facilitation effect than familiar (Guerin, 1993) or peer observers (Henchy & Glass, 
1968; F. G. Miller et al., 1979).   
In Experiment 4 (below) participants typed their full name (simple task) and a code 






(complex task) once, which they were told was the log-in to a subsequent 
experiment. Following the typing tasks, the participants then completed a 
“Perceptual Judgement” experiment that was a decoy, intended to deceive the 
participants that the name and code were only a log-in to the “real” experiment. (The 
results of the perceptual judgement task were reported in Chapter 3). Participants 
were either alone or proximately observed when they typed the name and code. The 
order of the observation conditions was randomised and counterbalanced. Firstly, we 
asked whether the normal social facilitation effect was found, by investigating 
whether there was an interaction between observation condition and task complexity 
on typing speed. We controlled for possible confounding personality and individual 
differences variables. Secondly, we investigated whether there was an interaction 
between observation condition and task complexity on typing accuracy. Thirdly, we 
investigated whether there was an interaction between observation condition and task 
complexity on perceived task difficulty, rated by asking participants how difficult the 
tasks were. Lastly, we investigated whether there was an effect of observation on 
state anxiety.  
7.6.1. Hypotheses. 
1 There will be an interaction between observation condition (proximate 
observation or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) in terms of typing 
speed. Participants in the proximate observation condition will type their names (the 
simple task) faster than participants in the alone condition. Participants in the 
proximate observation condition will type their alphanumeric code (the complex 
task) more slowly than participants in the alone condition. In other words, proximate 
observation will elicit the social facilitation effect. 
2 There will be an interaction between observation condition (proximate 
observation or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) in terms of typing 






(the simple task) more accurately than participants in the alone condition. 
Participants in the proximate observation condition will type the code (the complex 
task) less accurately than participants in the alone condition. In other words, 
proximate observation will elicit the social facilitation effect. 
3 There will be an interaction between observation condition (proximate 
observation or alone) and task complexity (simple or complex) in terms of perceived 
task difficulty. Participants in the proximate observation condition will rate typing 
their names (the simple task) as easier, and typing the code (the complex task) as 
more difficult, than participants in the alone condition will rate these same tasks.  
4 Participants in the proximate observation condition will rate their state 
anxiety higher than participants in the alone condition. 
7.7. Method 
7.7.1. Design. 
The design was a mixed model with two independent variables: observation 
condition (alone or proximate observation) between-subjects, and task complexity 
(simple or complex) within-subjects. The dependent variables were typing speed, 
typing accuracy, perceived task difficulty ratings, and state anxiety scores.   
7.7.2. Participants. 
Fifty participants, ranging from 17 to 45 years of age (M = 23.33, SD 5.11 years), 28 
of whom were female and 22 male, volunteered. None of the participants from 
Experiment 3 were included, neither was anyone who might know about the aim of 
the experiment. Participants were recruited from tutorial groups and lecture theatres, 





 year psychology students, who had not yet studied social 






recruited in the first tutorial and so did not know her well, and knew her as a tutorial 
teacher, thus in a position of authority. Therefore, the participants and the 
experimenter/observer were unfamiliar to each other, and the observer was an expert 
rather than a peer in status.  
Experimenter and Observer. 
The author took the role of experimenter and observer.  
7.7.3. Ethical Considerations. 
We identified one potential ethical issue, deliberate deception of the participants, 
similarly to Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (see above and Chapters 3 and 4). We addressed 
this by giving participants the right to terminate the experiment at any time and a full 
debrief following the experiment. The Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Edinburgh granted ethical approval for this experiment to proceed. 
7.7.4. Materials and Apparatus. 
Program. 
The experiment was programmed in Microsoft Excel XP and Shockwave by the 
author in conjunction with a computing expert at the University of Edinburgh. The 
Excel program presented the instructions for the perceptual judgement task and the 
name and code. The time at which the participant pressed each key (key down) and 
the time of releasing each key (key up) were logged, along with each letter or digit 
typed. In order to assess how accurately the custom-made Excel program measured 
timing, the processing speed of the computer and the accuracy of recording the 
responses were considered. The processing speed of all modern computers is fast 
enough to ensure millisecond accuracy in timing (Wikipedia Clock Rate, 2002). The 






benchmarking program (E Prime, 2002) and were found to be accurate to beyond 
100
th
 of a millisecond.  
Personality Questionnaires. 
The 240-item NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) was used to score extraversion 
and neuroticism. High scores indicate high levels of that trait, e.g., high extraversion, 
and the maximum score for a trait was 192.  
To measure state anxiety participants completed the 20-item state anxiety section of 
the STAI (Spielberger, 1983). This scale has a minimum score of 20 and a maximum 
score of 80; high scores indicate high state anxiety. 
7.7.5. Procedure. 
Randomisation of observation conditions. 
The order of the observation conditions had been determined in advance of all trials 
using random entry into random number tables (RAND, 1966).  The entry point was 
taken from the random number function on a hand held Casio calculator. The first 
two digits determined the page number, and the third digit the line at which the 
sequence began. Starting from this random entry point, the next 25 digits to the right 
were converted into observation conditions as follows: an even number became 
observe one participant, leave the next alone; an odd number became leave one 
participant alone, observe the next. This created a randomised, counterbalanced order 
of observation conditions. These observation conditions were printed on a list. 
Participants were assigned to the next observation condition in the order in which 








Participants were tested individually. Participants were greeted at the door to the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh, and shown to a waiting 
room in which they completed the NEO PI-R, which took between 20 and 35 
minutes. The waiting room was the hospitality room for the parapsychology suite, 
just along the corridor from the experimental room. Participants also signed a 
standard consent form agreeing to participate, and on the understanding that they 
could terminate the experiment at any time (none chose to). The experimenter then 
showed participants into the experimental room. One office in the Department of 
Psychology was used for testing. This office had two desks, each with one desktop 
computer on it.  There was a dormer window, which was covered by a blackout blind 
for the experiment. The light was always switched on in the room to maintain a 
constant level of light across sessions. Participants sat at the desk with the 
experimental computer, a Sony VAIO Laptop, and another desktop computer, which 








The star marks the position of the observer in the proximate observation condition. 
Figure 6: Map of the Experimental Room for Experiment 4 (not to scale) 
 
The experimenter explained the instructions for the perceptual judgement task to the 
participants, and explained that they would also have to log-in to the experiment, but 
that the instructions for that were in the program. That was all that was said about the 
name and code. An example name and code was given in the instructions, but was 
not visible on the screen when the code was inputted. The example was: “Name: 
Bilbo Baggins, Code: s1n2i3g4g5a6b7o8b9l10i11b12”. The instructions requested 
participants use just lower case letters in the code. We chose a fantasy name to 
reduce the chances of recruiting anyone with the same name, which might have 






name and code were entered on the same screen, into two input boxes similar in 
appearance to an email log-in. Pilot tests had confirmed this was more naturalistic, an 
important consideration as participants were not supposed to realise that this was part 
of the experiment or feel evaluated at this point. The experimenter asked participants 
to fetch her from the waiting room at the end of the experiment.  
According to the observation condition the experimenter stayed in the room up to the 
end of the inputting of the name and code (proximate observation), or left before the 
participants began the name and code (alone). In the proximate observation condition 
the experimenter stood in the experimental room with the participants. She stood 
about a metre behind them, and slightly to one side. She could see the participants, 
their hands on the keyboard, and the screen in front of them. In the alone condition 
participants were alone in this room, with the door closed. No-one else entered the 
room. The experimenter occupied her mind with other matters during this time. After 
the participant completed the log-in (name and code), the perceptual judgement task 
started automatically, and the participants went on to generate data that is not 
analysed in this chapter (see Chapter 3). At the end of the perceptual judgement task 
the participants fetched the experimenter, who was in the waiting room. The 
experimenter asked the following questions verbally to check that experimental 
manipulations had worked, and wrote down the participants’ answers.  
1 “How did you find it?” 
2 “At the time of doing the name and code log-in, did you think that they were 
part of the experiment?” (If participants needed clarification “part of the experiment” 
was further defined as being an experimental task. This question was introduced after 
the first 20 participants had done the experiment, prior to which participants were 
just invited to comment on the name and code but no scripted question was asked.) 
3 Participants were asked to rate the difficulty of the name and code tasks on a 






4 “How often do you type your full name?” 
5 “Have you ever typed the code before?” 
6 Participants who had been alone were asked “What was the effect of being 
alone on how you did the name and code?”  Participants who had been observed 
were asked “What was the effect of being observed on how you did the name and 
code?” 
Then participants completed the STAI and another questionnaire relevant to the 
perceptual judgement task. The STAI was completed first to ensure that the way they 
had felt in the experiment was fresh in their minds. They were asked to fill this out 
for “how you felt at the beginning of the experiment, before the lines task, around the 
time of doing the log-in”. Participants were thanked for participating, and were 
offered a sweet from a lucky dip box as a gesture of thanks before they were shown 
out of the experimental room. Only after all participants were tested and the results 
were analysed were the participants debriefed by email.  
7.7.6. Analyses. 
Analyses were conducted in SPSS version 14 and Microsoft Excel. 
7.8. Results 
Manipulation check 1: Did participants believe that the typing 
tasks were not part of the experiment? 
As soon as the experimenter returned to the room after the experiment was over she 
asked “How did you find it?” This informal question was part of the manipulation 
check to see what participants referred to as having been the experiment (the name 






45 of the 50 participants, for this and all the other questions. Five of the response 
sheets (anonymised) were lost prior to coding due to a break-in. 
Forty-one participants (89%) referred only to the perceptual judgement task. One 
referred to the log-in task, and one to both tasks. Two others commented on other 
aspects of the experiment. Therefore, the majority of the participants interpreted the 
experiment as being the perceptual judgement task only, and not the log-in, which 
indicated that they did not think that the log-in procedure was part of the experiment. 
This would mean that the perceptual judgement task functioned well as a ruse, and 
the participants should not have felt evaluation apprehension (an arousal-increasing 
influence from the expectation of observation/judgement) when typing the name and 
code. 
From participant 20 onwards, participants were also asked “At the time of doing the 
name and code log-in, did you think that they were part of the experiment?” Of the 
30 participants who were asked this question, 18 (60%) did suspect the code of being 
something to do with the experiment, with varying degrees of certainty, including 
just thinking there was a slight possibility. Twelve participants (40%) did not suspect 
at all. Only one participant commented “I didn’t think. I just did it, so used to logging 
in”, which was how we had hoped participants would react. Six of the participants 
(20%), who suspected the tasks were part of the experiment, guessed that they were 
being timed. Seven of the participants (23%) reported suspecting the log-in tasks 
because the code was “complicated” or “weird”. 
Participants who were not asked this question had a chance to comment on the code, 
and four (20%) reported suspicion: one because this task was complicated, one 
guessed it was being timed, one thought it was being observed (he was in the 
observed condition), and one was only suspicious because he was being observed. In 
summary, the majority of the participants did think that the typing tasks were, or 






in to the psi task did not work as effectively as in Experiment 3, and there might have 
been a risk of evaluation apprehension from participants assuming that their typing 
was being monitored, or realising that it was being timed (Griffin, 2001; Griffin & 
Kent, 1998). Thus the alone condition in Experiment 4 may have been contaminated 
by evaluation apprehension, and therefore would not have been a true alone 
condition (Markus, 1978). This finding had not emerged from the answers to the first 
manipulation check question. 
Manipulation check 2: Was the name easy and the code 
difficult? 
Participants rated the difficulty of the typing tasks on a nine-point Likert scale 
anchored at 1 (easiest) and 9 (most difficult). Three participants did the code 
incorrectly; one did not use numbers, and just typed her name backwards; one used 
only the number 1, repeatedly. One other did the numbers correctly, but did not 
reverse the order of the letters of her name in the code. These three participants’ 
ratings were excluded from the comparison. Five participants typed the code in a 
different way, which was not actually incorrect, but was not how we had intended 
they would type it. Instead of typing it sequentially (the last letter of their surname 
first, then the number 1…) they typed their name backwards, then side-spaced 
through the name adding the numbers. This might have made the task easier, 
reducing its complexity. Their ratings are given separately in Table 17 and are called 
shortcut, because they took a shortcut on the code. 
Table 17: Perceived Difficulty of Simple and Complex Tasks. 
Task N M SD 
Simple 45 1.24 0.61 
Complex 37 6.09 1.48 







As the figures in Table 17 indicate, the code was rated as being more difficult than 
the name. To test whether this difference was significant we ran a Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test (data for the name were highly positively skewed), which showed that the 
name was significantly easier than the code: z = -5.40, p <.01. The ratings for the 
name are towards the far end of the easy side of the scale (M = 1.24), but the code 
ratings are nearer the midpoint than the far end of the difficult side (M = 6.09). 
Therefore, although the code was more difficult than the name, the code was not a 
very difficult task in absolute terms.  
The shortcut of the code was not significantly easier than the code: t(41) = -1.49, p = 
.29. The non-significant difference between the difficulty of the code and the 
shortcut of the code is important for Experiment 3. In Experiment 3 the final output 
was the only record of the typing tasks. It was not known how many people had 
taken shortcuts with the code. If, for example, the shortcut was much easier than the 
code, and if many participants had used the shortcut in Experiment 3, that might have 
reduced the complexity of the code in Experiment 3. As the difference between the 
ratings in Experiment 4 is non-significant, it is likely that any shortcuts in 
Experiment 3 did not significantly alter the difficulty of the code task. The 
participants who did the shortcut were excluded from further analysis in Experiment 
4 because we had decided in advance to exclude all those who did not strictly adhere 
to the way the code was supposed to be typed.  
Manipulation check 3: Was the name familiar and the code 
novel?  
Participants were asked “How often do you type your full name?” Thirty-three of the 
45 participants (73%) typed their full name at least once a day and all the other 
participants typed their full name at least once a week. The name was therefore a 
familiar, well-practiced task. Participants were also asked “Have you ever typed the 






participant reported that she knew how to type her first name backwards, and another 
that he typed backwards as a child. Therefore, the code was a novel task. 
Hypothesis 1: There will be an interaction between observation 
condition (proximate observation or alone) and task complexity 
(simple or complex) in terms of typing speed. Participants in the 
proximate observation condition will type their names (the 
simple task) faster than participants in the alone condition. 
Participants in the proximate observation condition will type 
their alphanumeric code (the complex task) more slowly than 
participants in the alone condition. 
Typing speed is the mean speed of typing each letter or digit. Typing speed was 
calculated as the inter-stroke interval, the average time elapsed between pressing one 
key (letter or digit) to pressing the next key. This used the key down times, not the 
key up times. The time taken to start typing was excluded, as was any time taken 
between finishing the name and moving on to the code, as these were often long 
delays that could misleadingly decrease the mean speed. The time of pressing the 
shift key to capitalise the first letter of the name was also excluded as not all 
participants had used capitals, and the very short duration between pressing shift and 
the first letter of the name would have increased the mean speed misleadingly. Time 
taken to make and correct errors was also included in the calculation of mean inter-
stroke interval, in line with the following examples. If Sam typed samm-backspace 
each of those keystrokes were included in the calculation. If, on the other hand, Sam 
typed stam watson then rapidly side-spaced (using the left arrow key) back through 
the name to remove the t, then the rapid left arrow presses were not included as they 







Participants’ responses were excluded if they had used the shortcut of the code, typed 
the code wrong, or if they had outlying data points with some justification for 
removal. (Five participants typed much slower, two were dyslexic, and three spoke 
English as a second language.) Data used in the analysis were normally distributed. 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 18 and displayed graphically in Figure 
7.  
Table 18: Time take to Type Simple and Complex tasks by Observation 
Condition 
Observation Condition 
Task Alone N=17 Proximate N=20   
 M SD M SD Row Means 
Simple 362.47 151.29 320.9 104.53 522.92 
Complex 1505.06 269.69 1363.4 224.73 2186.76 












Figure 7: Mean Typing Speed in milliseconds by Task Complexity and 
Observation Condition 
 
From visual inspection of the figures in Table 18 and Figure 7 it would appear that 
the speed of both the name and code were increased by observation, and that this 






ANOVA was calculated with typing speed as the dependent variable.  Observation 
condition (proximate observation or alone) was the between-subjects variable and 
task complexity (simple or complex) was the within-subjects variable. The ANOVA 
results are displayed in Table 19. 
Table 19: Analysis of Variance for Typing Times 
Variable Main Effects df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 3.55 .09 .07 .45 
Complexity 1 652.93** .95 <.01 1.00 
Error 35 (455.19)    
Interaction      
Observation x Complexity 1 1.37 .04 .25 .21 
Note. N = 37. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
There was a significant main effect of complexity: The complex task was completed 
more slowly than the simple task. As the mean inter-stroke intervals, which are 
unaffected by the length of the task, were used in this analysis this main effect was 
due to differences in complexity, not the differences in the length of the task. There 
was no significant main effect of observation, although this was approaching 
significance. There was no significant interaction. Hypothesis 1, that observation 
would increase the speed of the simple task and decrease the speed of the complex 
task, was not supported. There was a slight trend instead for observation to increase 
the speed of both tasks, but this was non-significant.  
As there was a trend towards observation increasing the speed at which both tasks 
were typed, and because the figures in Table 18 indicated that this effect might be 
more pronounced in the code, a post-hoc t test was run to assess whether the code 
was typed significantly faster in the observation condition. It was: t (35) = 1.74, p < 
.05 (one-tailed), with a small effect size, r = .08. Therefore, typing the code was 






The non-significant results for Hypothesis 1 might have been due to confounding 
personality variables, such as extraversion or neuroticism, or other individual 
differences, such as gender or age. In order to increase the sensitivity of the analysis, 
the personality and individual differences variables that might have introduced 
variance were controlled for. Participants’ responses to the personality questionnaires 
are summarised in Table 20. A sub-set of personality questionnaires (N=29 for the 
NEO PI-R, N=22 for state anxiety) were lost prior to coding due to a break-in, and 
after it was no longer practical to ask participants to repeat them. The remaining data 
are shown below. 
Table 20: Descriptive statistics for the Personality and Individual 
Differences variables  
Variable N M SD Minimum Maximum 
Extraversion 21 119.78 19.81 79 154 
State Anxiety 28 40.17 8.34 27 56 
Neuroticism 21 103.22 24.76 59 147 
 
In order to rule out multicollinearity, the inter-correlations between all these 
variables were assessed by two-tailed Pearson correlation coefficients. A coefficient 
of over .8 indicates problematic multicollinearity (Field, 2005). If two variables 
correlate over .8 they should be amalgamated, or one of them should be dropped. All 
the correlations are presented in Table 21, none of which were over .8. 
Table 21: Correlation Coefficients for Individual Differences variables 
Variable   Neuroticism Gender Age 
Extraversion N = 21 0.02 0.11 -0.28 
Neuroticism N = 21  0.29 0.09 
Gender N = 48     0.02 
 
The covariates were entered into an ANCOVA (general linear model) with typing 






alone) was the between-subjects variable and task complexity (simple or complex) 
was the within-subjects variable. The results are reported in Table 22.  
Table 22: Main effects and Interactions from the Individual Differences 
predictors on Typing Times 
Main Effects from Variables df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 2.68 .31 .15 .28 
Complexity 1 3.06 .34 .13 .31 
Extraversion 1 0.12 .19 .74 .06 
Neuroticism 1 0.19 .03 .68 .07 
Gender 1 1.36 .19 .29 .17 
Age 1 1.52 .03 .71 .06 
Error 6 (44396.86)    
Interactions      
Observation x Complexity 1 0.14 .02 . 72 .06 
Extraversion x Observation x Complexity 1 0.08 .01 .79 .06 
Neuroticism x Observation x Complexity 1 0.12 .02 .74 .06 
Gender x Observation x Complexity 1 0.02 <.01 .64 .07 
Age x Observation x Complexity 1 1.26 .17 .30 .16 
Note. N = 19. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The figures in the top half of Table 22 denote the main effects. The main effects of 
observation and complexity in Table 22 report only the variance that is uniquely 
attributable to these variables, with the effects of the covariates controlled for. The 
main effects of observation and complexity are non-significant. Controlling for the 
variance attributable to the personality and individual differences measures rendered 
the main effect of complexity, significant in Table 19 above, non-significant. (It is 
more likely that this non-significant finding is due to the low power in this analysis 
than that the finding in Table 19 was artefactual.) 
The main effects of the personality variables (in the top half of the table) show the 






personality variable explains. Partial ŋ
2 
gives the effect size for that variable, not 
influenced by the effect of the other variables included in the analysis. Neither 
extraversion, neuroticism, gender, or age had a significant main effect on typing 
speed.  
The second half of the table displays the interactions for each of these predictors and 
observation and complexity; lower order interactions were included in the model. 
This shows the effect that each predictor had on the social facilitation effect (i.e., the 
interaction between a personality variable and observation and complexity). None of 
these interactions are significant: None of the personality or individual differences 
variables had any significant interaction with the social facilitation effect. The 
interaction between observation and complexity was non-significant. Controlling for 
the variance attributable to the personality and individual differences measures did 
not render this interaction significant, and so the non-significant interaction in the 
ANOVA in Hypothesis 1 was not due to confounding variables. 
Hypothesis 2:  There will be an interaction between observation 
condition (proximate observation or alone) and task complexity 
(simple or complex) in terms of typing accuracy. Participants in 
the proximate observation condition will type their names (the 
simple task) more accurately than participants in the alone 
condition. Participants in the proximate observation condition 
will type the code (the complex task) less accurately than 
participants in the alone condition. 
Errors were counted in two ways: as the number of incorrect letters or digits that 
remained and the number of incorrect letters or digits that had been corrected. For 
example, if Sam typed Sams Wattson then side-spaced with the left arrow and 
corrected the double t, he scored 1 for remaining errors (the s on Sam) and 1 for 






shortcut in the code or typed the code incorrectly were excluded. The descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 23.  
Table 23: Total Errors by Observation Condition and Task Complexity 
Observation Condition 
Task Alone N = 19 Proximate N = 22  
  Mean SD Mean SD Row Means 
Simple 0.26 0.73 0.18 0.4 0.22 
Complex 1.26 1.85 0.86 1.21 1.06 
Column Means 0.76  0.52  0.64 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, a two-way ANOVA was calculated with typing errors 
as the dependent variable. Observation condition (proximate observation or alone) 
was the between-subjects variable and task complexity (simple or complex) was the 
within-subjects variable. The data for the errors were very positively skewed, 
because the majority of the people had very few errors. There is no non-parametric 
equivalent to a two-way ANOVA, and as ANOVA is very robust (Field, 2005) it was 
deemed to be suitable. The ANOVA results are in Table 24. 
Table 24: Analysis of Variance for Errors 
Variable Main Effects df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 0.89 .02 .35 .15 
Complexity 1 10.53** .21 <.01 .89 
Error 39 (1.33)    
Interaction      
Observation x Complexity 1 0.38 .01 .54 .09 
Note. N = 41. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
There was a significant effect of complexity, no significant effect of observation, and 
no significant interaction. Participants made more errors in the complex task than the 






into account. Hypothesis 2, that observation would decrease the errors in the name 
and increase the errors in the code, was not supported. Due to the data being highly 
skewed, further investigations with the errors and the personality and individual 
differences variables were not made. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be an interaction between observation 
condition (proximate observation or alone) and task complexity 
(simple or complex) in terms of perceived task difficulty. 
Participants in the proximate observation condition will rate 
typing their names (the simple task) as easier, and typing the 
code (the complex task) as more difficult, than participants in 
the alone condition will rate these same tasks. 
To test Hypothesis 3, the data from the same ratings as those used in Manipulation 
Check 2 were used, but they were analysed by observation condition. The Likert 
scale was anchored at 1 (easiest) and 9 (most difficult). Participants who used the 
shortcut in the code or typed the code incorrectly were excluded. The descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 25.  
Table 25: Perceived Difficulty of Simple and Complex Tasks by 
Observation Condition 
Observation Condition 
Task Alone N = 19 Proximate N = 22   
  Mean SD Mean SD Row Means 
Simple  1.22 0.55 1.15 0.37 1.19 
Complex 6.11 1.71 6.08 1.28 6.10 
Column Means 3.67   3.62   3.64 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, a two-way ANOVA was calculated with perceived 
difficulty as the dependent variable. Observation condition (proximate observation or 






was the within-subjects variable. Although these data originate from a Likert scale, 
and are therefore not interval data, they can be used for ANOVA (Field, 2005). The 
ANOVA results are in Table 26.  
Table 26: Analysis of Variance for Perceived Difficulty 
Variable Main Effects df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 0.04 .00 .84 .06 
Complexity 1 382.33** .91 <.01 1.00 
Error 36 (1.27)    
Interaction      
Observation x Complexity 1 .01 .00 .94 .05 
Note. N = 38. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
As the outputs in Table 26 suggest, there was a significant effect of complexity: The 
name was rated as being easier than the code. There was no significant effect of 
observation, nor any interaction. Hypothesis 3, that observation would decrease the 
perceived difficulty of the simple task and increase the perceived difficulty of the 
complex task, was not supported. The data for the perceived difficulty of the name 
were highly positively skewed. For this reason, further investigations controlling for 
the personality and individual differences variables were not made.  
Post-hoc analysis: Correlation of errors and speed. 
There might have been a trade-off between speed and accuracy, such that people 
either type faster, or more accurately (Meyer, Smith, Kornblum, Abrams, & Wright, 
1990; Plamondon & Alimi, 1997). This could compromise any effect of observation 
on speed. This effect would be seen as a correlation between the remaining errors, or 
the total errors, and faster speed.  Alternatively, it might take participants longer to 
correct errors. This would be seen as a correlation between the corrected errors, or 
the total errors, and slower speed. Conversely, correcting errors might make the 






couple of times in quick succession.  This would be seen as a correlation between the 
corrected errors, or the total errors, and faster speed. In order to check for any of 
these effects, correlations were run between remaining errors, corrected errors, or 
total errors and speed within task complexity. 
All the correlations were extremely small and non-significant. The calculation of 
speed as the mean inter-stroke interval already predominantly took into account the 
extra keystrokes involved in correcting errors. The findings for Hypotheses 1 and 3 
were not affected by a trade-off between speed and accuracy. 
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the proximate observation 
condition will rate their state anxiety higher than participants in 
the alone condition. 
As participants’ state anxiety is likely to be influenced by their neuroticism, the 
effect of neuroticism was controlled for. Table 27 displays the descriptive statistics 
for state anxiety levels, corrected for neuroticism. 
Table 27: State Anxiety by Observation Condition, corrected for 
Neuroticism 
Observation Condition 
Task Alone N = 8 Proximate N = 11   
  M SD M SD Row Mean 
State Anxiety Score 43.01 3.19 40.46 2.65 41.735 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, neuroticism was included as a covariate in an 
ANCOVA with state anxiety as the dependent variable. Observation condition 







Table 28: ANCOVA of Observation on State Anxiety, corrected for 
Neuroticism 
Variable  df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 1 0.29 .02 .60 .08 
Neuroticism (covariate) 1 2.30 .13 .15 .30 
Error 16 (69.93)    
Note. N = 19. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The outputs in Table 28 show that there was not a significant main effect of 
observation condition on state anxiety, when corrected for neuroticism. Neuroticism 
also did not significantly predict the state anxiety scores. Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported.  
7.9. Discussion 
Experiment 4 aimed to obtain a social facilitation effect using improved 
methodology and apparatus. The improvements and changes aimed to overcome the 
problems found in Experiment 3, and to replicate a previous experiment that found a 
social facilitation effect with typing tasks (Schmitt et al., 1986). Experiment 4 aimed 
to obtain the normal (non-psi-mediated) social facilitation effect, of facilitation of 
simple task performance and inhibition of complex task performance from proximate 
observation compared to being alone. We intended to find the normal social 
facilitation effect to establish the validity of our methods and apparatus. If this 
methodology obtained the normal social facilitation effect, we could then use it to 
investigate whether there is a social facilitation effect from remote observation. The 
participants completed typing tasks that were presented as being the log-in to another 
experiment, and so should not have elicited evaluation apprehension. Each 
participant typed both his or her names (simple task) and a code (complex task) once, 
either under proximate observation or while alone. We measured two indicators of 






of observation: perceived task difficulty and state anxiety. The social facilitation 
effect, the interaction between observation and task complexity, was not found using 
any of these measures. Each of these measures will be considered in turn below.  
We hypothesised that proximate observation would increase the speed of typing the 
name (simple task) and decrease the speed of typing the code (complex task). This 
effect was not found, even when potentially confounding individual differences were 
controlled for. There was, however, a trend towards observation increasing the speed 
of both tasks. A post-hoc test found that the speed of typing the code was 
significantly increased by proximate observation. This is the opposite of the expected 
effect, and also the opposite of the effect found by Schmitt et al. (1986) with the 
same code. One possible reason for facilitation of complex task performance is that, 
when considering speed, complex task inhibition is an unreliable effect (C. F. Bond 
& Titus, 1983). Over many studies, 42.6% of investigations into the effect of 
observation on the speed of complex tasks found a facilitatory effect (C. F. Bond & 
Titus, 1983). As argued in Chapter 6, this could have been because simple and 
complex tasks are poorly differentiated, but it could also simply mean that the 
inhibition of complex task speed from observation is unreliable, and is therefore a 
difficult effect to find. If that is the case, a facilitatory effect of observation on 
complex task performance is in accordance with the previous literature. 
Alternatively, the code might have been facilitated by observation because it acted as 
if it were a simple task in this experiment.  
One possible reason for this difference in the direction of the effect of observation on 
the code between Experiment 4 and Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment is that 
people’s skill level at typing, and familiarity with logging-in, might have increased 
considerably since 1986. Zajonc’s (1965) original distinction between facilitated and 
inhibited tasks was that the facilitated ones were well-learned. The code might have 
been a complex task previously, but typing might now be such a well-learned skill 






argued, tasks that are inhibited by observation should be difficult (e.g., Aiello and 
Svec, 1993), then the fact that the participants rated the code as only just above the 
midpoint on the difficulty rating indicates that the code was perhaps not an 
adequately complex task.  
The name, on the other hand, was confirmed as being well-learned and easy by the 
manipulation check questions. The facilitation of the speed of simple tasks is a 
reliable effect (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983). There are three potential explanations of 
the failure to replicate the facilitation of simple task speed. Firstly: a ceiling effect, as 
the name might have been so easy that it could not have been done any faster. 
Secondly, there might not have been enough of a difference between the proximate 
observation and alone conditions (limitations of the observation condition 
manipulation will be considered below). Lastly, the names might have been too 
short, despite participants using their full names, to show the social facilitation effect. 
Thus, if in Experiment 4 the name and code were both responding as if they were 
simple tasks, the code might have shown a facilitatory effect better because it was 
longer and more labile. As the code took a longer time overall, changes in the time 
taken due to observation were more apparent. Future investigations into social 
facilitation with typing tasks might benefit from using longer tasks.  
The second hypothesis asked whether proximate observation would have a social 
facilitation effect on the accuracy of the typing tasks. Specifically, it investigated 
whether observation would increase the accuracy of the name (simple task) and 
decrease the accuracy of the code (complex task). This was assessed by looking at 
the total number of errors made by the participants, both those corrected, and those 
that remained. There was no significant social facilitation effect found on task 
accuracy. When considering how task accuracy responds to observation, C.F. Bond 
and Titus (1983) found that simple task facilitation had low reliability. Therefore the 
failure of Experiment 4 to find an increase in the accuracy of typing the name might 






however, was the most reliable effect found, more reliable than either the facilitation 
of the speed of simple tasks or the inhibition of the speed of complex tasks (C. F. 
Bond & Titus, 1983). Proximate observation has previously been found to decrease 
complex task accuracy in anagram tasks (Aiello & Svec, 1993), and in learning word 
pairs (Berkey & Hoppe, 1972). Decreased complex task accuracy from observation 
was also found in a task that did not manifest a decrease in complex task speed 
(Stanton & Sarkar-Barney, 2003). It is possible that observation did not decrease the 
accuracy of typing the code in Experiment 4 because, as argued above, the code was 
inadequately complex.  
The third hypothesis asked whether observation would affect participants’ perception 
of how difficult the tasks were. Specifically, it asked whether observation would 
decrease the perceived difficulty of the name, and increase the perceived difficulty of 
the code. This hypothesis was not supported: There was no significant difference in 
perceived task difficulty between observation conditions. Perceived difficulty of a 
complex maths task was increased by observation in a previous experiment (Bradner 
& Mark, 2001). However, Bradner and Mark’s study also found a social facilitation 
effect: Observation impaired complex task performance. Thus Bradner and Mark’s 
findings were in accordance with each other. When observed, participants both 
experienced the complex tasks to be more difficult, and performed them as if they 
were more difficult. Experiment 4 failed to replicate the finding that observation 
alters the perceived difficulty of the tasks, but also failed to replicate the social 
facilitation effect. The findings from Experiment 4 are therefore also in accordance 
with each other; observation did not affect either task performance or the perception 
of task difficulty. The question of whether perceived difficulty routinely responds to 
observation should be investigated in further social facilitation studies, preferably 
ones that find a social facilitation effect.  
The last hypothesis asked whether observation would affect participants’ state 






state anxiety during the experiment than participants who were alone. There was no 
effect of proximate observation on state anxiety, with individual differences in 
neuroticism controlled for; this hypothesis was not supported. State anxiety in 
Experiment 4 was used as a self-report measure of participants’ arousal levels. There 
is little precedent for this in social facilitation research, but stress is a similar concept 
to state anxiety and was found to be affected by observation (Aiello & Kolb, 1995). 
The direction of the effect (whether stress was increased or decreased by 
observation) was mediated by participants’ locus of control (internal or external), and 
so the effect of observation on state anxiety might also be mediated by individual 
differences that were not considered in Experiment 4. The null effect of observation 
on state anxiety is in accordance with the null effect of observation on accuracy and 
perceived difficulty found so far in this experiment, all of which point to a lack of an 
effect from the observation manipulation. The discussion will now turn to possible 
reasons that observation did not appear to exert much influence in Experiment 4.  
To remind the reader, Experiment 4 aimed to replicate the proximate observation and 
alone influences on name and code task performance that showed a social facilitation 
effect in a previous study (Schmitt et al., 1986). The changes made after Experiment 
3, using full names in the typing tasks and a between-subjects design, meant that 
Experiment 4 was a close replication of Schmitt et al.’s study, albeit without a mere 
presence condition. Schmitt et al. found a significant main effect of complexity, and 
a significant interaction between task complexity and observation condition. 
Experiment 4 found significant main effects of complexity for task speed, accuracy, 
and perceived difficulty, but no interactions with observation. One possible reason 
for this is that observation did not exert enough influence, although there was a trend 
for observation to increase the speed of both tasks. One reason the observation 
condition manipulation in Experiment 4 might have been weak is the possible 
contamination of the alone condition. The experimenter, who was also the observer, 
was in the room with the alone participants until just before they typed their name 






Ayme, 2005), this may have been an insufficiently alone condition. Another possible 
reason is that participants realised the typing tasks were being monitored. In 
Experiment 4, 60% of the participants suspected the typing tasks of being part of the 
experiment, and six of them guessed that they were timed. Some (seven) of the 
participants said that their attention was drawn to the code because it was “weird”. 
Therefore, the performance measurement was not covert. Apart from the increased 
length, the difference between the codes in Experiments 4 and 3, in which 
participants did not suspect this was a task, was that they had to work the code out 
mentally, not copy it. The most likely reason that more participants suspected the 
code in Experiment 4 was because they had to work it out for themselves. In contrast, 
no participants even suspected the typing tasks in the original experiment with these 
tasks (Schmitt et al., 1986). It is important in creating a true alone condition that 
participants do not feel as though they are being monitored, evaluated or watched 
when alone (Markus, 1978). In Experiment 4 this criterion of a true alone condition 
was not fulfilled. Thus, the alone condition may have been compromised by 
evaluation apprehension. Evaluation apprehension can lead to the social facilitation 
effect (Henchy & Glass, 1968), meaning that the alone condition in Experiment 4 
was not the influence-free baseline it aimed to be. This may have lessened the 
difference between the observation conditions, and reduced the relative impact of 
proximate observation. 
Another possible reason that observation might not have exerted enough influence in 
Experiment 4 is the short duration of the observation period. Participants were only 
observed for around one minute. Although it is not known how long it takes for the 
effect of observation to start, nor how long the effect of observation lasts (Guerin, 
1993), it might be the case that such a short duration is not sufficient. In comparison, 
assuming that the participants in Schmitt et al.’s (1986) experiment were observed 
for the duration of the tasks, they were observed for between seven seconds and just 
over one minute. These are similar to, if not shorter than, the observation durations in 






observed before and after the typing tasks in Schmitt et al.’s experiment. If 
participants were observed before and after they would have been observed for 
longer. Likewise, the tasks in Markus’s (1978) experiment, which revealed a social 
facilitation effect, only took a minute or two, but the participant was left in their 
observation condition for 10 minutes (most of which was after completing the tasks). 
Longer durations have also been used: Aiello and Svec’s (1993) anagram tasks lasted 
10 minutes, and participants were in their observation conditions for this whole time. 
A social facilitation effect was also found on simple data entry tasks that took 15 
minutes (Aiello & Kolb, 1995). Stanton and Sarkar-Barney (2003) found a social 
facilitation effect in a complex database checking exercise that lasted 35 minutes, 
and the participants were in their observation conditions this whole time. Proximate 
observation also facilitated simple data entry in two sessions of 45 minutes each 
(Griffith, 1993). So a wide range of observation durations, most, but not all of which, 
were longer than in Experiment 4, have elicited a social facilitation effect. Future 
research could investigate how long a duration of observation is optimal, as too long 
an observation duration could possibly lead to extinction of the arousal-increasing 
response when the participants become accustomed to the observer (Wapner & 
Alper, 1952). Attempts to improve upon the design of this experiment should include 
a longer observation duration.  
In summary, Experiment 4 failed to find a social facilitation effect. The speed of 
typing the code was, unexpectedly, increased by proximate observation, indicating 
that it behaved as if it were a simple task, not a complex task as intended. We 
tentatively suggested that the code demonstrated a facilitatory effect, while the name 
did not, due to the longer length of the code task. The code, however, also 
compromised the covert nature of both typing tasks, and the “aloneness” of the alone 
condition, by attracting participants’ attention and leading them to suspect that these 
tasks were being timed. Therefore, this code is not a suitable complex task for future 
studies involving a remote observation condition. The failure to replicate the social 






finding was itself spurious or artefactual. Experiments 3 and 4 were the first 
replication attempts, and both found null results. The methodological problems in 
Experiment 3 should have been overcome by the changes in Experiment 4. In 
Experiment 4 the null findings might have been because the alone condition was 
compromised, and the duration of observation may have been too short. One final 
possible reason for the failure to replicate the social facilitation effect was the low 
power. Many participants’ data were excluded for typing the code differently, or to 
normalise the data. The between-subjects design also reduced the amount of data 
collected from each participant. Therefore, larger sample sizes might be needed.  
7.10. Conclusions 
The social facilitation effect of simple task facilitation and complex task inhibition 
on typing speed, typing accuracy, and perceived task difficulty was not found. There 
was also no effect of observation on state anxiety. There were trends towards 
observation facilitating the speed of both the simple and the complex tasks, but 
overall the effect of observation seemed weak, and increased observation durations 
might be required to elicit social facilitation effects. In future experimentation the 
code should be omitted, as it seems to behave as a simple task is expected to, and it 
compromised the alone condition. However, as the code showed some facilitatory 
effects, which might have been due to its longer length, longer typing tasks might 
better capture a social facilitation effect. However, as the typing tasks might be less 







8. Experiment 5: Psi-Mediated Social Facilitation from 
Remote Observation in Simple Task Performance 
8.1. Overview 
This chapter presents an empirical study, Experiment 5. This study aimed to further 
investigate whether there is a social facilitation effect from remote observation 
(observation that participants can only be aware of through psi). As in Experiment 3, 
we used three observation conditions: alone (physically alone and not observed, even 
covertly); remote observation; and proximate observation (observation from a 
physically present observer). We investigated the effect of remote observation and 
proximate observation with a new set of tasks. In Experiments 3 and 4, typing the 
code (intended to be a complex task) was actually marginally facilitated by 
proximate observation, as if it were a simple task, but typing the name (a simple task) 
was not. As previously argued, the code might have shown an effect from 
observation, while the name did not, because it was a longer task. Consequently, in 
Experiment 5, the typing task was modified to be an even longer simple task while 
still being covert. As the only effect from observation in Experiments 3 and 4 was 
facilitatory, the following study only used simple tasks, aiming to find a facilitatory 
effect from remote and proximate observation. The new tasks were a simple maths 
task, and a Stroop task, neither of which were covert. In prior literature, maths and 
Stroop tasks have shown social facilitation effects, and we review this below. In 
Experiment 5, we asked whether performance on these tasks was facilitated by 
remote and proximate observation compared to performance when participants were 
alone. The moderating effects of participants’ extraversion, neuroticism, state 








According to the PMIR model, people can respond to circumstances beyond the 
reach of their senses, similarly to the way they would respond if they had sensory 
knowledge of them (Stanford, 1990). In other words, through psi, people can respond 
to sensorially remote stimuli as if they had sensory contact with them. As reviewed 
in Chapter 6, when people are in the physical presence of an observer (proximate 
observation) they usually perform simple tasks better and more accurately compared 
to their performance when alone. Experiment 5 explored whether a similar simple 
task performance facilitation occurs when people are observed in such a way that 
they cannot have sensory knowledge that they are being observed (remote 
observation), and could only be affected by the observation via psi.  
To recapitulate briefly, in Experiments 3 and 4, name and code typing tasks were 
presented as if they were an incidental part of the experiment set-up. In other words, 
they were intended to be covert tasks. This manipulation was important in limiting 
participants’ evaluation apprehension. As noted in Chapter 6, evaluation 
apprehension is an influence with an effect similar to observation, which results from 
participants’ awareness or concern that their performance is being assessed (Henchy 
& Glass, 1968). Covert tasks are important in creating a true alone condition, in 
which participants are not only physically alone and unobserved, but do not feel 
monitored, observed, or evaluated (Markus, 1978). The typing tasks, especially in 
Experiment 4, were not successfully presented as covert tasks, predominantly 
because of the code task. It is difficult to create a covert task on which performance 
can be assessed. The typing tasks aimed to replicate the only successful covert task in 
the previous social facilitation literature (Schmitt et al., 1986), but failed to do so. 
Therefore, we decided to introduce other tasks in Experiment 5 that have shown 






In Experiment 5, we measured participants’ speed and accuracy in three different 
tasks. The first of these was a typing task. As observation had increased the speed at 
which participants in Experiments 3 and 4 typed the code, the longer of the two 
typing tasks in those studies, we used an even longer typing task in Experiment 5 to 
increase the chances of finding the social facilitation effect. Participants each typed 
their full name and email address, misinformed that this was an incidental part of the 
experiment set-up. This was the only task that aimed to be covert in Experiment 5. 
As it was a simple typing task, being both easy and well-practised, we predicted that 
observation would facilitate performance. 
The first new task that was introduced in Experiment 5 was a colour Stroop. In this 
section, we describe social facilitation effects previously found with the Stroop task, 
and, therefore, the effects remote observation might lead to. In a Stroop task 
participants name, or respond to, the ink colour that words or control stimuli are 
presented in. People are faster at naming, for example, the green colour of the ink for 
either control strings (e.g., +++) or the word GREEN written in green ink, than for 
the word RED written in green ink (Stroop, 1935). This is a robust effect called 
Stroop interference (Stroop, 1935). Interference is measured as the difference 
between the time taken to name the colour of the incongruent colour words (i.e., 
words written in a different colour ink to the colour word they spell) and the time 
taken to name the ink colour of the control items. Stroop interference occurs because 
the meaning of the word interferes with the naming of the ink colour, and this slows 
people’s responses to words written in incongruent colours (MacLeod, 1991). In the 
earliest research, the Stroop task was presented in a block design, with one card 
containing only incongruent colour words and another containing only control 
stimuli (Stroop, 1935). This design risks the potential disadvantage of anticipatory 
effects, as participants would expect the next item to be an incongruent colour word, 
if the last one was. With electronic presentation it is possible to intersperse control 






eliminates the possibility of anticipation effects. Modern research more often uses 
electronic presentation of stimuli. 
Stroop interference has responded to social influences in previous experiments. For 
instance, competition has been found to reduce Stroop interference (Dumas et al., 
2005; Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004; MacKinnon, Geiselman, & Woodward, 
1985). In MacKinnon et al.’s (1985) experiment, participants performed a Stroop 
task under one of two conditions; they were randomly assigned either to compete 
against each other in pairs for a prize, or to perform without competition. 
Competition reduced Stroop interference. In another study, Huguet et al. (2004) also 
compared participants’ performance alone, or in the presence of a competing 
confederate. In a third study, Dumas et al. (2005) measured participants’ 
performance alone, but directly following being in the presence of a competing 
confederate. The presence, or previous presence, of a competitor significantly 
reduced Stoop interference (Dumas et al., 2005; Huguet et al., 2004). In all of the 
above experiments, Stroop interference was reduced and participants’ reaction times 
to both the control and incongruent colour items were faster. In sum, these studies 
revealed a reduction in Stroop interference from competition, a social influence that 
has a similar influence to observation (Triplett, 1898) and, therefore, observation 
might similarly reduce Stroop interference.  
Huguet et al. (2004) and Dumas et al. (2005) attributed the reduced Stroop 
interference to changes in arousal. There is support for the idea that increased arousal 
reduces Stroop interference. For instance, Stroop interference was reduced by 
increased arousal from loud white noise (Booth & Sharma, 2009; Chajut & Algom, 
2003; O'Mally & Gallas, 1977; O'Mally & Poplawsky, 1971). Arousal induced by 
administering electric shocks, and threatening participants with higher voltage 
shocks, also decreased reaction times to control items and incongruent colour words 






A similar effect of reduced Stroop interference and decreased reaction times to both 
control and incongruent colour items was found in response to observation (Huguet 
et al., 1999; Klauer et al., 2008). Participants in both these experiments were first 
trained in responding to colour stimuli (blue, green, red, or yellow) by pressing 
buttons on a standard computer keyboard. Once trained, participants were timed 
responding to the colour of control items (strings of 3 or 4 ‘+’s or colour-neutral 
words, e.g., chair) and incongruent colour words. Participants in Klauer et al.’s 
(2008) experiment completed electronically presented Stroop tasks whilst either 
alone or proximately observed, within-subjects. Observation reduced the Stroop 
interference effect, especially when the control items were strings rather than neutral 
words (Klauer et al., 2008). Participants’ reaction times to all items were faster under 
proximate observation. Additionally, Huguet et al. (1999) compared two proximate 
observation conditions: an observer standing directly behind the participant, and an 
observer watching attentively from in front of the participant. Both proximate 
observation conditions were compared to a mere presence condition (the observer 
was reading) and to an alone condition. Both the proximate observation conditions 
reduced Stroop interference compared to the mere presence and alone conditions. 
Again, participants’ reaction times to all items were decreased by proximate 
observation. In sum, Stroop interference and reaction times have been reduced by 
competition, arousal, and proximate observation. Therefore, in Experiment 5, 
proximate observation is predicted to reduce Stroop interference while decreasing 
reaction times to both control and incongruent colour items. If remote observation 
has a similar effect to proximate observation, then it too would reduce Stroop 
interference.  
For the participants, the Stroop was overtly an experimental task. As it was 
completed on a computer, participants were likely to be aware that their responses 
were recorded. It was also presented as being the main task in Experiment 5; it was 






evaluation apprehension. This might, on the other hand, have conveyed the 
advantage of distracting suspicion away from the typing task.  
The other new task in Experiment 5 was multiplication. Maths tasks have manifested 
social facilitation effects in previous research. For instance, Grant and Dajee (2003) 
compared participants’ performance on a simple multiplication task when 
participants were either alone or proximately observed, between-subjects. 
Participants completed 45 multiplication questions, which were made up of 
combinations of the digits 0 - 10 (e.g., 2 x 10) on paper while timing themselves with 
a stopwatch. The alone participants were physically alone in the testing room. The 
observed participants were watched quietly by another participant who was also in 
the testing room. The observed participants completed the maths task significantly 
faster than the alone participants. Accuracy was not investigated. In another previous 
experiment complex maths task inhibition was found when comparing performance 
under proximate observation to performance alone (Zanbaka et al., 2007). 
Participants decided whether simple (e.g., 5+2=7) and complex (e.g., (6/3)+8-
(4x2)=3) equations were true or false, while alone or with proximate observation, 
within-subjects. Participants made significantly more errors and were significantly 
slower on the complex task under proximate observation compared to their 
performance alone. Zanbaka et al. noted that there was slight facilitation of the 
simple maths items, both in terms of speed and accuracy, and suggested this was 
non-significant due to ceiling effects, as the simple task was too easy. Considering 
these two experiments together, proximate observation has led to facilitation of 
simple maths task performance (Grant & Dajee, 2003) and inhibition of complex 
maths task performance (Zanbaka et al., 2007), demonstrating both aspects of the 
social facilitation effect.  
Further examples of social facilitation effects in maths tasks involved co-action 
influences (Dashiell, 1930; Fletcher, 1985). Children produced more accurate 






compared to their performance when alone (Fletcher, 1985). Dashiell (1930) also 
found that co-acting groups, even when working in individual rooms, were faster at 
simple multiplication tasks than participants who were alone. Thus, maths tasks 
appear to be influenced by observation and other social influences and can manifest 
the social facilitation effect. 
Experiment 5 used a simple maths task closely based on that used by Grant and 
Dajee (2003), although digits up to 12 were included in the multiplication problems 
to ensure that the task was not too easy and prone to ceiling effects. Observation was 
predicted to facilitate performance. Like the Stroop, the maths task was obviously an 
experimental task, and might therefore have provoked evaluation apprehension. To 
minimise this, we used a deception similar to that used by Huguet et al. (1999). 
Huguet et al. aimed to reduce evaluation apprehension in participants performing a 
Stroop, by telling them that due to technical problems they would not do the real 
task, but a different one (the Stroop), on a computer that was not yet programmed to 
record their responses. They did not report the success of this manipulation. In 
Experiment 5, we misinformed participants that the maths task on the computer had 
failed, and that they would do the task on paper, self-timed with a stopwatch, just so 
that they did a comparable procedure to the other participants. We hoped this would 
reduce evaluation apprehension.  
In addition to speed and accuracy of task performance, we measured participants’ 
perceived difficulty of the tasks. As reviewed in Chapter 7, it is possible that 
observation might make tasks seem easier or more difficult. This effect has been 
shown in complex tasks, which participants perceived to be more difficult when they 
were observed (Bradner & Mark, 2001). In Experiment 5, participants rated the 
perceived difficulty of the tasks on Likert scales. We predicted that the tasks would 






As reviewed in Chapter 6, the social facilitation effect is thought to be mediated by 
observation leading to an increase in the participants’ arousal (Moore & Baron, 
1983). State anxiety can be used as a self-report measure for arousal level (Mullen et 
al., 1997). In Experiment 5, participants rated their current state anxiety during the 
experiment. We predicted that observation would increase state anxiety.  
In Experiment 5, we measured personality characteristics and individual differences 
that can affect both task performance and how observation affects people’s task 
performance. These were: extraversion, neuroticism, belief in psi, gender, and age. 
As a conservative measure, the potential effects of these individual differences were 
controlled for when assessing whether a social facilitation effect was found, although 
no directional hypotheses were made. 
In summary, in Experiment 5 (below) participants typed their full names and email 
addresses once, misinformed that this was an incidental part of the experiment set-
up. They were not told that their typing was timed. Participants then completed a 
Stroop task on a computer, a task that presumably provoked evaluation apprehension. 
Participants then timed themselves completing a maths task on paper, with an 
evaluation apprehension reducing manipulation (participants were misinformed that 
this was not the real maths task). Throughout the whole experiment, participants 
were either alone, remotely observed, or proximately observed. Firstly, we asked 
whether the normal social facilitation effect was found, by investigating whether all 
the tasks were performed faster and more accurately by participants who were 
proximately observed, compared to participants who were alone. Secondly, we asked 
whether there had been a psi-mediated social facilitation effect by investigating 
whether all the tasks were performed faster and more accurately by participants who 
were remotely observed, compared to participants who were alone. The direction and 
magnitude of the remote observation effect were also compared to the effect of 
proximate observation. As a conservative measure we controlled for possible 






whether there was an effect of observation on state anxiety. Lastly, we investigated 
whether there was an effect of observation on perceived task difficulty.  
8.2.1. Hypotheses. 
1 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will type their 
name and email address faster than participants who are alone. We tentatively predict 
that proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. In 
other words, proximate observation and remote observation will both elicit the social 
facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker effect from remote observation. 
2 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will type their 
name and email address more accurately (i.e., make fewer errors) than participants 
who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate observation will have a greater 
effect than remote observation. In other words, proximate observation and remote 
observation will both elicit the social facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker 
effect from remote observation. 
3 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will 
demonstrate reduced Stroop interference compared to participants who are alone. We 
tentatively predict that proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote 
observation. In other words, proximate observation and remote observation will both 
elicit the social facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker effect from remote 
observation. 
4 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will make 
fewer errors on the Stroop task than participants who are alone. We tentatively 
predict that proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. 
In other words, proximate observation and remote observation will both elicit the 






5 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will complete 
the maths task faster than participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that 
proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. In other 
words, proximate observation and remote observation will both elicit the social 
facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker effect from remote observation. 
6 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will make 
fewer errors on the maths task than participants who are alone. We tentatively predict 
that proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. In 
other words, proximate observation and remote observation will both elicit the social 
facilitation effect, but we expect a weaker effect from remote observation. 
7 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will have 
higher state anxiety ratings than participants who are alone. We tentatively predict 
that proximate observation will have a greater effect than remote observation.   
8 Participants who are observed, either proximately or remotely, will rate the 
difficulty of the tasks (typing, Stroop, and maths) differently to the participants who 
are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate observation will have a greater effect 
in this than remote observation.   
8.3. Method 
8.3.1. Design. 
This experiment used a between-subjects design. The independent variable was 
observation condition (alone, remote, or proximate observation). 
8.3.2. Participants. 
One-hundred participants volunteered for a “Stroop Gobbledegook” experiment. The 






naïve to the purpose of the experiment. To maximise the chances of performance 
effects from observation, we recruited participants who were strangers to the 
observer and would perceive her to be an expert. This decision was based on 
previous research findings: Observers who are strangers or experts elicit a greater 
social facilitation effect (C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1993; F. G. Miller et al., 
1979). The observer should have appeared to be an expert by virtue of her position as 
experimenter. Additionally, she was older and further up the educational hierarchy 
than most of the participants, who were predominantly undergraduates, increasing 
her expert status.  
There is no previous research relating to the effect of social contact between the 
observer and participant prior to an experiment, nor whether affiliation between 
observer and participant would affect the social facilitation effect. However, to 
maintain the participants as strangers, we minimised contact between the 
experimenter and participants before the experiment. Sixty-five participants were 
recruited from the first year psychology student pool at the University of Edinburgh; 
they received course credit for participating. The students signed up online for 
experiments that were posted to the website, and most of them did not meet, or have 
any contact with, the experimenter prior to their arrival at the experimental room. 
There were few exceptions to this: Late students received a reminder by text, if they 
did not reply they also got a phone call, which very few of them answered. A few 
other participants e-mailed or texted in advance to ask for directions or to apologise 
for being late, and they all received a reply. Fourteen participants were recruited via 
other emailing lists, but had not met the experimenter prior to doing the experiment. 
A further 17 were recruited from one face-to-face contact before the experiment, but 
had no other previous contact with the experimenter. The remaining four participants 
were known to the experimenter, but only by sight.  
None of these participants could have known from their personal knowledge of her 






participants finding this out in other ways, the experimenter deliberately had a 
misleading entry on the Psychology Department’s website, which did not specify her 
true research interests. The experimenter did not discuss the purpose of the 
experiment with anyone other than her supervisors.  
The sample size was calculated in G Power (Buchner, Erdfelder, & Faul, 1997; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). With a one-way ANOVA the recommended 
sample size for power of .8 was around 100 participants. The effect sizes from 
Experiments 3 and 4 were used to calculate this.  
Experimenter and Observer. 
The author took the role of experimenter and observer.  
8.3.3. Ethical Considerations. 
We identified two potential ethical issues in this experimental design. There was 
deliberate deception of the participants regarding the overall aim of the experiment 
and the exact function of the experimental tasks, and covert observation via webcam 
images relayed to a computer terminal. As discussed in Chapter 7, we decided that 
giving participants the right to terminate the experiment at any time and a full debrief 
following the experiment would resolve these issues. The Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Edinburgh granted ethical approval for this 
experiment to proceed.  
8.3.4. Materials and Apparatus. 
Typing task. 
The program that timed the typing of each participant’s name and email was an 
adaptation of the name and code timing program written in Microsoft Excel for 






University of Edinburgh. It logged each keystroke with key down and key up times, 
accurate to the millisecond. Participants saw an input screen with two text boxes, one 
for their full name and one for their email address. There was no indication that 
typing speed was recorded. The program also made and presented a code on the 
screen which was made up of the first and third letters of the participant’s name, and 
a random four digit number (e.g., Sam’s code might be sm1576). This code was the 
participant’s identification for the other experimental tasks. 
Personality Questionnaires. 
Extraversion and neuroticism were measured on scales from the International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999). Each scale has 10 items, such as “I 
feel comfortable around people” for extraversion. Some of the items are negatively 
phrased, such as “I am not easily bothered by things” for neuroticism. Participants 
respond on a five-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly 
agree). Each personality scale is scored from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 50 
points. High scores indicate, for example, high extraversion. The IPIP measures the 
same five-factor personality constructs as the NEO PI-R (Goldberg, 1999), but is in 
the public domain, and is therefore free and editable. A bespoke version was 
constructed, omitting the scales for agreeableness and conscientiousness, saving 
experiment time. The full list of IPIP items are in Appendix 3.   
State anxiety was measured on a six-item state anxiety questionnaire (Marteau & 
Bekker, 1992). Participants rate items, for example “I am tense” on a four-point 
Likert scale anchored at 1 (not at all) and 4 (very much). State anxiety is scored from 
a minimum of six to a maximum of 24 points; high scores indicate high state anxiety. 
The full list of STAI questions are in Appendix 3. 
The final questionnaire was the Koestler Parapsychology Unit belief in psi 12-item 






anchored at 1 (no) and 7 (yes). Belief in psi is scored from a minimum of 12 to a 
maximum of 84; high scores indicate a high belief in psi.  
Stroop task. 
Five colours were selected for the Stroop: red, green, blue, yellow, and white. Red, 
green, blue, and yellow have been used in previous published Stroop research 
(Dumas et al., 2005; Huguet et al., 2004; Huguet et al., 1999; Klauer et al., 2008). 
White was included because it had been used in several recent student projects that 
manifested a Stroop interference effect (Vigentini, 2007). Three formats of Stroop 
stimuli were used in Experiment 5: example sheets, practice stimuli, and 
experimental stimuli. Example sheet 1 had five congruent colour items (e.g., RED 
written in red) and 3 strings (e.g., ++++). Example sheet 2 had seven incongruent 
colour words (e.g., RED written in yellow). Both sheets were A4 with the words in 
capitals in Arial size 72 font on a black background (Appendix 5).  
The practice stimuli consisted of JPEG images of coloured rectangles in the centre of 
a black screen. The coloured rectangles were the same height as capital letters in font 
size 72, and the same width as three-letter words. There were three presentation of 
each colour, making a total of 15 practice trials. 
The experimental stimuli comprised a total of 105 items: 60 incongruent colour 
words, 15 congruent colour words, and 30 control strings. The 60 incongruent colour 
items consisted of each colour word presented in all the other colours three times 
each (e.g., 3 x RED written in green, 3 x RED written in yellow, and so on). 
Congruent colour items were included because, in previous research, a higher 
proportion of congruent colour items increased Stroop interference (Kane & Engle, 
2003; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Pilot testing for Experiment 5 likewise revealed that 
if only incongruent colour words are used, people anticipate that a colour word will 
require a response other than the colour that the word spells; including congruent 






incongruent colour items to become too difficult for the participants, as we expected 
observation to facilitate this task, a low proportion (20%) of congruent colour items 
were included to ensure that a Stroop interference effect was found. The 15 
congruent colour items consisted of each colour word presented in the colour that the 
word spelled three times each. The congruent colour items were not used in the 
analysis of the Stroop interference. Strings of ‘+’ s were used as controls, because, in 
previous research, a greater interference effect was found between ‘++++’ and 
incongruent colour words than with colour-neutral words as controls (Klauer et al., 
2008). In previous research, strings of three to six ‘+’ s have been used (Booth & 
Sharma, 2009; Dumas et al., 2005; Huguet et al., 2004; Huguet et al., 1999; Klauer et 
al., 2008). The strings should be around the same length as the colour words, and in 
Experiment 5 we chose to use strings of four and six ‘+’.s The 30 control strings 
consisted of each string length presented in all the colours three times each. The 
stimuli were presented as JPEG images in Arial font size 72 on a black background. 
The order of presentation of the targets was randomised using a random sequence 
generated in STATA (StataCorp, 2003, Stata Statistical Software: Release 8). 
Adjacent exact colour and word duplicates were removed. These targets were 
inputted into a Stroop presentation and timing program (vCeleris) written by a 
computer programmer at the University of Edinburgh. One limitation of this program 
was that the order of stimulus presentation could not be individually randomised, and 
all participants saw the same stimuli in the same order.  
The answer keys were the buttons along the right side of a mini keyboard, (right 
arrow, End, PgDn, PgUp, Home). These were chosen because they were the most 
accessible keys, equally easy for left or right handed participants, because the 
orientation of a mini keyboard can be changed easily. The mini keyboard was 
connected by a USB cable to the computer, and so there was no delay in the 
registering of the timing of keystrokes, which is a risk with infra-red light remote 






white paper fixed to the keyboard. It is important not to label the answer buttons in 
colour, because this has been found to reverse the Stroop effect by participants 
bypassing verbal encoding and just looking at the colour of the word and the answer 
key (Durgin, 2000). The program recorded the time from the presentation of the 
target on the screen to the pressing of the answer button down with millisecond 
accuracy, and recorded which button was pressed. 
Maths task. 
The maths task was presented on paper. It was compiled by generating random 
integers from zero to twelve using STATA. These were then put together as 50 
simple multiplication questions (e.g. 3x5 =__) (Appendix 2). Adjacent duplicate 
questions were removed. An ATECH SW210 stopwatch, accurate to centiseconds, 
was provided along with a clipboard and pen.   
8.3.5. Procedure. 
Randomisation of observation conditions. 
The experimenter prepared a randomised, counterbalanced schedule of observation 
conditions prior to experimentation commencing. The order of the observation 
conditions was generated by a random function in STATA, manipulated so that over 
102 trials each observation condition (alone, remote observation, or proximate 
observation) would be used 34 times. Two lists of observation conditions were 
created by the STATA program. Sheet 1 was a list of trial numbers (1 – 102) and the 
words IN or OUT (meaning inside or outside the experimental room) for each trial. If 
the observation condition was proximate observation Sheet 1 said “IN”, and if it was 
remote observation or alone it said “OUT”. Sheet 2 was a list of the trial number and 
the observation conditions (alone, remote observation, or proximate observation) for 
each trial. Once this sheet was created, the experimenter instantly put it inside an 






leaving participants who would be remotely observed or alone in the experimental 
room. When she checked the observation condition for each trial on Sheet 2, the 
experimenter used a method of occluding all subsequent trials. The experimenter was 
thus blind to the future observation conditions on Sheet 2. This blind was set up to 
prevent any inadvertent differences in the way that the experimenter treated 
participants between the alone and remote observation conditions. 
Session procedure. 
The experimental and observation rooms were two cubicles within the experimental 
laboratory in the basement of the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Edinburgh. The observation and experimental rooms were separated by a corridor 
and two doors (see Figure 8) reducing the risk of accidental noise cueing, but not 
eliminating it entirely, as the rooms were not soundproofed. The experimental room 
had no windows, and so the layout of the room should not have made participants 







The position of the observer in proximate observation is shown by the star. 
The position of the observer in remote observation is denoted by ‘Observer’. 
The participants’ room is denoted by ‘P’. 
The arrows represent windows. 
Figure 8: Map of the Experimental Suite for Experiment 5 (not to scale) 
 
Participants were tested individually. Prior to the participants’ arrival, the 
experimenter checked Sheet 1. Participants were assigned to the next line in the 






experimental room, ensuring that the participant’s instruction sheets matched the 
observation condition. The instructions for participants who would be physically 
alone stipulated “When you have finished go and get the experimenter” at the end. 
This was the only difference in the instructions. 
There were two PCs (Vision Master Pro 413) on either side of the testing desk, the 
Sony VIAO Laptop computer was placed between them. This laptop had a screen 
size of 23cm high by 30.5cm wide, the screen resolution was set to 1024 x 768 
pixels. The Logitech Quickcam Messenger Webcam was hidden inside a lever arch 
folder, positioned so that the lens looked out through the small hole in the folder’s 
spine. The lens aperture and the hole were the same size (2.5cm), so the view from 
the camera was not occluded by the folder. Only one participant saw the camera, and 
she was not allowed to take part in the experiment. The folder was placed on top of 
the PC on the right side of the testing desk. The monitor attached to this PC was 
switched off throughout the experiment, and it was not used for any other purpose. 
Remote observation was enabled through the video call function of Windows Live 
Messenger (Microsoft Corporation, 2009). To activate the video link, a video call 
was made from the computer in the experimental room. The image of the participant 
could only be seen after the call was answered from the observation computer in the 
observation room. The experimenter made the video call before the participant 
arrived, irrespective of the observation condition.  
The experimenter greeted the participants in the waiting area, or, occasionally (if 
testing after hours when the door to the building was closed) by the door to the 
psychology building. Each participant was shown into the experimental room in the 
laboratory, and sat in front of the Laptop, about 60cm from the screen. The 
experimenter explained the procedure for all the tasks verbally, and gave the 
participant a printed list of the tasks. As a Stroop practice, the participant read out 
loud the colour of six congruent colour words, seven incongruent colour words and 






blindness (one participant was eliminated from the Stroop task), and ensured that all 
of the participants understood the task. The experimenter apologised that the 
software for the maths task was not working, and asked the participants if they did 
not mind completing it on paper and timing it themselves, just so that they completed 
the same tasks as the others (the implication and deception being that the others had 
completed it on the computer, and that the paper task was not assessed). Participants 
practiced using the stopwatch. After an opportunity to ask questions, participants 
signed a standard consent form. This explained that they could terminate the 
experiment at any time (no participants chose to). 
Once the participant was ready to start, the experimenter either left the room or 
remained to observe according to Sheet 1. If the experimenter left the experimental 
room, she then checked Sheet 2 for the current trial only. In the proximate 
observation condition, the experimenter remained in the experimental room 
throughout the entire experiment, without leaving, clearly watching the participant. 
She stood diagonally behind the participant to the right, with a clear view of the 
participant, and the task he or she was doing. In the remote observation condition, the 
experimenter accepted the video call from the observation room. She could see an 
image of the participant from the right, from a similar distance and angle to where 
she stood in the proximate observation condition. She watched the image of the 
participant with her full attention, until just before the participant came to get her, 
when she minimised the image window so that the participants would not see that 
they had been observed. In both observation conditions (proximate and remote) she 
mentally rehearsed “I am watching you. You are being watched.” to block out other 
thoughts. In the alone condition the experimenter declined the video call, occupied 
her attention with matters unrelated to the experiment, and remained in the 
observation room. No other people entered the experimental room. 
Participants did the typing task first. They were prompted by instructions on the 






note of the code that would be displayed onscreen. The rationale for the code was to 
protect the participant’s identity when doing the online personality questionnaires. 
The rationale for typing their name and email was so that the experimenter knew 
who was identified by each code. (Both these reasons were true.)  
Participants next completed the personality questionnaires and the STAI on the 
experimental PC (the PC on the left on the testing desk) in Lime Survey, an online 
survey host (Lime Survey, 2005). They used their experimental code to identify 
themselves. They then completed the Stroop task on the Laptop using the mini 
keyboard to enter their responses. Participants first entered their experimental code 
and read an onscreen reminder of the Stroop instructions, which emphasised speed 
and accuracy. Participants then completed the 15 practice trials. Then a screen 
appeared that said “That concludes the practice. Press any colour key to continue. 
The experiment will start at once.” Participants then completed the 105 experimental 
Stroop trials. Each trial was preceded by a 500-millisecond presentation of a white 
fixation spot in the centre of a black screen, then the Stroop stimulus appeared. This 
remained on the screen until a valid response key was pressed, when the fixation spot 
re-appeared.  
Participants then went on to the maths task. This was presented in an envelope, with 
instructions on the outside reiterating that the paper version was a substitute for a 
computer-based task that was broken. This was contrived to look like a last minute 
arrangement. Participants removed the maths task from the envelope and timed 
themselves with the stopwatch as they completed it. They wrote their answers onto 
the paper, and noted the time taken at the end. 
At this point, participants who had been physically alone in the room came to get the 
experimenter, and they returned to the experimental room together. The participants 






4). Participants then did the post-experiment questionnaire online in Lime Survey on 
the experimental PC. This included the following manipulation check questions: 
1 “Were you aware of being observed (looked at by a person) during the 
experiment?” 
2 “At the time of typing your name and email did you suspect that it might be 
an experimental task?” 
3 Participants were asked to rate the difficulty of each of the experimental tasks 
individually on a seven-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (extremely easy) and 7 
(extremely difficult). 
4 Participants were asked to rate their familiarity with each of the experimental 
tasks individually on a seven-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (never done before) 
and 7 (do it all the time). 
The post-experiment questionnaire included the belief in psi scale, which was 
presented last to avoid indicating to participants that the experiment had anything to 
do with parapsychology while the experiment was still underway. Although these 
final questions were not an experimental task, the observation condition was kept 
constant. If the participant was being proximately observed, the experimenter stayed 
in the room and marked the maths task. If the participant was being remotely 
observed, the experimenter returned to the viewing cubicle and marked the maths 
task with intermittent glances at the participant’s image. If the participant was alone, 
the experimenter returned to the observation room without the maths task and kept 
her attention away from the experiment. The whole experiment took around 45 
minutes per participant.  
Once the participant had finished, he or she was thanked and shown out of the 






results were analysed did they receive emailed feedback debriefing them about the 
experiment. 
8.3.6. Analyses. 
Analyses were carried out in SPSS version 14 and Microsoft Excel. 
8.4. Results 
Manipulation check 1: Did more participants who were observed 
(proximately or remotely) report feeling observed than 
participants who were alone? 
Participants were asked “Were you aware of being observed (looked at by a person) 
during the experiment?” and answered yes or no. Their responses are displayed in 
Table 29. 
Table 29: Frequencies of Participants who did or did not feel Observed 
by Observation Condition 
Observation Condition 
Felt observed? Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
Yes 1 2 31 
No 32 31 3 
Note. With a total of 100 participants the cell counts are the percentage values. 
A visual inspection of the data in Table 29 indicates a clear difference in the number 
of participants who answered that they felt observed between the observation 
conditions; a greater number of proximately observed participants felt observed. The 
difference in the frequencies of yes and no responses between the observation 
conditions was assessed by χ
2
 analyses. The difference is significant: χ
2
 (2) = 75.12, 
p < .01 with a large associated effect size, Cramer’s V = .87. This difference is only 
significant between proximate observation and the two physically alone conditions. 
The difference between alone and remote is non-significant: χ
2






an associated effect size, Cramer’s V = .07. Therefore, no more remotely observed 
participants felt observed than did alone participants, but most proximately observed 
participants did feel observed. If awareness of the feeling of being observed is crucial 
to performance effects from observation, we would expect that a social facilitation 
effect might manifest between proximate observation and the two physically alone 
conditions in Experiment 5, but not between remote observation and alone. 
Manipulation check 2: Did participants suspect that typing the 
name and email address was an experimental task? 
Participants were asked “At the time of typing your name and email did you suspect 
that it might be an experimental task?” and answered yes or no. Forty participants 
(40%) reported suspecting that typing the name and email address was an 
experimental task. This task was therefore not successfully presented as an incidental 
part of the experiment set-up. The participants who suspected it might have 
experienced evaluation apprehension in the alone condition, meaning that a true 
alone condition was not achieved, lessening the expected difference between the 
observation conditions and the alone condition. 
Manipulation check 3: Were the tasks simple? 
Participants rated the difficulty of each experimental task on a seven-point Likert 
scale anchored at 1 (extremely easy) and 7 (extremely difficult) and their familiarity 
with each task on a scale anchored at 1 (never done before) and 7 (do it all the time). 
The mean ratings are shown in Table 30.  
Table 30: Task Difficulty and Familiarity, from seven-point Likert Scales 
Task 
  Typing Stroop Control Stroop Incongruent Maths  
Mean Difficulty 1.28 2.49 4.29 3.56 
Mean Familiarity 6.66 2.31 2.43 4.24 






If a task is simple it should have low difficulty scores and/or high familiarity scores. 
Table 30 shows that participants found the typing very easy and were familiar with it. 
Both the Stroop tasks were unfamiliar, with the incongruent colour items rated as 
more difficult than the controls. The incongruent colour items were not rated as very 
difficult, however; they are at the midpoint of the scale. The maths task was around 
the midpoint for both familiarity and difficulty. The tasks were all easy, familiar, or 
in the middle of the scales and so are simple tasks. Therefore, if social facilitation 
effects manifest in Experiment 5, we would expect task facilitation from observation. 
Hypothesis 1: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will type their name and email address faster than 
participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate 
observation will have a greater effect than remote observation.  
Typing speed was measured as the mean inter-stroke interval of each participant’s 
name and email address combined. There were two extreme outliers in these data, 
both from participants who reported during the experiment that they were unfamiliar 
with typing. These data were removed. Table 31 shows the mean typing speed by 
observation condition.  
Table 31: Tome taken to Type in milliseconds by Observation Condition 
Observation Condition 
Typing speed Alone N=32 Remote N=33 Proximate N=33 
M (SD) 357.28 (122.59) 370.91 (136.35) 324.01 (91.01) 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, 
namely performance facilitation from proximate observation. A one-way ANOVA 
was calculated with typing speed as the dependent variable. The independent 
variable was observation condition (proximate observation or alone), between-






1.52, p = .22, η
2
 = 0.02, observed power = .23. This could have been assessed by an 
independent t test, but an F test was used to maintain consistency with the other 
analyses.  
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on 
performance. A one-way ANOVA was calculated with typing speed as the dependent 
variable. The independent variable was observation condition (proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The difference in 
typing speed between the three observation conditions was non-significant: F (2,95) 
= 1.35, p = .26, η
2
 = 0.03, observed power = .29. This hypothesis was not supported; 
neither a normal nor a psi-mediated social facilitation effect was found. 
The non-significant results for Hypothesis 1 might have been due to confounding 
personality variables, such as extraversion and neuroticism, or to other individual 
differences, such as age, gender, and belief in psi. In order to increase the sensitivity 
of the analysis, the personality and individual differences variables that might have 
introduced variance were controlled for. Participants’ responses to the personality 
questionnaires are summarised in Table 32. 
Table 32: Descriptive Statistics for the Personality Variables 
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Extraversion 100 35.71 5.92 18 48 
Neuroticism 100 25.47 6.03 12 42 
Belief in psi 98 35.72 16.88 12 81 
Note. Two participants refused to answer the belief in psi questionnaire because of strong 
feelings against parapsychology. 
In order to rule out multicollinearity, the inter-correlations between all these 
variables were assessed by two-tailed Pearson correlation coefficients. A coefficient 
of over .8 indicates problematic multicollinearity (Field, 2005). If two variables 
correlate over .8 they should be amalgamated, or one of them should be dropped. All 






Table 33: Individual Differences Correlation Coefficients 
Variable   Neuroticism Belief in psi Gender Age 
Extraversion N = 100 -.38** .35** -0.07 -.30** 
Neuroticism N = 100  -.14 -.16 .18 
Belief in psi N = 98   -.15 .04 
Gender N = 100       .05 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
The covariates were entered into an ANCOVA (general linear model) with typing 
speed as the dependent variable. The independent variable was observation condition 
(proximate observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The results 
are reported in Table 34. 
Table 34: Main effects and Interactions of Individual Difference 
Covariates on time taken to Type 
Main Effects from Variables df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 2 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.52 
Extraversion 1 4.67* 0.06 0.03 0.57 
Neuroticism 1 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.05 
Belief in psi 1 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.06 
Gender 1 0.16 0.00 0.67 0.07 
Age 1 0.11 0.00 0.74 0.06 
Error 79 (14185.56)    
Interactions     
Extraversion x Observation 2 0.13 0.00 0.88 0.07 
Neuroticism x Observation 2 0.07 0.00 0.94 0.06 
Belief in psi x Observation 2 0.75 0.02 0.48 0.17 
Gender x Observation 2 2.16 0.05 0.12 0.43 
Age x Observation 2 0.00 0.00 >0.99 0.05 
Note. N = 93. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The figures in the top half of Table 34 denote the main effects. The main effects of 






variable, with the effects of the covariates controlled for. The main effect of 
observation is non-significant. Controlling for the variance attributable to the 
personality and individual differences measures did not render this main effect 
significant, and so the non-significant results of the ANOVA above were not due to 
confounding variables. 
The main effects of the covariates (in the top half of the table) show the amount of 
the variance in the dependent variable, typing speed, that each individual difference 
covariate explains. Partial ŋ
2 
gives the effect size for that variable, not influenced by 
the effect of other variables included in the analysis. Extraversion had a significant 
association with typing speed, but, as noted above, even when extraversion was 
controlled for the effect of observation was non-significant. Neuroticism, belief in 
psi, gender, and age had non-significant main effects on typing speed. The second 
half of the table displays the interactions for each of these covariates and 
observation; lower order interactions were included in the model. None of these 
interactions were significant: None of the individual differences variables had any 
significant interaction with observation. The interaction between extraversion and 
observation was non-significant, showing that although extraversion had an 
association with typing speed, it did not interact with the social facilitation effect. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will type their name and email address more 
accurately (i.e., make fewer errors) than participants who are 
alone. We tentatively predict that proximate observation will 
have a greater effect than remote observation.  
Errors were counted as both errors made and then corrected, and errors that remained 
in the participants’ names and email addresses. Correct versions of the participants’ 
email addresses were found via the online system that the students used to sign up for 






their email addresses. The descriptive statistics for the errors in the typing task are 
displayed in Table 35.  
Table 35: Error counts in the Typing Task by Observation Condition 
Observation Condition 
Number of errors Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
M (SD) 1.15 (0.28) 0.85 (0.19) 0.94 (0.25) 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, 
namely performance facilitation from proximate observation. We used a non-
parametric test because the data in Table 35 were not normally distributed. The 
Mann-Whitney U test is the non-parametric equivalent of an independent t test or 
one-by-two ANOVA (Field, 2005). This showed that there was a non-significant 
difference in the error rates: U = 494.50, p =.37 (two-tailed).   
Secondly, we checked the effect of all the observation conditions on performance. 
We used a Kruskal-Wallis test, the non-parametric equivalent of a one-way 
independent ANOVA (Field, 2005). The difference in the frequency of participants 
with errors between observation condition was non-significant: H (2) = .94, p = .63. 
This hypothesis was not supported; neither a psi-mediated nor a normal social 
facilitation effect was found. As the data for typing errors was not normally 







Hypothesis 3: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will demonstrate reduced Stroop interference 
compared to participants who are alone. We tentatively predict 
that proximate observation will have a greater effect than 
remote observation. 
Participants’ reaction times in response to each item were recorded, and the mean 
reaction times for the incongruent colour items and the control items were calculated. 
Stroop interference was calculated as the mean incongruent colour item reaction time 
minus the mean control reaction time for each participant.  
Exploratory data analysis revealed there were two participants with high outlying 
error scores. One had made many mistakes of answering with the colour that the 
word spelled, but otherwise completed the task correctly. It appeared that she had 
understood the task, but found it very difficult; her data were retained. The other high 
error scorer had done the task about 10 times faster than the norm and the errors 
seemed indiscriminate. We concluded that this participant had just pressed random 
buttons as fast as possible; his data were excluded. One participant did not attempt 
the Stroop due to colour blindness. Due to a technical error, the data for three 
participants were lost. Data for 95 participants were retained for analysis. One of 
these remaining data points was a very slow outlier on the Stroop. This was recoded 
to the mean (of all the other participants) plus two standard deviations (Field, 2005). 
The descriptive statistics of the analysis dataset are presented in Table 36. 
Table 36: Reaction Times and Stroop Interference in milliseconds by 
Observation Condition and Item Type 
Observation Condition 
Mean time (SD) Alone N=32 Remote N=32 Proximate N=31 
Incongruent items 1,357 (253) 1,297 (248) 1,245 (174) 
Control items 1,223 (246) 1,170 (212) 1,148 (198) 







A visual inspection of the data in Table 36 reveals that the reaction times for the 
control and incongruent colour items and the Stroop interference decrease from alone 
to remote observation, and again from remote observation to proximate observation. 
A Stroop interference effect was found: Participants responded faster to the control 
items (M = 1,180, SD = 220) than to the incongruent colour items (M = 1,300, SD = 
231), t(94) = 10.54, p < .01 (two-tailed). 
To test Hypothesis 3, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, 
namely a reduction in Stroop interference in the proximate observation condition. A 
one-way ANOVA was calculated with Stroop interference as the dependent variable. 
The independent variable was observation condition (proximate observation or 
alone), between-subjects. The Welch correction for non-homogeneity of variances 
was applied. There was no significant effect of observation on typing speed: F 
(1,56.25) = 2.45, p = .12, η
2
 = 0.04, observed power = .34. This could have been 
assessed by independent t test, but F was used to maintain consistency with the other 
analyses.  
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on 
performance. A one-way ANOVA was calculated with Stroop interference as the 
dependent variable. The independent variable was observation condition (proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The Welch correction 
for non-homogeneity of variances was applied. The difference in Stroop interference 
between the three observation conditions was non-significant: F (2,60) = 1.38, p = 
.26, η
2
 = 0.03, observed power = .30. This hypothesis was not supported; neither a 
normal nor a psi-mediated social facilitation effect was found. 
The non-significant results for Hypothesis 3 might have been due to confounding 
personality variables, such as extraversion and neuroticism, or to individual 
differences, such as belief in psi, gender, and age. In order to increase the sensitivity 






introduced variance were controlled for. The covariates (see Table 33) were entered 
into an ANCOVA (general linear model) with Stroop interference as the dependent 
variable. The independent variable was observation condition (proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The results are 
reported in Table 37. 
Table 37: Main Effects and Interactions of Individual Difference 
covariates on Stroop Interference 
Main Effects from Variables df F Partial ŋ
2
 P Power 
Observation 2 0.60 0.16 0.55 0.15 
Extraversion 1 0.18 0.00 0.89 0.05 
Neuroticism 1 0.39 0.00 0.84 0.05 
Belief in psi 1 0.25 0.00 0.62 0.08 
Gender 1 0.24 0.00 0.62 0.07 
Age 1 2.35 0.03 0.13 0.33 
Error 75 (0.05)    
Interactions     
Extraversion x Observation 2 1.02 0.03 0.37 0.22 
Neuroticism x Observation 2 0.88 0.00 0.92 0.06 
Belief in psi x Observation 2 1.03 0.03 0.36 0.22 
Gender x Observation 2 0.37 0.01 0.69 0.11 
Age x Observation 2 1.37 0.04 0.26 0.29 
Note. N = 93. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The figures in the top half of Table 37 denote the main effects. The main effects of 
observation in Table 37 report only the variance that is uniquely attributable to each 
variable, with the effects of the covariates controlled for. The main effect of 
observation is non-significant. Controlling for the variance attributable to the 
personality and individual differences measures did not render this main effect 
significant, and so the non-significant results of the ANOVA in Hypothesis 3 were 






The main effects of the covariates (in the top half of the table) show the amount of 
the variance in the dependent variable, Stroop interference, that each individual 
difference covariate explains. Partial ŋ
2 
gives the effect size for that variable, not 
influenced by the effect of other variables included in the analysis. None of the 
individual differences variables had a significant main effect on typing speed. The 
second half of the table displays the interactions between each of the covariates and 
observation; lower order interactions were included in the model. None of these 
interactions are significant; none of the individual differences variables had any 
significant interaction with observation.  
Hypothesis 4: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will make fewer errors on the Stroop task than 
participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate 
observation will have a greater effect than remote observation.  
An error in the Stroop task was defined as responding with any response key other 
than the one corresponding to the colour of the stimulus, and errors were summed for 
the control and incongruent colour items combined. The same five participants’ data 
were omitted as in the analysis for Hypothesis 3, above. The descriptive statistics for 
the error data is displayed in Table 38. 
Table 38: Means and standard deviations of errors in the Stroop task by 
observation condition 
Observation Condition 
Number of errors Alone N=32 Remote N=32 Proximate N=31 
M (SD) 4.06 (1.17) 3.13 (0.33) 2.26 (0.24) 
Note. N = 95. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, 
namely performance facilitation from proximate observation. A Mann-Whitney U 






showed that there was a non-significant difference in the error rates: U = 450.50, p 
=.52 (two-tailed).   
Secondly, we checked the effect of all the observation conditions on performance. 
The difference in the number of errors between the observation conditions was 
assessed by a Kruskal-Wallis test. There was no significant effect from observation: 
H (2) = 4.29, p = .12. This hypothesis was not supported; neither a psi-mediated nor 
a normal social facilitation effect was found. As the data for Stroop errors was not 
normally distributed, further investigations with the individual differences variables 
were not made. 
Hypothesis 5: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will complete the maths task faster than 
participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate 
observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. 
The total time taken to complete the maths task was timed by the participants. The 
descriptive statistics for the time taken to complete the maths task are displayed in 
Table 39.  
Table 39: Time in seconds to complete the Maths Task by Observation 
Condition 
Observation Condition 
Maths task time Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
M (SD) 184.13 (91.49) 230.40 (137.49) 176.78 (76.45) 
 
To test Hypothesis 5, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, 
namely performance facilitation from proximate observation. A one-way ANOVA 
was calculated with time taken to complete the maths task as the dependent variable. 
The independent variable was observation condition (proximate observation or 
alone), between-subjects. There was no significant effect of observation on the time 
taken to complete the maths task: F (1,65) = 0.13, p = .72, η
2






= .06. This could have been assessed by an independent t test, but an F test was used 
to maintain consistency with the other analyses.  
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on 
performance. A one-way ANOVA was calculated with time taken to complete the 
maths task as the dependent variable. The independent variable was observation 
condition (proximate observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. 
The Welch correction for non-homogeneity of variances was applied. There was no 
significant effect of observation conditions on times: F (2,61.45) = 1.94,  p= .15 η
2
 = 
0.05, observed power = .50. This hypothesis was not supported; neither a normal nor 
a psi-mediated social facilitation effect was found. 
The non-significant results for Hypothesis 5 might have been due to confounding 
personality variables, such as extraversion and neuroticism, or other individual 
differences, such as belief in psi, gender, and age. In order to increase the sensitivity 
of the analysis, the personality and individual differences variables that might have 
introduced variance were controlled for. The covariates (see Table 33) were entered 
into an ANCOVA (general linear model) with time taken to complete the maths task 
as the dependent variable. The independent variable was observation condition 
(proximate observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The results 







Table 40: Main Effects and Interactions of Individual Difference 
covariates on the time taken to complete the Maths Task 
Main Effects from Variables df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 2 0.19 0.00 0.98 0.53 
Extraversion 1 0.06 0.00 0.81 0.57 
Neuroticism 1 0.11 0.00 0.75 0.06 
Belief in psi 1 0.80 0.10 0.38 0.14 
Gender 1 2.39 0.03 0.13 0.33 
Age 1 0.05 0.00 0.82 0.06 
Error 80 (10728.47)    
Interactions     
Extraversion x Observation 2 1.39 0.03 0.26 0.29 
Neuroticism x Observation 2 1.32 0.03 0.27 0.28 
Belief in psi x Observation 2 1.48 0.03 0.23 0.31 
Gender x Observation 2 0.26 0.07 0.77 0.09 
Age x Observation 2 1.15 0.03 0.32 0.25 
Note. N = 98. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The figures in the top half of Table 40 denote the main effects. The main effects of 
observation in Table 40 report only the variance that is uniquely attributable to each 
variable, with the effects of the covariates controlled for. The main effect of 
observation is non-significant. Controlling for the variance attributable to the 
personality and individual differences measures did not render this main effect 
significant, and so the non-significant results of the ANOVA in Hypothesis 5 were 
not due to confounding variables. 
The main effects of the covariates (in the top half of the table) show the amount of 
the variance in the dependent variable, the time taken to complete the maths task, 
that each individual difference covariate explains. Partial ŋ
2 
gives the effect size for 
that variable, not influenced by the effect of other variables included in the analysis. 






task speed. The second half of the table displays the interactions for each of these 
covariates and observation; lower order interactions were included in the model. 
None of these interactions are significant; none of the individual differences 
variables had any significant interaction with observation. 
Hypothesis 6: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will make fewer errors on the maths task than 
participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate 
observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. 
Errors were counted as both errors that remained, and errors that participants had 
corrected. Table 41 displays the mean error rate on the maths task by observation 
condition. 
Table 41: Errors in the Maths task by Observation Condition 
 Observation Condition 
Number of errors Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
M (SD) 1.82 (0.36) 2.30 (0.56) 3.62 (0.97) 
 
To test Hypothesis 6, we first checked for the normal social facilitation effect, of 
performance facilitation from proximate observation. As these data were not 
normally distributed, a Mann-Whitney U test was run. This showed that there was a 
non-significant difference in the error rates: U = 473.00, p =.26 (two-tailed).   
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on 
performance. The difference in the error rates between observation conditions was 
assessed by a Kruskal-Wallis test, and was found to be non-significant: H (2) = 1.60, 
p = .45. Observation did not significantly influence the accuracy of the maths task. 
This hypothesis was not supported; neither a normal nor a psi-mediated social 
facilitation effect was found. As the maths error data was not normally distributed, 






Hypothesis 7: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will have higher state anxiety ratings than 
participants who are alone. We tentatively predict that proximate 
observation will have a greater effect than remote observation. 
Participants self-rated their state anxiety levels on a short form of the STAI. The 
descriptive statistics for state anxiety scores are displayed in Table 42. 
Table 42: State Anxiety by Observation Condition 
Observation Condition 
 Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
M (SD))  9.97 (2.78) 10.94 (2.88) 9.59 (2.30) 
  
To test Hypothesis 7, we first checked whether there was a difference in state anxiety 
ratings between participants in the proximate observation and alone conditions. A 
one-way ANOVA was calculated with state anxiety as the dependent variable. The 
independent variable was observation condition (proximate observation or alone), 
between-subjects. There was no significant effect of observation on state anxiety 
scores: F (1,65) = 0.38, p = .54, η
2
 < 0.01, observed power = .09.  
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on state 
anxiety. A one-way ANOVA was calculated with state anxiety as the dependent 
variable. The independent variable was observation condition (proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone), between-subjects. The difference in state 
anxiety between the three observation conditions was non-significant: F (2,97) = 
2.28, p= .11 η
2
 = 0.05, observed power = .45. This hypothesis was not supported. 
As Experiment 5 used a between-subjects design, there might have been differences 
in participants’ neuroticism levels. This would affect participants’ propensity to 
become state anxious. The effect of observation could be masked by an effect from 






ANCOVA with observation (proximate observation, remote observation or alone) 
between-subjects, and state anxiety scores as the dependent variable.  
Table 43: ANCOVA of Observation on State Anxiety, corrected for 
Neuroticism 
Variable  df F Partial ŋ
2
 p Power 
Observation 2 1.28 .03 .28 .27 
Neuroticism (covariate) 1 16.76** .15 <.01 .98 
Error 96 (6.10)    
Note. N = 100. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
The results in Table 43 indicate that there was no significant main effect of 
observation condition on state anxiety, when corrected for neuroticism. Neuroticism 
significantly predicted the state anxiety scores. This hypothesis was not supported.  
Hypothesis 5: Participants who are observed, either proximately 
or remotely, will rate the difficulty of the tasks (typing, Stroop, 
and maths) differently to the participants who are alone. We 
tentatively predict that proximate observation will have a greater 
effect in this than remote observation. 
Participants rated all the tasks on seven-point Likert scales anchored at 1 (extremely 
easy) and 7 (extremely difficult). Table 44 displays the descriptive statistics for task 







Table 44: Mean Perceived Task Difficulty by Task and Observation 
Condition 
Observation Condition 
Task Alone N=33 Remote N=33 Proximate N=34 
Typing  1.27 1.12 1.44 
Control items 2.45 2.67 2.35 
Incongruent items 4.21 4.42 4.24 
Maths 3.15 3.67 3.85 
 
To test Hypothesis 7, we first checked whether there was a difference in the 
perceived difficulty ratings between participants in the proximate observation and 
alone conditions. A Mann-Whitney U test was run on the typing data, which were 
highly skewed. One-way ANOVAs with observation condition (proximate 
observation or alone) as the independent variable, between-subjects, were run on the 
Stroop and maths task data. There were no significant differences in task difficulty 
by observation condition: typing: U = 487.00, p =.23 (two-tailed); control items: F 
(1,65) = .12, p=.73 η
2
 = 0.01, observed power = .63; incongruent colour items: F (1, 
65) = .01, p=.95 η
2
 = 0.01, observed power = .50; or the maths task: F (1, 65) = 2.87, 
p=.10 η
2
 = 0.04, observed power = .39. 
Secondly, we investigated the effect of all the observation conditions on perceived 
task difficulty. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used on the typing data, which were highly 
skewed. One-way ANOVAs with observation condition (proximate observation, 
remote observation or alone) as the independent variable, between-subjects, were run 
on the other dependent variables. There were no significant differences in task 
difficulty by observation condition: typing: H(2) = 2.64, p=.27; control items: F 
(2,97) = .57, p=.57 η
2
 = 0.01, observed power = .14; incongruent colour items: F 
(2,97) = .22, p=.81 η
2








 = 0.03, observed power = .32. Therefore, this hypothesis was not 
supported. 
8.5.  Discussion 
Experiment 5 aimed to discover whether people’s behaviour nonintentionally 
responds in the same way to remote observation (observation one can only be 
affected by via psi) as it responds to proximate observation. In other words, it aimed 
to discover whether remote observation can lead to the social facilitation effect. In 
Experiment 5 all the tasks were simple, as confirmed by the manipulation checks. 
We predicted that observation would facilitate their performance, in terms of both 
speed and accuracy. Participants completed a simple typing task (typing their full 
name and email address), a colour Stroop, and a simple multiplication task under 
either proximate observation, remote observation, or alone conditions. We also 
investigated the possibility of observation increasing participants’ state anxiety, or 
altering their perception of the difficulty of the tasks. The findings for each of these 
areas will be considered in turn. 
Neither proximate observation nor remote observation increased participants’ typing 
speed, even with potentially confounding individual differences controlled for. 
Neither observation influence increased participants’ accuracy on this task either. 
This was unexpected, because in Experiment 4 there was a trend for proximate 
observation to increase the speed of participants typing their name and code, and a 
post-hoc analysis found that the code was significantly facilitated. In Experiment 3, 
also, the code was typed significantly faster when participants were proximately 
observed. The difference in findings could be due to the different tasks used: In 
Experiments 3 and 4 typing an alphanumeric code was facilitated, in Experiment 5 






The typing tasks were based upon name and code tasks that elicited a social 
facilitation effect in previous research (Schmitt et al., 1986), but the experiments 
presented in this thesis failed to replicate the social facilitation effect with these 
tasks. This could be because Schmitt et al.’s findings were spurious. On the other 
hand, social facilitation effects have been found with data entry tasks, which are also 
simple typing tasks. For instance, proximate observation increased the speed (Aiello 
& Kolb, 1995) and accuracy (Aiello & Kolb, 1997) of a data entry task of copying 
strings of six digits. However, no performance effects were found comparing 
proximate observation to being alone on another data entry task (Griffith, 1993). 
Possibly, typing and data entry do not respond reliably to observation. It is also 
possible that there are other factors that affect whether typing responds to 
observation. For instance, Aiello and Kolb (1995) found that the effect of 
observation was mediated by participants’ initial skill level; highly skilled 
participants’ performance was facilitated by observation, and less skilled 
participants’ performance was reduced. Therefore, a wide initial skill mix might 
produce an overall null effect that masks internal social facilitation effects. In 
Experiment 5, we did not check participants’ skill at typing, so it is possible that a 
wide range of initial skill masked an observation effect. Future research with 
performance tasks should take initial skill level into account.  
One reason for using these typing tasks was because they had successfully 
functioned as covert tasks (Schmitt et al., 1986), and this is important in creating a 
true alone condition (Markus, 1978). In Experiment 5, however, 40% of the 
participants suspected that the typing was an experimental task. Therefore, this 
manipulation failed, and this experiment lacked a true alone condition. It follows that 
participants might have felt evaluation apprehension in the alone condition; this is 
another possible explanation for the null results. 
Neither proximate nor remote observation increased participants’ speed of 






controlled for. Neither observation influence increased participants’ accuracy on this 
task either. This was unexpected, as this task had been based on a maths task that 
demonstrated a social facilitation effect in a previous experiment (Grant & Dajee, 
2003). It is possible that differences between the tasks used by Grant and Dajee 
(2003) and those in Experiment 5 led to the difference in outcomes. Grant and 
Dajee’s (2003) maths task had 45 questions, and none of the digits in the 
multiplication tasks were over 10. In Experiment 5 there were 50 questions and the 
digits in the multiplication tasks went up to 12. Although these differences may seem 
minor, there is a possibility that they made the maths task in Experiment 5 more 
difficult than Grant and Dajee’s (2003) task. Participants in Grant and Dajee’s (2003) 
experiment performed their maths task faster when they were observed, in other 
words it behaved as a simple task. Participants in Experiment 5 rated the maths task 
as being just to the easy side of the midpoint when rating task difficulty. Although 
this means that the maths task was easy (as opposed to difficult), there is a possibility 
that it was not easy enough to be facilitated by observation. According to the optimal 
arousal curve (see Chapter 6) there is a region, between tasks that would be 
facilitated and tasks that would be inhibited, in which there is little or no effect from 
observation. Maybe the maths task was in this region. This suggestion comes with 
the caveat that participants’ subjective ratings of task difficulty might not reliably 
indicate the direction in which observation affects task performance. There is also a 
further caveat in that Grant and Dajee (2003) did not take task difficulty ratings, so 
there is no objective basis for comparing task difficulty between these two 
experiments. One previous maths task did not find simple task facilitation from 
observation, although it did find complex task inhibition, of both speed and accuracy 
(Zanbaka et al., 2007). Zanbaka et al. attributed their failure to find simple task 
facilitation to ceiling effects. Ceiling effects are unlikely to be the reason for the null 
effect in Experiment 5, as the maths task was designed to be more difficult than that 
used by Grant and Dajee (2003). It would benefit future research to analyse ratings of 






greater understanding of just how easy, difficult, familiar, or novel tasks need to be 
to manifest facilitation or inhibition from observation.  
There was another difference between Experiment 5 and Grant and Dajee’s (2003) 
experiment that might have affected the results. In Experiment 5 the observer was the 
experimenter, and in Grant and Dajee’s experiment the observer was another 
participant. In both experiments the observer was unfamiliar to the participant. In 
Experiment 5 the observer had expert status, and so should have exerted a greater 
social facilitation effect than the peer observer in Grant and Dajee’s (2003) 
experiment (Guerin, 1993; Henchy & Glass, 1968; F. G. Miller et al., 1979). There is 
prior evidence that experimenters elicit the social facilitation effect when they 
observe (Ekdahl, 1929; Ferris & Rowland, 1980). Therefore, although the observer 
type differed between these two experiments, there was no reason indicated in 
previous literature for the observer in Experiment 5 not to induce a social facilitation 
effect. 
Observation, whether proximate or remote, did not reduce Stroop interference, nor 
did it reduce the number of errors made. Considering firstly the effect on the error 
rates, previous studies have found low error rates (under 5%) (Dumas et al., 2005; 
Klauer et al., 2008), as did Experiment 5. In these previous studies, observation did 
not affect the error rate, which could be due to floor effects because the error rate 
was low. One previous study did find that arousal, induced by the threat of electric 
shocks, affected the error rate (Pallack, Pittman, Heller, & Munson, 1975). Although 
the effect of observation is thought to be mediated by arousal (Zajonc, 1965), the 
threat of electric shocks is likely to exert a stronger arousal-increasing influence than 
observation. Observation is possibly too weak an influence to manifest an effect on 
Stroop error rate.  
Observation has been found to reduce Stroop interference, however, by reducing 






Klauer et al., 2008). Experiment 5 found a Stroop interference effect, but did not find 
any effect from observation, even after controlling for potentially confounding 
individual differences measures. Experiment 5 was closely modelled on the 
experiments cited above, and so was expected to replicate their effects. In 
Experiment 5, the observer stood in the same relative position to the participant (for 
proximate observation) as did the observer in Klauer et al.’s (2008) experiment, and 
this was the most successful of all the observer locations compared by Huguet et al. 
(1999). The Stroop stimuli used, and the method of response (pressing buttons on a 
keyboard), were very similar to those used in previous research that found that 
observation reduced Stroop interference (Huguet et al., 1999; Klauer et al., 2008). 
One possible reason for the failure to replicate an observation effect on Stroop 
interference was the length of practice time given to the participants. Participants in 
Experiment 5 had a 15-trial practice. In comparison, participants in Dumas et al.’s 
(2004; 2005) experiments had a 100-trial practice, and these experiments found 
competition significantly reduced Stroop interference. Possibly as a result of the 
short practice time, participants in Experiment 5 had slightly longer reaction times 
(control and incongruent colour item means were all over one second) in comparison 
to previous studies (most means just under one second) (Dumas et al., 2005; Huguet 
et al., 2004; Huguet et al., 1999; Klauer et al., 2008). This slower reaction time could 
also have resulted from the five-colour choice that participants made in Experiment 
5. Experiment 5 included five colours in the Stroop, instead of four as used 
previously (Dumas et al., 2005; Huguet et al., 2004; Huguet et al., 1999; Klauer et 
al., 2008). These differences could all have contributed to the null findings.  
We also hypothesised that observation, both proximate and remote, would increase 
participants’ state anxiety. This hypothesis was not supported; no significant 
difference in state anxiety was found between the observation conditions. State 
anxiety was measured to capture any effect from observation on participants’ arousal 
during the experiment. Prior research has found that observation causes increases in 






physiological indicators of arousal found that proximate observation increased 
participants’ arousal (Chapman, 1974; Mullen et al., 1997). However, there is more 
evidence that observation increased arousal when participants were performing 
complex tasks (Gendolla & Richter, 2006; Martens, 1969) or in conjunction with 
arousal-increasing stimuli (Rourke, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, & Baron, 1990). 
The null result in Experiment 5 might therefore be because the participants were 
performing simple tasks, not complex tasks. Alternatively, it might be because the 
observation influence in Experiment 5 did not increase arousal, which corroborates 
the null task performance findings discussed so far. If the social facilitation effect is 
mediated by arousal, and arousal was unaffected by observation in this experiment, it 
follows that performance would also be unaffected. The question of why observation 
seemed to exert such a weak effect remains. 
We also investigated whether observation, both proximate and remote, would affect 
participants’ ratings of task difficulty. There were no significant differences between 
the ratings of task difficulty due to observation condition; therefore, this hypothesis 
was not supported. Observation has been found to increase the perceived difficulty of 
complex tasks in one prior social facilitation study (Bradner & Mark, 2001). It is not 
known whether observation would affect the perceived difficulty of simple tasks. 
The null results found here could indicate that observation does not affect 
participants’ perception of simple task difficulty. Alternatively, the null results could 
corroborate the findings relating to task performance and state anxiety: that there was 
no effect from observation in Experiment 5.  
In summary of the findings so far, observation, whether proximate or remote, did not 
increase the speed or accuracy of any of the tasks, increase participants’ state anxiety 
ratings, or alter their perception of the difficulty of the tasks. Perhaps this was 
because the observation influences did not exert any effect on the participants. We 
attempted to check whether the observation condition manipulation had been 






during the experiment. Significantly more participants in the proximate observation 
condition reported awareness of being observed than in either of the physically alone 
conditions. In other words, the proximately observed participants were aware of 
being observed and still this did not significantly affect their behaviour, anxiety, or 
perception of the tasks. Therefore, awareness of observation, in Experiment 5 at 
least, was not a sufficient condition to manifest the social facilitation effect.  
There was no significant difference between the numbers of participants who 
reported awareness of being observed between the remote observation and alone 
conditions. Almost all the participants in the physically alone conditions reported no 
awareness of being observed. This might have been because of the way the question 
was phrased; it specified that observed meant “looked at by a person”. Possibly, 
participants would be less likely to answer yes when there was no other person in the 
room. Therefore, this question was probably an inadequate check for the feeling of 
being remotely observed. The experimenter noticed that many participants checked 
the room for hidden ways of observing them when they read this question (they did 
not find the webcam), so it is likely that they interpreted it as asking whether they 
were observed rather than that they felt observed. It would be important for future 
experiments to check the manipulation of observation more carefully. It is also 
possible that in the confines of a small room with no windows people are unlikely to 
feel observed. If the ability to detect remote observation developed from an 
evolutionary advantage of being able to detect predators’ gaze, it is plausible that this 
ability is usually prompted only in situations where it might seem possible to be seen. 
An alternative explanation for almost no participants being aware of being observed 
in the remote observation condition is that there was no psi-mediated remote 
observation effect in this experiment. In previous research, participants have 
demonstrated that they can consciously detect remote observation at above chance 
rates (e.g., Colwell et al., 2000; Sheldrake, 2000; Williams, 1983), but other studies 






experiments, participants were informed that they would be remotely observed, but 
not when. This is a different influence from that used in Experiment 5, when the 
participants were not informed that they would be remotely observed. Only two 
previous remote observation studies have used remote observation without informing 
the participants. Lobach and Bierman (2004) did not find that participants’ 
physiology differentiated between remote observation and not being observed when 
participants were not informed about the remote observation. Sheldrake (2003) found 
that a higher proportion of people in a crowd turned to look in the direction of 
concealed observers when they were observing them remotely than when they were 
not observing them. Further research is required into people’s ability to detect and 
respond to remote observation when they have not been informed that it will occur, 
but the findings from Experiment 5 do not provide support for either the detection of 
remote observation or the social facilitation effect. 
8.6. Conclusions  
Observation, whether proximate or remote, did not increase the speed or accuracy of 
participants’ performance on simple typing or maths tasks, or reduce Stroop 
interference. Observation also did not increase participants’ state anxiety or alter 
their perception of the difficulty of the tasks. There was no social facilitation effect 
found in Experiment 5. As we did not find a normal social facilitation effect 
(between proximate observation and alone), we could conclude that these tasks did 
not respond to observation influences. Alternatively, we could conclude that the 
observation influences in Experiment 5 were insufficient to produce the social 
facilitation effect, despite the fact that the proximately observed participants were 
aware that they were being observed. This lack of the normal social facilitation effect 
means that the possibility of a social facilitation effect from remote observation was 
not adequately tested in this experiment. If the normal facilitation of simple task 
performance had occurred, then there would have been a baseline from which to 






observation had produced any significant performance facilitation or inhibition 
compared to either of the other observation conditions, unexpected though that 
would have been, it would have shown that there was some effect from remote 
observation. With the null results found we can merely conclude that neither 
proximate observation nor remote observation affected participants’ performance in 











9. General Discussion of Experiments 3, 4, and 5: Psi-
Mediated Social Facilitation from Remote Observation 
This section reviews the findings from Experiments 3, 4, and 5. We start by briefly 
restating the aims of these studies, and comparing similarities and differences across 
the findings of these studies. The null effect of remote observation from a hidden 
observer is interpreted in light of the predominantly null effect from a physically 
present observer. From the limitations discovered in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 we 
discuss how future research might establish the optimal conditions for investigating a 
social facilitation effect from remote observation. We suggest ways forward for 
further investigations into the possibility of psi-mediated social facilitation effects. 
Throughout this general discussion, we also address what implications our findings 
have for the wider literature. 
Considered together, Experiments 3, 4, and 5 aimed to discover whether people’s 
behaviour nonintentionally responds in the same way to remote observation 
(observation they can only be affected by via psi) as it responds to proximate 
observation. In other words, they aimed to discover whether remote observation can 
lead to the social facilitation effect. We hoped that these experiments would add to 
both of the fields of social facilitation and remote observation, and inform 
psychology methodology in general. Many previous social facilitation experiments 
used covert observation to assess performance in the condition they called alone 
(e.g., Markus, 1978; C. F. Bond & Titus, 1983) as if this observation, that the 
participants were not informed of and could not perceive sensorily, would make no 
cogent difference to their behaviour. The experiments reported in this thesis are the 
first to check whether covert observation (as remote observation by hidden 
observers) has any social facilitation effect. Thus, our experiments are the first to test 
whether or not that assumption is justified, and thus make an important contribution 
to the social facilitation literature. Our experiments also advanced the field of 






conscious guess and psychophysiological measures. Only one previous study 
considered the effect of remote observation on task performance (Lee et al., 2002), 
and this study did not take into account the effect of proximate observation on the 
behaviour under investigation. Ours are the first experiments to compare 
corresponding psi- and non-psi-mediated observation influences on behaviour. We 
hoped that the social facilitation effect would become a useful tool with which to 
investigate the effect of remote observation. Lastly, if the presence of, and 
observation by, the experimenter can alter participants’ behaviour, this should be 
taken into consideration in all psychology experimental research designs; however, it 
rarely is (Huguet et al., 1999). If remote observation or attention from the 
experimenter can affect participants’ task performance, then experiments are open to 
many more influences than are usually considered. These influences could help us 
understand the experimenter effect, an important consideration in psychology and 
parapsychology (Palmer, 1997). Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were a preliminary inquiry 
into whether these remote observation effects should be considered in experimental 
designs. 
In Experiment 3, participants completed typing tasks that were presented as being the 
log-in to another experiment, and so should have been covert assessments of 
performance. The participants typed both their first name (simple task) and a code 
(complex task) three times, under different observation conditions each time: alone, 
remotely observed, or proximately observed. We predicted that observation (both 
remote and proximate) would increase the speed of typing the name, and decrease 
the speed of typing the code. The hypothesised interaction between observation and 
complexity was not found. Instead, the speed of typing the code was increased by 
proximate observation.   
Certain limitations in the methodology and apparatus of Experiment 3 were 
identified, and Experiment 4 aimed to overcome these limitations. Experiment 4 






facilitation of simple task performance and inhibition of complex task performance 
from proximate observation compared to being alone. Participants completed typing 
tasks which were presented as being the log-in to another experiment. The 
participants typed both their full name (simple task) and a code (complex task) once, 
under either proximate observation or while alone. Two measures of task 
performance: speed and accuracy, were measured, in conjunction with two further 
indicators of the effect of observation: perceived task difficulty and state anxiety. We 
predicted that proximate observation would increase the speed and accuracy of 
typing the name, and decrease the speed and accuracy of typing the code. We also 
predicted that proximate observation would increase participants’ state anxiety 
ratings, and affect their perception of the difficulty of the tasks.  
None of these hypotheses were supported. The social facilitation effect, the 
interaction between observation and task complexity, was not found using any of 
these measures. Typing the code, however, which we intended to be the complex 
task, was facilitated by observation: Participants typed it faster when proximately 
observed. The code also made some participants suspect that they were being 
assessed on the typing tasks. This was a problem, because the typing tasks were 
supposed to be covert. Covert tasks are important in creating a true alone condition 
(Markus, 1978), which was not achieved in Experiment 4. It is important to create a 
true alone condition to create an influence-free a baseline as possible. The influence 
of remote observation was expected to have a small social facilitation effect. If there 
were any other social facilitation effect-inducing stimuli in the alone condition, the 
chances of finding a social facilitation effect from remote observation would have 
been reduced. The fact that the tasks were not covert compromised the alone 
condition in Experiment 4, as evaluation apprehension, caused by participant’s 
awareness that their performance is being evaluated, can lead to the social facilitation 
effect (Henchy & Glass, 1968). This may have anulled any social facilitation effect 






As we had not found the normal social facilitation effect with the typing tasks, we 
used different tasks in Experiment 5. As the only observation effects we had found in 
Experiments 3 and 4 had been facilitatory (increased speed of typing the code), we 
decided to look for facilitation effects exclusively, and therefore only used simple 
tasks. Participants completed a simple typing task (typing their full name and email 
address), a colour Stroop, and a simple multiplication task under either proximate 
observation, remote observation, or alone conditions. We predicted that observation 
would facilitate task performance, both in terms of speed and accuracy, for the typing 
task and the maths task, and would reduce Stroop interference. We also investigated 
the possibility of observation increasing participants’ state anxiety, and perception of 
the difficulty of the tasks. There were no observation effects found with any of these 
tasks or measures.  
In Experiments 3, 4, and 5, an array of individual differences that might have 
confounded the social facilitation effect were controlled for. These were: 
extraversion, neuroticism, belief in psi, age, gender, and (in Experiment 3 only) state 
anxiety. While belief in psi was an exploratory variable, extraversion, neuroticism, 
and state anxiety were included based upon prior research showing that they interact 
with observation, task complexity, or both (see Chapter 6). In the process of 
controlling for these variables, any main effects or interactions with observation, 
complexity, or both would have emerged. None of the individual differences 
measures had significant main effects (even when considered individually at 
exploratory stages of the analysis), or interactions with observation and/or 
complexity. This could be for the simple reason that there was no social facilitation 
effect in these experiments, and so these variables had nothing to interact with. 
Importantly, controlling for the individual differences measures did not render any of 
the social facilitation effects significant.  
A recent meta-analysis of the social facilitation and personality literature found that 






direction of the effect observation has on performance. Uziel (2007) identified two 
personality types that relate to how one experiences social situations. The first was 
positive-self-assured people, characterised by extraversion and high self-esteem, 
whose task performance is facilitated by observation. The second personality type 
was negative-apprehensive people, characterised by neuroticism and low self-
esteem, whose task performance is inhibited by observation. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 
failed to confirm Uziel’s hypotheses, as there were no significant interactions 
between observation and either extraversion or neuroticism. Again, this might simply 
be because there was a meagre effect from observation in our studies, rather than 
there being no effect of personality on how people react to observation. It is 
important, therefore, for future research into the social facilitation effect to consider 
the role of personality. This could be achieved by controlling for the effects of 
personality, as we did in the experiments presented in this thesis. Alternatively, as 
Uziel found that the personality types interacted with observation, not with 
observation and complexity, future research could focus on the effect of observation 
and personality on performance. This might increase the chances of finding an 
observation effect, and, thereby, increase the chances of finding an effect from 
remote observation, if there is one. Another suggestion for future research, if Uziel’s 
proposals are correct, would be to use experimental samples of either positive-self-
assured or negative-apprehensive participants so that the direction of the effect of 
observation on performance could be predicted.  
One similarity between the findings of Experiments 3 and 4 was that proximate 
observation increased participants’ typing speed on the code. Typing the code was 
originally intended to be a complex task, and we therefore expected that it would be 
slowed by observation (following Schmitt et al., 1986). However, all the evidence 
points to the code having behaved as if it were a simple task: Proximately observed 
participants typed it faster and participants rated it as quite easy. If, post-hoc, we can 
reconceptualise the code as being a simple task, then in both Experiments 3 and 4 






that the speed of typing the code was increased. Experiment 4 did not include a 
remote observation condition, but Experiment 3 did. So, within Experiment 3, we 
can compare participants’ speed of typing the code between alone, remote 
observation, and proximate observation conditions, in a task that demonstrated a 
social facilitation effect. The post-hoc tests conducted revealed that there was no 
significant difference between the alone and remote observation conditions in the 
speed of typing the code. There was, however, a significant difference between alone 
and proximate observation, and a marginally significant difference between remote 
observation and proximate observation in the speed of typing the code. All of these 
analyses are post-hoc, and assess an effect that went the opposite way to the 
hypothesis, so any conclusions drawn can only be tentative. With those caveats, these 
findings indicate that remote observation had a more similar effect to being alone 
than to being proximately observed. In other words, there was no social facilitation 
effect from remote observation.  
This finding is in accordance with the most similar research in the previous literature. 
Lee et al. (2002) compared the number of errors that participants made on a wobbly 
wire task between remote observation and an alone condition. In both conditions a 
camera was present, and participants knew that they might be observed through it at 
any time. No significant difference in the number of errors made on the wobbly wire 
task between remote observation and the alone condition were found. Further 
research which finds the social facilitation effect between a true alone condition and 
a proximate observation condition is required to further explore the effect of remote 
observation on behaviour, and we will return to the types of tasks and observation 
that might be optimal for this after the overview of the experiments. 
In Experiment 5, there were no significant effects from remote observation or 
proximate observation on any of the tasks or dependent measures. The hypothesis 
that there would be a social facilitation effect from remote observation was not 






effect between proximate observation and being alone was also not found. This effect 
was to be the baseline against which the effect of the new condition, remote 
observation, would be conceptually calibrated. The lack of the normal social 
facilitation effect as a baseline means that Experiment 5 did not adequately test for a 
remote observation effect. As the tasks used did not discriminate between 
participants’ performance when alone and when proximately observed, we cannot 
claim that they would have been able to detect an effect from remote observation, if 
there is one. It is commendable that Experiments 3 and 5 included both an alone 
condition and a proximate observation condition as baseline comparators. If, for 
example, Experiment 5 had compared remote observation to proximate observation 
only, we might have concluded that remote observation exerted a similar influence to 
proximate observation. Conversely, if we had compared remote observation to being 
alone only, we might be certain that remote observation exerted no greater effect 
than being alone. The increased complexity in the design and analysis of having 
three observation conditions was justified by avoiding either of these errors. Future 
research into remote observation and social facilitation should therefore continue to 
use both proximate observation and being alone as baseline conditions.  
The failure to replicate the social facilitation effect in our experiments might have 
been due to the tasks we chose. The typing task used in Experiment 5 was designed 
to capitalise on the facilitatory effect found in the code in Experiments 3 and 4. We 
thought that the code might have demonstrated a facilitatory effect while the name 
did not because the code was longer than the name typing task. Hence, an even 
longer task, typing one’s full name and email address, was used in Experiment 5. 
This longer task, however, did not show any observation effects at all. One 
suggestion for future research, based on the findings of these experiments, is 
therefore to continue to use the code typing task, as it was the only task that 
responded to observation. One drawback of the code, however, was that it was 
difficult to present as a covert task. Following Markus (1978) we thought that it 






being physically alone, undertaking a task that would not elicit evaluation 
apprehension, and not being remotely observed while alone. This imposed 
restrictions on the choice of tasks. The tasks had to be presented as if they were not 
assessed experimental tasks, but nonetheless it had to be possible to record 
performance speed and accuracy without the experimenter watching or listening. The 
typing tasks used in Experiments 3 and 4 were selected as they were the only 
example, to our knowledge, of tasks on which speed and accuracy could be 
measured, that were covert, and that had previously shown the social facilitation 
effect (Schmitt et al., 1986), but they might have been non-optimal.  
The majority of social facilitation research has used cognitive tasks, but there is also 
a wealth of previous research into motor tasks (Strauss, 2002). Cognitive tasks, such 
as solving anagrams, would be very difficult to present in such a way that 
participants would not realise that their performance was being assessed, monitored, 
or recorded. Motor tasks, on the other hand, might be easier to present as being an 
incidental part of the experimental set-up. Based on a review of previous research 
findings, Strauss found that certain types of motor tasks are fairly reliably facilitated 
by observers. Motor tasks that require mostly strength or power, rather than co-
ordination, such as running (e.g., Worringham & Messick, 1983) are facilitated by 
proximate observation. One possible task for future research could be to ask 
participants to lower blinds over a window, ostensibly to dim the lights prior to a 
visual perception task, and have the blinds connected to a device that timed their 
speed. 
One cultural change that might make a difference to people’s reactions to remote 
observation is the recent rise in technology that makes covert observation common-
place. We are under constant covert surveillance; video footage is taken of streets, 
shops, and busses. People also choose to communicate via web cams and surround 
themselves with a virtual community via email, blogs, and Facebook. This means 






technologies has ecological validity (Baker, 2005). However, if people are constantly 
exposed to arousal-increasing stimuli the arousal response reduces over time, a 
process called extinction (Pavlov, 1960). It is possible that in modern times people 
would have a lesser arousal response to remote observation than in the early days of 
remote observation detection experiments. Thus, it might be more difficult to detect 
an effect from remote observation that relies on arousal, and hence a social 
facilitation effect from remote observation (if that is mediated by arousal).   
One pattern that occurred over all three experiments was that there was no significant 
difference between the observation conditions, when assessed by the planned 
analyses. This could have been because observation did not exert enough of an 
effect, which could have been due to aspects of the observer. One limitation of these 
three experiments is that they used the same observer. Many of the social facilitation 
studies have two observers, one male, one female, to balance any gender effects, 
(e.g., Dickerson, Mycek, & Zaldivar, 2008; Griffin & Kent, 1998), or used the same 
gender observer as the participant, (e.g., Huguet et al. 1999). Although there were no 
gender effects in our experiment, gender effects frequently occur in psychology, so 
gender-balancing observers is a wise precaution. Another limitation of using the 
same observer throughout is that her personality might not have been optimal for an 
observer. The effect of the observer’s personality on the social facilitation effect has 
not been researched (Guerin, 1993). It is possible that the observers’ characteristics 
play a role in how great an observation influence they exert. Very little investigation 
has been carried out into the characteristics of influential remote observers. However, 
some research suggests that remote observation from an observer who believes in psi 
might have a greater effect than remote observation from an observer who does not 
believe in psi (Wiseman & Schlitz, 1997; Wiseman & Schlitz, 1998). The observer in 
Experiments 3 – 5 did believe in psi, however, so that is not the reason for the null 
results here. One suggestion for future research is to investigate the characteristics of 
observers that affect whether they exert an effect on participants’ performance; then 






One aspect that might affect observers’ social facilitation influence is whether they 
calm or arouse the participants. In the parapsychology literature there were 
psychophysiologically arousing effects found from remote observation (e.g., W. G. 
Braud et al. 1993a (untrained participants); Schlitz & LaBerge, 1997; Wiseman & 
Schlitz, 1997 (Schlitz’s trials)). There were also sometimes calming effects found 
from remote observation (e.g., W. G. Braud et al., 1993a (trained participants); W. G. 
Braud et al. 1993b, Wiseman and Schlitz, 1998 (Schlitz’s trials)). This calming effect 
could be called remote affiliation. A tentative explanation for the remote calming 
effect was the amount of experience and comfort that the observer had with remote 
observation (W. G. Braud et al., 1993a). As the social facilitation effect is thought to 
be mediated by arousal (Moore & Baron, 1983), too much affiliation might, in 
theory, reduce the chances of finding the social facilitation effect. So an optimal 
hidden observer in a social facilitation experiment should increase participants’ 
arousal. Therefore, in the experiments reported in this thesis, the observer attempted 
not to be too friendly with the participants, nor to put them at ease. On the other 
hand, manipulations to increase the arousal inducing effect of the observer were 
avoided. This was because social manipulations, such as behaving in an intimidating 
manner, could have only been applied in the proximate observation condition. To 
maintain comparability of the remote observation and proximate observation 
conditions, the difference between these was restricted to only the presence or 
absence of the observer and any consequences, such as the participants knowing that 
they were observed. However, the observer’s familiarity with observation increased 
over the sequence of experiments. By Experiment 5 she was used to observing, and 
this was the experiment without even a slight observation effect, even though the 
proximately observed participants reported awareness of being observed. Research 
into the calming or arousing aspects of observers is therefore recommended for 
understanding both remote and proximate observation effects.  
One final difference between the remote observation influence used in Experiments 






research, is that our participants were not informed that they would be remotely 
observed. It is possible that not informing the participants may have reduced the 
magnitude of the remote observation influence. Telling people that they are being 
observed can mimic the effect of observation on behaviour (J. L. Cohen & Davis, 
1973). J. L. Cohen and Davis presented participants with a one-way mirror through 
which they were told that people were watching them. There was, in reality, no-one 
watching. Participants practiced solving lexical problems which involved following a 
pattern. For example, finding the word goat in GZOQART follows the pattern of 
reading alternate letters. This trained pattern was deemed the dominant response, and 
finding the word art in GZOQART was deemed the non-dominant response. This 
deception of observation condition significantly affected participants’ performance 
on the lexical problem task: Participants responded with more dominant responses 
when they thought that they were being observed. Likewise, Ganzer (1968) reported 
a social facilitation effect using a deception of observation condition. Participants 
were either misinformed that they were being observed through a one-way mirror, or 
not told that they were being observed. Ganzer used a deception of observation 
condition instead of a genuine observation condition because, in pilot tests, 
misinforming participants that they were being watched had exerted the same social 
facilitation effect as actually being watched through a one-way mirror.  
Telling participants that they are being monitored can also enhance the social 
facilitation effect. For example, Aiello and Svec (1993) compared participants’ 
performance on a complex anagram solving task. All the participants had been 
shown the computer monitoring system with which their performance was observed 
by someone watching their progress onscreen from a remote location. The 
participants who were told that they would be monitored made the most errors, 
participants who had been shown the monitoring system, but neither told that they 
would or would not be monitored made fewer errors. The fewest errors were made 






that they are being observed affects their behaviour in a similar way to genuinely 
observing them. 
In most previous remote observation research participants were informed that they 
would be watched remotely, but not when they would be watched (e.g. Williams, 
1983, W. G. Braud et al. 1993a,b). One study directly compared observee’s 
physiological responses to remote observation with and without telling participants 
that they would be watched (Lobach & Bierman, 2004). Participants’ electrodermal 
activity was measured while they were secretly remotely observed at random 
intervals by a hidden observer. Participants were then informed that they would 
subsequently be observed, and their electrodermal activity was measured throughout 
further remote observation and non-observation trials. There was no significant 
difference in their electrodermal activity between the observation and non-
observation trials, irrespective of whether the participants knew that they might be 
observed. The findings from this experiment were therefore inconclusive. It is 
therefore uncertain whether informing people they might be remotely observed 
affects them any differently from just remotely observing them. Future research 
could compare psychophysiological and behavioural responses to remote observation 
simultaneously, with and without informing participants that they are being watched.  
To increase the ecological validity of research into behavioural responses to remote 
observation, future research could investigate behaviours that have been reported in 
spontaneous remote observation detection experiences. One such behaviour is 
turning to look at the observer (Sheldrake, 2003). Sheldrake and a group of other 
observers, hidden behind a one-way mirror, observed an audience queuing for a 
show at random intervals interspersed with non-observation intervals. A video 
recording of the audience, rated by a judge who was blind to the observation 
manipulations, revealed that more people had turned to look at the hidden observers 
when they were observing than when they were not. This study was not conducted 






to the randomisation methods, and exactly how many people turned round, were not 
reported. However, it is the only previous example of observation that people were 
not informed of affecting their behaviour. Sheldrake suggested, based on many 
reported spontaneous experiences, that people regularly experience looking in 
exactly the direction of a hidden observer. One suggestion for future research 
involves using modern head-mounted eye-tracking devices. These record the 
direction that people look in. Participants could be involved in another task, 
justifying the use of the eye-tracker, and be subject to remote observation at random 
intervals. Their eye movements could then be compared with the direction that the 
observer was watching them from.  
In summary, Experiments 3, 4, and 5 did not find a psi-mediated social facilitation 
effect from remote observation. These experiments also did not find the normal (non-
psi) social facilitation effect. We have interpreted the null findings to mean that the 
remote observation influence was not fully tested by these experiments. However, 
Experiment 3, in which post-hoc tests indicated that the speed of typing the code was 
facilitated by proximate observation, but not remote observation, indicated that 
remote observation has a minimal effect on task performance. Therefore, it might be 
reasonable for covert observation to be used in psychology testing as an equivalent to 
an alone condition, but further testing with paradigms that find the normal social 
facilitation effect are required to uphold this claim. The hidden observers used in 
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 were different from the remote observers that participants 
were informed about in previous remote observation research. Future research 
closely examining the effect of informing participants about remote observers and 
testing behavioural, psychophysiological, and conscious guess measures in tandem 
would ascertain whether social facilitation effects are a viable way to investigate the 











10. Final Summary, Discussion, and Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate ways that human behaviour nonintentionally 
responds to hidden psi information or influences. These psi influences were hidden 
targets or hidden observers. Not only were these hidden psi influences beyond the 
participants’ sensory reach, the participants did not know that they existed. We 
investigated whether participants’ behaviour would respond as if they knew about the 
hidden information or influences. This was based upon models of psi function that 
propose that psi is an unconscious process, but that psi information can come to 
consciousness (Tyrell, 1947). This suggested that the consciously known psi 
information was the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Therefore, measures that respond to both 
conscious and unconscious information, such as behaviour, would be very suitable 
for testing psi. We also based this research on theories, including the PMIR model, 
that suggest that psi operates nonintentionally, and that the function of psi is to alter 
behaviour in line with needs or dispositions, or to aid survival (Broughton, 1988, 
2006a,b; Eisenbud, 1966-67; Stanford, 1974, 1977, 1982, 1990). These theories 
proposed that psi information is able to influence everyone all of the time, 
nonintentionally, and often without awareness. Thus, the nonintentional psi paradigm 
used in these experiments attempted to simulate how psi might function naturally and 
spontaneously in real life. We achieved this experimentally by setting up situations in 
which certain predicted effects from hidden psi information or influences on 
participants’ behavioural responses in psychological tasks could be measured.  
We used two main paradigms to investigate nonintentional behavioural responses to 
psi. In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated the effects of hidden targets on 
participants’ performance on psychological tasks. These experiments also explored 
the effects of a variety of personality characteristics and other individual differences 
on psi performance (extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, state anxiety 
and belief in psi). In Experiments 3 and 5, we investigated the effect of hidden 






remote observation from hidden observers, proximate observation from physically 
present observers, and participants being alone and unobserved. In Chapters 5 and 9 
both of these different paradigms were subjected to thorough discussion, and in this 
chapter we now focus on the common elements of both paradigms. Firstly, we relate 
our findings to the original research question of whether behaviour nonintentionally 
responds to psi. Secondly, we compare our outcomes to the wider literature 
considering nonintentional behavioural responses to psi. We conclude with the key 
findings from the studies in this thesis and their contributions to parapsychology.  
Overall, the empirical findings in this thesis did not provide support for the psi 
hypothesis. However, in Experiment 1 there was an indication of a psi effect in a 
replication of a response bias effect (the tendency for participants’ less frequently 
chosen responses in a task to manifest a higher proportion of psi hits). In Experiment 
1 there was also a significant correlation between participants’ extraversion scores 
and hit rates. Both of these findings will be considered in more detail below. In the 
general discussions in Chapters 5 and 9, we considered whether the predominantly 
null results might have been due to our use of unselected participants with, perhaps, 
too little motivation or experience in psi testing. In Experiments 3 – 5, the null effect 
of remote observation on behaviour was interpreted in light of the null effect of 
proximate observation on behaviour. We argued, therefore, that these studies might 
not have provided a chance for remote observation to manifest a behavioural effect. 
The results of Experiment 3, however, indicated that if there is a social facilitation 
effect from remote observation, it is likely to be very weak. This is a relevant 
finding, given the high prevalence of covert surveillance in general use in modern 
times (Sheldrake, 2001), but it is a tentative finding that requires replication and 
confirmation. On the whole, we did not find support for the hypothesis that human 
behaviour nonintentionally responds to psi.  
This thesis therefore did not support the hypothesis that behaviour nonintentionally 






nonintentional behavioural responses to psi, and for many of the hypotheses in the 
PMIR model. However, some of the previous studies were unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no psi effect (e.g., Stanford & Castello, 1977). Thus, there is 
evidence for and against the psi hypothesis. The studies in this thesis add to this body 
of research findings that do not support the psi hypothesis overall. 
However, some previous research into quite different nonintentional psi paradigms 
has yielded positive results, and we consider those here in relation to our findings 
and note any differences that might explain our null overall effects. For example, a 
series of experiments investigated the effects of one person’s intention on remote 
human or animal behaviour (W. G. Braud & Schlitz, 1991). In all of these 
experiments the influencee (the organism who was influenced) was physically distant 
and sensorially shielded from the sender. The sender attempted to alter aspects of the 
influencee’s behaviour through intention, attention, or imagery. Some of their 
experiments used an automatic behavioural response, involuntary movements 
measured by the swing of a pendulum held in the hand, as the dependent variable. In 
other experiments they investigated the effect of remote influence on muscle tremor; 
the influencee aimed to keep his or her hand as steady as possible, while holding a 
device that recorded any tremors. There were also experiments on animal behaviour; 
senders aimed to alter the orientation and location of fish swimming freely in a tank, 
or the speed of a gerbil running in a wheel. The position of the fish and the speed of 
the gerbil’s wheel were automatically recorded without the need for human 
observation or presence. Three of the behavioural measures demonstrated a 
significant psi effect: the involuntary movement, the swimming fish, and the running 
gerbil. Muscle tremor did not show a significant effect. W. G. Braud and Schlitz 
noted that muscle tremor was the behaviour that was most amenable to conscious 
control.  
It is possible that more automatic, unconscious behaviours are better at capturing psi 






much under the participants’ conscious or voluntary control. This suggestion is 
corroborated by the relative success of nonintentional psi tasks that used affective 
judgement tasks (e.g., Luke, Roe et al. 2008; Luke, Delanoy et al., 2008), which 
respond to unconscious information (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Merikle & 
Daneman, 1998). However, null results were also found in similar affective 
judgement tasks (Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000; Watt & Ravenscroft, 2000), so it is by no 
means certain that automatic behaviours would capture psi effects better; 
nevertheless, it might be a fruitful avenue for future exploration. To assess whether 
behaviour is automatic, four aspects should be considered. These are whether one 
acts: intentionally, with awareness, with voluntary control, and efficiently, in terms 
of mental resources (Bargh, 1994). According to those criteria none of the tasks used 
in Experiments 1 – 5 were fully automatic; although, according to Kihlstrom’s 
(1987) definition of unconscious, the simple task of typing one’s name would be. It 
is possible that future experimentation would benefit from considering the 
automaticity of tasks for psi testing. Tasks that have become automatic are also likely 
to have correct dominant responses, and therefore count as simple tasks in social 
facilitation terminology (Zajonc, 1980). Therefore, automatic tasks show promise for 
future nonintentional psi tasks in general, and those that use social facilitation as the 
behavioural response.  
In the theories of nonintentional psi explained above, one key aspect was that psi led 
to behaviour that served one’s needs or was in line with one’s dispositions (e.g., 
Stanford, 1990). We considered in Chapter 4 whether adequate motivation was 
present in Experiments 1 and 2 to induce a need for participants to score in line with 
their hidden targets. In Experiments 3 - 5, no motivational incentive was created, but 
instead participants were expected to respond to the psi influence (remote 
observation) as they would to the non-psi influence (proximate observation). This 
expectation was in line with Stanford’s hypotheses: firstly that people would respond 
to psi-mediated information about situations if they would respond to the same 






would experience changes in arousal in response to extrasensory situations. Thus, we 
argued that if there was a social facilitation effect from proximate observation, there 
would also be a social facilitation effect from remote observation. As noted above, 
these hypotheses were not supported.  
It is therefore worth considering whether psi possibly serves “stronger” needs. 
Broughton’s evolutionary theory of psi stated that the function of psi is to bias 
behaviour to aid survival. Whilst it would be unethical to put human participants in 
life-threatening situations for psychology experiments, some research with animals 
has investigated just this. Morris (1977) reviewed evidence considering whether fish 
behave differently immediately prior to being caught in a net and taken out of the 
water than fish that were not about to be caught. There was evidence that the fish 
randomly selected to be removed were more active just prior to being caught. 
Increased activity might convey an advantage if survival depended upon escape. 
However, Morris noted that much of this evidence was from pilot studies, which 
were not optimally controlled. The question of whether psi serves needs, and, if so, 
which needs, is still open to debate.   
We now consider the key findings from this thesis, which were both from 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 there was a replication of a response bias effect. This 
is the tendency for higher psi hit rates in participants’ less frequently chosen answers. 
The response bias effect has been found in both intentional psi tasks (Stanford, 1967, 
1973) and nonintentional psi tasks (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1972; Stanford, 1970; 
Wilson, 2002a, 2004). In most of the previous research, the less frequently and more 
frequently chosen answers were ascertained at group level, and may therefore not 
have applied equally to all of the participants. In Experiment 1, we extended the 
response bias effect research by considering preferences at the individual level. Our 
replication of the response bias effect adds to the claim that there is a psi effect 
relating to how often a target is chosen. This sheds light on the kind of situations in 






habit or non-psi information points the other way. In other words, a psi effect might 
manifest most in participants’ non-dominant responses. This might conflict with the 
expected social facilitation effect, that dominant responses are increased by 
observation or presence (Zajonc, 1965). If, for example, a sender could elicit a social 
facilitation effect, that would increase dominant responses. If psi manifests in the less 
dominant responses, it is debatable whether a sender would increase or decrease a psi 
effect overall. Also, Stanford and Stio (1976) found support for their hypothesis that 
psi targets would be more effective in facilitating than inhibiting participants’ 
dominant responses. Thus, these social and psi influences might combine in many 
ways, and further investigation of this is a potenial avenue for future research. 
In Experiment 1 there was also a significant positive correlation between psi hit rate 
and extraversion. This is a key finding for two reasons. Firstly, it is, to our 
knowledge, the first investigation of the role of extraversion in a nonintentional psi 
task. Secondly, the relationship between psi and extraversion in forced-choice tests 
has been debated. It is still a controversial area owing to a potential artefact Honorton 
et al. (1998) mooted, of measuring extraversion after participants know their psi 
scores (Honorton et al., 1998; Krishna & Rao, 1991; Palmer & Carpenter, 1998). 
Experiment 1 provided support for this relationship without any risk of this artefact.  
To conclude, this thesis investigated nonintentional psi with novel experimental 
tasks. If psi is predominantly a nonintentional process, then nonintentional psi 
experiments are more relevant than the traditional intentional psi tasks. 
Nonintentional psi is also comparatively under-researched compared to conscious 
guess and psychophysiological paradigms in parapsychology. The experiments 
reported in this thesis contributed an investigation of a novel nonintentional psi task: 
line-length judgements, and a conceptual replication of a nonintentional effect on 
timing. The effect of personality variables on psi performance is an important area to 
investigate to understand how psi might work, and it is also under-researched in 






investigation of nonintentional psi and several individual differences and personality 
variables.  
This thesis also asked the original question: Is there a social facilitation effect from 
remote observation? The investigation of this extended both the fields of social 
facilitation and remote observation detection. There are very few studies that have 
investigated a behavioural response to remote observation, and this is the first to 
consider the effect of normal (proximate) observation in comparison to the effect of 
remote (psi-mediated) observation. One previous remote observation experiment 
used a performance task as a dependent variable (Lee et al., 2002), but did not 
consider the social facilitation effect. This thesis, therefore, represents a valuable 
conceptual development in the field of remote observation research. There have been 
many studies investigating social facilitation that used remote observation in the 
alone condition (e.g., Markus, 1978). This was on the grounds that remote 
observation would have no effect on the participants’ task performance, an 
assumption unchallenged within the field of social facilitation. Our experiments are 
the first thorough investigation, with tried and tested performance tasks, of whether 
remote observation is measurably different from being alone. The prediction was that 
the social facilitation effect would be replicated, and that remote observation would 
exert a similar effect to proximate observation. The results did not support these 
predictions, but represent the first step in investigating this new paradigm. These 
experiments presented in the thesis provide a baseline for future research to build on. 
Therefore, this thesis contributed theoretical and experimental developments to the 
parapsychological and psychological literature. The question of whether psi can 
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12.2. Appendix 2: The Maths Task 
START THE STOPWATCH 
 
1) 12 x 1 =     26) 12 x 12 =   
2) 4 x 9 =     27) 5 x 9 =   
3) 7 x 7 =     28) 0 x 10 =   
4) 1 x 1 =     29) 8 x 11 =   
5) 6 x 4 =     30) 9 x 9 =   
6) 3 x 3 =     31) 10 x 2 =   
7) 3 x 8 =     32) 4 x 10 =   
8) 0 x 11 =     33) 6 x 6 =   
9) 6 x 1 =     34) 8 x 11 =   
10) 5 x 12 =     35) 9 x 7 =   
11) 10 x 8 =     36) 11 x 5 =   
12) 9 x 6 =     37) 1 x 11 =   
13) 12 x 9 =     38) 3 x 7 =   
14) 8 x 5 =     39) 8 x 8 =   
15) 3 x 9 =     40) 1 x 9 =   
16) 8 x 6 =     41) 11 x 11 =   
17) 11 x 12 =     42) 9 x 2 =   
18) 6 x 5 =     43) 10 x 7 =   
19) 12 x 2 =     44) 4 x 2 =   
20) 7 x 6 =     45) 5 x 7 =   
21) 5 x 5 =     46) 12 x 4 =   
22) 1 x 8 =     47) 5 x 2 =   
23) 8 x 4 =     48) 7 x 12 =   
24) 11 x 6 =     49) 3 x 2 =   
25) 7 x 8 =     50) 11 x 3 =   
        
      STOP THE STOPWATCH 
 
TIME (minutes, seconds and fractions of seconds): ____________________ 


































12.4. Appendix 4: Post-experimental Questionnaire from 










































12.5. Appendix 5: Stroop Practice items 
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